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i 
Preface 
 
Being educated as a “main stream” economist, this project has been an 
exploration into areas of contemporary social and economic theories which 
to me at the outset represented a somewhat foggy world of ideas. It started 
off with an interest in understanding some peculiar changes in property 
rights and behaviors within public sector electricity companies in the wake 
of the market reform. These appeared to take place simply through re-
interpretations of what the public company “really was”. So what is a public 
sector company actually? Why do some of them all of a sudden behave as if 
they were something else - like private capital owned enterprises? And why 
is it that their employees engage in “educating” their owners to behave as if 
they were? What if there had been a completely different reform – would 
they then have understood the character of their own activity in very 
different ways and behaved accordingly? How can we explain this type of an 
economic change process? These early questions brought me into additional 
questions and to the need for an appropriate analytical framing. 
Initially, I thought that the area of evolutionary and neo-institutional 
economics would probably put me on the right track, and worked 
extensively on forcing various of its ideas onto my empirical observations. It 
run into what appeared to me to be a dead end though, as the explanatory 
modes of the theory pointed in quite unreasonable directions as compared to 
my observations. I then turned to the area of neo-institutional organization 
theory for help, which certainly represented a more promising route. But, 
being an area primarily oriented towards the understanding of organizations, 
I soon run into the problem that it had little to say about the role of the state 
in the economy or the role of economics as a scientific discipline in 
economic change, both of which seemed to be important points of departure.  
At Stanford University I was lucky to get introduced to the more recent work 
of Mark Granovetter and his colleagues on their “social construction of the 
economy” project, which focused on the “social construction of the 
American electricity industry” from the perspective of network theory. I then 
did some extensive journeys into the sociological tradition in economics. An 
apparent problem however, was the still rather limited roles for states and 
such a thing as economic science in Granovetter’s theories. This seemed to 
follow from the strong emphasis on the role of interpersonal networks rather 
than networks identified by their specific content and meaning. To explore 
the problem with the state, I investigated further into the tradition of 
economic sociologists like Katzenstein and Gerschenkron as well as the 
more recent “Bringing the state back in” comparative institutional tradition 
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represented for instance by Peter Evans and Theda Skocpol, which carries 
substantially on a “power of the state” theory provided by Michael Mann. 
After substantial efforts to apply these theories to my problems, I also felt 
that I was into much of a dead end. The theory - despite the explicit 
objective of it – appeared to be unable to “capture” the problem of radical 
change. The problem seemed to be that the theory started out with basic and 
stable categories of state institutions and state-civil society relationships. 
Even though their work provided very interesting empirical stories about 
state-market change processes, of how they were enforced by actors, 
technologies, educational institutions and state bureaucrats, etc., the 
constraints of the structural and static institutional concepts applied seemed 
to prevent them from developing a theory which reflect the dynamics and the 
causal forces of state-market transformation processes. – leaving us simply 
with different institutional structures and capabilities as theoretical building 
blocks.  
Then, at a course in social constructivism at the Copenhagen Business 
School which I attained with the purpose of exploring further into 
Granovetter’s approach, I also got introduced to the sociology of science and 
technology tradition and their actor-network analytical concepts. These, I 
found, corresponded more closely to what I was in search for; a theory with 
general and flexible analytical concepts by which to analyze change-making 
processes driven by program-specific actor-networks of a very general type, 
rather than by interpersonal networks as advocated by Granovetter. But, the 
concepts where highly abstract, expressed in the language of philosophy- 
and sociology of science, and were applied within quite different areas of 
science than economies and markets. They also in important respects broke 
away from the paradigmatic concepts within economic thought that I had 
become aware of. Would it be possible to translate some of these concepts 
into analysis of economic reforms?  
Then, at a conference about institutional economics in early 1998, I came to 
learn that scientists within the more classical institutional school of 
economics were working on somewhat similar theoretical approaches. This 
led to another theoretical journey to discover a bit of a perhaps fragmented 
area of economic science, but which offered some highly interesting 
contributions to a dynamic economic theory, which also addressed the role 
of economics itself in the shaping of economic systems and economic 
behaviors. In the end, I found important contributions within both new 
economic sociology and (traditional) institutional economics which provided 
me with important points of departure from where to align concepts taken 
from the sociology of science and technology to a theory about market-
making activities. 
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Coming close to an end, I also learn that scientists associated with the 
science study tradition have recently started expanding their field of science 
to include economic issues such as markets in ways which resemble quite a 
few striking similarities with my own work. In his latest book “The Laws of 
the Market (1999), Michel Callon relates to and builds on work within both 
new economic sociology and (traditional) institutional economics which in 
part also are discussed in this thesis. In the uncertain world of academic 
controversy – in particular related to efforts which break away from well 
established paradigms, I feel confident to note that my trust in the fertility of 
an integration between new economic sociology, (traditional) institutional 
economics and the new area of “economic innovation theory” based on 
flexible and general analytical concepts, is shared not only by the sociology 
of science tradition, but apparently also by a few outstanding members of the 
two economic scientific communities. Finally, I am also pleased to note that 
this permits me also to return rather safely to the area of main stream 
economics – on the basis of a different understanding of what this area or 
science is about.  
Even though the many shifting framings and theoretical approaches have 
been somewhat hazardous from a project management perspective, I feel that 
it has been truly driven by scientific curiosity and an insistence on testing the 
capacity of the various approaches to deal with the analytical problems at 
hand. In retrospect however, one must probably conclude by citing Winston 
Churchill’s famous statement: “This is not the end. This is not even the 
beginning of the end. But it might be that this is the end of the beginning”. 
Potential contributions from areas like sociology of science and technology 
to economics has probably only been scratched upon by this piece of work. 
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 1 
Summary 
The topic of this thesis is the shaping of modern economies, represented by a 
case-study of the Norwegian electricity market reform process. The essential 
questions raised are: “Why are industries and economies organized the way 
they are?” and “Why and how do they occasionally experience fairly radical 
transformations during which we come to see their organizational structures 
and associated behaviors in entirely different ways?” To answer these 
questions, the author has followed a radical “market-making” economic 
reform process through its many projects, processes and rivalries, from its 
roots in specific historical controversies through its major breakthrough and 
into a stabilized new economic system. 
A major argument through out the analysis is that economics as a scientific 
activity and -community plays a particularly important role in the re-shaping 
of economic systems. Large scale economic reforms are found to be 
dependent upon scientific and political powers and legitimacy which results 
from broad consensus within the relevant scientific communities. In order to 
make his point, the author presents and discusses various historical economic 
reform initiatives both within the Norwegian electricity sector, within other 
sectors of the economy and in other countries. He also presents elements of a 
broad process of reorientation within economics during the 1970s and 
follows these new conceptions up to the electricity market reform process in 
the late 1980s.  
The analysis tries to explain why Norway became a hotbed for market 
reform of the technically integrated and institutionally complex and locked-
in electricity system, but also tries to extract medium range insights about 
economic reform processes and to discuss more general implications for 
other large scale economic reform projects as well as for economic theories 
about economic change - through a rethinking of some of the basics in 
economic thought. 
The thesis is separated into four parts. The first part discusses the theoretical, 
analytical and methodological approach, which mainly draws from 
contributions within Sociology of Science and Technology (the Actor-
Network approach) and from Economic Sociology (social network theory). 
Other lines of thought are also touched upon, like different traditions within 
institutional theory and institutional economics. Even though issues within 
main stream economics are also discussed in brief, this scientific tradition 
here mainly serves as an empirical area of investigation.  
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The second part of the thesis presents the historical background of the 
Norwegian electricity sector in broad – drawing lines back to the early 
establishing of the Norwegian electricity system and passing though 
important formative processes and reform attempts which came to establish 
vital directions and constraints on the later market reform.  
In part three, the emergence of the market reform is triangulated through 
analysis with distinctly different focuses. One concentrates on the immediate 
controversies and rival reform programs within the sector in between 1965 
and 1985. Another takes its departure from the reorientation among leading 
economists internationally in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and follows 
their new economic concepts, models and arguments back to Norway, 
through various economic and public sector reforms in between 1977 and 
1986. The third perspective is obtained from a focus on the SAF research 
institution in Bergen, where the market reform program gradually got 
established through the carrying out of various research projects regarding 
the functioning of the electricity system. Finally, there is a focussed 
discussion of the various attempts at modernizing the Norwegian state 
administration and the role of the state in the economy during the second 
half of the 1980s, by shifting governments and in particular by actors within 
the state administration with the responsibility to help shaping and carrying 
out these political-economic ambitions. The linking together of these 
processes is demonstrated to represent the crossroad where the electricity 
market reform got mobilized as a political and economic reform initiative. 
 The fourth and final part analyses the market reform process itself, with a 
focus on the research projects and reports conducted by the SAF research 
institution, and on some of the discussions within the economics community 
regarding the market reform approach. It also analyses the content of the 
reform and the strategic relationship between the reform program and rival 
reform programs at the time. From there, the actual political breakthrough 
for the market reform process is presented and discussed, before the author 
goes on to discuss the actual process of expansion and stabilization of the 
reform program through a flow of regulatory initiatives and scientific 
constructions in the aftermath of the new legislation. 
Finally, there is a summary which also discusses the major empirical and 
theoretical findings. 
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1 Introduction and outline of study 
The point of departure for this piece of work is the question: Why are 
industries and economies organized the way they are? And secondly: Why 
and how do they occasionally experience fairly radical transformations 
during which we come to see the rationality of their organizational structures 
and associated behaviors in entirely different ways? What we tend to see as 
rational, natural and as quite simply a self-evident order of things, apparently 
varies substantially both across cultures and over time. When looking back 
at the many examples of radical economic reforms in the 1980s and –90s 
typically depicted by words such as ”de-regulation”, ”market reform” or 
”globalization”, it becomes apparent that these many changes are interrelated 
in some way which has to do with why and how they take on some specific 
dominant form rather than some other. 
Different types of answers and explanations about such changes come from 
different corners of the social sciences as well as through media, politicians, 
experts of various types or from wide-spread commonsensical reason among 
practitioners in the various industries affected. For instance, the explanation 
about a radical reform process may take either of the two extreme positions 
that the given change was inevitable, or that it was an outcome of chance 
events – of pure luck. The latter position indicates that if events somehow 
had been slightly different at some crucial point during the change process, 
the outcome would have been all together very different. The first type of 
argument, may either result from a conception of economic and industrial 
shape and change as being determined by ”economic laws”, ”choices by 
completely rational economic man”, ”the survival of the most efficient 
industrial form” or other underlying inherent characteristics of nature, 
society or the economy. It may also result from assumed inherent features of 
new or changed technologies like information and communication 
technologies, or it may be said to result from specific historical 
circumstances and events which is said to have caused the later outcome in 
some deterministic sense.  
Even though determinism - or mechanical and structural-functional types of 
arguments - within the social sciences are increasingly being rejected across 
fields of research which involves also human volition in action1, it can 
hardly be denied that given shapes of economies and industries, institutions, 
                                           
1 See for instance the argument of Daniel Bromley about mechanical and final cause 
arguments (1998), Thorstein Veblen’s critique of classical economics (1898) and Mark 
Granovetter’s discussion of functionalism in economic theorizing (1985). 
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new technologies and historical circumstances and events are still important 
to viable explanations. Neither can it be rejected that such a thing as an 
accidental event may severely alter the outcome of a change process, even 
though one may obviously hold that such an event alone would by far be a 
sufficient account of the constitution of the outcome. The theoretical 
problem central to efforts in more recent studies of industrial and economic 
shape and change, has been to identify the adequate framing of the 
explanatory approach, while rejecting conjectures associated with whatever 
is the more rational, the more functional or natural, or the self-evident order 
and character of things.  
A number of these efforts may – despite dissimilarities - be grouped into an 
emerging area of science we may denote sociology of industries and 
economies2. These are all concerned with explaining why and how specific 
industries and economies obtain their shape and why and how they may 
radically change. In broad terms, the various approaches seem to share the 
basic understanding that industries and economies are embedded in social 
systems, in political systems, in legislation, in technologies, in scientific 
activities and in culture in the very broad sense, which will have to be 
accounted for in appropriate ways. For instance contributions within 
economic sociology explain how massive shifts towards corporate 
diversification in the US resulted from efforts to expand companies under 
conditions of tight anti-trust legislation. Alfred Chandler’s argument about 
the assumed ”superior efficiency of the M-form” as an explanation for this 
wide spread practice and apparent success, thereby became re-addressed and 
handed over to the interaction of industries with politics and the legislative 
system – to the processes and controversies during which the M-form shape 
became produced3. Others emphasize the importance of social 
(interpersonal) networks in the shaping of industries4. The more general 
view that there are many different types of embeddedness which somehow 
have to be dealt with on a non-discriminate basis, is represented for instance 
by S. Zukin and P. DiMaggio (1990), by Viviana A. Zelizer (1988) and by 
                                           
2 The concept of “sociology of industries and economies”, refers to Mark Granovetter’s 
outline of a research program for economic sociology (1990) 
3 For a discussion of the argument, see Robert Freeland, 1996 
4 See for instance Mark Granovetter (1985), Patrick McGuire, Mark Granovetter and Michael 
Schwartz (1993), Thomas Hughes (1983) and John L Campbell, J. Rogers Hollingsworth 
and Leon N. Lindberg (1991) 
 7 
Neil Fligstein (1993)5. Institutionalists within studies of organizations and 
industrial fields emphasize both the coercive, the normative and the 
(collective) cognitive sources of their structuring and their perceived 
rationality6. The tradition has been particularly concerned with the 
adaptation of new organizational forms, and more recently with broad waves 
of industrial and economic change analyzed by concepts such as 
“translation” and “fashion”7. There is also an extensive literature on the role 
of intra-organizational relationships in the development of and the 
configuration of industries8. 
The ambition of this study is to participate in and to contribute to these 
renewed efforts at investigating into why and how industries and economies 
obtain their particular shape and change the way they do, but by following a 
somewhat different approach than those indicated above. While sharing 
many of their viewpoints and their criticism of more traditional approaches, 
the ambition here is also to incorporate the very explanation- and rationality-
making activity into the empirical field which is to be investigated - on the 
ground that rationalizations, explanations and framing constitute important 
elements of the actual shaping and change-making of industries and 
economies. That is, concepts and explanations about how and why 
something ought to be shaped or changed in particular ways cannot be 
treated as merely a separated academic exercise. Rather, it is part of 
industries and economies in their established forms as well as of their re-
making into new forms. To capture this phenomenon, the study draws 
primarily on analytical concepts and research strategies developed within 
sociology (anthropology) of science and technology9, which is commonly 
denoted the ”actor-network approach”. The tradition is largely associated 
with three of its founders; Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law10. 
There are several other reasons for this choice of approach as well: 
                                           
5 A particularly interesting and influential analysis is found in Neil Fligstein’s “The 
Transformation of Corporate Control” 1993 
6 See for instance Richard W. Scott  (1995)  
7 A good example is Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevón (1996) 
8 For an outline of the approach, see Bjørn Axelsson and Geoffrey Easton (1992)  
9 Concepts will be presented in chapter 2. 
10 See for instance M. Callon & B. Latour, 1981, M. Callon & J. Law, 1997, B. Latour, 1987, 
1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 
 8 
First, because their methodological approach surpasses the problem of 
agency versus structure as well as the problem of individual intentionality 
versus collective institutions (norms, rules, etc.) as the  categories which 
make up the alternative primitives of the story one can tell, which has caused 
so much controversy within the social sciences – seemingly without having 
reached conclusive results11. Rather, what the actor-network approach 
obtains, are basic categories of stories about innovations and making of 
society projects, which starts out from the activity of concept-making, 
framing, networking, configuration and persuasion related to some purpose, 
vision or scenario of the future. One thereby avoids taking anything for 
given in an a-historical sense, and may reduce the analytical approach to the 
construction of analytical devices of a minimalist and general type which 
may be flexibly used for empirical inquiries into the actual sense-making, 
shaping and change-making of industries and economies - into the making of 
society in the making12. To describe those entities - or basic categories - that 
are engaged in these activities, I will use the concept of an entrepreneurial 
collective, emphasizing the innovative character of such activities as well as 
the understanding of the acting entities as extending beyond what can 
reasonably be described by reference to certain individuals alone13. 
Second, another advantage of the actor-network methodology and research 
strategy is that it provides both useful framing and analytical tools to 
investigate into the making of irrefutable structures, inevitable changes and 
perceived natural, rational or efficiency superior structures and practices. By 
clearly separating the change-making from the outcome, it extends the 
methodological capacity to ”operate” the change-making and stabilizing 
phenomenon by the researcher as compared to rival approaches that I am 
aware of. It focuses the phenomenon of stabilization of “new systems” 
through their linkages to whatever has been attached to them in order to 
support their existence and their shape. Hence, to explain a particular stable 
outcome necessitates an account of how it came into being, of how various 
heterogeneous stabilizing elements became shaped and put into place so as 
to make the new order became inevitable, rational, natural, efficient, true or 
the like. The approach also adhere to the symmetry-principle initially put 
forward by David Bloor (1976), which demands that successes and failures, 
                                           
11 See for instance discussion by Giovanni Dosi (1995) 
12 For an elaborated discussion of this point, see Bruno Latour (1999) 
13 The concept of an entrepreneurial collective is shaped on the basis of actor-network 
concepts, and may be seen as a synonym for specific categories av actor-networks. 
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efficient and in-efficient arrangements, true and false statements etc. be 
explained by the same causes. When explaining why something became a 
success, we also should be able to explain by the same type of concepts and 
arguments, why something else which was also in the making, did not 
become a stabilized success. 
The third rationale for applying the actor-network approach, is that it offers 
attractive tools to investigate into the de-locking of whatever has become 
locked-in14. Whatever arguments for the existence of lock-ins and path 
dependencies applied – ranging from the economic increasing returns 
argument to holistic accounts and power arguments, a pressing theoretical 
challenge is to explain in the presence of path dependencies, how rapid de-
locking and revolutionary change may occur. From the actor-network 
perspective, de-locking can be re-interpreted as a de-stabilizing activity by 
means of breaking apart the stabilizing capability of elements which hold 
locked-in phenomena in place. The outcome of a making of an industry- or 
an economy process, is accordingly just as much about destabilization of 
rival stabilized or “in the making” systems, as it is about stabilizing a 
particular alternative. 
These are the major reasons for my choice of research strategy and 
methodology for the study of an instance of radical industrial and economic 
change. The case under investigation is the Norwegian electricity market 
reform formally established through a new legislation in 1990. Traditionally, 
the actor-network approach has focussed much of its attention on the role of 
technology in industrial transformations. While there are certainly important 
aspects of the electricity market reform which deserves a careful 
investigation into new technologies prevailing in the industry, the main 
focus of attention is rather attracted by a specific area of science, namely 
what is commonly referred to as ”main stream economics”. A striking 
observation in the aftermath of the market reform, is that economic agencies 
and economic man as these are described in economic theory with reference 
to analytical assumptions about rational economic structures and behaviors, 
appear to have emerged as real life phenomena. Where economists had 
previously typically criticized the sector for its ”irrational” organizations, 
structures and economic behaviors, new structures and behaviors are largely 
being approved by economists. Also the identification of a major 
                                           
14 The typical references to lock-ins and path dependency are Paul A. David (1986), Brian W. 
Arthur (1989) and Paul A. David and J. Bunn (1987), but the concepts of lock-ins and  path 
dependency in more or less different implicit forms, are widely spread in many of the 
research traditions mentioned above. See also Dosi (1995) for a discussion of the problem 
of de-locking. 
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entrepreneurial collective engaged in the making of the market reform with a 
particular economic research institution, calls into focus the role of main 
stream economics as both a scientific activity, a scientific community and an 
area of knowledge, in the shaping of industries and economies. The possibly 
most interesting contribution of this study to a sociology of industries and 
economies, may therefore be associated with a branch of it which we may 
call ”sociology of economics”. This area of investigation appears to be 
vastly underinvestigated. An interesting contribution has recently been 
presented by Michel Callon (1998), where he offers an analysis of the role of 
economics in shaping calculative economic behaviors and the role of 
conceptual framing in conjunction with economic technologies in solving the 
essential problem of radical uncertainty facing economic decision-makers.  
 
 
1.1 Perspectives on the Norwegian electricity market  
reform   
The case itself offers a number of additional points of departure for this 
study, which has to do with the broader transformation of the electricity 
industry and the economy towards “de-regulation”, “competitive markets” 
and “globalization”, in which we may see the electricity market reform as a 
specific representation. This offers the opportunity to extract insights from 
the study that are possibly relevant to industrial and economic “change-
makers” involved in industrial and economic change projects. Hopefully 
being equipped with a toolbox of useful analytical concepts, my research 
strategy is to apply them to my empirical investigation in order to describe 
and link sequences of events and networks of actors in such a way as to be 
able to extract such insights in the form of middle range theories about 
transformations of economic systems in modern societies. Even though 
relatively modest, there is accordingly also an instrumentalist ambition 
attached to the study. 
In June 1990 the Norwegian parliament approved a new energy law which 
came to represent the breakthrough for a radical change process in which 
what had been commonly perceived of as a corporate, mixed hierarchical 
and cooperative public electricity sector became turned into a competitive 
market system. The new law was implemented from January 1st 1991. For 
decades we had seen the electricity sector as a technically integrated natural 
monopoly, a public sector not-for-profit infrastructure system for the supply 
of a basic low priced welfare good to the population, to businesses, and 
especially the supply of cheap input to large scale energy intensive 
industries. All of a sudden, it became something different. Its very identity 
apparently changed.  
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The new legislation was followed by a multiplicity of rapid changes within 
the sector in terms of new regulatory systems, rapid expansion of organized 
trade in standardized electricity contracts, restructuring of electricity 
companies as well as of industrial structures, redistribution of governance 
roles, reinterpretations of property rights, new types of actors, expansion of 
international electricity trade etc. To those familiar with the apparent 
rigidities of the sector during its previous history, the unwillingness to 
change experienced by those who had been working hard to restructure the 
fragmented sector for more than 30 years, those who had been engaged in 
overturning the deadlocks forced by the power intensive industries on the 
issues of electricity pricing practices and energy exports; to all of those, 
changes were stunning – a complete and unexpected revolution. Despite 
incidents of severe real-life tests, the new system appears to be stable and in 
part enthusiastically embraced by many practitioners both among regulators 
and market actors. 
During 1995/1996, Finland and Sweden also deregulated their electricity 
markets – largely in line with the Norwegian model – and joined the 
Norwegian Power Pool system. Since then, we talk about a Nordic model for 
electricity market deregulation rather than a Norwegian one; the world’s first 
transnational open competitive market for electricity trade. Through cables 
to Denmark and Poland, these countries are also trading in this market, and 
with planned cables to Germany and the Netherlands, more and also larger 
national electricity systems are being connected. From its immediate origins 
in the 1990 Norwegian electricity reform, we are seemingly watching a 
stepwise unification and transformation of national electricity systems in a 
movement from the north towards central Europe. 
The Nordic model seems to have become rather popular by transnational 
policy institutions like the OECD and the European Commission as a both 
normative and pragmatic alternative to the British electricity market reform 
which was carried out in 1989 by the Thatcher government. The British and 
the Norwegian reform concepts were indeed very different. From a quick 
gaze, major differences can be traced back for instance to their very different 
starting points in the British nationalized system and the Norwegian fairly 
fragmented corporate system, to the different energy resource bases in the 
two systems and to the differences of the political regimes under which they 
came to remake their systems. The most eye-catching difference in reform 
approach was between the privatization or state sell-out approach of the 
British reform as opposed to the complete absence of privatization but more 
rapid and perhaps also more complete transformation to competitive market 
trade in the Norwegian case (Midttun, et al., 1997, Midttun & Thomas, 
1998).  
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The EU Commission in the wake of the British and the Norwegian reforms 
pushed hard to achieve electricity market deregulation of the entire EU 
electricity sector, and presented several directives about third party access, 
common carrier principles and transparency of national tariffs etc. These 
initiatives met substantial opposition from France, but also from other 
nations and their electricity industries, and the controversy ended in a EU 
compromise in 1995 which opened for a restricted transnational trade 
between generators and large scale consumers. Initiatives for further 
electricity market deregulation thereby shifted to individual member states. 
Following Sweden and Finland, initiatives have been taken lately by both the 
Danes15, the Dutch and the Spanish on the issue of general reforms. Various 
initiatives have also been taken in Germany. With the new social 
democratic/green federal government, uncertainty over where to go appears 
to be considerable, but through the introduction of trade exchanges and a 
stepwise increase in electricity trade across traditional supply monopolies, a 
market system also appears to be on its way in Germany. The result of all 
this has been that the EU process has regained momentum and that the 
directives presented by the EU Commission in the late 1980s and  early 
1990s are about to reach a general breakthrough. 
A critical problem to national policy makers has to do with the issue of 
privatization. In Britain, privatization became possible because all relevant 
property rights were in the hands of the government. In countries like 
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, this is not the case. Property rights 
are divided within cooperative systems that are either autonomous or in the 
hands of lower level governments, or they are mixed in complex institutional 
arrangements. A privatization approach by the state accordingly involves a 
much more challenging task than just selling out ones own property. One has 
to force a sale of properties hold by others. Under the rule of the various 
constitutions, this is both cumbersome and politically risky, as it would 
directly confront the historically established power systems within the 
sector, the distribution of governance rights and financial returns.  
Under these circumstances, attempts at constructing national electricity 
sector reforms on the basis of the British model, have mostly approached a 
dead end. The attention of economists and  policy-makers has then moved 
towards the Nordic model, and as a consequence, many of the large 
electricity generators in Europe have established subsidiaries in Norway and 
Sweden to participate in the market and thereby gain experience and 
knowledge about the Nordic market system. Even the British are planning to 
                                           
15 Jutland and Fyn joined the Nordic Power Pool from Juli 1st 1999. 
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adjust their trading system in the direction of the Nordic model. European 
electricity market deregulation seems to have entered a more pragmatic stage 
which suggests an incremental process where national electricity systems are 
being attached to the Nordic competitive market, where additional similar 
national trading institutions are created, where practitioners gain some 
experience and familiarity over time and where scientists, politicians and 
bureaucrats develop modes of deregulation which adjusts the specifics of 
their national historical systems to the theoretical concepts of competitive 
markets. This is not to say that privatization is unlikely to return to the 
agenda – only that the established power structures will demand that the 
creation of markets and market agencies comes first. 
By representing an important element in this larger European process in 
terms of being its perhaps most important hotbed and possibly its most 
complete real life representation so far, the Norwegian electricity market 
reform becomes an interesting object of study. Recognizing the importance 
of early events, the Norwegian model is likely to exhibit something which is 
likely to substantially influence the emerging integrated electricity market 
system in at least the northern half of Europe. This might be called a 
European perspective or rationale for this study; to shed some light on the 
roots of and the preconditions for this apparently incremental European 
process, and to investigate those elements which were created to force the 
process as well as to shape a new competitive market system.  
A second rationale for investigating into the Norwegian market reform, is 
more of a Norwegian perspective. After the wave of market reorientation and 
“neo-liberal” economic revolutions across the world in the 1980’s and 
1990’s, many sectors of the economy and of public administration have been 
changed – also in Norway. But the only case in which a Norwegian initiative 
seems to have created something which has propelled or substantially 
influenced large scale economic reforms in other countries, is the electricity 
market reform. In all other cases, large scale sector reforms in Norway 
appear to have been inspired from or “forced upon us” from abroad, where 
we might say that our actions have been responsive and also creative from 
time to time, but where our contributions are perhaps not too relevant to a 
larger audience. The Norwegian electricity market reform experiences 
however, are demanded from abroad. Not only from EU countries, but also 
from other continents, from Japan to Brazil and from institutions like the 
World Bank which is searching for possible new models for third world 
countries to take over from their previous advocacy for large scale vertically 
integrated systems. And we are setting out to advice people on these matters 
– being highly confident in the applicability of our model and our successful 
experiences. Looking back, it even appears to many of us to be the only 
rational way to organize an electricity system – an impression which 
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illustrates our tendency to fall into the retrospective fallacy that the actual 
outcome of our own latest change process represents the most obvious, the 
most likely and the most modern and rational alternative there is - which 
suggests that others would be better off if they did the same things, 
disregarding the character of their historically established systems. 
I find that such links are not at all trivial – an insight which for instance can 
be extracted from the entire history of the Norwegian electricity system and 
its fairly “stubborn” objections to being transformed by strong normative 
models coming from other countries where they might have fitted very well. 
Yes, even the success of the market reform itself can perhaps be traced back 
to resistance towards taking anybody else’s strong advice16. To give advice 
is accordingly neither simple nor necessarily rewarding, and it certainly 
requires a sufficient amount of humbleness. For a start, we should be careful 
and serious about understanding our own system and our own reform 
process properly, including its deep indebtedness to ideas and experiences, 
movements and events that are truly international, without which any 
Norwegian market reform would hardly have been thought of. We have to 
understand the specific historical pre-conditions for our own reform and the 
specific roles of those actors and those institutions which created and 
formatted its content and regulatory approach. Not to stop pouring out our 
pieces of advice to others, but in order to understand the complexity of their 
challenges and the vital importance of the specifics of history for the 
prospects of such reforms.  
A third and final rationale for this kind of a study has to do with a general 
phenomenon which we might address as “the making of new competitive 
market systems”. Many such reforms have been  carried out in various parts 
of the world. Some have been successes and others have not. At least some 
of the actual outcomes have provided negative surprises to their advocates 
and system designers, not at least in former Soviet Union and in parts of 
Eastern Europe. Many a grand plan has fallen apart, is found in ruin or has 
been taken control of by actors who have turned them into something of a 
very different character. Radical institutional reforms across the world which 
aimed at turning hierarchical or massively state regulated systems into well-
functioning, efficient and stable competitive market systems, have proven 
both difficult and extremely complex with apparently unexpected and often 
unwanted outcomes. This should force us to raise questions and to 
investigate deeply into these “messy” processes of change, to understand 
their shaping and complex mediations, and to search out possible conditions 
                                           
16 Various approaches and their controvercies are discussed in chapter 7. 
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for successful radical institutional changes. To see what is involved in the 
management of large innovative economic system reform projects. 
 
 
1.2 Research approach and research questions  
The primary ambition of this work is to construct medium range theories 
about industrial and economic change and about stabilization and lock-in of 
new industrial and economic shapes and orders, from the application of the 
actor-network approach to a single case study. 
Essentially based on the actor-network methodology, the research approach 
will be to investigate into the making of the new market system by following 
entrepreneurial collectives associated with the electricity sector through their 
controversies, rivalries and projects in order to obtain an account of why and 
how the change came about. Given the existence of an ordered historical 
system, one could indeed ask: Why make a market system where it 
apparently does not fit into the prevailing order of things? How come 
someone got the idea, got it through and actually made it work?  And, how 
was it possible to radically change a sector of the economy which could be 
characterized as institutionally as well as technologically locked-in and 
stable? Is it possible to extract elements to a process of change theory from 
the Norwegian electricity reform case which hold both explanatory and 
instrumental value?  
The approach implies to investigate into the controversies within or 
associated with the sector as well as the framing-, concept-making- and 
networking activities from where “the market reform entrepreneurial 
collectives” emerged. Which where these controversies? What were the 
characteristics of the approaches and the concepts of understanding which 
had governed the shaping of the prevailing order of the electricity sector, and 
which alternatives where mobilizing for change at the time? These questions 
implies to investigate into the content of the reform approach, into its 
controversies with existing practices and the content of rival approaches. 
Next, there is a need to study what went into the making of the new system. 
Which projects where launched to support it, to expand it, to persuade 
opponents, to create alliances or to turn it into reality? Figure 1.1 below 
illustrates the phenomenon under investigation: 
 
Figure 1.1. Model of research approach 
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            Time 
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Single arrows indicate sequence of events. Double arrows indicate controversy/ 
rivalry between collectives with different visions/scenarios of the future. Dotted 
lines indicate that some element may play different roles in rival collectives. 
The entrepreneurial collective at the heart of our story is one which is 
centered around economics as a scientific discipline. I will accordingly use 
the Norwegian electricity reform case to investigate further into what Michel 
Callon has denoted “the embeddedness of modern market economies in 
economics” (Callon, 1998). The core idea is that economics as a scientific 
discipline in a broad sense plays a particularly important causal and 
formative role in the making of new market economies by re-framing and re-
performing established economies, industries, organizations and behaviors. 
On the basis of conceptual re-framing and theorizing, it is found to engage in 
shaping new trade systems, developing new regulation and control systems, 
re-configuring industrial and organizational structures and transforming 
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economy can be said to be embedded in economics itself. How can this 
capacity be explained, and why is it that once stabilized, the new economic 
system seems to exert such a powerful influence on even those who would 
rather see it abolished?  
While developments within economics may be found to constitute a major 
source behind the powerful transformation of industries and economies 
during the last couple of decades, the success of individual transformation 
projects guided by such developments appears by no means inevitable. My 
thesis is that such projects are basically constructed attempts at overthrowing 
locked in trajectories based on specific historical, technological and 
political/ideological logic, and do not represent the fulfillment of a pre-given 
objective “drive towards economic efficiency optimality”, as argued by 
evolutionary and neo-institutional economic theory. Neither does it follow 
from any other development implicitly pre-given in the order of things. 
These projects are essentially open ended and innovative, tied onto local 
initiatives and circumstances where they might break down for a great 
number of reasons or break off into different directions – despite their 
possibly superior efficiency characteristics in theory. A successful 
stabilization of a new market system, accordingly follows as the outcome of 
the market-making activities shaped and performed by those engaged - if 
they succeed in providing and maintaining such a stabilization. Important 
“points of entrance” and mediators of both change and stabilization in 
between economics and industries, economies and behaviors, seem to be 
such things as state economic regulators, economic regulation and control 
models, accounting systems and economic ideologies or paradigms. 
A crucial question which emerge from this reasoning is: What then, may be 
said to be the role of economic efficiency in the making of new economic 
systems, if economic efficiency in itself cannot explain the outcome?  
A possible successful breakthrough for and stabilization of a new economic 
system seems to be dependent on complex social processes guided by unique 
applications of economic theory to the specifics of the historical, technical 
and economic system at hand. This change-making activity contains such 
things as concept formation, strategy formation, construction of-, association 
with- and mobilization of power, capturing and re-formatting of major 
commanding heights, and complex mediations with political and industrial 
actors. A stabilization of the new system also appears to be dependent on the 
availability of a large number of “delegates” on whom the expansion out of 
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the local constraints of the reform initiators can be based, and on appropriate 
political strategy and project-managerial skills17.  
Through a complex molding of a historical economic system by economists 
and economic theory, a new economic system might eventually be shaped 
which is both formatted in accordance with core principles, techniques and 
measurement technologies in modern economics and unique in its actual 
configuration of major conceptual components.  
The analytical focus on economics demands that economics will be treated 
as an empirical and historical phenomenon in this inquiry. What I will 
present, is a sequence of industrial transformation in which important 
elements of the history of related economic thought will be aligned with a 
specific historical change process. Traditionally, these two issues have been 
presented as separated histories; a history of economic thought which is 
structured according to its own internal conceptual logic, and another history 
of the political economy in concrete descriptive terms. It is my position that 
combining the two offers quite a few lessons to be learned. For a start, it will 
demonstrate that economic theory has also played an important role in 
shaping non-market organized electricity systems. Economists have not 
always been engaged in the making of markets, but also for instance in the 
making of cooperative structures, state hierarchies and comprehensive state 
regulatory economic systems. We may therefor talk about rival historical 
economics-networks which have been engaged in shaping economic systems 
in accordance with quite different core concepts. 
 
 
1.3 Outline of study 
A difficult consideration through out this work has been to identify the 
appropriate point of entrance into the actual emergence of the market reform. 
“Everything” seems to be having relevant deeper roots in history, and 
particular change process and stabilized outcomes way back in history have 
turned out to play crucial roles in the later change process. In order to 
capture at least some of the most relevant of these stabilized outcomes, I 
have included a somewhat extended presentation of the historical 
background. The point of entrance into the making of a market reform has 
been set in the late 1960’s, with the introduction of scientific electricity 
economics to Norway, with the establishing of an internal market for 
electricity among generators which followed in 1971, and the controversy 
                                           
17 A further elaboration of analytical concepts will be presented in chapter 2. 
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which emerged over pricing- and investment principles within the sector 
among leading economists and system design engineers. 
The study is organized into four major parts; (1) Research strategy and 
methodology, (2) Historical trajectories and rivalries, (3) Pathways to the 
electricity market reform and (4) Transforming the electricity industry. 
  
Part 1: Research strategy and methodology 
The first part prepares for the empirical study. Chapter 2 presents and 
discusses core analytical concepts within the actor-network methodology, 
and also relates the approach to concepts within economic sociology and 
(traditional) institutional economics. The presentation focuses on the 
concepts of entrepreneurial collectives and actor-networks, on the concept of 
power, the concept of expansion of collectives by means of enrollment, 
translation or transformation of elements of their environments, the concept 
of controversy and rivalry between collectives and the concept of stability. 
Chapter 3 takes the first steps into investigating the historical making of the 
electricity sector, while at the same time exemplifies and elaborates over the 
research strategy and the methodology. This occurs through a brief 
presentation and discussion of a piece of work presented by Patrick 
McGuire, Mark Granovetter and Michel Schwartz about “Thomas Edison 
and the social construction of the early American electricity industry” 
(1993). 
Chapter 4 discusses operational research strategy, methods and problems of 
validity and reliability. 
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Part 2: Historical trajectories, controversies and rivalries 
In part 2, I will present an overview of important historical trajectories and 
rivalries within and associated with the Norwegian electricity sector in 
between the 1870s and 1980-85. The purpose is to generate a background 
picture for the analysis of the later market reform and to present one of my 
major perspectives in an analytical triangulation of the market reform; the 
history of the industry and the history of associated economic ideas. The 
purpose is furthermore to investigate into what may have contributed to or 
provided the opportunity for a radical market reform collective to emerge 
and to succeed at the later stage. Is it possible to trace important roots of the 
electricity market reform in early historical events – or in the early structural, 
institutional or economic systems which through history came to constitute 
the Norwegian electricity sector in unique ways?  
The historical overview accordingly focuses on major historical collectives 
which established themselves in powerful positions within the Norwegian 
electricity sector, which have shaped the industry and its institutional 
systems up to the market reform. I follow these through their stabilization 
processes, rivalries, partial de-stabilization and through initiatives to regain 
formative influences.  
 
Part 3: Pathways to the electricity market reform 
Part 3 represents a major part of my empirical analysis of roots of and the 
pathways of the market reform process. The analysis covers chapter 7 
through 10, each providing a specific perspective on the emergence of an 
electricity market reform program associated with what I have called an 
entrepreneurial collective. I start out with a focus on the internal rivalry 
within the electricity sector between entrepreneurial collectives who 
represented different ideas about and different framing of how a more 
efficient electricity system could be achieved. It focuses in particular on a 
collective of actors, institutions, theories and governance technologies 
associated with professor in hydroelectric engineering Vidkunn Hveding, 
who from his familiarity with electricity economics internationally in the late 
1960s and from his position as director general of the NVE18 between 1968 
and 1975, played a major role in introducing an economic reform program 
based on scientific electricity economics to Norway which was shaped by 
superior principles of electricity system design. This, among other things, led 
to efforts to integrate the Norwegian hydro-power system with thermal 
power systems in Sweden and Denmark and to the creation of an internal 
                                           
18 Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsverk 
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competitive market for “occasional power” exclusively for electricity 
generators.  
These events are taken to represent important points of departure for the 
early formation of an electricity market reform research program at the 
Center for Applied Research (SAF19) in Bergen in the early 1980s, which 
became a key node in the electricity market reform network and a driving 
force in later events. 
The development of a market reform collective is then described and 
analyzed from three different points of observation. First, from the 
perspective of economic theory developments internationally and the links 
from these developments to early market reforms and market re-orientations 
in Norway before the electricity market reform. The second perspective is 
obtained from a focus on the emerging SAF research institution in Bergen, 
on the electricity system research done by its director Einar Hope and some 
of his colleagues and on the gradual shaping of an electricity market reform 
research program. The third is derived from a focus on the state 
administration which engaged in the project, on the social democratic 
modernization project in the late 1980s, on the Ministry of Finance, where 
Tormod Hermansen from 1986 obtained an important governance and 
managerial position from where the market reform process got orchestrated, 
and on the links between the SAF in Bergen and the Ministry of Finance at 
the time.  
Through this triangulation I hope to be able to extract the major ingredients 
of a coherent explanation about why and how a market system became a 
possible, operational alternative to a system where apparently no-one had 
thought of it as a relevant, possible or rational option until then. 
 
Part 4: Transforming the electricity industry 
In this final part, which covers chapters 11 through 13, I will first present a 
sequence of events in between the political initiative to support and mobilize 
a market reform alternative,  through the political rivalry with a hierarchical 
restructuring alternative program in parliament, to the decisive breakthrough 
for the market reform alternative with the approval of the new energy law by 
parliament in June 1990. Then, I will describe some of the many initiatives 
and projects which were launched by the market reform collective within the 
state administration and the SAF in the wake of the legislative breakthrough, 
initiatives to re-shape, re-configure and re-format many different aspects of 
                                           
19 Senter for anvendt forskning 
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sector institutions, electricity companies and economic actors within the 
sector. I focus in particular on the formative role of accounting systems and 
regulation and control models and technologies in this process which 
contributed to the “creation of competitive firms”, “profit oriented natural 
monopolies” and “rational calculative economic behavior”.  
Through these many projects, the market reform program which had been 
designed from an iteration between empirical research and economic theory, 
gradually stabilized itself as a robust real world economic system. The 
robustness became tested in two severe instances of relatively  extreme 
opposite weather conditions in 1992 and 1996. My intention is to 
demonstrate that this robustness and stability followed from a successful 
carrying out of the broad range of interrelated projects - in combination with 
the support received from within the sector and from the many different 
actors who entered the sector to exploit business opportunities and to advice 
“institutional actors” on issues of organizational change – those described by 
John Meyer as “the institutional others” (Meyer, 1996). 
Finally, chapter 14 will provide summary, discussion of findings and major 
conclusions.  
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Introduction 
The objective of this first part of the analysis is to present the research 
strategy, the methodological framing and the analytical concepts by which I 
will embark on the empirical material. To present the actor-network 
approach is of course a core aspect of this exercise. As a basic point of 
reference, it should be noted that the approach is not yet another theory of 
the social or a provider of explanations about for instance what makes 
society exert pressures on actors. It is simply a methodology, “a very crude 
method to learn from the actors without imposing on them an a priori 
definition of their world-building capacities” (Latour, 1999:20). 
To present the ANT is relatively demanding, as the approach tends to deviate 
in a paradigmatic sense from the framing and the analytical concepts which 
have become stable, taken-for-granted, natural or even self-evident ways of 
looking at things among socio-economic sciences. One example would be 
that the traditional distinction between macro- and micro order of society 
vanishes as the “order of things” are turned into circurculating references 
hooked on to by humans as well as non-humans in different locations 
(Latour, 1999). Both orders of things and aspects of individual subjectivity 
are thought of as being elements of a variety of such circulating references 
which may be more or less extended and thereby part of the shapes of 
society and its many actors and activities. The advantage is that now we 
need not explain the order of things at the micro-level with reference to 
either a macro-order on the basis of concepts such as “culture”, “structure”, 
“political regime”, “institutions” or the like, or to pre-given and general 
characteristics of the individual. Rather, such explanations can be obtained 
within a single, variable social world – represented by the local actors and 
the circulating references they have hooked themselves on to.  
Another radical aspect of the approach, is that it rejects the separability of 
things which traditionally have been compartmentalized as providers of 
different sources of change and shape – like technology, economy, industrial 
structure, science, politics, organizations, social networks. etc. On the 
contrary, the approach recognizes that these always co-exist, that both shape 
and change are represented by interrelated elements from various of these 
camps, and that different juxtapositions of elements jointly represent 
alternative approaches to which one may associate or disconnect. By linking 
a specific technology with a specific economic shape along with other 
elements, a unique “system alternative” may be put together and turned into 
another circulating reference. The framing of actor-network studies, is 
directed towards the making of these interrelated phenomena, their linking 
up with other elements, their performing of other elements and their possible 
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stabilization in society as durable systems which may come to represent a 
new “natural” or “self-evident” order somewhere. The result is a 
concentration of attention on movements and linkages between empirical 
details and the framing of them represented by actors within the field of 
inquiry. The network aspect of the actor-network concept is not quite the 
same as the opponent pole to the actor which makes sense to the actor and 
order his world. It is rather an ordering of a fraction of his world which he 
may even detach himself from. Neither is it an anonymous field of forces 
pushing something towards a particular shape and meaning. It is the sum of 
interactions between various kinds of elements, devices, humans, 
inscriptions, forms, etc. into very local, very practical and even very tiny 
locus (Latour, 1999:20). 
I have chosen to include a - perhaps too extended - presentation of a 
collection of actor-network analytical concepts in order to make up for at 
least some of this possible lack of familiarity. The analytical concepts which 
will be presented, are there to make it possible to operate and to move 
around in this “floating world” of circulating references and elements which 
may hook themselves on and off. They are there to describe and to explain 
things. To characterize the circulating phenomenon that I am particularly 
interested in here, I have chosen to use the concept of an entrepreneurial 
collective – which provides more extended associations to whatever is 
involved in change-making and stabilization of new industrial and economic 
shape and order. The concept however, may also be used as a synonym for 
actor-networks of this particular type. 
In chapter 3, I have included a discussion of a very interesting case study 
conducted by Patrick McGuire, Mark Granovetter and Michael Schwartz 
about the social construction of the early American electricity industry. The 
purpose is threefold: First, it serves as a step into an historical inquiry into 
the making of the electricity industry internationally, which came to 
represent a given point of reference also in the Norwegian case. Second, it 
serves to contrastate a sociological approach based on social constructivism 
and the relative importance of interpersonal networks in the making of 
industries, with the actor-network approach. Third, it serves to demonstrate a 
research strategy and a mode of explanation which is much more similar to 
the actor-network approach than would the different theoretical approaches 
suggest. The case may accordingly serve to illustrate my research strategy as 
well as much of the methodology outlined in chapter two. Finally, in chapter 
4, I will provide some additional comments regarding methods. 
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2 Analytical framework and concepts in 
sociology of industries and economies 
Sociology of science and technology has from the late 1980’s emerged as an 
influential area of theorizing often denoted actor network theory (ANT). The 
concept of an actor network was initially presented by Michel Callon and 
Bruno Latour in ”Unscrewing the Big Leviathan – How do Actors 
Macrostructure Reality?” in 198120. The idea basically grew out of Callon’s 
sociological studies of technological and industrial change processes, while 
the new analytical concepts to be applied to a large extent emerged out of 
Latour’s science studies developed with Steve Woolgar in “Laboratory Life: 
The Social Construction of Scientific Facts”21 published in 1979, and out of 
“Science in Action” from 1987. An important source of influence appears to 
have come also from semiotics, which at the time emerged to exert a 
substantial influence on the philosophy of science (Boyd, Gasper & Trout, 
1992). The actor-network theory may thus be seen as a semiotics of 
materiality (Law, 1999:4) in which the idea that a semiotic sign derives it 
meaning from its relations to other semiotic constructs is extended to 
material things and humans. All entities exist and are defined and produced 
so as to achieve their form as a consequence of their relations to other 
entities. This shaping is essentially uncertain, variable and reversible and 
never given in the order of the things in themselves. This leads to a concern 
with how durability is achieved, which has induced specific actor-network 
concepts of power and stability, which are core concepts in this study. 
The development of a new sociology grew from the 1981 article and from 
early “anthropological” studies of the work of scientists and technologists, 
into a more complete philosophical and sociological theory by the end of the 
1980s and early 1990s. The new theory outlined an innovation-perspective 
                                           
 20 Callon had been working with sociological studies of technologies and industries, where as 
Latour had been working with Steve Woolgar on anthropological studies of scientific work. 
The 1981 book-chapter presented their initial joint formulations of the idea that existing 
sociological theory could not be extracted to explain science, technologies and industries, but 
on the contrary, that new theories about science-, technology- and society-making were 
needed to redefine sociology on the basis of more dynamic concepts (Laursen & Olesen, 
1996).  
 21 In the 1986 edition of the book, the word “social” is excluded. This reflects Latour’s 
deviation from the social constructivist position at the time. 
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rather than the more structural accounts and perspectives typical for the 
traditional sociology22.  
As noted in the introductory, there are certainly other theoretical traditions 
which share at least some elements with the actor-network approach. In 
particular the neo-institutional organization theory tradition23 appears 
recently to have been linking up with the ANT in the area of organization 
studies (Czarniawska and Sevón, 1996: 5-8). Others have contributed with 
concepts which bear on somewhat similar basic approaches. An important 
contribution comes from within a tradition usually denoted “New Economic 
Sociology24”, in particular represented by Mark Granovetter, focussing on 
the embeddedness of economies and industries in social (interpersonal) 
networks. These networks are seen as endogenously defined actor-structure 
entities made up of relations between humans, and the essential point was to 
argue that such networks play particularly powerful roles in the structuring 
of industries as well as in the actual functioning of markets25.  
For instance from (Veblenian) institutional economics, this network concept 
may be refined through its pointing at the essential role of purpose in social 
                                           
22 It thereby apparently challenged the domain of sociological philosophers of science 
represented for instance by H. M. Collins and S. Yearly who through their theories had 
substantially contributed to the downfall of positivism in the early 1970s. The new actor 
network theory attracted growing interest from science and technology researchers, which 
fuelled a fairly harsh rhetorical attack on the new school of thought from the sociologists (or 
social realists as they preferred to denote themselves) over whether or not there was a need 
for Latour’s new dynamic concepts. In particular after the publication of the French version 
of “We have never been modern” in 1991, where Latour presented what he saw as a way out 
of “the philosophical deadlock situation of the social constructivist research program in 
science studies”, the sociol realists apparently felt the wind was no longer blowing in their 
direction. The discussion is found in Collins, H.M and S. Yearly, 1992: “Science as Practice 
and Culture”  
 23 The tradition of Walter Powell, Paul DiMaggio, John Meyer, Lynne Zucker, Richard Scott 
etc.  
24The area of theorizing denoted New Economic Sociology emerged from work in the early 
1980s by sociologists  like White (1981), Stinchcombe (1983), Baker (1984) and Coleman 
(1985), but received its “new” label after the publication of Marc Granovetter’s celebrated 
article “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness” in 1985. The 
article spurred the entrance of sociologists into the area of market and economic research, 
which at the time largely had been left by sociologists as a domain occupied by economists 
(Swedberg, 1997).  
25 See for instance Granovetter, 1973, 1985, 1990, and McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz, 
1993)) 
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and economic change processes and to the roles of non-human phenomena 
like institutions, money, resources and technology in processes of change 
characterized as “trajectories towards improving the methods of doing 
things”26. By combining the two schools of thought, we may arrive at a 
network methodological concept with many similarities with the ANT, in 
which concepts, objectives and entrepreneurs rather than social relations 
move to the focus and where the network is opened up to include non-
humans as important explanatory elements. 
The idea about embeddedness of economies and industries in networks of 
this kind is presented in Granovetter’s 1985-article, but the argument goes 
back to his earlier work on network theory presented in “The Strength of 
Weak Ties” (1973), which has an intriguing aspect to it in the sense that 
Granovetter does not perceive of a social network as something which is 
framed and constituted by the existence of some external institutional or 
other (macro-order) context-shaping elements. Rather, the identities, 
objectives, interests and other characteristics of the actors which constitute a 
network are taken to be variable outcomes of types of relations which hold 
the actors together and thereby define the network as well as the actors. It is 
thereby possible to characterize actors by the distribution of and the 
character of their relationships to other actors. Changing phenomena can 
thereby be described completely in terms of mutual shifts in relations 
between actors, and thereby escape the “imprisonment” of having to result 
from changes in their environments or from assumed characteristics of the 
macro society.  
In his 1973 article, Granovetter used this concept to explain why an actor 
who is completely interrelated into one network loses the capacity for 
making choices which differ from that of other actors within the network, 
because his characteristics will be locked into a network of relations which is 
defined by common identity, objectives, interests etc. Other alternatives will 
thereby be redundant to him, where as actors that are located at the 
intersection of two or more different networks - denoted network overlap - 
may switch their relations or link relations in new ways.  
The aspect of Granovetter’s network theory which is particularly important 
to this study, is that it identifies and conceptualizes those entities that are 
hold together by similar identities, objectives, interests etc. as dynamic, 
point-relational networks as opposed to theories based on constructs which 
describe separated spaces, areas or levels such as in sociological system 
                                           
26 See for instance Daniel Bromley, 1990, 1998 
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theories. These networks – even though open and interacting with networks 
of different identities, objectives etc.  – may also be capable of acting in 
coordinated ways in order to achieve their objectives and interests, to 
confirm their identities and so forth. They may constitute endogenously 
defined entities that are engaged in reshaping society projects or in 
maintaining specific social order in some respect. The “entity” which created 
and carried through the electricity market reform, may thus be seen as such a 
network; a “market reform network” which is defined by its own unique 
inter-relations. 
The interpersonal network approach by Granovetter has however received 
some criticism - also from within the New Economic Sociology, from those 
who represent the more cultural perspective – like Viviana A. Zelizer and 
Paul DiMaggio. They criticize the tendency in economic sociology to reduce 
everything to social relations and networks. Rather they argue for a “well 
balanced analysis which would simultaneously take structural, economic and 
cultural factors into account. The goal would be “to plot a middle course 
between cultural and social structural absolutism” (Zelizer, 1988, cited from 
Swedberg, 1997). Zukin and DiMaggio (1990) argue that the concept of 
embeddedness in networks of social structure is of great importance, but that 
there are also other types of embeddedness, like political embeddedness, 
cognitive embeddedness and cultural embeddedness, which have to do with 
beliefs, ideologies, taken for granted assumptions, rule systems etc. 
Granovetter’s interpersonal network theory is found to be too narrow to fit 
these complexities of real-life economic activities and systems. Or, to quote 
another critical voice from within economic sociology: 
“The major downfall of the network approaches is that they are such 
sparse social structures that it is difficult to see how they can account 
for what we observe. Put another way, they contain no model of 
politics, no social preconditions for [the economic institution in 
question] and no way to begin to conceptualize how actors construct 
their worlds”. (Fligstein and Mara-Drita, 1992:20, cited from 
Swedberg, 1997))27 
 
The problem seems to be that whatever is not perceived of as a “social 
relation” is lost by the approach, which leaves numerous relevant variables 
on the outside of what the explanatory device “network” is made of. With 
                                           
27 My underlining 
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the actor network approach however, we may recapture what has become 
lost by the social network theory – included a conceptualization of how 
actors construct their worlds. 
The idea that the economy is performed by economics as a scientific 
discipline, also has roots in (Veblenian) institutional economics. One 
example is Daniel Bromley (1990) “The Ideology of Efficiency. Searching 
for a Theory of Policy Analysis”, where he argues that economics has the 
essential properties of an ideology for the advancement of economic 
efficiency in society. We may thus infer that economics can be seen as 
representing a specific purpose of the future which constitute the essence of 
a system which is engaged in shaping developmental pathways or 
trajectories in society, and thereby in shaping institutions and behaviors 
consistent with this particular purpose. Through the work of those associated 
with economics, economic methods of doing things are being changed, 
improved and implemented. When it comes to organizing economies, what 
Veblen saw as the intellectual problem; “… the sequence of change in the 
methods of doing things”, is to a large extent found in the history of the 
economic sciences themselves, which represents the history of cumulative 
change in the methods of making economies work efficiently. 
 
 
2.1 The concept of an actor network 
The word actor-network was invented to describe the agent-structure entity 
implicit in the new theoretical perspective, and to serve as a linguistic tool to 
describe scientific and technological activities - to move around in the ”new 
floating world” of science and technology which emerged after the rejection 
of traditional positivism. It was constructed to describe those entities that 
were engaged in both the creation of new scientific knowledge and 
technologies and in their own implementations as durable and extended 
phenomena in society.  
It is essentially a methodological concept rather than a description or theory 
about any part of society. The word has accordingly nothing to do with the 
traditional technical meaning of the word network, such as gas pipes, 
electricity grids, computer networks, or with the traditional interpretation of 
social networks such as associated with friendship, family of neighbor 
relations. It is rather a pure linguistic construct which contains a generalized 
concept of “an acting network” which is constituted by the relations between 
its nodes in a similar way as the concept of a “social network” in 
Granovetter’s 1973 article. However, here the concept is a pure analytical 
statement without the “social” being associated with it; a concept which can 
be applied to any phenomenon. Human as well as non-human. Social as well 
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as cultural, political, technological, financial etc. This “tautological” 
character of the concept is basically the reason why it becomes a powerful 
analytical device, similar for instance to the concept of utility-maximization 
in economic decision theory or the concept of embeddedness in 
contemporary sociology. 
The actor-network concept represents the starting point for an extended 
theory about changes in society - a sociology based on concepts which 
describe change-making. The core of the new program is the actor-network 
concept. It is a hybrid construct; a network which is both a relational 
structure and an acting entity. In opposition to both contemporary 
sociological analytical concepts and the analytical concepts developed by the 
various new complexity and system theories (like chaos theory) so popular 
in the 1980’s, the actor-network theory offers a simplistic methodological 
toolbox based on one-dimensional basic concepts; points and lines (relations 
and nodes), as opposed to the three- and two-dimensional concepts applied 
by those other traditions, which describe such entities as “systems”, 
“spheres”, “environments” and “levels”. In some sense, the actor-network 
theory became a devise for the ”destruction” of systems, spheres and levels 
which appeared to be separated from each other. It turned the attention 
towards their interrelations and mutual influences. Rather than surfaces and 
rooms, the analyzer got lines and links and points, where the points had as 
many dimensions as they had links.  
The application of one dimensional concepts also implied that whatever is in 
between the lines disappears. The analyzer does not have to think of the 
entire room or level. If he for instance regards the environment of 
something, he does not have to deal with the continuity of it in all three 
dimensions. It suffice to identify the interesting points and the lines in 
between them, which gives him a more focused attention on what exactly in 
the environment is relevant to the something. What is also obtained from the 
construct, is that the analyzer avoids the implicit dependency on 
geographical concepts of distance and room. Two entities can be seen as 
being closely united even though the geographical distance between them is 
large. Or they can be radically separated even though they are 
geographically close to one another. Also the scale distinction disappears 
from the analytical framework, like the micro-macro distinction. Rather, 
there is a concept of relations and of networks that are never ”larger” than 
others, but more extended and qualitatively more closely integrated. The 
ordering into top and bottom disappears and all phenomena are studied in the 
same way.  
In order not to take things for given, all of these distinctions are excluded 
from the toolbox of the analyzer and handed over to what is to be studied 
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empirically, to what is represented by the objects of study. In a sense, the 
concepts excluded are being regained from the actors of the field of 
investigation. The effect, is that the analyzer from a second order level of 
observation obtains a greater freedom to maneuver in between what is 
generally accepted as the elements which make up society; its vertical room, 
its hierarchy, its separation into layers, its macro-micro scales and its totality 
in order to describe and explain how these categories are achieved and 
altered and what they are made of (Latour, 1996: 51-55). 
What is lost, is apparently an analytical sense of the importance of 
distinctions identified by using concepts based on spheres and levels – like 
the administrative versus the political spheres, the public versus the private 
room etc. To regain such contrasts on the basis of one-dimensional concepts, 
is apparently an ongoing project within the actor-network tradition, which I 
will not go further into here.  
To this network point-line concept, it is added an actor concept, which 
permits the network to explain dynamic phenomena in terms of its own 
actions. According to Callon and Latour, science, technology and economies 
are outcomes or effects of lots of actions and work within actor-networks 
with specific empirical content. In order to explain changes, one accordingly 
has to follow the actions of these actor-networks in their actual making of 
society.  The point-line-actor concept permits us to follow how a given 
element moves from an individual to become part of a collective and back 
again, through linking up with other elements or through separating itself 
from them. 
The concept of an actor-network is said neither to be reducible to an actor of 
its own nor to a network of relationships. It is exactly both at the same time. 
Neither is it linking elements that are perfectly defined and stable. It 
describes an open entity. The elements could at any moment redefine their 
identity and mutual relationships in some new way and bring new elements 
into the network. It is accordingly simultaneously an actor whose activity is 
networking with heterogeneous elements and a network which is able to 
redefine and transform what it is made of. Its stability is dependent on the 
stability that is generated by the actor-network itself. The actor-structure 
problem is thereby conceptually “bypassed” by including both into one and 
the same analytical concept. 
The actor-network concept is applied by Callon and Latour to define the 
entities which make up heterogeneous associations engaged in the making 
and remaking of society – also denoted “collectives”. These associations are 
seen as structured around core scientific, technological, economic, political 
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or other types of programs. We may visualize the definition of a collective 
in the following way: 
 
Figure 2.1. Definition of a collective 
 
  Actor Network 1       
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The actor-networks AN 1….AN 5 are hold together through their individual 
relations to a common program. Each of the points P1… P10 can be 
described as a conceptually similar actor network, and the entire collective 
may be seen as a point in some more extended actor network. 
 
2.1.1 The concept of a program  
Each program contains core simplified and structured concepts as well as 
relational systems of language, theories, technologies, institutions etc. that 
are developed and interrelated, as well as being building blocks in a project 
for transformation of society in some respect. These are similarly seen as 
points in the network, jointly denoted ”actants”. The success of an actor-
network is equally dependent on the success of each of its actants in their 
interactions with society (Latour, 1991) 
The program, according to Callon and Latour, has a specific core which 
separates its collective from others, as well as an entire internally consistent 
system of actants surrounding it. The program is itself interpreted as an 
actor-network structural system which can be separated into what is denoted 
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basic simplifications. These have been constructed through “blackboxing” of 
complex phenomena and make up the building blocks for the micro-theory 
of a program. Hence, the making of a program has to do with the 
combination of a radical reduction of complexity with a specific framing. 
 
Figure 2.2. The concept of a program in Actor Network Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S = Simplification 
In order to succeed, the entrepreneur, when pushing for an innovation 
project, will have to simultaneously deploy visions about a future end into 
which his project fits in, and to reframe some aspect of the world in order to 
make others see the context and rationale of the project. These visions (or 
frames) are produced in order to convince non-members that the realization 
of the project will produce attractive improvements, for instance in terms of 
increased efficiency, convenience, profitability or truth, and that the project 
“fits into” other elements of society. They also contain political and 
sociological ideas that are much broader and richer than the simplified core, 
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which permits for the linking up to a broader range of other networks and for 
the generation of coherent persuasive powers towards other actors in society.  
Hence, even though for instance the electricity market reform can be seen as 
being initiated and pushed by an actor-network with a main stream economic 
core program originated from a vision about some future state of “optimal 
efficiency”, the realization of its innovative project in society is dependent 
on a joint formulation of economic, sociological and technological theories 
and operational strategies. The transformation process can accordingly be 
seen as guided by a continuous mix of these types of theories. They define a 
new economic-technical-sociological history and future, identify the roles to 
be allocated to various actors and the enrollment of certain properties into 
them. It has to do with the building of a world in which everything has its 
place.   
 
2.1.2  Transformation of content through shifts in actor-network 
  relations 
Two mechanisms are taken to be essential to the shaping of the actor-
network: simplification and juxtaposition (or structure of associations 
between simplified elements). Simplification has to do with the reduction of 
an infinitely complex world to a series of discrete entities to be maintained 
as long as other entities do not overthrow their ability to represent reality, for 
instance by dividing them into unmanageably many different elements. 
Thus, simplifications are never guaranteed and will have to be tested in the 
actual making of society. Juxtaposition has to do with the structural ordering 
of the simplifications in unified core concepts. Simplification exists only in 
context, in relation to other entities to which it is linked. If one removes one 
of the elements, the structure will shift and change. Juxtaposition requires 
that elements are simplified. They define the conditions for operation, makes 
up the coherence, consistency and structure of relationships between the 
elements. 
Through this construct, the ANT authors establish an analytical device which 
is based on stable “points” in the form of simplifications, but which is also 
able to change and to transform  through the shifting of relationships 
between the points. To shift a relation from one point to another is 
accordingly associated with a mutual transformation of content. We may 
accordingly separate the concept of transformation (or re-shaping) into two 
different concepts; re-structuring (or re-configuring) and re-formatting, 
which refer to the change in structure and the change in content respectively. 
The mechanism is illustrated in figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.3. Transformation of content through shift in relations between 
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          elements 
 
Initial juxtaposition    Shift   New juxtaposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P1 qualitatively different from P1a 
P3 qualitatively different from P3a 
P2 qualitatively different from P2(-b) 
a = mutual element in transformation of P1 and P3 
b = mutual element in transformation of P1 and P2  
 
By shifting its relation from P2 to P3, the point P1 loses its characteristic (b) 
which followed from its mutual relationship to P2, and gains the 
characteristic (a) which emerges from its relation with P3. Both P2 and P3 
are affected accordingly. 
This concept may for instance serve as a starting point for the analysis of 
collective cognitive transformations associated with radical conceptual 
changes in economic systems, by which for instance concepts of property 
rights and economic rationality may switch as people and organizations 
disconnect themselves from one collective and re-associate with another. 
 
2.1.3 Simplification and enrollment 
The basic concept of change in the actor-network theory is tied on to an 
active-passive distinction, where the actor concept is thought of as the 
element which contains the driving force for change, the acting capability 
which causes some point to shift its association from one point to another 
and thereby cause a qualitative transformation. The network concept is the 
passive partner which is being acted upon. 
A related concept is “the act of simplification” or “enrollment” or 
“translation”. This implies that an actor within an actor network through the 
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act of simplification can include another actor-network into his program by 
giving it a specific role with specific relations to other simplified elements 
within its own network. Any actor-network can be simplified by another 
actor-network and thereby be included into its specific program. The 
structure is such that every point is at the intersection of two networks; one 
that it simplifies by defining it within its own program and another that 
simplifies it. It can accordingly be mobilized in other actor-networks for the 
fulfillment of their specific programs. On the other hand - according to 
Latour - any specific actor network can only hold its points together if the 
different entities concerned accept the roles that are assigned to them by the 
actor-network itself, which will also include any hierarchical-solidarity 
position affiliated with the roles (Latour, 1991). This requires that for some 
simplification to be established as a stable element, it has to be tested in real-
life practice. 
 
Figure 2.4. The act of simplification by an actor of another actor-network 
          (enrollment, translation) 
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This concept may serve to address situations when some entrepreneurial 
collective is being given important roles within the context of another 
entrepreneurial collective.  
The strategic role of specific actants, is said to follow from the number of 
relations controlled by a given actant (Latour, 1996a:58). The more relations 
some actor has to the various parts of his actor-network and the more types 
of relations he has to each of them, the more significant will be his ability to 
mobilize and direct complex collective actions by the entire network. The 
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entrepreneur is often associated with such a strategic position, and 
accordingly represents a focus for empirical investigations. Hence, when 
investigating industrial change processes, we should pay particular attention 
to individuals in such strategic positions. 
 
 
2.2 The expansion of an actor-network  
The important focus of attention generated by the actor-network concepts, is 
on the emergence and growth of actor-network collectives taken to be 
originated by some local entrepreneur(s), constituted into local collectives 
and expanded - sometimes even into global networks with dramatic 
influences on societies. What characterizes such a process of expansion?  
Well, it may now be seen as a process of translation (enrollment). On the 
one hand, there are the actions of actors which generate creative, interacting 
activities aimed at shaping, extending, creating support for and expanding 
the entire collective through enrollment of non-members. On the other, there 
is competition, rivalry and conflict between collectives that are engaged in 
the remaking of the same elements of society in accordance with different 
conceptualizations and programs. The expansion of a collective is 
accordingly seen in a politics-like or a war-like metaphor where elements of 
society are to be conquered and re-shaped in conflict with other collectives.  
Through simplification (enrollment) of other networks, collectives are 
capable of linking to each other in complex and differentiated ways in such a 
way as to influence each others strength and to use each other for the 
fulfillment of mutually modified programs in conflict with collectives which 
reject simplification/enrollment. In addition to traditional concepts of 
alliances, the actor-network concept focuses both the differences of 
perspective and purpose hold by the allied parties and the mutual qualitative 
transformation of content involved in alliance-making as a necessary 
ingredient in real-life remaking of society processes. The outcome of a large 
scale remaking of society process should accordingly not be seen as the 
result of one single conceptually unified program, but as the result of 
mediated programs of different collectives which have engaged in the 
process in order to fulfill a variety of objectives. 
The creation of new allies is related by Latour to the affiliation between new 
actants and what he calls “immutable mobiles”, which represent the “core 
simplified concept” of the actor-network. These are series of simplified and 
unchangeable elements which defines the uniqueness of the actor-network; 
the explanatory device that essentially distinguish the member from the non-
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member. In order to expand, the actor-network has to be attractive to non-
members or forceful so that those who are on the outside get on the inside. 
The actual act of being a member is seen as taking place through  
”obligatory passage points” of the specific actor-network which constitutes 
the new actant through the affiliation between the new member and the 
immutable mobile.  
The “weapons” of these kind of “battles” for members are taken to be 
“inscriptions” - that are basic simplified statements, models or visualizations 
which represent the objective of the actor-network as well as rationality, 
truth, efficiency etc. that are used as rhetorical devices. These inscriptions 
can also be “loaded” with technologies and institutional elements, seen as 
affiliations between the content of the immutable mobiles and specific non-
human actants that are mobilized through actions intended to increase the 
transformative power of the inscription. The activities of actor-networks of 
this type has to do with the production of convictions, authority and power 
in order to expand (translate) the immutable mobiles into new “territories” 
and to create stronger associations between its members. 
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Figure 2.5.  The expansion of a collective through translation 
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The expansion of a collective, is accordingly defined on the basis of a 
variety of additional analytical concepts, like ”immutable mobiles”, 
”inscriptions”, technological and institutional ”loads”, ”associations” and 
”translation/enrollment”. These are all analytical statements which jointly 
constitute a toolbox for empirical investigations into how entrepreneurial 
collectives expand and thereby may radically transform elements of their 
environments.  
 
2.2.1  The concept of representation, and the role of delegation in 
the expansion of collectives 
An important aspect of the theory of actor-networks is added from Latour’s 
attempt at incorporating a historical account of relativity theory (Latour, 
1988 and Latour, 1996b). The basic idea is that the perspective of an actor 
depends on his position within some stabilized actor-network and that an 
actor-network always constitute a relative local phenomenon from which 
you can only escape by shifting to another actor-network which is also a 
local phenomenon. There is no position on the outside of any actor-network 
Inscriptions 
    I.M. Core 
I.M 
New member I.M. 
Non-member 
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from where one may overview the world and act upon it. The overview and 
the powers of some actor is accordingly always limited.  
Recognizing this relativistic insight has two important implications. First, if 
a collective shall be able to expand beyond the limits of the overview and 
powers of its enunciators, it has to produce durable representations of its 
program and its powers in entities which can serve as delegates in the 
expansionary process. The production of such delegates becomes a crucial 
condition for expansion. Without such representations, the program cannot 
expand into additional localities and will remain a local phenomenon with 
limited capacity to remake society. Investigations into the Norwegian 
electricity market reform accordingly have to dwell with the generation and 
linking up by its entrepreneurs with adequate representatives of their 
program. 
Secondly, there is always the possibility that actions taken at the outside of 
the overview and the powers of some collective, will interfere into its “local 
world” and thereby introduce what will be perceived of as a chance event 
which may substantially influence on the outcome of the remaking of society 
process in which the collective is engaged. Hence, chance events are not just 
stochastic. They follow from the limited overview and the power-constraints 
of local collectives.  
Chance events not only follow as a consequence of programmatic 
differences, but also as a consequence of time, because the intersection of 
two collectives at two different points in time will provide different 
conditions for choices and actions by the actors, which will of course lead to 
different outcomes. Time is accordingly likely to constitute a crucial 
strategic variable to collectives engaged in the remaking of society. 
  
2.2.2 The concept of power in actor-network theory  
The actor-network theory offers the opportunity to rephrase traditional 
questions of social order, stability and change, and in particular questions 
about the origins of and durability of domination of power. Social theory has 
always been concerned with the definition of power relations, and there exist 
a substantial number of such. What has been achieved however, are 
primarily conceptions of power relations which stems from their structural 
character. It is however difficult from these definitions to see how 
domination is achieved in the first place. This is what is offered by the actor-
network concept of power. The actor-network theory offers the possibility of 
holding both human and non-human elements of society together as a 
durable whole and thereby to define power as a function of this “holding 
together”. 
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The underlying simplified principle is illustrated by Latour (1991) by 
showing that the force by which a speaker makes a statement is never 
enough to predict the path of action that will follow from the statement. It 
depends on what successive listeners do to the statement. The speaker can 
try to make sure that every listener interprets the statement the same way, 
that is, to make sure that the correspondence between the linguistic and the 
content of meaning is standardized. Or, he can support his statement with 
further loads like adding certain technological devices or institutional 
arrangements to it. How much loads he will have to add largely depends on 
the listeners’ resistance or ignorance, carelessness or mood, and on their 
cleverness. Hence, the program of the speaker counters an anti-program of 
the listeners, which in order to be overturned generates an anti-anti program 
by the speaker intended to convince or force the listeners to conform to 
specific acts in line with the statement. It is only when most of these anti-
programs are countered that the statement can generate predictable acts in 
concordance with the statement.  
Through this process, the statement has been transformed into a much more 
complex system with persuasive powers far beyond that of the initial 
statement. Also the speaker, the listeners and the elements included have 
been transformed into a new juxtaposition which can now be characterized 
by some durable power structure. The speaker here holds the role as the 
enunciator of the actor-network who’s statement becomes reality by the 
adding of means of transportation of the statement and through the 
transformations of actors that are undergone in the process. Rather than 
focusing the division between society and the theoretical superstructure that 
can be extracted from it, the concept focuses the division between naked and 
loaded statements as the main ingredient in the formation of power.  
To investigate the power of an actor-network accordingly involves the 
evaluation of the program of action of the enunciator of the actor-network, 
seen as different means of transportation (loads) of its programmatic 
statement in terms of associations between the statement and different non-
human actants that are intended to expand the actor-network by including 
more actors into conformity with the statement. Power is not the property of 
any one particular of those elements, but of the aggregated chain of 
elements. During the process of transformation, different human and non-
human elements are turned into associated entities by the accumulated 
actions of the enunciator, into different degrees of attachment and into 
associations which can be reallocated either because the enunciator stops 
reproducing his actions of power or because the entity is challenged from 
another actor-network.  
 44 
This conceptual understanding links power to the continuous efforts to 
expand the actor-network by means of applying new acts (loads). “The 
understanding that there exist some state in which the internal force of 
innovations are irreversible and would expand through society by their own 
steam, is simply dissolved” (Latour 1991: 118). Nothing becomes real to the 
extent that it does not need an actor-network to keep up its existence. Every 
innovation has to hold on to all those people, institutions, organizations and 
technologies that themselves hold on to the innovation.  
This also accounts for the breakdown of power caused by the rejection of 
anyone of the core actants of the actor-network - either because of strong 
anti-programs encountered or because simplified elements are forced into 
unmanageable complexity through real-life tests. Such events cause a 
breakdown of power - and as a consequence - of the collective itself as the 
“holding together” is falling apart.  
The conception of power as something which is generated in the interaction 
of programs, anti-programs, anti-anti-programs etc. points to possibilities for 
modifications and negotiations which are not only tied on to the exchange of 
benefits or utilities. Negotiations also involve the powers of conviction and 
the ability to produce “loads” of persuasion. To investigate the expansion of 
some collective, accordingly, has to do with investigating its construction of 
acts and loads of persuasion aimed at including more actor-networks, and its 
efforts to undermine core concepts in the program of rival collectives in 
order to force a breakdown in their powers. 
This implies that the ability of a program to counter an anti-program also 
depends on how well an actor’s conceptions of others corresponds to their 
conceptions about themselves. If the difference is large, the actor will 
populate his world with actors that behave in - for him - unpredictable ways 
by apparently leaving and entering his network arbitrarily. The larger the 
difference, the more substantial must be the “loads” mobilized and the more 
likely will be a breakdown of the program or a substantial modification 
through negotiations with the anti-programs. The innovative entrepreneurial 
collective may accordingly arrive at a compromise solution and 
progressively change its political-sociological interpretations and 
associations as well as the shape of the innovative devices or systems they 
develop. 
  
2.2.3 The concept of rivalry across frontlines 
The “frontline” model presented by Latour (1991:107) may also be useful to 
illustrate the rivalry between a collective with some specific program of 
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action, and another collective with some specific anti-program of action. The 
program is located to the left and the anti-program to the right. 
Figure 2.6.  The frontline model 
             AND 
                 (actants) 
       program:             anti-program: 
(1)     e:   A        ||||||||   |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
(2)     e:   B        ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||   ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
(3)     e:   C        |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||    ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| 
(4)     e:   D  |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||    ||||||||||| 
   Frontline 
           
 OR (acts/loads)       
Source: Latour, 1991:107 
 
The OR dimension represents various acts (B, C, D, etc.) which the 
enunciator (e) can add to his simple statement (A) in order to counter the 
anti-programs of his rival. The AND dimension represents the actants of the 
rival actor-network which are the objects for association and transformation. 
By using the resources and the powers he controls - whether financial, 
institutional, technological or scientific -  to invent and add new acts (loads), 
the program is gradually capable of expanding its “statement” by enrolling 
new actants into its own network; the number of actors that have attached 
themselves to the innovation. The point of view is here taken to be the 
enunciator of the expanding actor-network. A similar model could of course 
be drawn which focuses the viewpoint of the rival. Hence, in case an act is 
overturned by the anti-program, the frontline will move to the left rather than 
to the right. The selection of and adding of new acts accordingly takes the 
form of a continuous testing of the capability of the program to make and 
remake society by overturning its anti-programs. 
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2.3 The concept of ontological stability as an approach to 
path dependency analysis 
The final concept from the Actor Network Theory that I will address, is 
extracted from a detailed philosophical discussion in “We have never been 
modern” and in “One more turn after the social” (Latour, 1992), which is 
really a critique of Kant’s separation of nature and society into separated 
objective and subjective poles respectively, commonly seen as a fundamental 
basis for scientific thought. Latour argues that the ontology of things 
requires that the two poles are related. The strong separation represented by 
Kantian philosophy should accordingly be discarded along with the attempts 
of both the natural realists and the social constructivists to regard the two 
poles as unbalanced in either direction. These arguments also represent the 
core of Latour’s critique of social constructivism.  
The distinction which he suggests as an alternative to the nature vs. society 
concept, is that of ontological variation; the distinction between an entity 
which exists for instance in the form of an idea or a vision and its existence 
as a material and social reality. The distance between the new poles would 
represent the distance for instance between an initial scientific discovery and 
the transformation of some aspect of society generated from the new insight. 
In order to account for existence in the real world, ”any entity should also be 
logged according to its degree of stabilization” (Latour, 1992:284). An 
entity, within this framework, would accordingly be defined within a two 
dimensional scheme with Nature-Society as the opposite poles of the 
horizontal axis and a stabilization gradient ranging from instability to 
stability on the vertical dimension. 
 
Figure 2.7. Variation in ontological stability 
  
Object/Nature pole              Subject/Society pole 
      Instability (non-ontological level)  
                P 
 
   A              B 
 
 
              C    D 
 
 
 
        Stability gradient 
 
            Stability (ontological level)             
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An entity can accordingly be defined for instance as the line AB, which 
crosses the meeting point (P) of Nature and Society and has some specific 
level of stability. Another entity might be described as the line CD. This 
construct permits Latour to maintain the difference between the ”points” A 
and B or C and D, so that A and C are said to have Nature status, where as B 
and D have Society status, while maintaining that any entity (phenomenon) 
also represents the line in between, which incorporates both. The 
stabilization gradient, on the other hand, permits Latour to differentiate the 
ontological status of different entities in society: 
”As soon as we consider two sets of coordinates for every single entity 
– its degree of naturalness or socialness on the one hand, and its 
degree of stabilization on the other – we become able to do justice to 
the variable ontology of the entities we all studied in our case studies. 
(Latour, 1992: 286) 
A variety of words has been used to define the elements of such trajectories: 
”quasi-objects” (Serres, 1987), ”actor-networks” (Callon, 1986), ”forms of 
life” (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985), ”experimental practice”  (Lynch, 1985) 
and ”allies”, ”collective things”, ”entelechies”, ”actants”, and ”modalities” 
(Latour). Whatever words used, they cover these elements that vary both in 
their Nature and Society content and in their ontological status. 
The concept of ontological stability applied to collectives, and a dynamic 
concept of power, permits us to rewind on a theory of path dependency and 
trajectories in which historical collectives can be seen as highly stabilized 
ontologies. The creation of a trajectory can accordingly be seen as a process 
of ontological stabilization of a new collective (circulating reference) 
engaged in the remaking of some aspect of society. And the breakdown or 
overturning of a “lock-in”, can be seen as following from the overturning of 
historical collectives by a collective of increased ontological stability. This 
might follow either from the aggregation of more substantial powers or from 
the breakdown of simplified programs within established historical 
collectives – for instance through its inability to pass the real-life test of an 
economic recession.  
In this perspective, the Norwegian electricity market reform may be seen as 
a process in which ideas/conceptualizations about a market based system 
through various stages (semi-ontological) are being transformed into a real 
life system (ontological). 
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2.4 Final comments on the methodology of 
         entrepreneurial collectives 
From the above presentations and discussions, I think it is possible to 
conclude that the “new sociological theory” represented by the sociology of 
science and technology, offers promising  perspectives as well as a number 
of useful analytical concepts to the study of radical industrial and economic 
change. It fits fairly well into the theoretical perspectives represented by 
Bromley as well as into some of the conceptual and methodological 
approaches and explanatory modes advocated by the new economic 
sociology28, even though it radically bypasses their theory of “social 
constructivism”. As such, it provides a more specific methodology to the 
study of economic and industrial change which emerge from processes of 
concept-making and purpose-formation. The result of this methodological 
presentation is a toolbox of analytical concepts which mainly draws on 
actor-network concepts, but which will also draw on concepts extracted from 
other sociological and economic traditions, like “lock-ins”, “trajectories”, 
“institutions”, “breakthroughs”, “commanding heights” and “entrepreneurial 
collectives”.  
As noted in the introductory to this chapter, the ANT does not constitute a 
theory of what social phenomena are made of, but rather provides a crude 
method and a toolbox by which to travel from one place to the next and to 
learn from actors and their constructs without imposing on them any pre-
given (a-priori) understanding of their economy- or society-building 
capabilities. The concepts are deliberately poor, abstract and flexible and of 
a second order of observation usefulness, so as to avoid re-placing the 
concepts of and the sociology represented by the actors involved in the 
change process under investigation. In this respect, it is an “anthropological” 
methodology rather than a competing social theory. By this, it deviates from 
the social construction theory and the social network theory in economic 
sociology. These are theories about the social reality where “social 
constructions” result from pre-given social phenomena like interests and 
powers, and where “social network” is thought of as a generalization of 
empirical observations.  
The theoretical perspective outlined by the sociology of science and 
technology tradition calls the attention to the innovation-aspect of large scale 
economic change processes and the “active” expansion of economic systems 
and organizations rather than “passive” diffusion processes – which for 
                                           
28 Granovetter, DiMaggio, Fligstein etc. 
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instance are typically represented by (traditional) neo-institutional 
organization theory concepts like “isomorphic processes”, “diffusion” or 
“fashions” applied to describe these phenomena29. “No innovation spreads 
around the world simply by its own steam” may be seen as a core critique of 
these analytical concepts from a theory of entrepreneurial collectives. To 
identify those driving forces which “spread economic reforms around the 
world” through processes of re-conceptualization, re-configuration and re-
formatting of economic systems, and to follow these through their many 
projects, processes and mediations with other circulating collectives, become 
essential to a study of radical changes in economic systems.  
 
                                           
29 An interesting discussion can be found in Barbara Czarniawska and Guje Sevón: 
“Translating Organizational Change”, 1996 
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3 The social construction of industry approach 
I will now return to the New Economic Sociology to discuss another of its 
master concepts; that of “the social construction of industry” as presented by 
Patrick McGuire, Mark Granovetter and Michael Schwartz (1993). As noted, 
the purpose is threefold: First, it represents a point of departure for an 
historical inquiry into the early making also of the Norwegian electricity 
industry. Second, the purpose is to compare their social network theory with 
the actor-network approach on the basis of a discussion of their prime case. 
Third, it serves to demonstrate and exemplify the research strategy and the 
actor-network analytical concepts presented on a case which is central in the 
literature about economic and industrial change. Furthermore, there is also 
the ambition to extract additional analytical concepts to my empirical 
investigation into the Norwegian market reform process. 
The idea about social construction enters Granovetter’s work around 1987, 
and together with the idea of embeddedness, it came to represent one of the 
two fundamental sociological propositions of his later work (Swedberg, 
1997: 167). This work can be seen as departing into two different directions 
– one primarily in the direction of interpersonal networks, like the “business 
groups theory”, and another in the direction of social constructivism30. The 
work to be discussed here, represents what I see as the major project within 
the social constructivist approach, presented in a publication by McGuire, 
Granovetter and Schwartz (M-G-S) called “Thomas Edison and the Social 
Construction of the Early Electricity Industry in America”31 (in R. 
Swedberg, 1993). What the three authors do here, is to link Berger and 
Luckmann’s theory about “the social construction of reality” with 
Granovetter’s interpersonal network concept by arguing that such networks 
play particularly important roles in the early creation and structuring of 
industries.  
                                           
 30 For an extended presentation of the research program, see interview with Granovetter in 
Swedberg: “Economics and Sociology: On Redefining Their Boundaries. Conversations with 
Economists and Sociologists”, 1990) 
31 This is a preliminary report on a larger research project by the three authors, denoted: “The 
Social Construction of Industry: Human Agency in the Development, Diffusion, and 
Institutionalization of the Electric Utility Industry”, a book which I believe is still 
forthcoming at Cambridge University Press, New York. The entire project covers a period 
from the late 1870s to the 1920s, where the article that I am going to discuss, is a preliminary 
report on the early period until around 1892-95. Another presentation by Granovetter and 
McGuire is found in Callon (1998). 
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Having reached an institutionalized stage, the authors also argue that the 
electricity industry became “locked in”. The “lock in” or “path dependency” 
concept might be seen as a third master concept and is taken from the path 
dependency theory of economists like Arthur (1989), David (1986) and 
Bunn (David and Bunn, 1987). Their reference to the path dependency 
theory however, needs a bit further clarification. 
In the following, I will discuss some of their major theoretical arguments in 
some detail before I go on to show that their descriptions, explanations and 
research strategy are in fact fairly close to the actor-network approach and 
concepts that I have presented. What we may denote their “implicit” network 
concept focuses differences in purpose/program more than interpersonal 
relations per se. They also devote substantial importance to non-human 
relational systems like networks of firms, of financial contracts, of debts, of 
technologies, of manufacturing plants etc. in their explanations, which points 
directly at core ANT concepts based on a research strategy which we in 
short-hand writing may call a “following the networks” approach. The case 
may thereby serve to demonstrate a theoretical and methodological approach 
to a study of large scale shaping of industries and economies which can 
serve much as a model for my own investigation.  
 
 
3.1 “The Edison case” 
The authors argue that the formation of the early electricity industry was not 
a necessary consequence of inherent technological and economic forces as 
argued for instance by Thomas Hughes (Hughes, 198332). Nor can it be seen 
as the efficient outcome of a market selection process in which the more 
economically efficient alternative became selected. They argue that on the 
contrary, the outcome was essentially open between two conceptually 
different rival alternatives, where a major reason for the success of the 
winner was not its profitability but the tremendous debt burdens it had 
created through out the new industry. The model favored by the financial 
investors; the isolated plant technology which could be sold to the many 
small consumption units through out the economy, became forced aside by a 
network of actors associated with Thomas Edison’s central station 
technology based on electric network distribution systems. As such the early 
formation of the electricity industry represents a critical test of the functional 
market selection argument in neo-institutional economics. 
                                           
32 Hughes’ argument can only partly be seen as a mechanical cause argument. His empirical 
analysis also presents a number of constructivist arguments. 
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One might object to their arguments on the ground that there certainly are 
important economies of scale involved in thermal power generation due to 
fundamental thermodynamic laws. The recognition of such as well as of 
other scale advantages is very likely to have played an important role in the 
process despite the absence of short run profits, by providing powerful 
arguments to gain huge long term financial support from Europe (M-G-S, 
1993:230-233). I find that the economic efficiency argument should not be 
rejected all together, as it may play a somewhat different role than the one 
argued against by the authors.  
The article by M-G-S outlines a both rich and nicely dense presentation of a 
large scale making of an industry process which reveals quite a few 
promising contributions to a theory about the construction of an industry. 
Their discussion of the Edison case is explicitly tied on to Granovetter’s 
interpersonal network theory. The empirical account of the networks 
involved in the rivalry over how the new industry was going to be 
structured, turns out to be quite consistent with the concept of 
entrepreneurial collectives that are hold together by their common “visions 
about the future” and their “aggregated chains of durable loads”. The authors 
write: 
“The friction between Edison and bankers such as J.P. Morgan 
continued (…) on account of their differing conceptions of the basic 
trajectory of the electrical generation business. Edison’s vision of the 
industry was that it would consist of utility companies that could 
compete with natural gas by building central generating stations and 
selling electricity to individual residents and business 
establishments.”   
And on the other side: 
“The major American investors in electrical development sought a 
decentralized system in which residential and individual users would 
generate their own electricity, using small devices bought from 
manufacturers and installed (like furnaces) into their buildings.(…) 
They sought to assign their patent rights to manufacturers and collect 
licensing fees. Their ultimate ambition was an industry composed of 
scores of manufacturers, each producing its own line of electricity 
production and distribution equipment based on Edison patents, for 
untold numbers of homes and factories.” (p. 218) 
The relevant distinction between the two rival networks is identified in terms 
of their different visions about a future end and the different trajectories 
which would lead to these ends. The authors also indicate that the opponents 
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were in fact interpersonally related. They were related within the same firm 
as well as within its executive committee. Hence, interpersonal relations 
isolated from their affiliation with specific purpose is obviously irrelevant as 
demarcation criteria between the rival networks. The interpersonal network 
concept applied in this simplistic sense, fails to provide input to or adequate 
framing of the content of rivalry between the two networks associated with 
T. Edison and J. P. Morgan respectively, where as the empirical description 
is in fact a description of two rival entrepreneurial collectives in the actor-
network sense. Hence, the concept of social network applied by the authors 
is a more complex one in line with the idea of “endogenously defined 
networks of actors” as I have shortly discussed it in relation to Granovetter’s 
1973 article.  
Another conceptual problem is encountered when the authors argue that a 
great number of non-human conceptually structured systems, networks and 
interdependencies, like networks of firms or of institutions, systems of 
contractual arrangements, systems hold together by financial debt, networks 
of local utilities built around central-station technology, interdependence 
between electric manufacturing plants and electric utilities etc. decided upon 
the outcome. All of these inter-relational systems lack a methodological 
account of their relations to interpersonal networks. Their explanations about 
how an interpersonal network structure may be transformed into an 
institutionally structured industry, thereby appears to be “on the outside” of 
the interpersonal network concept.  
 
3.1.1 The path dependency theory. An economic efficiency or a 
          power account? 
M-G-S argue that the roles of human agency and collective action are 
critical, but only within sharply defined historical and structural constraints. 
This contains the important argument that history must be taken as a given to 
those engaged in re-constructing society – that historical outcomes 
represents the only possible point of departure, and another argument that 
pre-given structural constraints exert important influences on present and 
future reconstruction processes. These pre-given structures apparently 
represents what we in the actor-network language would call “stabilized 
aggregated elements of power”. When describing the new formation of the 
industry, they go on to argue: 
“We mean to identify the forces that moved the industry in certain 
directions, and the advantages that those directions achieved simply 
by virtue of having been established; these advantages then changed 
the nature of the contest between industrial forms in such a way as 
eventually to lock in a form that might not have been abstractly 
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optimal. The new form then itself modified the environment in ways 
compatible with its needs. Later observers, who then look only at a 
snapshot of technology and organization, may note the fit between 
industry and environment and find confirmation for their argument 
that the industry has arisen in its present form in order to meet the 
needs posed by that environment. Only a dynamic, historical account 
can break through the misconceptions that result from confining 
analysis to comparative statics. 
Our argument has a family resemblance to that made by economists 
Paul David (1986) and Brian Arthur (1989), on the “lock-in” of 
inefficient technologies (…), but generalizes the argument from the 
case of technology to that of institutional and organizational form” 
(p. 216) 
Interesting to note here, is their pointing at formative “forces” which are 
found to direct developments in a specific direction. There is also the idea 
that “advantages and a new form” which have become reality from the 
efforts of these forces, play important additional roles in both locking in and 
strengthening the further process of expansion by transforming their 
environments. This indicates that the explanatory capacities of those 
constructed elements are related to the expansion of the common project of 
those who turned them into reality in the first place. They have become part 
of the network in an explanatory sense. The argument is completely 
consistent with the explanatory role of non-human elements that are 
somehow related to acting collectives in actor-network theory.  
Secondly, there is an argument that forces somehow grow through the 
formation of additional elements and through the capacity of these to 
transform new elements of their environments. This points in the direction of 
a power argument as fundamental to their path dependency theory, rather 
than an economic efficiency argument. This power has to do with the 
capacity of the network to expand through incorporating elements of its 
environment which originally are “on the outside” of it. It points at some 
dynamic concept of power rather than a “static” concept  traditionally used 
within sociology – which is typically seen as pre-given, stable and attached 
to the existence of given categories of  interests, institutions, humans etc. 
Such a dynamic concept of power may provide an entrance to investigating 
into the relationship between path dependency and radical transformation.  
The theory of David, Arthur and Bunn about path dependency in 
technological adaptations, is focused on the analysis of systems taken to 
have economic increasing returns over time. The basic explanatory argument 
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rests primarily on an economic efficiency or profitability argument rather 
than some type of power argument.  
Increasing returns has two well known properties in economic theory. One is 
non-predictability in terms of which outcome will be selected, and the other 
is potential inefficiency caused by the possibility for potentially more 
efficient alternatives to be locked out at an early stage. Additionally, Arthur 
(1989) shows that increasing returns provides for inflexibility in the sense 
that a given solution gets increasingly more locked in, and non-ergodicity, 
which contains the result that small events might not be “averaged away and 
forgotten”, but may decide the selection of the outcome. The idea that 
technological systems have increasing returns provides the system which due 
to some minor event “happens” to get adopted, with an economic advantage 
compared to any other competing technological system. Because of the 
ability to improve on the adopted system and to adopt it specifically to the 
circumstances that it counters in reality, the established system will increase 
its efficiency over time and accordingly increase its relative competitiveness 
in relation to its rivals. The more adopted it gets, the more experience is 
generated with it and the more the system is improved and efficiently 
adjusted to the complexity of everyday activities and needs and the more 
costly it will be to oppose it or to circumvent it. But, because potentially 
more efficient systems are locked out at an early stage, the outcome is 
potentially inefficient in a global sense.  
This economic efficiency argument can of course also be applied to a 
discussion of increasing returns in institutional adaptation as suggested by 
M-G-S. The problem involved does not seem to be the efficiency argument 
per se, but rather the explanatory capability that it provides. Increasing 
returns seems to provide the efficiency argument with a limited ability to 
explain the initial lock-in-making, which is taken to be unpredictable or 
merely accidental. Rather, it suggests that economic efficiency and 
profitability are primarily generated and revealed along the way, that they 
are outcomes rather than present from the beginning. Arthur, Bunn and 
David also seem to argue that whatever is not “of reality”, becomes 
relatively less efficient over time than what is of reality, and that this 
efficiency advantage can explain the lock-in effect over time. This raises 
questions to how radical change may occur in the presence of path 
dependency. How can non-existing alternatives suddenly overturn existing? 
What is involved in the de-locking which is apparently needed to facilitate 
radical change? 
M-G-S are not really clear about whether they lean on the economic 
argument or some type of power argument that I have pointed at, or rather on 
a more holistic account which draws on a range of different arguments. But 
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it seems to me that what can be extracted from their empirical descriptions 
and explanations is largely congruent with a power-conception of path 
dependency. The establishing of a lock-in may be seen as an outcome of 
construction of power (or “irrefutable structures” in the terminology of M-G-
S) – of new powers, or as an outcome of association with and transformation 
of established systems of power to fit into and to dominate a new area and 
thereby prevent rivals from doing the same. Increasing economic returns 
may then follow fundamentally from the establishing of domination of 
power. To reconstruct an industry – or to overturn an historical lock-in – 
would then have to do with the breakdown of established power systems and 
the creation of new ones – in which demonstration of future economic 
efficiency might be a crucial element.  
 
 
3.2  Discussion of analytical concepts 
In the following, I will discuss a number of actor-network analytical 
concepts in the context of the analysis presented by McGuire, Granovetter 
and Schwartz and also search out additional analytical concepts and 
theoretical arguments relevant to my analysis of the Norwegian electricity 
market reform.  
 
3.2.1 A dynamic concept of power and the concept of and role of a 
 “representation”  
A dynamic concept of power is not formulated by M-G-S. They explicitly 
offer a concept of power as something pre-given, which at least in part is at 
odds with the empirical descriptions and explanations they present, like in 
the following quote: 
 “We believe that the resulting structure was not the only 
technologically practical one, nor was it the most efficient in terms of 
market economics. It arose because a set of powerful actors gained 
access to certain techniques and applied them in a highly visible and 
profitable way. (p. 215)33 
What is pointed at by the authors, is the idea that those human actors who 
came to decide upon the outcome were powerful at the outset – before they 
gained access to certain techniques and before they applied them in specific 
ways, not that they engaged in constructing new powers or in increasing 
                                           
33 My underlining 
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their powers by linking together elements which represented additional 
power elements. My questions to this would be: Can we really separate the 
powers of the actors from the techniques to which they “gained access”? Can 
we separate their powers from the elements which were involved in their 
shaping of their industrial project? It seems to me that the authors at least 
implicitly argue for an alternative and more dynamic concept of power when 
they continue: 
 “Those techniques resulted from the specific and shared personal 
understandings, social connections, organizational conditions, and 
historical opportunities available to these actors. This success, in 
turn, triggered important pressures for uniformity across regions34, 
even when such uniformity excluded viable and possibly efficient 
existing or potential alternative technologies and organizational 
forms.” (p. 215-216) 
The techniques involved were apparently parts of a more general power 
system, whose “success triggered important pressures for uniformity across 
regions”. Rather than arguing that change followed simply from pre-existing 
powers, they argue that by creating an initial success, the network added 
further elements to its “pressures for conformity”. That is, power of 
transformation is part of what is being constructed along the way and 
provides input to explanations about the expansion process.  
Another type of question would be: Why was visibility important and how 
come the applied techniques were “highly” profitable as argued by the 
authors in the above quote, if they were not market efficient as is their 
general argument? I think it follows from the presentation that visibility was 
important because it was intended to increase the persuasiveness of Edison’s 
argument towards financial investors that the future was in the central station 
technology rather than the on-site technology. Visibility, accordingly, had to 
do with the construction of a powerful (persuasive) “representation” of the 
vision. In the Edison case, this refers in particular to his construction of the 
Pearl Street central station system at Manhattan New York. We may thus 
infer that a dynamic concept of power may contain constructed 
representations of a program – semi-ontological phenomena - which add 
powers to the entrepreneurial collective. 
To demonstrate profitability obviously served a similar purpose. But here, 
the authors seem to mix together the concept of realized short term 
                                           
34 My underlining 
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profitability and the concept of expected future profitability in a way which 
confuses the argument. To construct visible and profitable representations of 
the future appears to have been an important part in Edison’s building of a 
capacity to create a breakthrough into a position from where he and his 
network could shape the new industry. As it turned out, Edison could not 
demonstrate immediate profitability from his representative power plant, 
where as the alternative; the on-site technology, obviously could. 
Demonstration of profitability in this particular short term sense does not 
explain the resulting industrial structure as apparently claimed by the authors 
in the quote above. This is clearly demonstrated through out the text. Edison 
failed in persuading American investment bankers to support his ideas 
because they were focused on short term, low risk returns to investment, and 
accordingly rejected a project which required massive long term investments 
with nearly no share of the risk allocated to the consumer side. His large 
scale, long term and risky project did simply not fit with the financial 
strategy of American investment bankers at the time. This nearly caused a 
severe breakdown of power for the entire project. Hence, the failure of 
representations to “pass real world market tests” as represented for instance 
by the financial market, may seriously break down the aggregated powers of 
entrepreneurial collectives. What turned out to be Edison’s rescue, was his 
access to another large network of actors with huge financial resources in 
Europe – before profitability could be demonstrated. This occurred 
presumably on the basis of shared beliefs in the visions offered by the central 
station technology, its theoretical underpinnings, expected future profits and 
the Pearl Street representation of the system. Hence, to European 
institutional investors with a longer time perspective and strategy, Edison’s 
profitability argument35 probably appeared sound enough. 
As I read it, his project became rescued by someone largely at the outside of 
his own overview and control; German financial institutions headed by 
Deutsche Bank, who embarked on Edison’s project presumably in order to 
ripe the new and rapidly growing electricity sector from their American 
rivals. The entire Edison-central station network came to play a powerful 
role in a different game, which came to decide upon the outcome. The 
European financial network added financial powers to Edison’s 
technological network, where as the Edison network added technological 
powers to the project of the European financiers. A dynamic concept of 
power accordingly, needs to account for such mutual integration of powers 
of networks with different but relatively consistent purposes. 
                                           
35 It was really Henry Villard who managed to raise a European financial consortium to 
support Edison’s project (McGuire, Granovetter & Schwartz, 1993.230-233) 
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M-G-S thus offer input to a concept of power which is based on the 
aggregation of elements of power within self-designated networks. The 
adding of “successful” elements are needed to produce a necessary 
breakthrough into an area of the economy and to expand the project 
represented by the network. The failure of important power-elements on the 
other hand, leads to a reduction of aggregated powers, and may obviously in 
crucial cases even lead to a breakdown of the entire power system, in which 
case the network will not be able to achieve its objectives. 
 
3.2.2   The concept of a program; its core and its associated “rules 
and roles of the game” model  
In line with the actor-network approach, the content of meaning and purpose 
can be conceptualized in the form of a “program for change” which defines 
the uniqueness of a network such as the “Edison network” or the “Morgan 
network”. I find that “program” is a better concept than “truth” which is used 
by Bromley in a similar conceptualization (Bromley, 1998), because it 
incorporates notions such as identity, truth, rationality, interests, objectives, 
purpose and vision. It is commonly used to describe the content of political 
parties or other organizations that have specific changes in society or in 
organizations on their agenda – a representation of shared opinions about 
some preferred future state and about how to achieve them. Different 
programs which refer to the same phenomena in society, will then constitute 
rival collectives. 
If we turn to the structural aspect of a program such as Edison’s “central 
station program”, it can be separated into a core, which represents the unique 
and stable idea or concept of the program; the central station system, and a 
surrounding related model which could be described as a “rules and roles of 
the game model”. M-G-S touches upon these models when they elaborate 
over the fundamental causes of the conflict: 
 “The crucial fact is that the main point of contention between Morgan 
and Edison was not the technology as such, but rather the structure 
of markets and economic returns that would result.” (…) What was 
crucial was that Edison sought to sell electricity in a way that 
required massive investor capital and little economic outlay from the 
consumer. Morgan wanted to see equipment sold to consumers with 
minimal outlay from EELC investors, as would happen if licenses 
were sold to producers who risked their own capital and paid 
royalties to EELC rather than such risks being borne by EELC 
investor funds." (p. 219) 
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While a technological-economic concept defined the identity - the core - of 
each program, the surrounding model defined the perceived distribution of 
powers and economic returns affiliated with each program. These 
represented the basic content of the controversy. To identify the various 
models of “the rules and roles of the game” that are involved in industrial 
reform processes, should accordingly an important focal point for the 
analysis. 
 
3.2.3  The explanatory roles of non-human networks, 
  interdependencies and delegates 
McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz use a historical sequence of events to 
demonstrate how an industry is being created through the construction of 
different types of networks and interdependencies that are related through 
the specific roles they are given by the enunciators of a specific program. 
They describe a carefully and strategically constructed system where every 
entity has its unique role, and where the various elements can be seen as 
representing a fraction of the entire “collective” thing which constructs and 
shapes the new industry and enrolls elements of its environment to become 
consistent with its own shapes and structures.  
When searching for possible explanations for the eventual domination of the 
central station system over the isolated plant alternative, M-G-S engage in 
describing these networks, systems and interdependencies and the specific 
roles they played. To exemplify matters, let me start by quoting from their 
discussion about the technological “network” system: 
 “In developing his incandescent bulb, Edison turned away from low-
resistance, high-current lights that others had experimented with 
because his calculations showed that central stations would have to 
use fantastic amounts of copper wire in order to connect up any 
substantial area lighted in this way. Instead, he turned to the high-
resistance, low current model that he eventually made to succeed. 
He also developed new kinds of generators (then called “dynamos”) 
that could drive such a system. From the very outset of his work, 
Edison was guided by this overarching concept of a whole electric 
distribution system of which all the parts must be fitted into place. In 
contrast with other inventors who searched only for some magical 
incandescing substance, he worked out all the supporting structure 
of his system; its power supply, conductors and circuit, and then 
came back to determine what kind of light would be demanded by it” 
(Josephson 1959:211) (p. 220) 
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Technology-making obviously played a vital role. It created a representation 
of Edison’s vision as well as a network system where each part represented a 
node specifically related to other nodes. Each point as well as the whole was 
also related to specific institutional arrangements which defined property 
rights, patent rights etc. They were also related to specific organizations like 
Edison’s laboratories and manufacturing plants, to engineers working at 
these sites and to what might be called Edison’s financial system or -
network. Technology represents one type of related network which both 
defines elements of the collective and holds it together. 
The role of Edison’s laboratories is also described as a very essential part of 
the system: 
“Edison had never been the solitary inventor working in his late night 
laboratory. Francis Jehl, who had worked there described the Menlo 
Park operations thus: “Edison is really a collective noun and means 
the work of many men” (quoted in Lindgren 1979:17). From sometime 
in the early 1870’s, when his lab in Newark, through the legendary 
Menlo Park period (1876-1881), when so many important 
technological breakthroughs took place, Edison employed about 200 
inventors and technicians. After the move to New York, when the 
laboratory on Goerck Street guided the success of the Pearl Street 
station, at least 200 (and possibly perhaps as many as 500) additional 
employees passed through the Edison laboratories. These individuals, 
most of them inventors and tinkerers, became the heart of electrical 
manufacturing and generation in the United States. Many were 
promoted internally, so that most of the executives of the various 
Edison manufacturing companies (…) rose from the laboratory. (p. 
224) 
The expansion of the central station system is here argued to have been a 
collective enterprise through which numerous engineers were trained and 
skilled as well as were contributing to the innovation activities within the 
framework of Edison’s large project. The expansion of the central station 
alternative came to rest with a process of delegation to these men, who 
through the laboratories grew into advanced representations or delegates of 
Edison’s visionary program as well as to become important nodes in his 
expanding network.  
The role of the Edison laboratory was accordingly not only to invent new 
devices. It was also to associate with talented engineers and to transform 
them into qualified representations of the vision, who could be trusted to 
take on large delegated responsibilities. Trust in this sense, was largely a 
function of processes of translation where those to be trusted became 
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representations of the program – of shared understandings within the 
network. The laboratory accordingly represented a body of structures and 
activities which formatted both human and non-human elements to play 
specific roles within the expanding collective. 
What we see here, is not an expansionary process which is driven by 
economic superiority or some abstract impersonal pressures in society. It is a 
process driven by a dedicated production of human as well as non-human 
networks which constitute a grand construction of industry project. It 
appears that in order to explain large scale radical changes in society, we 
will have also to trace the system which produces qualified representations 
of the core of the collective. A simple illustration of the Edison system is 
provided in figure 3.1. below.  
 
Figure 3.1. Production of representations for expansion through a process 
  of delegation 
 
Production of representations:       Delegation:        Expansion: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M-G-S continue their article by presenting some of the most important 
associates of Edison, the companies they took responsibility for and the 
various economic arrangements between Edison and these men. The various 
companies typically obtained exclusive licenses from EELC to produce 
certain devices to the central station system as well as investment capital. 
Individuals who had contributed with important inventions, were given 
shares in their future revenues. These constructions formed interrelated 
networks of firms and of economic contracts, which added to the 
technological and the interpersonal network systems. They all played their 
important roles in transforming Edison’s vision into reality. Even though the 
interpersonal relations obviously were important, the other networks were 
virtually inseparable from the interpersonal, and the powers of the 
Laboratory:  
Prod. of technological  
representations (A, B, C,……) 
Education of human  
representations (G,H,I,……..) 
   Edison/EECL 
Local utilities 
Manufacturing of 
electrical devises 
Pearl Street 
 A, B,.. 
G, H,.. 
New laboratories K, L,.. 
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relationships within the entire “empire” obviously followed from the 
aggregated strength of the multiple types of relations, and not primarily from 
anyone particular of them. 
 
3.2.4 The concept of a lock-in creation through a decisive 
  breakthrough 
McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz demonstrate in substantial detail how 
Edison gradually through strategic actions managed to create a lock-in 
situation in which his central station system became irrefutable. This resulted 
in particular from his establishing of strong commitments and dependencies 
within his system in the form of financial debt and share issuance in lieu of 
cash payments, a centralized manufacturing system, an integrated 
technological system with patented protection on each part and a dominating 
influence on the community of electrical engineers – in short: the aggregated 
power system he and his collective had constructed to turn his vision into 
reality.  
After having constructed the Pearl Street representation and an industrial 
system to produce all his devices, Edison responded to the shunning by 
investors from his plan, with a decision to push the expansion process 
himself. In the spring of 1883, he established the Thomas A. Edison 
Construction Department to sell and build central stations, and put the 23 
years old Englishman Samuel Insull, who had become engaged as his 
personal secretary, in charge of it. During 1883 and 1884, he and Insull sold 
a number of central station systems to a variety of small towns. M-G-S note 
that: 
 “What was most significant about these sales was that Edison 
accepted securities of these firms in lieu of cash payment for 
equipment and for the EELC license. This further angered EELC 
investors, who received, instead of cash, securities for where there 
was no market, and upon which there would not be dividends in the 
foreseeable future given the absence of any substantial cash flow. 
This practice also worsened Edison’s own economic position by 
requiring that he cover the immediate costs of manufacturing 
equipment for these stations – a further drain on his limited capital 
supply. (…) the indebtedness of local utilities to the Edison 
Company – particularly the equity aspect of this indebtedness – 
created a long-term partnership between them that ultimately 
established both coordination and control across the market.” (p. 
127-128) 
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This ability to coordinate and control across markets appears to be the 
immediate result of an industrial lock-in by constructed powers which over 
time facilitated path dependency. 
Institutional and organizational control was an essential part of this game. 
The struggle for control over the EELC became a major focus of the rivalry 
between the Edison and the Morgan collectives. To the entire conflict, 
property rights to the patent owning entity – the EECL - represented the 
essential institution which had to be controlled in order to direct the entire 
system and to control the revenues. It was – so to speak – the commanding 
height of the battleground. 
The battle switched from side to side and appeared to be completely open. 
Both parties mobilized  the powers of their related networks and engaged in 
expanding them through the creation of new alliances. Thus, there was an 
escalation of “arms” on both sides which increased the amount of powers 
constructed as well as mobilized to overthrow the opponent. The eventual 
outcome appeared to depend on who was capable of constructing and 
mobilizing the most powerful aggregation of forces relevant to the fight in 
order to force though his program.  
In the end - in 1891 - after 12 years of intense rivalry, Morgan managed to 
take over complete control with a re-structured Edison General Electric 
Company (EGEC) through a merger with one of its major competitors; the 
Thomson Houston Company. By this event Edison left the electricity 
industry entirely and the EGEC shifted its name to General Electric 
Company (GEC). Morgan then made a final attempt to re-emphasize isolated 
power at the expense of central station development, but eventually had to 
give in after a series of bankruptcies between 1894 and 1896 for central 
stations in which the GEC had major stakes.  
Morgan gave in and abandoned his vision about an electric industry 
structured on the basis of isolated on site production units sold to the many 
millions of households and businesses, and turned his attention into rescuing 
his own financial position by promoting Edison’s vision while obstructing 
his own. Even though Edison personally lost the battle and disconnected 
himself from his network, the collective which had been constructed from 
his vision, won completely. From the mid-1890s, enormous amounts of 
capital became invested into the central-station business world wide, 
including vast resources to research and development in order to overcome 
technological difficulties and improve technological and economic 
efficiency, where as nearly nothing went into developing small scale 
technologies. We have to go all the way up to the late 1970’s and 1980’s 
before any new significant interest in small scale production reemerge – this 
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time not as isolated entities but as connected to an integrated into central 
station system with advanced operational and control systems, often in 
combination with local heath distribution.  
It appears that the establishing of a European consortium to support Edison’s 
expansionary project in 1889 represented the actual breakthrough event by 
which the Edison collective established a solid basis for dominating further 
developments. It also seems to me that somehow to produce such a 
breakthrough, provides the opportunity to create a lock-in situation. This 
does not imply that the program could not have been broken down by its 
rivals or by its own failure to pass some “real-life tests” after such a 
breakthrough event. Rather it suggests that a breakthrough provides the 
program with a unique opportunity to adjust institutions, restructure the 
field, construct interlocking directorates, redirect economic resources, 
expand its system of production of trusted delegates, technologies and 
manufacturing and consolidating them. To investigate radical industrial 
reforms, accordingly involves the investigation into how breakthroughs and 
lock-ins are created and maintained. 
I think McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz argue rather convincingly that 
the outcome at least until 1889 was fairly open and that Morgan’s alternative 
technology was feasible at the time. It was economically more profitable, 
more reliable, more energy efficient, easier to operate and contained less 
technological problems. In the longer perspective however, it is difficult to 
see the option that large scale central station technologies would not have 
been developed – due to the technical economies of scale involved. A delay 
however, may have provided a more balanced development as for instance 
small scale combined heath and power distribution systems, which may have 
been developed to take advantage of short distribution distances while 
maintaining relatively high energy efficiency levels at reasonable costs36.  
I also find that their explanation of the outcome of the rivalry, presented by 
M-G-S at the end of their paper, is convincing: Morgan found the central-
station approach irreversible, because the structural circumstances which 
had been produced during the 12 years of relative autonomy during which 
Edison, Insull and their affiliates first developed central-station technology 
and then created a network of utilities based on it, were irreversible. These 
“circumstances” included the wide spread system of local utilities which 
prevented Morgan from realizing his own vision within these areas. It 
                                           
36 For instance on the basis of the Stirling engine constructed in 1816, which is now into a 
rivival. 
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included the highly centralized manufacturing sector which produced the full 
range of products needed. This undermined the basis for a multitude of small 
sized, specialized, licensed producers favored by Morgan, and it included the 
interdependency between the centralized manufacturing system and the local 
utilities (p.234). These “constructed structural circumstances” were nothing 
but the various network systems constructed by the Edison collective. 
To create a lock in, accordingly contains the construction of a persuasive 
system of power to support the given program, the capturing of relevant 
commanding heights, the creation of a breakthrough and the expansion of 
interlocking coordination and control arrangements. 
 
3.2.5 The concept of real-life testing of remaking of the economy 
projects 
From the analysis presented by M-G-S, it seems to me that profitability or 
“economic gain” holds an important role in what we may call the “real-life 
testing of rival remaking of the economy projects”. There were many ways 
by which the Edison vision could have failed to dominate the structuring of 
the new industry. But, it seems to me that the ability of the Edison collective 
to obtain financial support and later on to force a financial support for its 
system, constituted the major content of the real world test which the project 
had to pass. In this respect, the role of  financial resources was essential.  
The highly strategic capital boycott organized by Morgan, could have caused 
a breakdown of the system embedded in Edison’s collective. That is, a 
strategic act by the rival collective. But, the Edison project could have failed 
also for technological reasons. A similar attempt at constructing two central 
station projects initiated by the talented inventor and investor S.Z. Ferranti, 
in London in the late 1880’s, turned out to be a miserable and extremely 
costly failure which caused a set back for the central station vision in 
England for more than 20 years. And, for sure, the Pearl Street project was 
not a completely convincing demonstration of technological superiority 
either. Mainly caused by technological problems, it appears to have nearly 
ended in a technological and financial failure.  
The case also demonstrates how a breakthrough for one of the rival 
collectives simultaneously produced a dissolution of the powers associated 
with the alternative program, whose representatives in the end were 
transformed into the collective of the winner. The major weak point in the 
Morgan collective appears to have been its lack of an alternative inventor 
with the charisma, creativity and willpower of Edison and his affiliates, and 
the fact that they had invested large sums into the Edison venture, with an 
ambition to redirect Edison’s efforts by translating him into their own 
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program. When this did not succeed, Morgan could not find an alternative 
source for the capabilities mainly hold by Edison.  
The general learning from this may be that programs which manage to create 
a decisive breakthrough and thereby to create an initial lock-in, will have to 
pass through a series of real-life tests, ranging from financial tests and 
market tests to the overcoming of strategic efforts by rival collectives to 
regain control over essential “commanding heights”. The stability of the new 
structure can accordingly not be taken for granted, but will have to be 
maintained by all those networks that are holding specific roles within the 
system.  
I also find that the authors’ pointing at the significance of early events is an 
important point – which should lead us to be very serious about investigating 
the historical roots of economic sectors which became objects for large scale 
reforms later on. This should not lead us to believe that these early events 
prohibit radical reforms – only that the aggregated powers represented by the 
reformers will have to be substantial in order to overturn the locked-in 
powers of such established historical collectives. 
 
 
3.3 Final comments  
With these comments, I think I am able to conclude that to expand the theory 
of social networks to a theory of entrepreneurial collectives in line with the 
actor-network approach, offers theoretical concepts by which we can address 
the problem of radial change in sectors of the economy that are 
institutionally and technologically locked-in, in illuminating and 
conceptually consistent ways. The expanded network theory includes non-
human networks, systems and interdependencies that are important 
explanatory elements, but which remain exogenous to the social network 
theory in the analysis by M-G-S. The extended network concept may also 
include political, cultural, cognitive or theoretical elements like beliefs, 
ideologies, taken for granted assumptions, rule systems, economic or 
sociological models etc. These are tied on to historical or entrepreneurial 
collectives structured around programs with specific political, cultural, 
cognitive or theoretical content. It may contain models of politics, social 
preconditions for economic institutions etc. The concepts presented - I think 
- permit us to begin investigating into how actors construct their worlds and 
how they may reconstruct aspects of society on the basis of new concepts – 
to respond to Fligstein and Mara-Drita’s critique of the social network 
theory. 
 69 
Finally, I have shown that the analysis of the early formation of the 
American electricity industry as presented by M-G-S, does contain a number 
of analytical concepts and theoretical arguments which are fairly congruent 
with the actor-network approach, as well as a number of other useful 
concepts and theoretical insights. These provide additional methodological 
tools to my investigation into the Norwegian electricity market reform. I find 
that their research strategy, which is to follow what I have denoted 
entrepreneurial collectives through their controversies, projects and 
networking activities from early conceptualizations through networking, 
constructions of representations, breakthroughs, expansions through 
delegations and finally stabilization, offers a useful model also for an 
investigation into the Norwegian electricity market reform process. 
This concludes the up-front discussion of theoretical perspectives and 
analytical concepts. The rest will have to be derived from empirical 
investigations into the Norwegian electricity market reform and the history 
of the electricity sector. Before entering the historical analysis however, I 
will make a few short notes about research strategy and methods in chapter 
4, which concludes this first part of the discussion. 
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4 Operational research strategy and methods 
The point of departure for this study is a desire to explain the remaking of a 
large economic sector of society through radical regulatory reform, to 
understand the process of change, the forces which caused the sequences of 
events and the forces which had to be managed and overcome in order to 
establish the new order, the transformation of the sector and the stabilization 
of the new system over time. The ambition is to outline the causal 
explanations represented for instance by the conceptualizations, the 
programs, the actions and the negotiations among those involved in the 
remaking or the electricity sector economic system, which implies that the 
analysis will be concerned with investigating into the relevant sequences of 
events over time as well as into the origins of and the “directions of” the 
activities involved. 
The research strategy is similar to a single case study in that it aims at 
exploring a unified area of activity for the purpose of analytic generalization 
as opposed to statistical generalization. Apart from explaining the market 
reform process, its ambition is to explore theories, methodologies and 
analytical constructs in order to judge their appropriateness and fruitfulness 
in relation to the study of large scale economic change. And, eventually, it is 
to refine them with pieces of additional analytic generalizations based on 
insights obtained from the study. There is probably a deeper concern with 
history in this study however, than what is usually found in case studies 
(Yin, 1984:22).  
The case also offers a number of sub-cases at different analytical levels. At 
the level of large scale economic reform, the history of the electricity 
industry offers quite a few interesting examples, where as more parallel sub-
cases are offered at more detailed levels of investigation. This is not 
interesting because it permits us to collect a sample of change processes for 
the purpose of statistical generalization. It is interesting because it offers 
opportunities for an implicit multiple case study in which theory and 
analytical constructs can be tested on multiple cases.  
The fundamental approach is exploratory in two different ways. First, it 
explores into theory and analytical concepts to find appropriate theoretical 
perspectives and analytical concepts to both frame the study, focus the 
attention on the essential issues, capture the essence of what is to be 
explained and “move around” in the “messy” field of empirical 
investigation. Second, it explores the value of these analytical concepts in 
describing historical and contemporary events obtained from empirical 
investigations. In this sense, the exploratory study “shifts” into a descriptive 
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study where descriptions are partly interwoven with the analytical constructs 
which have been presented. Explanations and theory testing result from 
taking these descriptions further into critical examination and judgement. 
The entire process could perhaps be seen as a process of explanation 
building (Yin, 1984:113), which takes as its starting point that any 
explanation requires both appropriate analytical concepts, analytic 
generalizations, empirical content and critical reflection to constitute what 
we take as a convincing scientific explanation.  
The research strategy suggested by the actor-network approach is to follow 
human and non-human networks in their actual making and remaking of 
society. This has similarities with the research strategy explored by 
McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz: To investigate the different types of 
networks involved in “the social construction” of the new electricity industry 
from their origins through their investigations and projects. Explanations 
follow as extensions from the descriptions presented. That is, explanations 
will have to be rooted in descriptions of collectives (or circulating 
references) and their main collective things, their efforts to expand their 
programs and their building of technological, institutional and human 
structures seen as durable systems for power of domination.   
While the basic unit of explanation is the change process in large, the 
operational units of investigation are collectives/actor networks/circulating 
references at different points of analysis; from the extended collectives of 
economic schools of thought to individuals, specific technologies, research 
institutions and state administrative offices. 
The strategy implies a focus on identifying the dominant actors within the 
field of study, to identify their core economic concepts, their anchoring in 
more extended network systems including institutional positions from where 
they set out to analyze and to reshape the economy. It similarly implies a 
focus on identifying the dominant enunciators of rival programs and 
entrepreneurial collectives, their political-sociological theories and “world 
models”, their constructions of durable systems of power, their efforts at 
turning down, transforming and negotiating solutions with their rivals and 
possibly their major breakthroughs into new areas of the economy. It implies 
a focus on the rivalry between expanding entrepreneurial collectives and 
established historical collectives which have already managed to incorporate, 
transform and dominate institutional-organizational-technological structures 
within the given sector, and it implies a focus on the rivalry between 
collectives which aim at capturing the given sector of the economy at the 
same time.  
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The argument about the significance of early events points at the need to 
start the analysis with an historical presentation of the Norwegian electricity 
sector with a focus on major historical remaking of the sector processes – 
whether successful or not. The historical analysis will provide a description 
of the established stabilized industrial system which made up the point of 
departure for the market reform process. It will also serve to present the 
historical collectives which had to be overturned by the reformers as well as 
rival collectives which aimed at reforming the industry in accordance with 
quite different ideas.  
At the outset, I recognize that the complexity of my topic is large. This 
implies that no simple economic-sociological explanatory theory is likely to 
exist from which operational hypothesis could be derived and tested in a 
straight forward manner. Or at least, I know of no such convincing theory. 
But, as indicated through this introductory chapter, I find that there are 
promising theories which represent starting points for the empirical analysis 
and which provide fairly powerful implications for the research strategy as 
well as for the explanatory approach. So, this is a kind of “grounded theory” 
project á la Glaser & Strauss (1967) in which middle range theories can be 
extracted from the iteration between clarified analytical concepts, higher 
order theoretical propositions and empirical observations - starting from a 
chosen analytical position and perspective. Basically, however, it leans itself 
to the basic insight of enthnomethodology; that the actors that I am 
concerned with are expected to know what they do and why and how they do 
it – and that they know much more about it than I will ever do – because 
they were the ones who did it. My objective is not to reveal some hidden 
underlying explanatory force which may be said to explain the reform 
process to them, but to conceptualize and theorize on the basis of 
representations of their re-making of an industry activities. Neither is it to 
explain their reasons or their behaviors – only to identify what makes them 
able to find their ways through each other’s economy and industry re-
constructing activities. 
The great complexity of the phenomenon has in part to do with the many 
different perspectives one could obtain from where different observations 
could have been presented in unlimited detail. It would be far beyond the 
resource constraints of the project to present a description of and an 
explanation about the Norwegian electricity reform in any complete sense. 
The scope by necessity has to be more limited, and a number of possibly 
important events, links and influences will have to be left for others to 
explore. On the other hand, I will also be drawing on substantial research by 
a few others who have investigated into the history, the concepts of and the 
outcomes of the electricity market reform. In this respect, I hope to be able to 
add elements to a broader research on the subject. 
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4.1 The role of the analyzer in providing valid 
         explanations 
The dependency of scientific explanations on scientific theories and methods 
should be recognized as a basic condition for the provision of explanations 
about empirical phenomena. Describing and explaining observed phenomena 
can accordingly only be done from a position within some scientific actor-
network where a specific perspective, analytical constructs and methods of 
investigation have been stabilized within some research program. Only when 
there is such a basis, the actors and the objects they act upon can be 
observed, described and explained in a scientifically meaningful way. The 
purpose of this first part of the study is to present such a stable “scientific 
actor-network”.  
In accordance with Robert Delorme’s theory of complexity (Delorme, 1995), 
there is a possibility for analyzers to “incorporate” different schools of 
thought by reverting to a higher level of observation (which must of course 
be scientifically stabilized as well), where the analyzer escapes from the 
logical constraints of the subordinated level of observation and theorizing. 
From such a position the analyzer is free to shift his focus and obtain 
descriptions from different schools of thought as well as from different 
actors involved in the process specifically in focus. “We can only obtain 
explanation by triangulating the many points of view of actors. It is thus 
critical to be able to shift easily from one observer to another” (Latour, 
1991:124). On the other hand, the analyzer is not free to shift arbitrarily 
between different levels of observation. The observation-level of 
triangulation must be fixed – unless he explicitly decides to shift his level of 
observation and thereby accept the basic logic rules at the level of analysis 
he enters. Breaking this rule will severely confuse the analysis by breaking 
generally accepted principles of logic. 
It should also be emphasized that descriptions and explanations are 
dependent on some theoretical position from which you can only escape by 
evaluating the phenomenon from some other position, which has itself been 
stabilized by some other actor-network scientific program. There is no 
“neutral” position outside such “circulating phenomena” from where we can 
judge the situation. This understanding does not imply a relativist position in 
which all explanations are seen as equally good, but rather a relationist, 
which implies that descriptions obtained from the different points of view of 
engaged and engaging actors, provide substantial possibilities for fine-tuned 
analysis and rejection of unreasonable interpretations - even at very detailed 
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levels of analysis. Descriptions and explanations obtained by other analyzers 
similarly represent important observation for triangulation of perspectives.  
 
 
4.2 Empirical data 
The data generating and processing approach has been to conduct repeated 
empirical investigations, starting with a few pilot studies and continuing 
through a number of sub-case investigations in order both to explore 
theoretical approaches and to collect relevant data. Through an iterative 
process, different analytical approaches have been explored which have in 
part shifted the understanding of which data are relevant to collect, and 
additional empirical findings have triggered the need to check out further 
theoretical perspectives and analytical concepts and so forth. I have also 
made extended use of and scrutinized empirical findings and explanations 
offered by other researchers – such as the two historians Lars Thue and 
Bjørn Barth Jacobsen who have both addressed the history of the Norwegian 
electricity sector and the electricity market reform in some detail from 
different analytical perspectives. I have also been able to draw upon a 
substantial bulk of research projects at the Center for Electricity Studies at 
the Norwegian School of Management, research on the Norwegian 
electricity market by other research institutions, and reports from public 
institutions. 
The strategy has been to collect data from multiple sources in order to 
establish a chain of evidence on which the discussion of theoretical 
explanations can be based. This involves triangulation of evidences from 
sources such as interviews with actors, public documents, research reports, 
statistical data, participatory observations and public debates in newspapers 
and industrial journals, as well as triangulation of evidences presented by 
other researchers.  
Multiple source data collection implies a non-routinized procedure where 
data are collected on the basis of research questions, theoretical 
generalizations and analytical concepts that are developed and revised along 
the way, and where the empirical field is permitted to offer new 
opportunities, new challenges and additional sources of data through the 
process. It is the very challenging task for the analyzer to collect the 
evidences in a non-biased manner and to present them in a way consistent 
with generally accepted scientific standards for analytical relevance and 
critical reflection. The overall result is a mix of concrete evidence, abstract 
analytical concepts and a general theoretical perspective.  
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4.3 Validity and reliability 
Validation of analytical concepts has turned out to be a particular focus of 
attention in this study. This involves constructing or collecting analytical 
concepts that are consistent with the purpose of the study and with the 
proposed theoretical perspectives and propositions, and which fit to the 
empirical entities which have to be conceptualized in order to be discussed 
by the theory. The validity of these concepts will probably have to be judged 
on the basis of their fruitfulness to additional empirical investigations and 
explanation building attempts. I have, however, in an effort to increase the 
validity of my analytical concepts, made extended use of the study of 
McGuire, Granovetter and Schwarts presented in chapter 3.  
I still find that constructs of language such as “actor-network” and 
“collective” could be improved upon by finding some other concept that 
provides more accurate associations, but at least I find that they cover those 
empirical entities that I have been interested in, in a useful way. 
Internal validity has also been a major concern. In particular, it has been an 
ambition to identify and outline the proper character of the causal 
relationships between the events studied. As a starting point, I have 
discussed argued that changes in industrial and economic systems follow 
from the work of and the interaction of entrepreneurial collectives that are 
somehow established and shaped on the basis of some unifying concepts, 
purposes and programs regarding a future end. I have also outlined analytical 
models which permit us to incorporate elements that are traditionally seen as 
representing “mechanical” forces or causes, into such a “final cause” mode 
of explanation. One of the objectives of my case study is to investigate 
further into how certain conditions can be seen as leading to certain other 
conditions and thereby constitute causal links, without us having to perceive 
of them as mechanical or deterministic forces. 
External validity concerns the domain to which a study’s findings can be 
generalized. The ambition of my study in this respect is outlined in the 
introductory chapter and covers the domain of large scale radical economic 
reforms across the world and across time and the relationship between 
economics as a scientific discipline and the economy as a societal 
phenomenon.  
In broad, I find that the case studied is representative to this domain, despite 
the obvious “contextual” differences to other large scale economic change 
processes in other countries and to historical processes of change in 
economic systems. The problem would be that there are too many things that 
are taken for granted when we study our own society, which can not be 
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taken for granted when we shift to other societies or to different times. This 
is however, probably one of the major strengths of the actor-network 
approach; that its analytical constructs escape from the dependency of some 
outside context taken to shape the entities studied. Rather, it presents a set of 
analytical concepts which focuses the attention on the changing phenomenon 
and conceptualizes what constitutes change-making in a fundamental way. 
Analytical insights obtained from such a focused view might accordingly be 
transferred into very different historical and geographical “contexts” without 
loosing validity. This generalized applicability is also demonstrated by 
taking the analytical concepts from the area of science and technology 
studies and applying them to a process of large scale reform in the 
organization of an economic system.  
I have not found space within this project for a comparative study of similar 
market reforms in other countries, but have included some discussion of 
other large economic reforms in Norway which have been studied by others 
and which represent important preconditions for or influences on the 
electricity market reform. For obvious reasons, the validation of any 
conclusions would have been substantially improved with the inclusion of 
more cases. It is my hope that it may contribute to facilitate later 
comparisons with different large scale industrial reforms. 
Reliability is probably the more difficult part. I have tried to include 
sufficient references through out the text, but recognize also that more could 
have been included to demonstrate that the operations of the study can be 
repeated with the same results if someone else was to fight her way through 
what I have done. In order to check out the data as well as my interpretations 
of them, drafts of this manuscript at different stages through the writing 
process have been distributed to core participants in the electricity market 
reform for comments. Their critical comments as well as their confirmations 
represent the second important source of validation.  
The basic problem however, is the theory dependency of the analyzer which 
causes me to draw upon a substantial amount of knowledge and data that are 
simplified and conceptualized in specific ways and where the origins of the 
data have become partly obsolete or to complex to trace in each case, but 
where I still feel confident in their validity. In particular, I feel that the very 
explorative nature of this piece of research has forced me into a rather 
aggregated molding of complex empirical data with theoretical perspectives 
and analytical concepts where the selection of and interpreted data cannot be 
completely separated from the other ingredients. The context of investigation 
and explanation cannot be completely separated from the context of 
justification of analytical apparatus. On the other hand, checking and 
documenting the sources of data is a matter of scientific importance which 
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should not be taken lightly, where I constantly feel that I have room for 
improvements.  
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Part II:   
Historical trajectories and rivalries 
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Introduction 
In this part II of this elaboration I will present a short overview of important 
historical trajectories and rivalries within and associated with the Norwegian 
electricity sector in between the 1870s and  approximately 1980. The 
purpose is in part to provide a background picture for later events, and in 
part to investigate into what may have contributed to or provided the 
opportunity for a radical market reform collective to emerge and to succeed 
at the later stage. Is it – in hindsight – possible to trace important roots of the 
electricity market reform in early historical events – or in the early structural, 
institutional or economic systems which through history came to constitute 
the Norwegian electricity sector in unique ways?  
In line with the theoretical and methodological approach outlined, I will 
focus my presentation on those entrepreneurial collectives that engaged in 
the shaping of the Norwegian electricity sector, who struggled to develop a 
modern economy by advancing certain frameworks, concepts and strategies 
and to oppose rival concepts at the time. Over the years they created and 
strengthened durable systems of power within the sector which reflected 
their purposes, frameworks, concepts and strategies. What characterized 
these entrepreneurial collectives and their concepts for economic 
development and industrial structuring? Who were the major rivals? Were 
there important international links and developments associated with them? 
What was the role of economic theory in these developments? What legal 
arrangements, organizations, technologies, trading systems, etc. did they 
create which forced events into specific trajectories which had to be handled 
by later reformers? These are essential questions which I hope to be able to 
answer from the historical investigation. 
After having identified and characterized major historical entrepreneurial 
collectives and events, I will follow these network systems through some of 
their major developments and through their rivalries in order to give an 
answer to the question: Which historical elements provided the opportunity 
to radically transform a system presumably characterized by powerful lock-
ins? On answering this, another important questions would be: Did the major 
entrepreneurial collectives resolve their conflicts or were they still involved 
in intense rivalry at the time of the emergence of the market reform 
collective? And; was there any sort of immediate severe crisis within the 
sector which might explain the later emergence of a radical change process?  
Another effort will be to look out for any sort of unique elements or systems 
created to serve specific roles in some historical program which may have 
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served as an important point of departure for those who engaged in re-
shaping the sector into a market based system? 
Taking the propositions about path dependency and the significance of early 
events seriously, demands us to use some space on the historical discussion – 
without going too much into detail. The presentation is separated into five 
periods: 
 
Chapter 5:  
1877 - 1905: The early electricity industry; in between small scale and large 
scale visions, strong local cooperative systems and a weak nation state. 
 
1906 - 1922: Growing national resource control and early rivalry between a 
local cooperative collective and a national hierarchical collective. 
 
1923 - 1945: Stabilization of the small scale program, transformation of 
state-municipality relations, and the roots of direct state engagements in the 
large scale  program. 
 
Chapter 6: 
1946 - 1968: The social democratic social engineering collective; mobilizing 
state powers for industrial and economic growth and for economic 
redistribution. 
 
1969 - 1980: Destabilizing the post-war regime. Multiple frontlines, 
increased governance  complexity and renewed hierarchical initiatives 
 
The separation is of course somewhat arbitrary, as the origins of collectives 
and controversies in one period are usually found in the previous. However, 
I find the separation useful as a crude overview, as the shifts represent 
breaking points and turns towards the stabilization of specific historical 
programs or towards important processes of destabilization. 
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5 Shaping the Norwegian electricity sector. 
Cooperatives or hierarchy? 
The roots of the new electricity industry in Norway are found partly in the 
organization of the Norwegian society in the 19th century and partly abroad 
in the establishing of the new electricity industry as a separated global 
industry dominated by central station technology. The story presented by 
McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz about the early construction of the 
American electricity industry, represents an important starting point also in 
the Norwegian case, by outlining its framing, its concepts and its 
technologies. From a Norwegian point of view, these became given points of 
departure by the late 1890s. The larger scale central station technology that 
spread through Europe, gradually came to dominate the isolated plant 
alternative – known as “blocks” - also in Norway, as the model for 
electrification of the country.  
The central station technology suited quite well to the Norwegian resource 
situation, with its great number of waterfalls often located far away from 
population centers. But it did not in particular suit its demography and 
typography, as investment costs in electric distribution networks were 
extremely high in a country with a small and scattered population and 
difficult topographical conditions such as numerous populated islands, large 
mountain chains, deep and long fjords and difficult weather conditions. 
From the outset, it can probably be convincingly argued that a more 
balanced development of small scale and large scale technologies would 
have been more economic in the Norwegian case, if the small scale 
technology had been developed with greater force. But this, of course is 
merely hypothetical speculation.  
 
 
5.1 The early electricity industry; in between small scale 
and large scale visions, strong local cooperative 
systems and a weak nation state (1877-1905) 
By the end of the last century, Norway was a rather poor country by 
European comparison without national independence, with a small sized but 
relatively modern political regime in control of internal matters, dedicated 
towards using its judicial powers and knowledge to push for economic 
growth and modernization. The absence of a strong nation state, of 
substantial land-owning aristocracy and the semi-autonomous political status 
in the political union with Sweden, provided a situation in which modern 
political and economic ideas were easily adopted to and implemented 
through legislation. The first period, I have framed in between the first 
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introduction of electric lights in 1877 and the national independence from 
Sweden in 1905, when the young nation obtained control with its foreign 
relations. This event introduced the first substantial reshaping of the sector 
from 1906. 
Since 1814, the country had its own constitution, a parliament providing 
laws about internal matters and a government responsible for internal affairs. 
Until 1884, when parliamentary control with the government was forced 
through by parliament as a core constitutional principle, the government had 
been appointed by the Swedish king. The national political issue had then 
expressed itself in numerous and continuous attempts by the parliament to 
withdraw powers from the government and thereby to constrain the powers 
and the tasks of the state administration, for instance by obstructing the 
ability of the state to collect taxes. The result was a rather tiny state 
administration with a weak financial basis largely dependent on 
export/import tariffs and direct state economic activities. In 1837 the 
parliament passed a law which constituted the municipalities as highly useful 
institutions for local political and administrative organization and economic 
collective action, with an at the time modern democratic representative 
system and with substantial regulative and economic autonomy and 
responsibility. This permitted citizens to organize a number of economic 
activities cooperatively within the frameworks of or associated with 
municipal institutional powers. This was quite unique at the time and 
differed substantially from neighboring countries like Sweden and Denmark 
which typically had similar activities organized as private cooperatives or 
businesses or by the state administration.  
A second institutional heritage stems from the historical legal system related 
to the waterways. Contrary to other European countries, the state did not 
hold any property rights in the waterway system. In Norway, property rights 
to the waterways were private and belonged to those who owned the shore-
lands. However, the state had regulated the various interests related to the 
waterways, like fishing, transport, timber-rafting and industry. In 1887, a 
new «waterway-law» at several points adjusted to the needs of the growing 
industrial interests in exploiting mechanical power from waterfalls, and this 
had important early implications for the establishing of electric hydro-power 
plants. Among other things, it became possible to obtain a license from the 
state to construct dams across the entire river and to expropriate necessary 
land for the purpose of industrial use of the waterways. This provided a legal 
institutional framework with much better opportunities for industry to take 
advantage of hydro-power than for instance in Sweden and Finland, where 
the state owned the middle one-third of the waterways, which had to be kept 
open to collective use (Thue, 1994:24) This system also provided unique 
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opportunities for foreign industrialists to purchase waterfalls and to construct 
power plants to supply energy intensive industries. 
A third  heritage of importance was the system of state public service 
organization. In the 1840’s the government settled on the Swedish lean 
public service model rather than the Danish integrated public service model. 
Pressures form civil society for state competencies and administrative 
capacities in various sectors of society, led to the organization of directorates 
which were separated from and subordinated the ministries. This allowed for 
a “lean” central administration dominated by generalists (primarily judicial 
experts), and for directorates dominated by sector professionals. According 
to this principle, the early internal ministerial office «Canal-Directionen» in 
1847 became organized as a separate directorate: «Kanalvesenet», primarily 
as a result of pressures from the forest industry (Benum, 1979:60). This 
organization later became «Norges vassdrags- og elektrisitetsvesen»  
responsible for the electricity sector. 
The early electricity technology also had important consequences. The 
“block” technology initially established, could be introduced as a market 
commodity in line with Morgan’s vision in the lighting market, and 
gradually also in competition with steam engines and mechanical 
hydropower in the market for industrial machinery power. The customer 
base was typically the well-off urban population, public street lighting in the 
cities and private businesses who invested in the technology for industrial 
production purposes and also supplied nearby communities. Contrary to for 
instance the railroad-, channel- and telegraph systems into which the state 
rapidly became involved, only a very few saw a potential role for the state as 
a direct participant in the new electricity industry.  
In the broader perspective, the emerging Norwegian electricity industry can 
be seen as a local and rather peripheral part of the international electricity 
industry, basically shaped by the technological and institutional systems 
which came to dominate in the US, in Continental Europe and to some 
extent in Great Britain, but translated, interpreted and adjusted in a 
specifically Norwegian institutional and political context with a weak state 
and strong municipalities. 
  
5.1.1  The weak progressive state, the large scale industry and 
            the local cooperative system 
In Norway, the new electricity industry met a small but modern industry-
oriented liberal state and a civil service system oriented towards creating 
regulatory support for modernization organized by local interests. The new 
«waterway law» in 1887 and new laws which regulated safety in electrical 
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systems (1891) and expropriations for wiring (1894), completed a regulatory 
system well ahead of neighboring countries (Thue, 1996:35-39). Despite 
rather poor financial resources and initial industrial capacity, electricity 
based industries and distribution systems were established at a high speed by 
any international standard. 
Large scale industrial projects were based on large waterfall projects mostly 
financed and owned from abroad. These industries were all located close to 
the waterfalls, with the effect of creating an industrial structure with multiple 
new small cities spotted along the southern and western  regions as well as a 
system of large scale isolated power plant systems. Also more traditional 
industries started out with their own isolated steam- or hydropower 
generators, and so did private consumers. With the emerging Edison central 
station technology, municipal organization gradually took over37. By 1901, 
24 cities had established electricity companies out of which 11 were 
privately organized. Of the 600 electrical power stations installed in 1900 
about half were driven by steam engines. The larger ones however, were 
hydro-power generators (Thue, 1994:37). 
Initiatives for electrification of communities were primarily dependent on 
small local groups of entrepreneurs or individuals with some technical 
education or business experience. These networks of engineers and 
businessmen were the leading men of their local communities, and as such 
saw themselves as both private businessmen and representatives of the 
political efforts of their communities to improve and modernize living 
conditions. The difference in organizational form at this early stage can 
usually not be traced back to very deep ideological controversy, but rather to 
local experiences with various institutional forms within a broad range of 
economic activities. If the electricity company was privately organized, it 
usually had some cooperative community character established through 
political negotiations. On the other hand did business practices from private 
companies influence public companies to a larger extent than what became 
usual later. This had to do with the strong economic autonomy of the 
municipalities; in particular their responsibility for tax collection and their 
own borrowing. The affiliated hard budgetary constraints induced a 
business-like practice also within the public administration with substantial 
focus on cost control. 
                                           
37 The first municipal electricity company was established in the northern city Hammerfest in 
1891. The company constructed the longest transmission wire in the country (1,8 km, 1 kV) 
based on alternating current technology. In 1892, the capitol got its municipal electricity 
company as well, and soon several other cities followed. 
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The financing of the huge electricity investments differed between the large 
scale industry projects typically financed by foreign industries, financial 
institutions and Norwegian commercial banks, and the community based 
projects, which were typically financed through local savings- and loan 
institutions, by loans from private investors and by contributions from 
consumers or tax payers. Other important local institutions were the 
cooperative organizations of the owners of each waterway system38 - 
especially in the eastern and southern part of the country. These organized 
regulations and constructed dams, coordinated the various interests related to 
the waterways and often became the most important local counterparts to 
and cooperators with the state directorate “Kanalvesenet”. These local 
political, financial and property rights based organizations jointly developed 
and reinforced an institutional system of local cooperative control. 
 
5.1.2  The small scale and the large scale visions of 
modernization – and the entrepreneurial role of Gunnar 
Knudsen 
The early electricity system developed in between two different visions for 
national economic development and modernization. These represented 
different ideas about what was seen as a good society and a good life as well 
as about efficient routes to modernization, and were tied on to the emerging 
two different parts of the electricity system; the large scale energy intensive 
industry and the general supply to communities and small scale industries. 
Advocates for “the small scale program” argued in favor of a stable, 
decentralized industrial development based on relatively small business units 
and expansion from traditional industries. Economies of scale and more 
challenging technologies could be managed by networks of businesses and 
cross-industrial organizations. The role of the state was seen as supportive 
and supplementary to local activities. Politically, the model was primarily 
represented by the social-liberal and agrarian party “Venstre”, but also the 
agrarian and communalist parts of the labor party “Arbeiderpartiet” favored 
the small scale perspective as well as district representatives within the 
conservative party “Høire”. In government, the leading party at the time, 
Venstre, actively structured state policies in line with this vision of the 
future.  
The large scale model was based on a more growth oriented industrial 
program, open to foreign investments and oriented towards a centralized and 
plan-oriented coordination of the economy through larger private businesses 
                                           
38 Brukseierforeningene 
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and a stronger role for state bureaucracies. Advocates for this model were 
primarily to be found among representatives of the urban conservatives in 
Høire, representatives of the large scale industries themselves and among 
engineers and technocrats in all parties. The substantial influences of the 
internationally oriented and at the time highly prestigious engineer 
profession, tended to favor the large scale model, taken from dominant 
industrial countries like Germany, Switzerland and the US (Thue, 1994:13-
14). 
Even though the two models contained the essential alternatives in electricity 
sector politics, several in-between and dual positions existed, and the 
actually implemented policy had substantial elements of pragmatism. The 
high degree of pragmatism had to do with the nature of the hydro-power 
resources. Large waterfalls where located far away from population centers 
and could hardly be exploited and financed without participation from highly 
concentrated consumption units, where as many of the smaller waterfalls 
located closer to population centers were ideal for a more gradual 
development of general supply. This situation provided space for both 
alternatives to develop along side each other. 
The early visions of a more active role for the state was first and foremost 
represented by shipowner and industrialist Gunnar Knudsen, who later 
became prime-minister for Venstre (1908-1910 and 1913-1920). He was 
probably the most important entrepreneur behind the active state engagement 
in the electricity sector at the time, with substantial influences on the shaping 
of state electricity policies, regulatory systems and the choice of state 
projects. He was a true “developer” and “network constructor” across 
politics as well as industry, had participated in the first electricity 
distribution project in Norway already in 1885 and also initiated the first 
inter-municipal electricity organization in his home region in Telemark with 
the establishing of Skiensfjordens Kommunale Kraftselskap. As such, he 
was pragmatically oriented – more interested in economic and industrial 
development than in ideologies of cooperatives or state hierarchies. To him, 
a strong role for the state followed as there were no convincing alternative 
with the necessary powers and resources to do the necessary job. 
Through out his political career he played an important role in shaping the 
electricity policy of the state. One of his basic views was that small and 
internationally weak national industries as well as ordinary consumers had to 
be protected against the financially stronger foreign industrialists. He also 
hold that the state had to play a direct role in hydro-power generation and 
distribution – also in large scale industries. Already in 1892, he suggested in 
a letter to parliament, that the state in order to secure major energy resources 
for national industrial and civil society interests, should buy important 
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waterfalls as soon as possible (Thue, 1994:22). This role of the state 
however, turned out to be too far from the ideas represented by the dominant 
small scale local cooperative program of the time. The only viable argument 
for those who favored a more active state role turned out to be the 
“electrification of the railways” argument. From 1894 until 1902, the 
parliament every year allocated relatively small amounts of money to this 
particular purpose.  
Gunnar Knudsen’s view on the role of the state, pointed at an emerging 
frontline of rivalry between a state dominated hierarchical entrepreneurial 
collective and the established small scale cooperative program. It also 
pointed at yet another issue, which focused on the role of the state in large 
scale industry projects. Should the state engage directly in large scale 
industry projects for the purpose of increasing state revenues and developing 
national resources, or should this be left to foreign capital owners? 
 
 
5.2 Growing national resource control and early rivalry 
         between a local cooperative collective and a national 
         hierarchical collective (1906-1922) 
The years 1906-1922 covers a period of general economic growth and 
prosperity, of rapid growth in state administrative capacity and ambitions in 
the wake of national independence. During these years, the state and the 
municipalities gradually increased their domination of the general supply 
sector through public property rights and a tighter regulatory regime towards 
private interests in general and large scale industries in particular. The 
stronger national program at the time managed to create an initial 
breakthrough which led to the first major remaking of the sector with the so 
called «panic law» in 1906. Through a continuous process of debate and 
legislation under shifting governments until 1917, a fairly comprehensive 
concession law system was created in order to secure national and 
community control with the hydropower and other national resources.  
By the early 1920s, the electricity system had developed into a distinctly 
dual system. In 1924, 90-95% of investments in large scale industrial 
electricity generation were private, where as 83% of investments in general 
supply were municipal, 7% were state investments and 10% were private 
(Thue, 1994: 58). This reflected the expansion of both the small scale and 
the large scale programs. On the one hand, the state had adopted a policy of 
protecting civil society interests and needs against private industrial 
interests, primarily through laws which discriminated in favor of public 
ownership. On the other hand shows a rapid growth in large scale industrial 
hydro-power investments a continuous pragmatic state concession practice. 
The policy which emerged was to regulate in order to improve the 
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negotiating position of national and community interests and to direct large 
industrial investments to hydropower sites which were either too large or too 
distant from population centers to be relevant to general supply interests. 
 
5.2.1  The significance of the concession laws 
The breakthrough for the concession law process was forced by press 
initiatives, in particular the newspaper “Verdens Gang”, which in 1906 
published a number of critical articles. This occurred in an atmosphere of 
recently achieved national independence and national symbolic unity. 
Several of the articles attacked the role of director Gunnar Sætren of the 
directorate Kanalvesenet and one of his employees, who had been involved 
in hydropower projects with industrial clients like the Swedish financier 
Marcus Wallenberg, who was accused of systematic speculative purchasing 
of Norwegian waterfalls. A «panic-law» was approved by parliament on 
April 7. 1906, which stated that property rights and rights to exploit 
waterfalls could not be purchased by limited companies or foreign citizens 
without permission from the King. On June 12, the law was replaced by a 
more general law which expanded the principle to include forests and 
mineral resources in addition to waterfalls (Vogt, 1971:78-82).  
The main strategist directing the legislative process was Gunnar Knudsen, 
and gradually many of his early visions became established as the policy of 
the state. Parallel to the legislation process, the parliament increased its 
budgets for acquisition of waterfalls, and in 1907 the large Nore waterfall in 
Buskerud County in the central part of south-eastern Norway was bought, a 
decision with important implications for the future structuring of the 
industry. A new director of Kanalvesenet; Ingvar Kristensen, was employed 
in May 1907, and the name of the directorate shifted to «Vassdragsvesenet». 
The increased interventionist practice and the concession legislative form 
was not entirely new. Both the railway system and the telephone and 
telegraph systems had important concession systems. More importantly 
perhaps, was the influences from abroad where private monopolies in for 
instance the railway- and coal industries had shown themselves to be costly 
experiences to consumers. Also foreign examples - like Switzerland - of 
attempts at increasing the role of the state in the hydropower industry, 
influenced substantially the Norwegian debate. Countries like Switzerland, 
Austria, Germany, France and Italy all had established various kinds of state 
dominated regulatory systems in their hydro-power systems (Thue, 
1994:67). The increased state efforts to regulate and discriminate in favor of 
national and public interests should accordingly be seen on the background 
of the efforts of transnational capital interests to cartelize or monopolize 
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markets at the time and to gain world wide control over resources such as 
forests, minerals and energy.  
The panic law was gradually extended into an integrated system of laws 
which covered a multiplicity of industries, purchasing and renting of 
properties and user rights, waterway regulations, expropriations, operational 
licenses, state and municipal fees and compensations, the use of Norwegian 
equipment and workers, etc. In the final 1917 version, also Norwegian 
individuals and companies with unlimited responsibilities had to apply for 
purchasing concessions, which usually could be obtained for a period of 40 - 
50 years, where after investments returned at price zero to the state. 
Municipalities and counties did not have to acquire concession to buy 
waterfalls, unless the intent was to supply power to large scale energy 
intensive industries. Other concessions, such as for waterway regulations, 
were compulsory also for municipalities and counties. By the end of the 
process, the state under the Knudsen leadership had established a substantial 
national defense as well as a resource control system with radically extended 
powers and government capabilities. It came to represent a permanent, 
institutionally locked-in system which constitutes the basic regulatory 
system also after the market reform of the 1990’s.  
Despite the legal restrictions gradually imposed on private and in particular 
foreign industrial investments, large scale power intensive industries 
expanded rather rapidly during the entire period. The concession system 
developed only gradually into more restrictive and complete law systems, 
and hydropower resources were plentiful and by international comparisons 
cheap to exploit - also when the costs of government fees, local 
compensations and obligatory electricity supply to local districts were 
included. From 1917, after a few years of particularly rapid war-related 
industrial expansion, the state tightened its pragmatic policy (Thue, 1994:67-
69).  
 
5.2.2  The general supply sector: growth and conflicts 
During the growth period from 1906 to 1921, there were two major 
frontlines of controversy. One was between the publicly organized 
cooperative electricity companies and the private electricity companies. The 
second frontline gradually arose between the established cooperative system 
and a rapidly emerging national hierarchical program affiliated with the 
increased ambitions and capabilities of the state administration and with 
international developments towards large integrated electric utility 
companies.  
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A third controversy at the time, which had more to do with regional control 
with resources and markets, emerged between the cities and their 
surrounding rural areas, where the cities controlled the more lucrative 
markets and the rural municipalities controlled un-exploited hydropower 
resources. Rural municipalities from around 1913 organized inter-municipal 
or county based electricity companies to organize their electrification 
projects, to challenge the nearby cities and to overturn local small scale plant 
alternatives.  
Before 1920, private electricity supply companies still played important 
roles in some regions. The largest of these companies were Hafslund AS in 
Østfold and Treschow-Fritsøe AS and Skollenborg AS in Vestfold. Also 
Norsk Hydro AS hold contracts to supply areas in Buskerud and Oslo. In 
Vestfold however, private supply was forced into a public takeover by the 
county in 192039. The contract hold by Norsk Hydro turned out to be only 
temporal. Only Hafslund has managed to maintain an important regional 
position until today in the general supply system.  
The direct state engagement in the electricity sector rose from Knudsen’s 
early vision, and was gradually strengthened by a variety of similar ideas 
entering from abroad. It became linked with  demands from weaker regions 
which were unable to finance their own power production and electric 
network systems and accordingly lagged behind in the modernization 
process. Some of these continued to establish small scale isolated plant 
systems until the mid-1930’s (see for instance Rinde, 1995). 
From 1906 to 1920, the state established the foundation for its emerging 
direct engagement through extensive purchasing of waterfalls. By 1920, the 
state owned about 20% of the estimated hydro-power potential in the 
country. Until 1916, these investments were still explicitly related to the 
railway issue. The many years of arguments from prime minister Knudsen 
and his associates for a more direct role for the state, finally produced a 
breakthrough during World War I, when the role of the state increased in 
many respects as the young and inexperienced nation state had to respond to 
the various pressures from the European warfare. 
The actual political breakthrough for the more active direct state engagement 
occurred in the economic boom period between 1916 and 1920 when the 
parliament allocated much larger resources to regulate waterways and 
construct hydropower plants. Three different arguments combined in 
                                           
39 Only rural municipalities were included in counties at the time. 
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framing the new role of the state. The first argument was the traditional 
electrification of the railways argument. The second related to the fact that a 
further expansion of electrification in the south-eastern region depended on 
the exploitation of larger waterfall systems and thereby also on cross-
regional coordination. Many now saw the state as the “natural” organization 
to carry out this cross-regional operation. The third argument related to the 
interests of the less populated rural areas who argued for a greater state 
responsibility for the electrification of their regions. Apart from the purchase 
of the Glomfjord waterfall in Nordland in 1918, all state investments related 
explicitly to either of these three arguments. All together, the state by 1920 
only represented 7 % of the supply to general consumption and none to large 
scale industries. By 1940, the share had increased to 10% of total 
production.   
 
5.2.3 The emerging national hierarchical collective  
Both the ministry “Arbeidsdepartementet” and the directorate 
“Vassdragsvesenet” experienced a rapid growth in staff related to 
hydropower issues. From having only 7 employees in 1907, the state 
directorate expanded to 110 at the time of its reorganization into “Norges 
vassdrags- og energivesen” in 1921, excluding those directly engaged in 
state hydropower constructions. Additionally, the state established two 
separate permanent commissions directly subordinated the ministry; the 
“Electricity Commission” and the “Waterway Commission”, to administrate 
the various concession- and control systems. Other non-permanent 
commissions also played important roles in the increasingly complex 
administration of the sector. In 1921, all of these institutions were re-
organized into the NVE, which became a joint state organization for 
regulatory- as well as state production activities, organized outside and 
subordinated the ministry.  
Ingvar Kristiansen, director of “Vassdragsvesenet” from 1907 to 1921, 
strongly represented the idea that the state should hold the dominant role in 
the future electricity generating and supply system. His vision was that of an 
integrated national organization of the entire general supply system within 
the framework of a state monopoly. This vision gradually came to constitute 
an influential state-hierarchical collective with strongholds among leading 
engineers which hold national positions and perspectives rather regional, and 
which closely associated with similar continental entrepreneurial collectives 
at the time. 
As the state substantially increased its waterfall possessions from 1907, it 
gradually became clear that it had no convincing and coherent policy for the 
use of these large resources. The government was accused of putting a dead 
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hand on the resources. The government in 1911 appointed a commission 
with the primary purpose to come up with a state policy. In 1919, at last, the 
government presented its proposition to the parliament which however 
contained no clear policy. But, it suggested to establish yet another 
organization to produce such a policy and to carry it out; the NVE. 
Several issues, debates and events influenced the formation of the new 
organization. Firstly, there was a debate over the organization of the 
commercial interests of the state. Representatives of the local cooperatives as 
well as the large scale industries argued that state commercial activities 
should be organized separately and at a distance from the regulatory 
responsibility of the state. A joint state organization would increase the 
possibility - or at least the impression of such a possibility - that the state 
would favor its own competitive activities over county, municipal and 
private interests. Gunnar Knudsen and his government however, wanted to 
create a joint advisory board for its future electricity policy. This suggested a 
joint organization of all state electricity sector activities in order to secure 
coordination, control and breakthrough capability. 
Secondly, there was the question about the autonomy of the directorate. At 
least rhetorically, there was a broad support for a business-like organization 
of the directorate with substantial autonomy and independent 
responsibilities. The debate however occurred in connection to an earlier and 
similar debate over the role of the board of the state railway company NSB, 
where the business oriented board had been arguing strongly for a much 
more independent role vis á vis government and parliament. The discussion 
in that case ended when the board left in protest and the government passed 
a new law which only moderately provided a more independent position for 
the new board. This process substantially influenced the debate on the 
organization of NVE. In particular, it became clear that the direct 
engagement of the state in hydropower generation and distribution was to be 
rather tightly controlled by the government.  
By 1921, a new and more ambitious state directorate prepared for increased 
state leadership. The parliament however, represented an important 
counterpart to these ambitions, dominated as it was by the small scale 
cooperative program and local/regional interests. On several occasions it 
turned down the government and the directorate, for instance by forcing the 
government to sell state owned waterways to municipalities and counties.  
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5.2.4  The unsuccessful hierarchical reform; the first national 
plan 
Parallel to the work with the reorganization of the state directorate, the 
government in 1918 established a new “Electricity Supply Commission” to 
work out a national plan for the entire electricity sector. Such a plan had 
been advocated by leading engineers for quite some time, and received 
increasing support as the impressions of the escalating economic boom and 
lack of overall state governance and control became apparent. The 
Commission was established in January 1919 with the mandate to provide an 
in principle framework for the future electricity system, a general plan for 
the developments in each region, and a financial plan. Its dominant actors 
became Professor Olav Heggstad from the Norwegian Technical University 
in Trondheim (NTH), and the new director general of NVE; Birger Stuevold 
Hansen, who from 1921 served as the chairman of the commission. The 
commission had a representative character, aimed at collecting different 
professional, regional, business and consumer interests – a purpose which 
turned out to be in conflict with the radical restructuring approach 
represented by Heggstad. The large scale industries were poorly represented 
from the beginning, and later became without representation.  
The project was estimated to be finished within one year. It took however 
four years and much more money for the commission to finish its ambitious 
work. The approach of the commission was that of the complete, 
scientifically planned change; a rationalistic developmental approach in the 
sense that all the different aspects and details of a centralized, planned and 
coordinated development of the electricity system were presented and 
pushed jointly, based on the belief that scientific and technological 
rationality would be overwhelmingly convincing. The commission suggested 
five new laws or major changes in the existing legislation. Additionally, it 
presented a national plan which contained a general overview as well as 
outlined a comprehensive and detailed plan for all the 117 electricity regions 
identified by the plan. 
The economic slowdown from 1920/21 however, tended to reduced the 
political ambitions of state politicians. Demand for electricity staggered and 
declined as well as the financial capability of the state. The detailed planning 
had also revealed a more realistic understanding of the enormous technical 
and financial problems involved in the construction of an integrated national 
transmission system, which had been advocated by the most visionary 
engineers.  
The commission presented a radical hierarchical model. It suggested 
increased state powers to force local entities into larger units as well as 
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superiority for counties over municipalities in expropriations and in rights to 
supply consumers within their own territories. The plan in reality suggested 
something close to county based monopolies in supply as well as time 
constrained regional state monopolies related to state investments in large 
hydro-power plants in order to secure sufficient cost recovery to these 
investments. The commission also suggested to exclude private companies 
all together from participation in general supply. 
The national plan became forcefully attacked by local interests. The vision 
of a complete takeover of the electricity system by the state through gradual 
undermining of local autonomy, fuelled a heated debate and led to a 
completely negative reception of the suggestions presented by the 
commission. In its summary conclusion, the board of the NVE stated that 
time had not yet come for county- or state monopolies in the electricity 
system. None of the legal suggestions were eventually presented to 
parliament. As a result of the strong opposition to and limited results of the 
ambitious planning and legislative suggestions, the director general of NVE; 
Birger Stuevold Hansen, chose to withdraw from his position in 1925. 
Perhaps the most important influence of the enormous work of the 
commission in the relative shorter run, was its idea about a new state 
electricity bank. In 1927, the state established “The Municipal Bank40” with 
Stuevold Hansen as the chairman of the board. 
The large scale private industries also reacted negatively to the suggestions 
put forward by the commission, but their arguments were completely 
different. The industry organized their own committee on the subject which 
presented its own plan which argued for an integration of the public and 
private electricity systems into large electricity companies, organized as joint 
stock companies with participation by municipalities, counties, state and 
private interests. These ideas were typically influenced by organizational 
structures in the German electricity system. The industry argued that 
participation by private interests would direct the attention of local 
electricity companies out of their municipal constraints and improve the 
capability of local and regional electricity systems to form rational regional 
entities and cross-regional cooperation, that such a system would reduce 
some of the political problems involved in public sector organizations and 
secure a more modern and flexible business oriented organization. They also 
argued that the now separated large hydropower system from the general 
supply system represented an irrational structure. These arguments however, 
did not receive support from the publicly organized local cooperatives, and 
                                           
40 Kommunalbanken 
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left hardly any visible tracks in future developments - until the market 
reform process in the late 1980s. 
The conflicts and debates over the national plan ended with something close 
to a complete breakdown for the state-hierarchical collective, which led to a 
set back for these ideas in Norway for many years to come. The industry’s 
joint private-public program also failed to produce a political breakthrough, 
and its entrepreneurial collective found itself outside influential positions. 
Established small scale local cooperative collectives had won a complete 
victory. “Supported” by the economic decline, it destabilized the hierarchical 
ambitions within NVE and stabilized its own program through out the 
1920’s and early 1930’s – including the supportive and supplementary role 
of the state (Thue, 1994:187-211). 
The approach of the national plan strategy was strikingly different from the 
concession law process. It represented a complete and simultaneous 
approach aimed at a planned change of all relevant aspects of the system. 
Apart from directly provoking power struggles with those holding existing 
property and governance rights, the detailed and complete approach 
provided multiple opportunities for various counter-attacks from all kinds of 
positions and undermined the ability of the reformers to build alliances. This 
made even minor changes impossible to achieve. The process dropped dead, 
and the forces behind it were set back for an entire generation. The case 
nicely illustrates the breakdown of an ambitious entrepreneurial collective – 
with initial state institutional powers and academic as well as political 
support. During the 70 years to follow in the history of Norwegian electricity 
sector restructuring, the defeat in 1922 set the stage for a remarkably slow 
industrial restructuring process as compared to other European countries.  
 
 
5.3 Stabilization of the small scale program, 
         transformation of state-municipality relations and the 
         roots of direct state engagements in the large scale 
         program (1923 – 1945) 
The third period 1923 - 1945, covers a period of stabilization for the 
cooperative small scale program during the more or less strong economic 
recession between 1920 and 1935, the years of economic recovery until 1940 
and the war period 1940-45. In Norway, the 1920’s were mostly difficult 
years, in part because of the efforts of the various governments to comply 
with the international “back to the gold-standard” monetary policy, after the 
inflationary post-war boom period. The policy resulted in a relatively strong 
deflationary economy which increased debt-values and unemployment rates 
and decreased wages and public sector budgets. On top of this, the strong 
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international recession from 1929 radically reduced export markets on which 
the large scale industry was completely dependent. From the mid-1930’s, the 
international as well as the Norwegian economy gradually recovered.  
One important development from the mid-1930’s, was the industrial 
reorientation of state and county electricity policies. This resulted from a 
stronger production and employment orientation caused by the high 
unemployment rates, from the increase in international demand for energy 
intensive products and from the financial problems involved in the 
construction of remaining large waterfalls. For pragmatic reasons, large 
industrial customers were needed to absorb a sufficient share of new 
generating capacity from these larger projects from day one. Long term 
electricity supply contracts between public electricity generators and energy 
intensive industries gradually became a common practice. In this way, the 
small scale program and the large scale program came to interact directly 
with one another. 
Finally, the German occupation from 1940 to 1945 also left important 
durable patterns in the electricity sector. Firstly, when faced with a loss of 
control over the state administration, the concession laws and the local 
cooperative collectives became important national defense lines as 
Norwegian interests wanted to reduce the powers the German controlled 
state institutions. Secondly, the radical growth in large scale hydro-power 
and industrial investments initiated by the Germans, provided a new basis 
for a direct role of the state in the large scale industry program after the war. 
 
5.3.1  The economic recession and the destabilization of 
municipal autonomy 
The combination of the 1922-failure of the hierarchical program and the 
economic recession, provided for a long period of time when the cooperative 
small scale program was practically without serious rivals. However, the 
economic crisis gradually undermined also the strong autonomous status of 
the municipalities.  
Electricity consumption decreased and prices had to be reduced in order for 
the consumers to maintain their attachment to the electric system. To both 
public and private institutions who had invested heavily into the electricity 
system during the inflationary period, the consequences were dramatic. The 
state investments resulted in huge financial losses, which undermined further 
attempts at increasing the direct role of the state in the sector. To many of 
the municipalities, the economic recession had severe economic 
consequences. Already in 1920, the parliament decided to lend 50 million 
NOK to various municipalities in order to complete hydropower investments 
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under construction. By 1925, 49% of total municipal debt was directly 
related to electricity investments (Thue, 1994:215). As the deflationary 
policy undermined their ability to repay the loans, the state had to engage as 
an inter-mediator in between the municipalities and their creditors by 
refinancing municipal debts.  
To some of the municipalities and counties, the economic recession ended in 
severe crisis and in a few cases in outright bankruptcies. In particular some 
of the counties, who had taken on substantial investments, experienced 
substantial losses and lost much of their political legitimacy. In the wake of 
these events, the parliament passed a number of new laws which introduced 
state control with municipal taxation, debts and administration, after which 
municipal autonomy never really recaptured its previous position. The new 
state funded “Municipal Bank” became an important instrument for the state 
to direct and support local developments.  
By 1937, the board of NVE calculated the value of state support to local 
electricity companies to NOK 68 million, of which about 40 million directly 
covered losses. Comparably, the total state direct investments in electricity 
generation and distribution up to this point amounted to 88 million, of which 
an estimate of 35 million had been lost during the recession (Thue, 
1994:215-216). From 1938, the state established a permanent economic 
support fund to subsidize rural electrification, which also became a useful 
system of power for state regulators (Hindrum, 1991:9). 
However, many of the stronger local cooperative systems – in particular in 
the south-eastern part of the country - maintained a relatively sound 
economy during the period. Many of them had invested relatively little 
during the inflationary period, and were able to both buy electricity at low 
prices during the recession and to invest at low cost. It is illustrative to note 
that both liberal, conservative and labor governments at various points 
between 1923 and 1936 maintained an open attitude towards selling the large 
Nore waterfall to regional interests (Thue, 1994:216-221). The openness to 
such sales however, ended when the economy recovered in the second half 
of the 1930’s. 
  
5.3.2  The cooperative system; from local networks to regional 
    cooperatives 
The Electricity supply commission had argued for a hierarchical state-
county-municipal system to cope with the increased demands for cross-
regional coordination of investments, system operations and supply. With 
the rejection of the hierarchical model, the cooperative system was faced 
with the need to develop larger regional cooperative institutions and 
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organizations. In the districts, municipalities typically cooperated within the 
counties or within “natural” geographical regions. A larger system of 
coordination however, gradually became established in the south-east. Here, 
integrated regional cooperative systems had first been initiated from the 
private Hafslund system in Østfold, then from the interaction of Norsk 
Hydro in Rjukan (Telemark) with Drammen, Oslo and other population 
centers in Buskerud and Akershus, and from the interaction between the 
private Treschow-Fritzøe company in Vestfold and «Skiensfjorden 
Kommunale Kraftselskap» in Telemark during the post-war period. 
In the beginning, Norsk Hydro AS played an important role. Through its 
1920-contracts to sell electricity to several public electricity distributors, it 
served as the contractual counterpart to the first formalized cross-regional 
organization; “Fælleskontoret for Kristianiafjordens Elektrisitetsverker” in 
1922. From 1925 this organization coordinated local and regional interests 
towards the large state owned Nore hydropower station as well. From 
October 1928, all power stations within this south-eastern part of the country 
were technically integrated and coordinated by the organization which in 
1932 was re-named “Samkjøringen for kraftverkene på Østlandet”. Even 
though the state was not a member of the organization, the Nore power plant 
played a dominant role in the technical coordination of the integrated 
system. The command position of Samkjøringen provided its members with 
a strategic opportunity to take economic advantage of the direct state 
engagement in peak load management.  
NVE from the beginning, hold the position that technical coordination 
should be directed by NVE, based on the argument that anything which 
needed to be coordinated across county borders was a state responsibility. 
Accordingly, the directorate opposed to the superiority of Samkjøringen. 
NVE argued that Nore at least should be seen as an autonomous state 
responsibility which could be technically governed independently from the 
rest of the system. By 1929, the directorate had to give in to the argument 
that this was technically irrational, and accepted being instructed by the 
director of “Samkjøringen”. The organization thereby established a durable 
superiority over the NVE on the issue of technical coordination.  
Both the negotiations with the state over purchasing of power from Nore, the 
bargaining over a complete regional cooperative takeover of the state owned 
plant, and the rivalry over technical governance control, contributed to the 
formation of a strong and hierarchically organized cooperative organization. 
From 1935 the conflict between the state and the electricity companies in 
south-eastern Norway demented. In 1937, Samkjøringen prepared for taking 
up the NVE as a member of the organization, and the government decided to 
let NVE join the organization from July 1938. The electricity sector in the 
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south-east was thereby constituted as an integrated state-cooperative 
governance system.  
By the mid-1930’s, the ambitious state electricity policy was found in ruin. 
Most of the state generated power was supplied in the relatively rich and 
densely populated areas in the south-east, at prices below investment cost - 
rather than in the weaker regions which had actually been the political target. 
About one third of the invested state capital in hydropower generation was 
lost, and the expected profits which had been intended to support 
electrification in rural areas, had not materialized. Total national production 
by 1939 amounted to only 12 TWh – one tenth of the 1990 level. The state 
share was 1.2 TWh (10%). 
Gradually, new ideas about a more active role of the state in the economy 
spread from abroad. This occurred under the impressions of a rapid 
industrial growth with full employment in the Sovjet Union in a situation 
with a severe economic set back in the capitalist economy. On the other side 
of the political specter however, opposition against the concession system 
grew with the recovery of the economy, as economic opportunities for new 
industrial projects became apparent towards 1940. Uncertainty over where to 
go was considerable. Then, the war came to shape things in very different 
ways.   
 
5.3.3  The war: Large scale German industry and small scale 
Norwegian defense  
During the war, the electricity sector expanded more rapidly than in the 
1930’s, and the economy within the sector radically improved. The German 
electricity policy in practice represented a continuation of the dual system, 
even though the German administration argued for tighter organizational 
integration and large scale war related investments - ideally organized in line 
with German electricity systems with a few large national joint stock 
companies with both private and public interests represented – or if possible, 
as only one national electricity company.  
The German “Reichskommisariat” established its own electricity 
administration which worked in parallel to the state ministry and the NVE, 
usually with no clear cut separation of responsibilities between them. They 
also established a cooperative commission with Norwegian participation 
until the summer 1941. Wartime needs for more metals and hence large scale 
industries dominated German interests in Berlin, where as the administration 
in Norway to a larger extent advocated a more long term strategy based on 
acceptance and cooperation with the Norwegians. Berlin however, forced its 
interests through, and a wartime oriented large scale industry program came 
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to represent the dominant part of the German electricity policy. Very 
ambitious plans were presented to increase the aluminum production to 7 
times that of the Norwegian 1939 level, as well as large plans for other types 
of war related products. To own and operate these projects, a new company, 
«Nordische Aluminium Gesellschaft (Nordag) was established in Berlin in 
1940 under control by the German Air Force (Luftwaffe). It became 
established in Norway with two different subsidiaries, of which one had 
participation from Norsk Hydro (Vogt, 1971:134). 
The ideas presented by the Germans, corresponded closely with ideas which 
had been advocated by Norwegian industrialists for many years, ideas which 
were highly influenced from Germany in the first place; those which had 
been pushed aside by the Electricity Supply Commission in 1919-22. 
Representatives of these industrial interests became the main cooperative 
counterpart to the German electricity sector administration - at least until late 
in 1941. Their detailed knowledge about the Norwegian hydro-power system 
as well as about remaining un-exploited waterfalls, made it possible to 
construct a large operational plan rather quickly. 
The parallel German administration, shifting political alliances in Berlin as 
well as in Oslo and the conflicts within the NS-party, contributed to a 
substantial fragmentation of the state governance system during the war, 
which reduced the ability of the German administration to carry out a 
powerful and coherent policy. State employees engaged actively against the 
German large scale industrial plans. In this situation the concession law 
system represented a national defense system. The German companies did 
not meet the demands of the laws, and the German administration had to 
force their plans through the Norwegian state administration - usually after 
investments had already started. These events further reduced the legitimacy 
of the German policy in the eyes of the Norwegians, reduced German access 
to Norwegian financial resources and knowledge, and ended the Norwegian 
participation in the cooperative commission. 
The German policy succeeded to a very limited extent. None of the new 
large scale industries were completed by the end of the war, and the actual 
production of aluminum had been reduced by one third as compared to 1939. 
Both the lack of resources, materials and qualified employees caused by war 
events, sabotage and administrative obstructions contributed to this outcome. 
Combined with a steady growth in regional- and local generating capacity 
and the wartime coal shortage, general consumption increased by around 
50% from 1940 to 1945. Hence, despite the German pressures to increase 
large scale production, the actual expansion of consumption occurred in the 
general supply part of the system (Thue, 1994:347-386). 
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5.3.4 Public or private, cooperatives or hierarchy? 
The early history of the Norwegian electricity sector provided the industry 
with a number of specific structures which became locked in as durable 
patterns. On of these was the separation of the industry into a dominantly 
public sector cooperative system in general supply structured in accordance 
with federative organizational principles, and a private large scale industry 
sector.  
Through out the period a state hierarchical alternative challenged both, 
without significant success. In fact, a severe breakdown for the hierarchical 
program in 1922 led to a radical set back for the state-hierarchical program 
through out the period. At least one important reason for this breakdown was 
the highly rationalistic and complete reform strategy which prevented the 
reformers from establishing links and alliances needed to carry suggested 
reforms through the political system. In its absence, the cooperative system 
gradually developed a cross-regional organization with both bottom-up 
federative structures and strong hierarchical capacities and competencies, 
which forced through the ability to also direct NVE power plants. This 
provided the cooperative approach with an important instrument for sector 
coordination and governance. 
The small scale cooperative program reinforced its position in between 1922 
and 1935, but also experienced a gradual undermining of one of its core 
institutional elements; municipal autonomy. During the German occupation, 
the cooperatives once again reinforced its legitimacy in the role as a national 
defense line. Until the end of the war, the Norwegian general supply 
electricity sector remained predominantly cooperative in structure, headed 
by a still ambitious cooperative entrepreneurial collective with Samkjøringen 
in command position. 
The third element which became an important durable part of the system, 
was the Concession Law system, which represented the national resource 
control issue. Important to note, is that apart from providing the state with a 
strong regulatory capacity, it also provided municipalities and counties with 
substantial institutional advantages both towards private national interests 
and towards state domination. National resource control and local and 
regional electricity sector collectives were thereby tied closely together, and 
private interests to a major extent became locked-out from the general 
electricity supply industry . 
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6 Re-shaping the electricity sector. State 
dominance, emerging complexity and 
unresolved controversies 
Both war experiences and international political and economic developments 
were essential to the major transformation of the Norwegian electricity 
sector during the post World War II period. In particular to those who had 
been actively involved in the international warfare activities, the war left an 
overwhelming impression of the resource mobilizing and logistical capacity 
of the warfare states, as well as of the powers of and necessity of 
international political and economic cooperation. But, the war had also 
created an atmosphere of national unity and collective political values, a 
willingness to overcome traditional conflicts and to create a better society. 
All of this transformed into a new active role of the Norwegian state in the 
civil society economy.  
In the 1930’s, impressions from the rapid industrial growth and full 
employment in the Soviet Union had added political legitimacy and 
enthusiasm for economic planning and political governance of the economy 
– also among scientific economists. But, the new policy had even deeper 
roots in developments in the US in the post World War I period, were 
“Fordism” and “Taylorism” came to dominate industrial organization 
thinking and practices. One example of a specific American project which 
came to represent a new model for large scale economic modernization, was 
the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project decided by Congress in 1934. 
It differed from traditional large scale industry projects by allocating an 
active role to public institutions and governments. The TVA was a huge 
public corporation which constructed dams and generated electricity, 
established fertilizer plants, controlled floods, restored forests etc. for the 
purpose of regional industrialization and economic growth in economically 
underdeveloped Tennessee (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998:54).   
In the wake of a dramatic bankruptcy in 1934 for the huge privately owned 
Edison Chicago Company headed by Samuel Insull, the TVA through its 
largeness and its public interest orientation became immensely popular by 
the Roosevelt “new deal” administration as a different approach. Despite 
vigorous counter forces within the US electric utility sector (Hughes, 
1983:221-226) – the TVA became the more influential political model 
through its popularity with the government and the federal administration. It 
also made a substantial influence on the new generation of engineers through 
David Lilienthal’s best selling book: “TVA: Democracy on the March“ 
(1944). Large publicly owned companies and industry projects became the 
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completely dominating model in Europe after the war - with substantial 
support also from the American government. 
The entrepreneurial collective which came to take power and to remake the 
Norwegian society with substantial force after the war, had been educated 
and trained under these international impressions and had been pulled 
together during the war by the exile government in London. It emerged out 
of ideas developed within the Labor Party in the 1930’s, out of war 
impressions, out of initiatives to take leadership after the war, out of 
developments within economic theorizing and out of close associations with 
international political allies, who directed and coordinated the new political 
and economic order in Western Europe. In an important sense, it also came 
to represent a continuation of the developmental approach of Gunnar 
Knudsen, which had come to a halt between 1921 and 1935.  
Contrary to for instance in Great Britain and France, where the state 
nationalized a number of large industries including the entire electricity 
industry, the local cooperative collectives had strengthened their political 
legitimacy within the Norwegian electricity sector during the war. The exile 
government and state administration which arrived back in Norway in 1945, 
accordingly faced a strengthened small scale cooperative rival to their large 
scale industrial modernization program back home.  
By taking control of the “commanding heights” within the state 
administration and by establishing tight relationships with the Oslo School 
of Economics and the many new groups of professionals within various 
sectors of society, the new Labor Party regime managed to establish a 
system which to a great extent balanced and integrated the large scale 
program with the traditional cooperative. Politically and professionally 
governed sector hierarchies were combined with popular and democratic 
participation in cooperative organizations. Rather than confronting the 
cooperative program, the new entrepreneurial collective sought to enroll the 
cooperative governance systems by giving them specific roles within its own 
hierarchical model. When observed from the point of view of the 
cooperative organizations, the roles they were given provided opportunities 
for influence and exploitation of the regulatory capacity of the state for their 
own purposes. This mutual transformation and enforcement of state 
hierarchy and cooperative programs is broadly seen as the trademark for the 
Norwegian post-war corporate governance model.  
In sectors of the economy with strong cooperative traditions, national 
cooperative organizations had already before the war been given substantial 
political roles and responsibilities. In many instances they came to represent 
something in between a state directorate and an open membership 
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association – or rather a mix of both. In the electricity sector, the corporate 
system was primarily based on a combination of an active direct state 
engagement represented by the NVE and the cooperation of generators 
(including NVE) in various regional cooperatives similar to Samkjøringen, 
which gradually merged into one national organization as the regional 
electricity networks became linked to one national transmission network in 
1970. 
 
 
6.1 Hierarchy or markets? Rival collectives in economic 
theorizing 
During the 1930s, a major controversy emerged within economics between a 
hierarchical school of thought and a liberal market school. The positions 
were affiliated with the controversy between socialists and economic liberals 
in more general political terms. On the hierarchical/socialist side economists 
such as Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tindbergen developed econometrics as an 
area of economics which integrated statistical theory, business cycle theory 
and -modeling with planning theory and development of operational 
instruments for national economic planning purposes. Both were later given 
the first Nobel Prize in economics in 1969. Following Frisch and Tinbergen, 
the polish economist Oskar Lange became very influential – not at least at 
the University of Oslo, where Frisch and his students had established what 
was to became known as one of the international strongholds for the 
hierarchical school; the Oslo School of Economics. Lange’s publications 
became highly influential during the war also in the US, where he was a 
professor at the University of Chicago. In 1943 he took over as the editor of 
the journal “Econometrica” after its founder and first editor, Frisch (Barth 
Jacobsen, 1998:99)41.  
Lange was in part influenced by Joseph Schumpeter’s ideas about 
technological innovations as the source of economic growth, which had roots 
back to Marx. To mobilize state powers and science for large scale 
innovative economic growth was a part of his program. He was however 
even more influenced by the Austrian economist Ludvig von Mieses’ 
theories about the role of price-information in the economy. Lange brought 
this idea into his state-economic program by giving professional economists 
                                           
41 After the war, he became the Polish ambassador to the UN, and in 1949 he was called back 
to Poland, where he later became the provost for the school for economic planning in 
Warsaw, till he died in 1965. With the emerging cold war in the 1950s however, he became 
discredited in the West. 
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the task to imitate the price-formation in markets through calculus, within a 
hierarchically organized production system. The joining of these two 
elements resulted in a program for a hierarchical, scientific economic system 
based on state ownership, control and initiative, where the marginal cost 
based price theory was to be applied to ensure efficient resource allocation to 
the various parts of the economy. Optimal prices had to be designed by 
economic professionals within a central planning unit.  
At the time, the planned economy represented a serious alternative to the 
miserable state of capitalist markets during the 1930’s, and Lange and his 
allies argued strongly that economic theories traditionally applied to 
markets, could more efficiently be applied to centralized planning than to 
competitive markets. Markets could be imitated by planners and prices on 
input factors could be set so as to utilize resources efficiently for innovative 
growth. Positivism within the natural sciences had expanded into an 
economic social engineering program; the entire economy was to be turned 
into a laboratory where everything could be created and controlled by expert 
scientists. This was the economic program which came to influence 
international academic economics right after the war – in Norway as well as 
in the US, England, France and elsewhere - in addition to its dominance in 
the socialist countries.  
The major opponents to Lange and the hierarchical approach, were the 
“Austrian school of economics” represented by L. von Mises and his student 
F. von Hayek, and those who came to establish what was to became known 
as the “Chicago school”; in particular A.A. Alchian and M. Friedman, after 
Lange left Chicago and Friedman became appointed as a Chicago 
professor42. The Austrians and the Chicago economists argued that the 
hierarchical “imitated market” would not work due to the absence of the 
individual profit motive in state owned economies, the overwhelming need 
for centralized information transactions and the limited room for individual 
choice. This would hamper innovative activities and undermine growth. 
Rather they argued that rational social order and economic development 
should be based on the activities of self-organized market actors 
(Vaughn,1994:1-11).  
The hierarchical approach came to dominate the market liberal alternative in 
between 1945 and approximately 1975. With the discrediting of Oskar 
                                           
                                      42 Many of the leading international economists at the time worked together within the 
Cowles Foundation which was located at the University of Chicago at the time. It later moved 
to Yale University. 
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Lange in the early 1950’s, the Keynesian approach which focussed on the 
role of the state in macro-governance of the economy, moved to the center in 
the capitalist world and to dominate the central planning approaches of the 
industrialized states in the 1960s and early 1970s.  
The ideas of Mises, Hayek, Alchian and Friedman were pushed back into the 
universities, where they continued to develop their theoretical concepts and 
to produce arguments in order to expand their competitive market concepts. 
Given the strength of the hierarchical program in Continental Europe, the 
Austrian tradition moved to the US and England. In Norway, their ideas first 
and foremost came to be represented by the economist Trygve J. B. Hoff and 
the journal “Farmand”, in which Hoff was the editor for many years between 
1935 and 196643. At the time he was commonly regarded a right wing rebel 
– even by the conservative party. 
 
 
6.2 The war experienced social engineering collective; 
         mobilizing state powers for industrial and economic 
         growth and for economic redistribution (1946-1968) 
Many of the dominant actors of the emerging Norwegian social engineering 
collective had been involved with the Labor Party exile government in 
London, in the government administration and the institutions it created in 
order to follow German activities in Norway, to govern the Norwegian 
participation in war activities and to prepare for the takeover of political 
power at the end of the war. In this environment, a new export oriented large 
scale industry policy was developed within the government’s industry 
committee in 1943, under the Ministry of Supply. The new policy was based 
on detailed studies of German large scale investments in Norway, and 
concluded that these primarily had to be exploited for large scale industry 
purposes. The committee was headed by professor Fredrik Vogt, who had 
been the provost of NTH until 1941. Other important members were Konrad 
Nordahl, who later became the leader of the social democratic association of 
labor unions (LO) and Nicolai Stephansen from Norsk Hydro.  
The economist Erik Brofoss headed the Industry Office in the Ministry of 
Supply. He later became the Minister of Finance from November 1945 and 
the Minister of Commerce from December 1947 to 1954. From these two 
”commanding heights” he directed the establishing of a tight alliance 
between the social democratic government and the economists at the 
                                           
43 Hoff had also participated in the debates within the Cowles Foundation in the late 1930s. 
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University of Oslo who developed national economic planning-, control- and 
governance systems based on the ideas of Oskar Lange and the econometrics 
of Ragnar Frisch and Jan Tinbergen. Together they established a new 
organization for national statistics; the Statistical Bureau (SSB) as a 
“manufacturer” of the information and governance systems needed. As the 
minister of the new Ministry of Industry (ID) was appointed Lars Evensen, 
who had served in a core role for the LO in Stockholm and London during 
the war, and who had been involved in shaping the post-war political 
program of the AP (Barth Jacobsen; 1998:65). Just like the TVA project, it 
focused on the electricity sector, the electro-mechanical, the electro-technical 
and the power intensive industries as the main “engine” in large scale social-
economic projects, for expansion, economic growth and social welfare.   
The political heritage within the AP on the subject of state power supply to 
large scale industry, was ambiguous. The party had taken over government 
in 1935, but had mainly continued the electricity policy of the previous 
social liberal governments. This policy was closely in line with an important 
communalistic and agrarian part of the party. From 1933, a more active 
policy of the state emerged within the party, which stressed the need to 
exploit the large state owned waterfalls and to support the establishing of 
new large scale industries as well. In 1934, a technological association 
within the party became established to continue the work on these ideas. 
Because of the limited access to international markets at the time however, 
these ideas faced severe obstacles. The 1936 party plan for electrification, 
accordingly focused on supply for traditional industries and households and 
on rural electrification (Thue, 1994:388-390).  
The state electricity policy was the theme of a broad, representative 
electricity committee established in 1945, headed by NVE. The committee 
presented its report in 1947, but the government never presented it to 
parliament. The report argued for a continuation of state priorities for 
general supply rather than large scale industries, and for using the large 
German investments to general supply purposes. The committee obviously 
represented attitudes which dominated the sector rather broadly. On this 
background, it became clear that an explicit state political shift towards the 
large scale model would have met substantial opposition in parliament. 
Accordingly, the strategy became one of capturing the operational 
“commanding heights” through state administrative changes and a pragmatic 
step by step approach directly related to specific waterfall projects. It became 
based on a network of representatives distributed within the state 
administration, the universities and research institutions.  
One important aspect which made it possible to expand the role of the state 
in industrial production after the war, was the ability of the state to obtain 
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foreign aid and loans. First through the Marshall-plan, and later through the 
financial credibility of a state with a radically improved tax-base. State loans 
could be invested directly by the state or reallocated to counties and 
municipalities through the Municipal Bank. The state’s financial 
opportunities also suggested a state electricity supply to new power intensive 
industries rather than traditional industrial self-supply. To local and regional 
electricity companies, both the tight state control on foreign borrowing, and 
the lower cost of state loans, turned state loans into a major financial option. 
The radically increased demand through out the period, however, made it 
possible for non-state electricity companies to a great extent to finance new 
investments directly from internal funds. This financial strength of the local 
electricity companies, provided for an important defense against an even 
stronger state dominance between 1947 and 1960.   
Gradually, these developments stabilized a network of interdependencies 
between the state and the entire electricity based large scale industry. Many 
different networks became affiliated with the maintenance of this alliance; 
international political and financial institutions, large multinational 
companies, local districts, electricity sector organizations, trade unions and 
supply industries, in addition to the AP government and the state 
administration itself. Together they provided for a highly stabilized 
collective with persuasive political and economic powers (Midttun, 1987).  
 
6.2.1   Transforming the role of the state in the electricity sector 
Erik Brofoss and Lars Evensen played important strategic roles in carrying 
out the new policy. Both stressed the need to increase export revenues and 
labor productivity in a situation with a tight labor market, and both favored 
large scale industries as the tool in this respect, in line with the perspectives 
outlined by the industry committee in London and in line with the role 
Norway had been given by the international program for reconstruction of 
the European economy; to produce metals to the European reconstruction. 
NVE at the end of the war, was not a part of this new entrepreneurial 
collective. It rather reflected the unsuccessful direct state engagements in the 
electricity sector during the 1920’s and -30’s, and the national political 
confrontations with the German occupants and their electricity policy. The 
traditional market problems for state electricity, the downsizing of the direct 
state engagement, the dominance of Samkjøringen and the autonomy of local 
and regional cooperatives, had led to a rather disillusioned organization. In 
the discussions about what to do with the German investments in the large 
waterfalls Mår and Tyinn, NVE representatives argued that these waterfalls 
should be reserved for general supply purposes. In the case of Aura in Møre 
og Romsdal, they argued that the waterfall was too large and too expensive 
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to exploit and that resources rather should be invested into smaller waterfalls 
more suitable for general supply in the region. In all of these cases, NVE 
actively opposed to its minister Lars Evensen and the large scale industry 
ideas of the government (Thue, 1994:408-417).  
In 1947, the government started re-shaping the NVE by appointing professor 
Fredrik Vogt as the new director general. Under his leadership the ideas 
developed in London during the war was forced through. The elder 
generation became pushed aside and a new generation of engineers was 
hired. Salaries were increased. In 1948 a new construction department was 
established which embarked on a number of large hydropower projects in an 
atmosphere of pioneer-ship, of “getting rid of the red tape in order to get the 
job done” kind of attitude. The NVE – just like Edison’s laboratories – also 
had an important role in producing human representations of the program, by 
educating delegates who entered managerial positions in the larger regional 
electricity companies through out the country.  
In 1960 the NVE became reorganized and Halvard Roald took over as 
director general after Vogt. He came from a position as assistant minister44 in 
the Ministry of Industry (ID), and had also served as the vise director general 
in the NVE since 1954 – a delegate from within the social democratic 
political governance system. At the same time, Sigurd Aalefjær, became 
managing director of a new department within NVE called Statkraftsverkene 
– responsible for the state’s direct engagement in the electricity sector. 
The breakthrough for the large scale program apparently occurred through a 
“pragmatic” approach. However, the process was forcefully pushed by the 
government. The conflicts over the power from  the state owned Mår 
waterfall, illustrates how the new state industrial policy became shaped. By 
the end of the war, the state confiscated the German ownership in Nordisk 
Lettmetall, which owned the industries planned to take delivery from the 
Mår-power, and cancelled the electricity concessions involved. The 
construction of the power plant and the transmission system had been headed 
by Norsk Hydro. The industries were handed over to Norsk Hydro in which 
the state through its German confiscations became an important share owner. 
Norsk Hydro was given the responsibility to complete the construction work 
on behalf of the state. The company then offered to take over a large share of 
the ownership in the Mår waterway, in line with the traditional industrial 
self-supply model for large scale industry. The idea was however rejected by 
the government, and the two parties negotiated a 50 year state electricity 
                                           
44 statssekretær 
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supply contract for one third of the new generating capacity based on a self-
cost principle, with no price index regulations, but with adjustments for real 
generating costs. With this contract, the principles to be laid down in a 
number of later contracts between the state and power intensive industries 
had been established  (Thue, 1994:395-399). 
The institutionalization of self-cost based pricing in industrial contracts with 
below inflation adjustments of prices, gradually led to substantial economic 
losses to the NVE and to some of the regional electricity companies. These 
losses had to be covered through price increases to general supply purposes. 
Despite its traditional strong priority for general supply, the Parliament 
gradually was forced to increase consumer prices in order to balance the 
budgets of the NVE. 
 
6.2.2 The general supply system; from local autonomy and 
          business orientation to public   sector integration and state- 
          regional dominance 
Even though the new state priority for large scale industry represented the 
most eye-catching development after the war, there was a strong support also 
for general supply. In large scale projects, a combination was necessary for 
financial reasons. Both state programs for rural electrification, the state 
credit policy and the new state generating capacity contributed substantially 
to a rapid increase in general supply and to completing electrification in rural 
areas. By 1955 around 500.000 of the by 1945 registered 700.000 
households without or with insufficient supply of electricity, had been 
connected to the grid system by the help of 268 million NOK in state 
subsidies (ca. 2.14 billion NOK in 1990 money value). Ten years later, in 
1965, another 309 million NOK had been used, and only 2650 registered 
individuals were without electricity (Hindrum, 1991:127).  
To the local cooperative collectives, the situation had changed dramatically 
since the pre-war period. With a rapid increase in demand, the constraints 
now had become access to skilled labor, to capital and imported equipment. 
Allocations of these critical resources had became  centralized under a tight 
state control regime. What had previously been organized rather 
autonomously by the local electricity companies, was now forced into a 
negotiating system in which the government and the state administration 
hold the upper hand. This stronger position of the state was also exploited to 
induce a larger degree of cooperation between local electricity companies. A 
number of new inter-municipal organizations became established with the 
mediation of NVE. 
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The larger projects also necessitated a radical increase in cross-regional 
cooperation in order to establish a sufficiently large market for the new 
generating capacity. The largest projects, like Tokke in Telemark and Sira-
Kvina in Vest-Agder and Rogaland, typically involved cooperation between 
the state and a large number of local and regional electricity companies as 
well as negotiated agreements on where to locate new industries. Also 
regional companies signed industrial contracts at prices below production 
costs (Rinde, 1995:122). The new industry provided both direct and indirect 
employment and tax revenues, and electricity to a large extent came to be 
regarded as a public sector infrastructure investment and input factor to 
industrial and economic growth rather than as a separated economic area.  
Four additional cross-regional cooperative organizations responsible for 
operating and coordinating generation and network balancing were 
established in addition to the already existing organization in the south-
eastern region. The new “Samkjøringen organizations” were 
“Nordenfjeldske Kraftsamband” established in 1947, “Vestlandske 
Kraftsamband” in 1955, “Samkjøringen Nord-Norge” in 1960 and “Vest-
Norges Samkjøringsselskap” in 1961. NVE became a member in all of these, 
and through its investments into high voltage transmission lines, it came to 
play a core role in the gradual merging of regional networks into one 
national grid system in which the state owned the dominant share of the 
national high voltage network, but where operational control was 
subordinated the cooperative organization of the generators. In this way, the 
general supply system developed into an integrated state-sector cooperative 
system with divisions of roles inherited from the conflicts over Nore in the 
late 1920’s.  
During the 1950’s a new political program for structural reforms in the 
public sector emerged. It reflected the ambitions of social engineering 
program to rationalize the municipal sector. In 1960, the state initiated a 
reform in which the cities were included into the counties. It followed a 
municipal reform in 1957 in which a number of small municipalities were 
merged, and it was followed by a new wave of municipal restructuring in 
1967 (NOU 1992:15). In a parliament report in 1959/60 on the organization 
of NVE45, the question about major organizational reforms of the electricity 
sector was raised. In 1964 there was still 638 organizational entities within 
the electricity sector, most of them small distribution companies. 
 
                                           
45 St.prp. nr. 100 (1959-60) 
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6.2.3 The political shift to a right wing-center coalition  
          government 
The early 1960’s represented the peak of the domination of the social 
democratic social engineering collective, with continuous rapid growth in 
the economy as well as rapid expansion of the welfare state. The social 
engineering program and the Norwegian corporate governance model had 
reached a stabilized state in which its different networks; interpersonal, 
institutional, financial, organizational, political, industrial, technological, 
international etc. had managed to produce substantial results. With the 
introduction of computers in the late 1960s, the economic governance tools 
were radically expanded into complex economic simulation and forecast 
models used by SSB, FD and the Norwegian Central Bank (NB). The energy 
policy was directed from within the core of the collective which hold 
command positions towards the electricity sector within the government, the 
NVE, the research institutions NTH, SINTEF/EFI and IFE, and the state 
research council NTNF. In the words of Atle Midttun, the power-segment 
represented a large, well organized institutional complex with wide political 
mandates and substantial economic and political weight within the 
production system, the financial system, the state administration, the 
regional administrations, the trade unions and the core educational- and 
research institutions (Midttun, 1987).  
Politically, the situation changed during the 1960s. In 1961, the radical wing 
of the AP left the party and formed a new Socialist Peoples’ Party (SF) with 
two representatives in parliament. This led to the first government crisis in 
1962 and a short lived conservative government. In 1965, however, AP lost 
the parliament election and a coalition government was formed with 
participation from all the previous opposition parties; Høyre (H), Venstre 
(V), Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF) and Senterpartiet (SP). The coalition also 
won the election in 1969 and remained in government until 1971, when it 
broke apart over the EEC-membership issue.  
The political change in government however, did not represent any radical 
change in economic policy at the time, but rather a relative shift in focus 
from state driven industrial growth and resource allocation to a larger 
emphasis on organizational efficiency. In 1968, professor in hydroelectric 
engineering, Vidkunn Hveding, took over as director general of the NVE, a 
position he hold until 1975. Hveding came to represent an important shift 
towards “electricity economics” which focussed primarily on external 
pricing principles and efficient internal organization. The shift occurred with 
the backing of the new H-KrF-V-SP coalition government.  
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In line with international developments and after the initial investments into 
two small atomic power research reactors in the late 1950, a strong program 
for introduction of atomic power was pushed also in Norway. In the first 
parliamentary report regarding the energy policy in 1970, the coalition 
government suggested to introduce thermal power based on atomic energy to 
the electricity system46. However, the industry committee in parliament was 
skeptical and pointed to the need for a new atomic energy law if atomic 
energy was to be established47. This led to the initial work on a new energy 
legislation.  
The ambition to rationalize the organizational structure of the sector also 
increased through out the 1960s’. Where as Hveding represented a rather 
pragmatic attitude in favor of gradual voluntary mergers, others – like 
Siggurd Aalefjær in Statkraftsverkene – created plans for a state governed 
integration of the entire system. Also the atomic power plans put pressures in 
the direction of a centralization of organizational structures.  
In the late 1960’s three different lines of conflict between well organized 
entrepreneurial collectives emerged in relation to the electricity sector, which 
turned policy-making into a much more complex task. These where : 
1) An emerging conflict between the social engineering collective with its 
atomic power and large scale hydro-power projects and the emerging 
environmental movement.  
2) A renewed conflict between a much more ambitious state hierarchical 
collective primarily represented by NVE (Statkraftverkene and the E-
directorate) and the local cooperatives over governance principles and 
organizational control in the sector.  
3) A conflict between a program for allocative economic efficiency based 
on the new electricity economics introduced by Hveding and the energy 
intensive industry. 
Together they came to represent a gradual and partial destabilization of the 
post-war social democratic social engineering program. 
 
 
                                           
46 St.meld. nr. 97 (1969-70) 
47 Innst. Storting nr. 222 (1970-71) 
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6.3 Destabilizing the post-war regime. Multiple frontlines, 
        increased governance complexity and renewed 
        hierarchical initiatives (1968-1980) 
This fifth and final period of this historical background presentation covers a 
period of partial destabilization of the social engineering collective, forced 
by growing economic problems and emerging rival programs challenging the 
established order from multiple directions. Again, these developments were 
closely related to the emergence of similar programs internationally, to 
which the various Norwegian collectives were associated and from where 
they became influenced during the second half of the 1960’s. With a large 
new post-war generation leaving the educational system under the 
impression of the Vietnam war, the national independence movements in the 
third world and the political dominance of the large scale social engineering 
collective, all kinds of rival programs which aimed at the re-making of 
society in some respect, gained momentum all over the western world. The 
general beliefs in the growth philosophy declined along with positivism in 
science. The dominance of those educated in the 1930s came to an end. 
At the same time, economic problems gradually emerged. The rapid 
economic growth declined from 1968. Both expansionary state budgets and 
increased credits gradually led to a situation with a combination of inflation, 
government budget deficits and large state debt burdens in the 1970s. 
Keynesian economics also seemed to come to an end. Governments could 
not expand their budgets further and credits could apparently not be 
expanded to boost growth without fuelling inflation. In 1972, the Bretton 
Woods exchange rate regime broke down. The euro-dollar market outside 
the control of the Federal Reserve or any other government, made it 
impossible to control credit while maintaining political governance of 
interest rates. Both economists and governments had to search for alternative 
approaches in order to cope with the situation.  
In the US, Friedman’s monetary theory offered a solution in line with 
traditional American ideology; a return to a competitive market policy and 
hands off by the government. The University of Chicago became the new 
Mecca for economists. In England, Hayek’s ideas about self-organized 
markets provided similar thoughts – developed and argued during 25 years 
of political exile for the liberal market theory. With the Nobel prizes to 
Hayek in 1974 and Friedman in 1976, the “neo-liberal” program 
demonstrated its rapid recovery within the international community of 
economists. In Norway, Farmand and Trygve J. B. Hoff transmitted these 
ideas and gradually increased its audience – not at least among a growing 
network of market economic advocates in the new right wing party 
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“Fremskrittspartiet”, which challenged the conservative party Høyre from 
the market oriented side. 
The Soviet Union lagged substantially behind economically during the 
1960’s - in particular in consumer markets. Also the socialist experiments in 
third world countries in the early 1970s turned out to produce devastating 
results. When also the state owned large scale industries in Western Europe 
entered substantial economic problems and had to be closed down at a large 
scale, the socialist alternative lost much of its credibility. “More markets – 
less state” became a powerful slogan for the neo-liberal entrepreneurial 
collectives, which expanded into core institutional positions at national as 
well as international levels.  
Another generation of economic researchers became educated by the neo-
liberal program, and a massive influx of research interest fuelled a rapid 
expansion of economic theory and business economics; strategy, 
organizational theory, financial economics, theories of the firm etc.. This 
process added new concepts, loads and delegates to the neo-liberal economic 
program and provided politicians with new operational alternatives for 
economic governance. In Europe, the organizations which had been set up to 
increase economic integration and avoid nationalistic expansion; the EEC, 
the OECD and the EFTA, quickly became dominated by the neo-liberal 
program and became “educational centers” for civil servants from the 
various states. World wide, the IMF and the World Bank became important 
commanding heights for the advancement of the neo-liberal economic 
program.  
Within the energy sector however, the large scale social engineering 
collective pushed for new large atomic power projects, but faced a rapidly 
growing anti-nuclear movement. After the accident at the Three Mile Island 
atomic power plant in Pennsylvania in 1977, the atomic power program 
rapidly broke down in all western countries except France. The technology 
was apparently not as safe as claimed by the engineers, although the 
engineers maintained that the severity of the accident was well within 
predictions for accident frequency. Confidence in the technology broke 
down and the social engineering collective faced its perhaps most important 
defeat48.  
                                           
48 The Three Mile Island power plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania was owned by Edison 
Metropolitan (New York City) – the company which emerged out of the company Edison 
created to construct the Pearl Street central station project in the early 1880s. The accident 
illustrates a case in which a world wide strong and durable system of power broke down 
through a dramatic breakdown of one of its core elements – the atomic plant control system.  
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During the 1970s, the environmental issue became forced to the focus of the 
energy policy in countries like Germany, Holland, Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway, and gradually established political-institutional governance systems 
in accordance with its own rationality concepts - on top of the technical-
economic governance systems. The Norwegian environmental movement 
concentrated on the protection of remaining waterfalls, which led to the 
establishing of the Ministry for Environment in 1972. The new ministry 
became affiliated with the environmentalist collective, and represented the 
collective within the state administration. With the “joint plan for remaining 
waterfalls” sanctioned by parliament in 1986, the environmentalist reframing 
and remaking of the electricity sector had largely been completed. In the 
broader sense it had contributed to a strengthening of the state hierarchical 
governance structure by including all remaining waterfalls into one national 
plan. The inclusion of the environmental interests into the governance 
system however, made the concession processes more complex, more time-
consuming and politically far less predictable.   
 
6.3.1  Norway: A separated pathway? 
In Norway, developments came to follow a separate pathway during the 
1970s, caused by the rejection of the EEC membership in the 1972 
referendum and the growing oil economy. The defeat for the supporters of 
EEC-membership in the 1972 referendum, had important political 
implications. Once again by mobilizing against the loss of national political 
control, local and regional collectives reinforced their political legitimacy 
and powers at the expense of centralized state powers. To the political elite, 
the outcome was a political embarrassment in face of their European 
counterparts. The result was a destabilization of the internationally oriented 
social engineering collective and a substantial weakening of the traditional 
political elite, its industrial, scientific and political networks, its governance 
technologies and its state powers. In the 1973 parliament election, a united 
left wing Sosialistisk Venstreparti (SV) radically improved its parliamentary 
representation. The minority AP government under Trygve Bratteli, only had 
a majority of 68 representatives, including 13 from SV, over 67 from the 
opposition. This provided for a weak government dominated by trade 
unions, district interests and sector economic industries, which led to what 
may be seen as a peak in the “negotiated economy” between the state and its 
many civil society counterparts. 
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The oil crisis in 1973 contributed to the shift in the orientation of the energy 
policy from resource mobilization towards a more resource allocative 
perspective. But, the discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea on the other 
hand, turned the country into an extremely comfortable situation in terms of 
future energy supply and economic outlooks. The availability of large oil 
and gas reserves took what might have remained of power out of the atomic 
energy program and shifted attention to gas based thermal power as the 
future source for new energy supply. 
The new petroleum sector became organized by the state in a concession 
system similar to what had been established in the electricity sector in 
between 1906 and 1917. This provided for a tight national control over the 
large resources. Under the AP governments of the 1970’s, the traditional 
social engineering collective managed to gain control over the structuring of 
the oil sector. The state owned company Statoil became the core political 
instrument in building up a large, competent and dynamic national oil and 
gas industry, which also gradually turned the company into the dominant 
actor in the North Sea on the Norwegian side. 
The financial credibility of the new oil-state and the prospects for large 
future incomes, permitted the government to carry out a strong Keynesian 
counter-cyclical economic policy when the economic problems increased 
during the 1970s. State owned industries were kept alive by state subsidies, 
the ship building industries received additional support as well as other 
sectors of the export oriented or import competing economy. The 
government also presented an ambitious program for “a qualitatively better 
society”, a program for decentralization of governance responsibilities to 
counties and municipalities as well as several other fairly costly economic 
reforms. By 1977-78, the aggregated effects of this policy led to a severe 
economic crisis with increased inflation, large government budget deficits, a 
rapidly growing national trade deficit and pressures on the exchange rate. 
Where as other countries had been forced to restructure their industries from 
around 1975, Norway managed to maintain full employment and to avoid 
major economic restructuring until 1978/79. The result was a radical decline 
in international competitiveness, which had to be off-set by successive 
exchange rate devaluation. 
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6.3.2 The regulated national electricity trade system and the 
          occasional power market 
In 1970, the final merging of the northern electricity system with the 
southern, completed the operational integration of the national grid system49. 
From now on, the entire national hydropower system could be technically 
and economically coordinated through a unified network system under the 
operational control of the cooperative organization of electricity generators; 
“Samkjøringen av kraftselskaper i Norge” established January 1st 1971. An 
internal market for “occasional power” became established on a common 
carrier and third party access basis, organized as a centralized institutional 
exchange market for short term contracts. Only generators were permitted to 
trade directly in the market. This early construction of an institutionalized 
market for electricity came to represent one of the starting points of the 
market reform process, and will be discussed in more detail later on. 
The substantial economic risks involved in the hydropower system which 
largely result from the unpredictability in precipitation and temperatures 
from year to year and the bulky addition of new capacity, were basically 
managed at a cooperative and centralized level, through the joint policy of 
NVE and Samkjøringen. The major elements in this policy were the 
separation of cost recovery in the “firm power market” from marked 
balancing in the “occasional power market”, the establishing of sufficiently 
large reservoirs, the establishing of a separated and well defined market for 
consumer contracts with low security of supply standards and flexible prices, 
and the establishing of a trade system with Sweden and Denmark operated 
by a NVE/Statskraftverkene national trade monopoly. Over time, generators 
in Sweden and Denmark came to play the most important role in supply and 
demand side management of the Norwegian hydropower system. The 
following table 6.1. shows the relationship between expected operational 
production capacity, actual production, gross consumption and net export in 
the years 1975 through 1985. 
 
Table 6.1. Production capacity, actual production, gross consumption and 
net. export, 1975-1985 
 
 Expected 
operational 
capacity, 
 
 
Production 
 
Cross 
consumption  
 
 
Net export 
                                           
49 Only operational matters were integrated. Ownership to various power lines etc. was and 
still is separated. 
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 pr. 01.01 
1975     80 280     77 486     71 866      5 620 
1976     81 161     82 133     75 496      6 637 
1977     81 813     72 432     73 515    - 1 083 
1978     83 145     80 997     77 592      3 405 
1979     85 080     89 123     84 472      4 651 
1980     87 072     84 099     83 637         462 
1981     89 676     93 397     88 168      5 229 
1982     94 661     93 156     87 094      6 062 
1983     96 963   106 369     92 953    13 416 
1984     99 208   106 666     98 396      8 279 
1985     99 696   103 292     102 748         544 
Source, Central Statistical Bureau (SSB), Historical Statistics, 1992 
We note the substantial overcapacity by 1975 (10%) as compared to gross 
consumption, which was picked up by demand already by 1979. Then, 
production capacity increased rapidly in between 1979 and 1984. The two 
years 1983 and 1984 were unusually wet years with substantial net export. 
The new capacity however, is picked up by consumption already in 1984. 
Through 1981-84, the clear cut separation between the two parts of the trade 
system gradually weakened as a result of the large increase in generating 
capacity caused firstly by investments and then by weather conditions. As a 
result, prices in the occasional power market tended to be substantially lower 
over time than in the firm power contracts, and electricity companies to an 
increasing extent turned to the occasional power market in order to cover 
their supply obligations. As a result, there was a growing tension within the 
sector between those who supported an increased role for the occasional 
power market and those who pushed for stronger state control in order to 
constrain the ability to cover supply obligations through the short term 
market – in order to maintain prices sufficiently high to cover investment 
and generating costs.  
The state support for regional security of supply obligations, the increased 
prices in Statkraft contracts to general supply and the continuous push from 
large scale industries to increase electricity generating capacity, contributed 
to the growth in generating capacity within the local and regional general 
supply systems as well as by Statkraftverkene. The large expansion of the 
generating capacity in the 1970’s and early -80’s occurred despite the lack of 
a solid economic foundation (Atle Midttun 1987). To a substantial degree it 
was an effect of the long lead times in large hydro-power projects, which 
had not become shorter with the more complex governance situation in the 
1970’s. With lead times up to 10 years from initial planning to a completed 
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hydropower project, the ambitious growth oriented policy in the early 1970s 
came to decide upon the actual increases in capacity in the early 1980s. 
 
 
6.4 Historical roots of and points of departure for the 
        electricity market reform 
The presentation reveals an economic sector with substantial complexity. 
There are however, important trajectories of development which can be 
identified as major constituents of what has become the major unique 
features of the Norwegian electricity system; the combination of elements 
which both resemble substantial locked in powers and which may have 
provided the starting points for an alternative approach exactly in this case, 
rather than in some other country. I have shown that the sector emerged 
within an overall program for national resource control and economic 
modernization shaped under the leadership of Gunnar Knudsen, which 
became institutionalized and locked in as the fundamental governance 
system during the concession law process between 1906 and 1917.  
History also demonstrates how the sector has been thorn between a 
programmatic cooperative collective largely associated with a small scale 
vision of modernization which came to dominate the general supply industry 
at the early stage, and a state hierarchical collective for national, political 
and professional control and large scale modernization which mainly 
emerged in the wake of the two world wars, and with the growth of state 
capacities and resources. We have seen that the hierarchical approach 
experienced an important early defeat in 1922 and that the cooperative 
alternative which grew strong from a unique 19th century municipal 
legislation, reinforced its powers through the 1920s, during the war and after 
the 1972 referendum over EEC membership. It also managed to defend a 
relatively strong position for its major federative organization Samkjøringen 
in the national electricity sector governance system. 
The influences from municipalities and their federative, cooperative systems 
prevented radical hierarchical restructuring of the electricity sector, which 
left the sector with a relatively large number of “semi-autonomous” 
generators and distributors. It also left professional economic and state 
governance ambitions with substantial difficulties in directing and 
controlling local economic decisions and behaviors. The rationality of the 
Norwegian electricity sector from this point of view, was rather 
unimpressive. 
History also reveals to us a very interesting process of industrial 
transformation directed by a dedicated post-war entrepreneurial collective 
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who represented a radical large scale program for economic growth. I have 
shortly referred how this collective became established and have traced some 
of its roots back into the 1930s, in the American TVA project and the 
American new deal program, in the state hierarchical political and economic 
approaches of the 1930s, in war experiences and in close relationships to 
similar programs elsewhere. I have indicated how it captured the major 
commanding heights within the electricity sector – despite confrontations 
with a more popular and traditional small scale cooperative approach. And, 
we have seen that it enrolled the cooperative systems, gradually transformed 
them and came to dominate developments through industrial initiatives, 
resource control, partial re-configuration of the sector and education and 
distribution of representatives through out the industry.  
From a situation of peaceful co-existence and mutual reinforcement between 
the state hierarchical and the local cooperative rivals, much more radical 
hierarchical ambitions politically as well as within the NVE in the 1960s, 
pointed at the apparently unresolved controversy between the two alternative 
approaches; the bottom up federative program and the top down state 
hierarchical. In particular the hierarchical side was not satisfied with the 
current structuring of the industry and with the ambitions of the opponent to 
maintain a structural domination in the future. Both however, had 
established strong institutional lock-ins in different parts of the sector which 
tended to turn the rivalry into a trench warfare. This might have created 
opportunities for a third alternative, which certainly however, would have to 
associate with the two locked-in collectives in such a way as to make them 
comply with a fundamentally different approach, in order to prevent 
devastating opposition and to create a significant political breakthrough. 
The authority and legitimacy of the sector had also been weakened by 
economic problems, by the efficiency problems implicit in the “negotiated 
economy” under weak governments, by attacks from the environmental 
movement and from critical economists, and from the opposition from the 
new post-war generation against rapid economic growth as a legitimate 
political program. The powers of the post-war entrepreneurial collective 
piece by piece declined as its advocates were unable to cope with these much 
more diverse and complex political challenges.  
The political shift in 1965, the appointment of Vidkunn Hveding as the 
director general of the NVE, the new organized market for power exchange 
between generators, the 1970- energy report from the coalition government 
which pointed at a deeper concern with “external pricing efficiency and 
internal organizational efficiency” and the demand from parliament for a 
new energy law in order to regulate atomic energy systems, all appear to 
represent possible points of entrance for further investigations into the roots 
 124 
of the market reform. These events in Norway were followed by significant 
shifts in economic theory orientation within the international economics 
community, from well established hierarchical state regulatory approaches to 
general market equilibrium theory. This change occurred both in the area of 
macro economic theory and in the area of sector economic regulation and 
control theory. These developments within economic theorizing and their 
possible links to an emerging electricity market reform collective, is also an 
obvious point of entrance. 
Finally, the emerging over-capacity in the early 1980s and the tensions this 
created within the sector provided for vested interest among generators and 
distributors who were in net purchasing situations, to support a more flexible 
market system by which they could purchase electricity from other 
generators at marginal cost rather than the higher, politically set prices and 
contractual conditions in long term contracts.  
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Part III:  
Pathways to the electricity market reform 
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Introduction 
The objective of this third part of the analysis is to investigate in some depth 
different sources of the electricity market reform and major elements in the 
emerging market reform collective – starting with those identified in the 
historical presentation. In accordance with the research strategy outlined, I 
will aim at triangulating the emergence of an entrepreneurial electricity 
market reform collective by obtaining descriptions of the activities of 
different collectives, actors and their collective things, and of historical 
circumstances which played essential roles in providing for its emergence. I 
will then take these descriptions further into explanations about how and 
why the market reform alternative came to represent a viable alternative for 
electricity sector re-orientation and restructuring.  
As the reader has certainly recognized by now, this exercise is not about 
extracting analytical typologies about structural, institutional, cognitive, 
individual or other types of variables - which is typical for much of the 
economic sociological literature. It is about providing a dynamic account of 
why and how something expands from a conceptualization to an ontological 
state of existence, of why and how some specific economic program 
becomes reality through the shaping and building of a sufficiently capable 
entrepreneurial collective to support it, through controversies and 
associations with historical- as well as rival entrepreneurial collectives, and 
through the ability of the entrepreneurial collective to expand by enrolling 
elements of its environment in accordance with its program and its “rules 
and roles of the game model”. This necessitates an in essence historical 
analytical mode of presentation which however is not similar to a historicist 
type of exercise in which every story is simply unique. On the contrary, the 
ambition is theoretical and closely in line with the agenda for economic 
sociology formulated by Granovetter: 
“.. the agenda that follows from my conception of economic sociology 
is one that aims to produce a theoretical argument consistent with the 
high level of contingency I see operating in the actual construction of 
economic institutions, but to do so without sliding down the slippery 
slope into historicism. This is not the only possible agenda for 
economic sociology, but it is a broad and challenging one that I claim 
has great potential to add a new dimension to our understanding of 
economic life.” (Granovetter, 1990:107) 
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First, I will investigate further into the immediate circumstances which may 
have left some space open to a radical market alternative. We need to obtain 
a much sharper understanding of what the alternatives were at the time, what 
their collectives did to advance their models for the reshaping of the 
industry, what arguments they mobilized and why they apparently did not 
succeed in creating decisive breakthroughs - which might possibly have 
locked the industry into some other pathway of developments into the 1990s. 
Second, we need to identify those elements which came to link up with the 
electricity market reform collective and thereby to add capabilities and 
powers to its program. From where did it gain such strengths? As a crude 
approximation, I will trace international collectives of actors engaged in 
similar programs for the reshaping of the economy, and follow their 
influences back to Norway – to economic and institutional change processes 
prior to the electricity market reform, and possibly to the electricity market 
reform collective itself. First and foremost, this exercise will concentrate on 
developments within economics and on the wave of economic reforms 
internationally associated with “economic deregulation” in the late 1970s 
and the 1980s. 
Third, I will describe in brief the actual emergence of the electricity market 
reform collective at the Center for Applied Research in Bergen, its 
immediate roots in broader scientific research programs and early research 
projects. I will trace the early shaping of its program and its main simplified 
elements, its relations to the electricity sector and the early construction of 
institutional and organizational networks into which the program became 
embedded. What did the actors involved do to advance their early program 
into a viable alternative for the transformation of the entire electricity 
industry? 
Finally, because the market reform program became mobilized as a political-
administrative alternative in between 1986 and 1989 under a Labor Party 
government, I will shift focus to a different pathway of developments which 
emerged from efforts to modernize the Labor Party after the party had 
regained government control in 1986. What was the content of this 
modernization approach? What was the role of economics as a scientific 
program in this change process? Who were the major actors and were any of 
these substantially involved with the electricity market reform at an early 
stage? What were the links between the labor party modernization program 
and the electricity market reform collective at the SAF? Where there major 
differences between core concepts within the modernization program and the 
core of the market reform program? 
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This part of the analysis contains the following four chapters: 
Chapter 7:  
Rival approaches to an efficient electricity industry. Why they did not 
succeed 
 
Chapter 8:  
Return to markets. Re-orienting economics and reshaping economies 
 
Chapter 9:  
Einar Hope and the entrepreneurial electricity market reform collective 
 
Chapter 10: 
Tormod Hermansen, the social democratic modernization program and the 
links to the electricity market reform collective at SAF 
 
These four different pieces of empirical analysis round up the discussion of 
how and why the electricity market reform emerged as a viable alternative 
for electricity sector reform in Norway. How it became stabilized as a real 
life system, is the topic of part IV. 
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7 Rival approaches to an efficient electricity 
industry. Why they did not succeed. 
We have now identified the early electricity economic program of Vidkunn 
Hveding as an interesting point of departure for closer inspection. What were 
the core concepts of his program? What made up the Hveding collective and 
its authority? Who were his allies? How did it relate to the Norwegian 
economics profession? Where there alternative economic approaches?  
Starting from these questions, I will investigate into the major concepts of 
electricity economics internationally and trace the major elements which was 
put together in Hveding’s program. What was his concept of an efficiently 
structured and governed electricity system? I will also present some of the 
systems which was created and established within the electricity sector as 
essential elements of the Hveding collective’s efforts to reshape the industry; 
the EFI simulation model, the “occasional power market” and the linking up 
of the Norwegian hydropower system with Danish thermal power plants.  
Of particular interest to the discussion, is to se how Hveding’s economic 
concepts were responded to by Norwegian economists at the University of 
Oslo (UiO) and the Norwegian School of Business Administration in Bergen 
(NHH). Where there important differences? What roles did they play in 
Hveding’s efforts to create a significant breakthrough for scientific economic 
principles within the sector? Why, and in what respect, didn’t he succeed – 
leaving his position as NVE director general in frustration in 1975? We also 
need to clarify the relations between the Hveding collective and a program 
for hierarchical restructuring of the electricity sector and the atomic energy 
program at the time. Were these essential elements in Hveding’s program, or 
did they rather represent separated trajectories which had been wrapped 
together in the 1970 energy program from the government? What happened 
after Hveding withdrew? Did his project loose its driving force? In that case 
– who gained the initiative? As the atomic power program already 
approached a dead end in Norway by 1975, it turned out to be the 
hierarchical restructuring program who gained the initiative, first and 
foremost associated with Statkraftverkene and the E-directorate within the 
NVE – and with their managerial leaders Asbjørn Vinjar, Gunnar Vatten and 
Erling Diesen. What did these institutions and actors do to turn their 
ambitious program into reality and why, apparently, didn’t they succeed 
either? 
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7.1 Vidkunn Hveding and the system design/electricity 
         economic program 
The first important work on electricity economics in Norway was initiated in 
the mid-1960s by The State Energy Council50 - an advisory board under the 
Ministry of Industry with a number of very influential members, headed by 
the economist Knut Getz Wold. In 1966, Vidkunn Hveding, professor in 
hydroelectric engineering at NTH, became engaged by the council to direct a 
broad economic analysis of the energy sector. Hydroelectric engineering is 
an area of engineering primarily concerned with electricity system design. 
Two young economists, Kristian Knudsen and Hans Holdahl, were also 
employed. Their report “Report regarding Norway’s energy supply 
industry51” was published in 1969 and came to represent a new direction for 
the electricity sector based on an introduction of the international scientific 
tradition in electricity economics which thereby challenged the traditional 
pragmatic mix of private business-, cooperative- and public sector “budget 
balancing” and “average cost pricing” practices.  
By giving a clear cut priority to economic efficiency, the economic program 
also to some extent confronted the many political objectives at multiple 
political/administrative levels which dominated the established system – like 
district policy, employment policy, redistribution policy, large scale 
industrial growth etc. Economic efficiency became forced to the focus.  
The report presented by Hveding, established what can be seen as a blueprint 
for a scientific economic program for the electricity sector politically 
adopted by and presented by the H-V-SP-KrF coalition government (1965-
71) in its 1970 energy report to parliament52 (Thue, 1996:96). The Hveding 
report argued strongly for the introduction of thermal power to the 
Norwegian hydro-power system – either through investments in new power 
plants or through a cable across Skagerak to the Danish thermal power 
system. In the government report however, atomic power - which expanded 
rapidly in Europe at the time – was moved to the focus as the alternative for 
the future energy supply – pushed by the Institute for Atomic Energy (IFA) 
and its social democratic social engineers such as Gunnar Randers, Finn Lied 
and Hans Christian Hauge. The government report also argued strongly that 
                                           
50 Statens Energiråd 
51 Utredning vedrørende Norges energiforsyning 
52 St. meld. nr. 97: 1969/70 
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efforts should be increased to restructure the sector by merging the many 
small distribution companies into larger entities. This point represented a 
continuation of a restructuring program which had been introduced by the 
AP government in 1960. These three purposes;  introduction of scientific 
economic pricing and planning principles, thermal power and organizational 
restructuring, came to dominate the agenda – in addition to the 
environmental issue – until the early 1980s. 
Before being appointed professor of hydropower engineering at NTH in 
1958, Hveding had been working on hydropower projects in Norway since 
1946, and for the three last years in Ethiopia and Brazil. With the 
reorganization of NVE in 1960-61, he was offered the post of deputy 
director general53. Finding that the post had been made effectively redundant 
with the same organization, he went abroad again in 1963, this time to work 
for the Kuwait Fund, a fund established on the pattern of the World Bank for 
financing major industry and infrastructure projects in the Arab world. The 
World Bank had been established right after the war and equipped with a 
development vision which had also been inspired from the American 
Tennessee Valley Authority project (TVA). Through the World Bank this 
vision was advocated to development countries across the world, part 
through World Bank lending and part through local or regional development 
banks set up with assistance from the Bank – such as the Kuwait Fund. Just 
like Fredrik Vogt, his student and colleague Hveding was convincingly 
introduced to this vision of economic organization and industrial and 
economic development. Being a member of Høyre, Hveding also became 
intimately associated with the 1965 coalition government on his return from 
Kuwait. He was acting permanent secretary of the Ministry of Industry in 
1967, but moved to the position as director general of the NVE after Halvard 
Roald in 1968. By these events, his new economic program experienced a 
rapid breakthrough into command positions within the electricity sector54.  
Where as Vogt had focussed on the industrial growth aspect and became an 
important actor in the post-war social democratic governance regime, 
Hveding came to influence events after that regime had been able to 
demonstrate its results. And he was not too impressed. “The large scale 
industries gained money to their owners, the state gained some, but their 
contributions to their districts were minor. The large iron and steel plant in 
                                           
53 “Administrerende direktør og generaldirektørens stedfortreder” 
54 Interview with and comments from Vidkunn Hveding, 25.03.98. 
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Mo i Rana headed towards a close down from the very beginning” 
(Hveding, 25.03.98).  
He caught interest in and became influenced by the liberal market economic 
ideas advocated by Trygve Hoff and Farmand, and he became one of the 
most prominent political opponents to the strong industrial role of the state 
in the post-war social democratic regime. In particular the new state-owned 
steel and iron-plant in Mo i Rana and the associated very generous state-
electricity contracts, became a key target for economic critique from 
Farmand, Høyre in parliament - and from Hveding.  
A very significant influence came through the economic principles and 
managerial practices which Hveding learned from the “World Bank 
blueprint” organization in Kuwait”55 and from his close links to leading 
World Bank administrators and professionals in the years to follow56.  
Working in Kuwait as an engineer on a team with brilliant Arab economists 
who had however no experience with real projects, Hveding had felt obliged 
to educate himself in economics too. During his reading he was surprised to 
learn from American journals of the considerable work on electricity 
economics that had been done by French engineers and economists at the 
EdF during the 1940s, unknown to the economics profession at large till 
after the war and adopted by American researchers only in the early 1960s. 
Central to the work done at EdF was the logic of basing substitution of plant 
or resources on their marginal rather than average cost, a thinking which had 
already gained some currency among Scandinavian engineers. Hveding also 
observed that this led straight into the shadow price planning theories 
advanced by Oskar Lange. 
Having acquired these new economic theories – and through the initiative of 
the State Energy Council – the engineer Hveding became the one to 
introduce electricity economics to Norway and to reframe the electricity 
sector policy of the state from the perspective of economic theories. 
From the perspective of Hveding, the role of the new economic theory was 
to improve the economic efficiency of the electricity system as a whole 
through efficient internal organization and correct marginal cost pricing, the 
                                           
55 Interview with Hveding, 18.03.99 
56 The Word Bank participated in financing the large Tokke hydro power project in the early 
1970s, when Hveding was director general in NVE. This was the last project the World 
Bank financed in industrialized countries. 
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quality of investment decisions and the planning capability of the 
administratively coordinated national system. It also offered possibilities for 
designing economic systems which would “force” local actors to behave 
more rationally, and Hveding wanted to explore these possibilities further by 
working with economists on these issues. He was also eager to present the 
EdF electricity economic theory to the Norwegian economic profession in 
order to strengthen professional support for his program. This however, at 
least in part turned out to become a frustrating confrontation with mixed 
implications. 
  
7.1.1 The international roots of electricity economics 
Internationally, electricity economics mainly grew out of three different 
national traditions, the American, the British and the French, of which the 
theoretical work which had been done by French economist and engineers at 
EdF during the 1940’s and -50’s, turned out to be the most complete 
(Joskow, 1976:197). During the early 1960’s, the French contributions 
became integrated within the English speaking research community and 
gradually developed into a more unified international area of theorizing. 
Because the EdF economic research program was in large initiated and 
dominated by engineers who were dedicated specifically towards overall 
system design and operational governance of the electricity system, many 
important papers appeared in technological journals, and in particular in 
those directed towards public utility sectors (Drèze, 1965). The fact that 
electricity economics was introduced to Norway through an educated 
engineer rather than an economist was accordingly not accidental. Neither 
was the close coupling between the welfare economic theory developed by 
the French mining engineer and economist Maurice Allais and the electricity 
economics developed at EdF, as the new welfare theory became the basic 
framework of the national economic reconstruction program in post-war 
France.  
The American approach had been to develop a pricing theory for non-
storable commodities with periodic demand within the framework of a given 
fairly homogenous production capacity. Its specific orientation can largely 
be seen as a result of the rapidly growing legalistic and price-oriented 
regulatory system which came to dominate the US governance system after 
the mid-1930s, where electric utility companies typically were private profit 
oriented monopolies largely shaped by the model of Insull’s Chicago Edison 
system. The electricity economic theory partly served as an approach to peak 
load management intended to smooth out production and thereby reduce 
operating costs, and partly it served to structure and regulate pricing 
practices, according to which for instance peak-users should pay for the total 
peak-load costs where as off-peak users should only pay for operational 
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costs. Cost recovery was at the core rather than the marginal cost based price 
theory. In short, the American approach could be labeled supply and demand 
side management and cost recovery based monopoly regulation. 
The British approach was that of supply side management in a more complex 
technological system which developed further into the details of efficient 
“merit order” management in systems with a variety of technologies. The 
approach relaxed the assumption about homogenous production capacity and 
recognized both that the efficient provision of a periodic demand will 
usually imply a mix of different types of capacities with different marginal 
operating and investment costs, and that the efficient management of a 
system necessitated availability of reserve capacities as well as periods for 
maintenance. Fluctuations in demand and supply would accordingly have to 
be coordinated (Turvey, 1967). Because the Norwegian system is entirely 
hydro-based, the British contributions were not that relevant. The core of the 
Norwegian challenge was rather the dynamic character of the pricing 
problem under substantial uncertainty about available energy resources 
within the system (stored water), which characterizes the pure hydropower 
system. 
The French approach emerged within the context of the reconstruction 
program after the war and the row of nationalized industries and utility 
sectors which became coordinated within a strong and elitist system of 
national planning quite similar to the ideas presented by Lange. The 
development of the theory by the staff at EdF was framed by the welfare 
theory developed by Maurice Allais and the national planning approach 
affiliated with Jean Monnet, which aimed at bringing France up to a leading 
industrial and economic welfare position. As a result, the EdF theory became 
intimately related to the relationship between pricing policy and investment 
policy in the context of the efficient operation of an integrated national 
public enterprise. The theoretical methodology encompassed both the 
American and the British approaches to supply- and demand side peak load 
management and made further advances in several directions. One of these 
was its recognition of the role of uncertainty in both demand and supply for 
pricing, network design, investments and operation. Another was their 
inclusion of curtailment costs or rationing costs to consumers when loads 
occasionally had to be curtailed, which also had implications for pricing and 
investment rules. And thirdly, the EdF gave further considerations to the 
transmission and distribution systems and analyzed in detail the economic 
characteristics of the various parts of the system and derived appropriate 
pricing and investment rules (Joskow, 1976:199-200).  
A fundamental contribution was done by Pierre Massé, a close colleague of 
Maurice Allais. He formulated the optimal decision rule for operating a 
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hydroelectric dam and the affiliated principles of dynamic programming, 
core properties of stochastic marginal analysis, problems of constrained 
optimization and other essential mathematical and theoretical contributions 
which linked operational research on electricity systems to advanced 
economic analysis. These and other theoretical contributions were taken up 
by researchers at EdF who contributed with numerous specific studies. The 
French marginalist program grew rapidly on the outside of main stream 
academic economics in France at the time, in the interaction between the 
French national planning system, a few outstanding mathematically oriented 
academics such as Allais and Massé and the staff of researchers within the 
various nationalized state industries dominated by engineers with substantial 
mathematical training from the French elite technological universities 
(Drèze, 1963). 
From France, the EdF theory spread to other countries in Europe – among 
them Sweden, from where both theoretical knowledge and practical 
experiences could be gathered by Hveding and those who engaged in 
applying the theory to the Norwegian electricity system. 
 
7.1.2 The creation of an internal competitive market for 
electricity 
          generators 
Equipped with the new economic approach and his system design 
professional competence, Hveding introduced a re-framing of the sector 
governance system. Each investment project should no longer be calculated 
as an autonomous project, but as an integrated part of the entire national 
electricity system. This turned the overall design of the system into focus. 
Efficient coordination of the entire system and the quality of marginal 
investments became important, as projects differed in their contributions to 
the overall efficiency of the system. This turned Hveding’s attention in three 
directions: Firstly, towards what could be achieved by introducing thermal 
power to the 100% hydro-power based system, secondly towards ranking 
new hydropower projects according to their system contribution 
characteristics, and thirdly, towards what could be achieved from an efficient 
system for short term power exchange across regions with statistical 
differences in precipitation and variations in reservoir capacities. These 
elements were important technical and governance system elements in a 
network system which we may denote “the Hveding collective”. Each of 
these elements shaped networks and events within the sector in line with the 
new framing. In the world model surrounding the core concept of the 
program, the dominant command position was that of the system planner, 
where as both economic theory, sector actors and technical or institutional 
governance systems where given the more supportive roles.  
 139 
His first publication on his approach was a paper denoted “Digital simulation 
techniques in power system design” (Hveding, 1968) in which he outlined 
the principles for a numeric simulation-model for the hydropower system 
which later became known as the EFI-model. The model became a very 
useful and powerful instrument to system planners as well as to electricity 
companies and network operators.  With modifications and substantial 
upgrading it is still used by practitioners within the electricity system. 
Simulations by the model showed that substantial economic gains would 
follow from an efficient short term trade system and from the introduction of 
thermal power to the system. These gains became known under the label 
“joint operation gains”57. 
In Sweden the two engineers Sven Stage and Yngve Larsson had done some 
early work on the EdF hydropower system theory and came to influence 
Hveding’s work. Larsson advised Hveding on how to construct a numerical 
simulation model rather than a statistical model, and Stage demonstrated to 
Hveding by the use of marginal cost theory, that thermal power plants would 
never be used for peak-load purposes if introduced to a hydro-power system. 
This followed because if the price approached marginal costs in a thermal 
power plant, it would be more economic to produce thermal power at full 
capacity and then use hydro-power for peak-load purposes58. These insights 
became essential elements in Hveding’s new electricity system design 
approach. 
From the insights obtained from his simulation model, and already before 
taking over as the new director general of the NVE in 1968, Hveding argued 
that the unification of the national grid system should be followed by the 
establishing of an organized market system for short term trade with 
electricity between generators. One of the essential problems in the hydro-
power system which had been addressed by the EdF, was the stochastic 
variation in precipitation across regions and across seasons and years. Each 
individual dam would have a stochastic variation much larger than the 
aggregated system. In order to increase the amount of power which could be 
produced with high security of supply standards, all the reservoirs had to be 
coordinated. In the centralized EdF system, this could be done by calculating 
the marginal storage value (shadow prices) in each dam, rank all the dams in 
accordance with their marginal values and then command those with the 
lower values to produce before those with the higher values. This would 
                                           
57 “samkjøringsgevinsten”, my translation 
58 Interview with Hveding, 18.03.99 
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correspond to an efficient “imitated” market as suggested for instance by 
Oscar Lange.  
In the Norwegian case, the hierarchical option was not plausible. The 
solution to the problem advocated by Hveding, was to establish a real 
marked in accordance with economic theory and with the standard 
institutional arrangements needed for an efficient and practical trading 
system. To calculate marginal storage values would then remain a local 
responsibility as well as the decision whether to store or produce at the 
margin in a straight forward market system. 
Such an internal competitive market system was established after the final 
merging of the northern electricity network with the southern in 1970, and 
after substantial pressures from Hveding and the NVE on Samkjøringen to 
create it. In 1971 - after three-four years of argument - NVE director general 
Hveding had to put substantial pressures on a grudging Samkjøringen to 
create an exchange system through which the generators could trade 
electricity with each other based on a single market price. Pressures were 
also mobilized through the parliament which criticized Samkjøring for not 
utilizing national resources efficiently, and through Statkraftverkene as a 
member of Samkjøringen. To Hveding’s apparent surprise, the system 
became operational only a few months later, from July 5th 1971, and was 
denoted “the occasional power market”59 (Barth Jacobsen, 1998: 136) 
Samkjøringen had been arguing for a different system based on bilateral 
power exchange in line with practices in other countries and similar to the 
contractual arrangements for longer term contracts. As it turned out, Norway 
already from 1971 came to establish a unique “ideal” market system for 
short term electricity trade within the central station system, with third party 
access and common carrier principles within the high voltage national grid 
system. (Within the regional and local networks however, each network 
owner controlled access). Over the years, the new market system came to 
represent approximately 10% of the total volume traded in the Norwegian 
electricity system.  
The presentation demonstrates that the new market system was not 
something which “emerged in some natural way” from within the sector – 
for instance as a consequence of the merging of the regional high voltage 
systems or from the economic interests of individual generators. Rather, it 
was constructed through the application of economic theory, system design 
                                           
59 Tilfeldigkraft markedet 
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theory and new governance technologies by actors engaged in re-framing 
and re-configuring the industry from the basis of a specific scientific reform 
program. The merging of the system into one national grid system, however, 
provided a “window of opportunity” for creating such a system – by 
overthrowing traditional practices and resistance from within the sector. 
The creation of the new market was done by establishing a very simple 
exchange institution with standardized contracts for a homogenous 
commodity, in which the generators could engage in an anonymous auction 
which externalized social networks or other links between the buyers and the 
sellers. Nothing but the price, the calculated marginal value of stored water 
and the expected future demand remained within the relevant context of 
decision-making.   
The initial institutional arrangements were primitive by any comparison to 
other organized exchange markets. There was only a weekly organized 
auction organized over telephone communication and with manual 
calculation of market equilibrium prices. There was only one type of 
contracts; weekly spot contracts for physical delivery, and regulatory 
services for shorter periods of time were operated by Statkraftverkene 
alone60. However, the construction of a market institution from a theoretical 
ideal model represented a radical but only partial remaking of the sector and 
its actors – as the trading system only related to a marginal share of the 
entire trading system.  
Soon the new computer technology was introduced to do the fairly complex 
calculations, and Samkjøringen gradually developed more efficient 
procedures which permitted for an extension of the market in terms of more 
frequent auctions and additional trading instruments. The new market 
quickly gained strong support from the members of Samkjøringen and its 
new director Rolf Wiedswang engaged in improving and expanding the new 
system. In figure 7.1. I have drawn up the simplified elements of the 
“Hveding-collective and its efforts at transforming the electricity sector: 
 
Figure 7.1. Simplified elements in the Hveding collective 
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actants in the Hveding collective. Shaded quadrangles indicate elements/ 
systems (actants) constructed by the collective. 
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design as an engineer discipline with the EdF electricity economics, and its 
authority and major support came from this economic system design 
tradition, from Hveding’s relations to leading World Bank managers and 
professionals and from the institutional powers of the NVE director general 
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hierarchical restructuring and the atomic energy programs within the 
council, the Hveding collective came to shape the principles of the coalition 
government electricity system policy.  
 
 
7.2 Hveding and the Norwegian electricity economists 
Hveding and his staff at the NVE brought their economic theories to 
economists at both the UiO and the NHH, but it was at NHH they received 
the more positive interest. The different orientation of the two academic 
research institutions came to represent an important duality among 
Norwegian electricity economists between one primarily macro-economic 
oriented approach at the UiO and a micro-economic industrial organization 
approach at the NHH. These came to play different roles in relation to 
Hveding’s electricity economic program. 
   
7.2.1 Hveding and the macro-oriented economists at the  
         University of Oslo 
At the UiO, professor Leif Johansen and younger colleagues like Finn 
Førsund and Steinar Strøm along with SSB61 researcher Torstein Bye, 
approached the electricity sector from the welfare theory. They focussed 
their attention on the optimal price and investment theory from a macro-
economic resource allocation perspective rather than from Hveding’s system 
design perspective. Through the close association of the UiO with the 
ministry of finance, they quickly engaged in sector politics. Much of their 
efforts concentrated on a critique of the low priced state contracts to the 
energy intensive industries and on a concern with the enormous economic 
resources which year by year went into electricity sector investments. Where 
these investments appropriate? Did they gain sufficient economic returns? 
Where they on time, or did the nation invest too much too early? Why 
should ordinary industries, consumers and tax payers subsidize large scale 
power intensive industries – both through inadequate price differences and 
through too large or too early public sector investments?  
Gradually, marginal cost principles worked their way into the sector and 
finally reached a political breakthrough in parliament around 1980 – after 
ten years of disputes. The interpretation of these principles however, became 
subject for substantial controversy.  
                                           
61 Statistisk Sentralbyrå 
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In this debate, there were broadly speaking four different positions; The 
Hveding-school and the welfare economists who represented two different 
scientific positions, the social democratic social engineering collective with 
their power intensive industries and the local cooperatives who represented 
traditional arguments and established practices which were the targets of the 
two others.  
Hveding’s position in the controversy was that production capacity should 
be expanded to meet the growing demand only to the extent that consumers 
were prepared to pay the cost of such expansion – a viewpoint shared by the 
economists. However, he argued that a price equal to long run marginal cost 
(LRMC) of expanding the system would be the right price “signal” to send 
to consumers. LRMC for the production system as a whole would be only 
roughly equal to the marginal cost of different individual new units added to 
the system, as units with different characteristics, like hydro or thermal, 
would contribute differently to overall capacity. This demanded a system 
design approach where prices should be set so as to reflect the relevant and 
rational system investment needs. Because of the long planning horizon, not 
only on the producer’s side but also on the consumers’, demand could be 
expected to come in line with LRMC only if prices were consistently 
determined on the basis of system expansion costs a few years ahead, and 
then periodically adjusted to the LRMC of further system expansion. 
Utilization of power available in the short term market on the other hand, 
played a relatively minor role and should be encouraged as representing 
resources which should not go to waste.  
With the system containing so much capacity from the past, built at much 
lower nominal cost, the LRMC pricing principle would generate 
considerable cash surplus in the system. This would be useful for equity 
financing of further expansion but, in case of the surplus being transferred 
back to consumers/owners, this redistribution should be made on a basis 
independent from actual consumption.  
Easy to recognize, this is the approach of an integrated system design and 
marginal cost economic program á la Oskar Lange with very high 
governance aspirations, which aimed at balancing the system at the point 
where marginal consumer willingness to pay, short run marginal costs and 
long run marginal costs coincide – through appropriate planning and 
imitation of market pricing. Pricing principles was not only about cost 
recovery, but also system development and economic solidity. They reserved 
the central decision-making role to the system designer – not the individual 
investors. Accordingly, the intended role of the occasional power market 
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was not to provide price signals to investors, but to improve the economic 
efficiency of the system as a whole62. 
A different position was represented by the economists. In their view, and in 
line with a fundamental principle in main stream economics, the LRMC 
principle was an investment principle only, not a pricing principle. 
Investments should be done only when LRMC is lower than the expected 
SRMC in the future. Prices should not be set to secure cost recovery for new 
investments. They should be set so as to reflect the actual relationship 
between generating capacity and demand. Investments should only be done 
in response to actually increased demand – at the right point of time in 
appropriate amounts. They also argued in line with economic theory, that 
there should only be one price; a SRMC based price for industry, households 
and other consumers corrected for differences in costs of delivery. This 
would secure that hydropower resources be developed more efficiently and 
allocated to where its was the most needed – as measured by the consumers’ 
willingness to pay. A price equal to LRMC would invite investments even 
though power might be available at a lower SRMC. The added capacity 
would then spill over into the occasional power market prices from where 
power intensive industries could purchase the capacity at even lower prices. 
The economists’ approach accordingly left a much more limited role to 
system designers, as managers of what they may have seen as “economic 
system externalities” which were exactly treated as less important 
externalities that “only had to do with the choice of technology” in any given 
case. Even though they argued for the SRMC as the pricing principle, they 
did not argue for a competitive market system. Their arguments seem to 
have remained at a highly abstract “in principle” level with no intent to 
construct an operational system based on the argument – or even to explain 
how a practical system might function. No doubt however, they thought of 
this in terms of efficient, professionally guided state governance and control 
rather than a decentralized market system. 
The third position was represented by the social democratic social 
engineering collective and the power intensive industries. They argued that 
prices to international competitive industries should be globally competitive, 
where as other consumers should pay the higher domestic price. This would 
still be economic in a national perspective because of the value added by 
industries which would otherwise leave the country. In order to secure 
internationally competitive electricity prices and possibly to expand these 
                                           
62 Interview with and comments from Vidkunn Hveding, 25.0398 
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industries in Norway, electricity generating capacity had to be expanded and 
export banned. These points of view did not seem to have any substantial 
backing from scientists, but had many other powerful combatants and 
representatives. 
Finally, the fourth position was represented by the cooperatives, which 
argued for their traditional pricing principles based on historical cost 
calculations and “average cost” principles. These arguments rested on the 
cooperative conceptual framing that the electricity sector represented a not-
for profit economic activity where the economic objective was to keep prices 
as low as possible to consumers (or to balance consumer surplus and 
company profits). However, to secure sufficient cost recovery to the 
electricity companies from their investments, prices had to be protected 
against the influences of the fluctuating occasional power market. Hence, the 
approach was a combination of subsidizing new investments with cash 
surpluses gained from historical investments so as to serve local consumer 
interests, and securing a minimum cost recovery and build up of internal 
funds for further investments. These pricing and investments principles are 
typically found in cooperative enterprises like requisite associations. Even 
though there is an international literature on cooperative pricing and 
investment principles, none of it appears to have became mobilized by 
advocates for the cooperative view. 
Hveding and his staff in NVE worked hard to convince the government and 
the politicians in parliament that prices should be based on the LRMC 
principle rather than “average costs”, and in particular that the Statkraft price 
– which served as a yardstick price also to other suppliers – should be 
increased accordingly. When the economists interfered by arguing that 
Hveding’s principle was incorrect and that the short term marginal cost 
principle should be applied as the pricing principle, without specifying how 
this could be practically implemented, this forced the political discussion 
into unmanageable complexity. Given that prices were to be set by 
parliament - and that large stochastic influences on prices in the occasional 
power market with limited consumer participation made calculations of 
correct short term marginal costs highly uncertain, it was not easy for 
politicians to apply the principle advocated by the economists.  
The outcome of the process was a long lasting and confused debate which 
only moderately influenced practical pricing principles and price levels, and 
which left harsh controversies between Hveding and the UiO economists. 
The economists claimed that Hveding was confused about the difference 
between the investment and the pricing criteria, and Hveding responded that 
the confusion was really on the economists’ side, as they failed to realize 
that there was no functional market for power at large to give price signals 
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with which to match the marginal cost of supply expansion. By disavowing 
the LRMC pricing principle, the achievement was only to turn pricing back 
to the traditional historical cost pricing – which in hindsight was largely 
what happened.  
The Hveding collective did not manage to generate a convincing 
breakthrough for its modified EdF economic program. The lack of both 
political and professional support to its fundamental economic planning 
principles obviously contributed to the frustrations which caused Hveding to 
retire from the NVE in 1975. 
The parliament in 1980 finally “obeyed” to the LRMC pricing principle, also 
for energy intensive industries. But state power prices remained politically 
negotiated in parliament. In order to settle with the energy intensive 
industries on prices, which had now been “talked” a bit up by the state 
administration and the economists, discounts now took place through 
adjustments in the calculated rate of return on investments implicit in the 
LRMC principle, to fit with the negotiated price level. Hence, “professional 
control” of pricing remained largely inaccessible. 
The energy intensive industry on the other hand, had to accept somewhat 
increased electricity prices in the new 1976 contracts and in particular in 
1983 contracts, which occurred in a period with increasing over-capacity in 
electricity generation with low prices in the short term internal power 
exchange market. The result was that almost no 1983 contracts were settled, 
that the industry increased their purchases in the short term internal market 
and that also the industry felt it was into a loosing game in parliament. 
Gradually, some of its core representatives - like Norsk Hydro’s director and 
later Minister of Petroleum and Energy; Eivind Reiten - argued for a more 
market based price-setting of new electricity contracts, without political 
interventions (Reiten, 1988:125-132). This shift in orientation permitted for 
a later important association between the power intensive industries and the 
market reform collective. 
 
7.2.2 Hveding and the NHH economists   
At the NHH, Hveding met an environment which was much more oriented 
towards the actual functioning of the electricity industry at a structural, 
operational and micro-economic level of analysis – to which Hveding felt a 
closer kinship63 (Thue, 1996:98). The one to take the most interest in his 
theories was a young economist named Einar Hope, who worked with 
                                           
63 Hveding had been a guest lecturer at the NHH when he returned from Kuwait in 1965. 
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professor Gerhard Stolz in the area of Industrial Organization Theory. On 
Hope’s initiative, Hveding and his staff at the NVE on several occasions 
came to present their theories at seminars with NHH economists and 
students.  
With the establishing of the Center for Applied Research (SAF) headed by 
Einar Hope at the Institute for Economics at NHH in 1972, the industrial 
organization research program had created an institution to carry out a large 
empirical research program which covered a variety of industries. The 
primary purpose of the program was to produce educational literature for the 
students. One of the sectors which quickly moved to the focus, was the 
electricity sector.  
In the wake of the oil-crisis in 1973, Hope obtained a research project from 
the private electricity company Hafslund AS to study the effects on the 
electricity market from increased oil prices. The project ended with the 
report “Economic effects from increased energy prices”64. Later, Hope’s 
attention turned towards investigating the functioning of the occasional 
power market. Through a close cooperation with Samkjøringen and its 
managing director Rolf Wiedswang, Hope gained access to large volumes of 
data from the power exchange system, and gradually established himself as a 
leading economic expert on the electricity trading system - with substantial 
legitimacy within the engineer dominated sector.  
To Hope, the occasional market represented a tremendously interesting 
empirical phenomenon because it represented an ideal competitive market 
for a very homogenous commodity. Despite the absence of free access to the 
market, the system represented a unique market system where theoretical 
propositions could be investigated. Soon, however, upon discovering the 
very simple arrangements involved, he became engaged in improving the 
institutional trading system, the contracts, etc. and to expand the competitive 
market into new functions and new types of contracts. One of the ideas 
which he presented already in the late 1970’s, was to establish a futures 
market for standardized financial electricity contracts in order for generators 
and distributors to manage their contractual risks. The idea did not catch on 
at the time – probably because it sounded too complicated or to “unfamiliar” 
to the practitioners at the time. In 1984 Samkjøringen established a trading 
system for such contracts which however did not became a noteworthy 
success at the time. 
                                           
64 Hope, E. and K. Lotsberg (1974): “Økonomiske virkninger av økte energipriser”, Bergen, 
SAF. My translation 
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According to the EdF theory, short term trade due for instance to stochastic 
influences, should be priced according to the SRMC principle. The 
occasional power market served a specific role within the hierarchically 
planned system; to absorb disturbances and to reduce the need for dams in 
the hydro-power system. With optimal investments, prices should be 
expected to fluctuate on both sides of the LRMC depending on 
meteorological conditions. The role of the occasional power market was a 
very specific one in the system design approach pushed by the Hveding 
collective, where as Hope in cooperation with his colleagues in Bergen 
gradually developed a different and much more fundamental role for the 
market institution. 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s the occasional power market price 
deviated substantially over longer periods of time below long term marginal 
cost. This followed partly because of the high security of supply standards 
according to which Norway should be self-supplied 39 out of 40 years on 
average, partly because of over-optimistic demand forecasts and pressures 
from within the sector as well as from energy intensive industries to 
construct new power plants (Midttun, 1987), partly because of the policy to 
constrain energy exports, because of the large capacity increases in Sweden 
caused by the establishing of new large atomic power plants in the early 
1980s and finally, because of a staggering international economy in which 
the expansion of large scale energy intensive industries became impossible. 
All of this resulted in a substantial over-capacity in electricity generation 
with successive price differences between the politically governed long term 
power contracts and prices in the occasional power market.  
It was from the study of the risk problems and the strategic conflicts these 
problems caused to market actors as well as to society that a more extended 
electricity market research program emerged at the SAF. 
7.3 The hierarchical restructuring program, atomic power 
and the roots of the new energy law  
Two additional programs were included in the 1970 energy report from the 
coalition government in addition to those represented by the Hveding 
collective. These were the atomic power program and a program for 
organizational restructuring of the sector, which had been initiated by the AP 
government in 1960. After Hveding left office, Sigmund Larsen got 
appointed as director general by the AP government. Under his leadership, 
the sector restructuring approach was moved to the center as the major 
element in NVE’s strategy to improve the economic efficiency within the 
sector.  
The hierarchical restructuring approach may be seen as having roots back 
into the ambitions of the 1922 national plan, but its more immediate 
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influential sources are to be found in the idea about organizational 
economies of scale, in the model of the nationalized French electricity 
industry; the organizational structure of EdF, in the model of large American 
utilities, in the more successful restructuring of the sector in Sweden at the 
time, and in the more general ambitions of engineers towards gaining higher 
levels of control with behaviors associated with their technical systems. 
 
7.3.1 The hierarchical restructuring collective 
There was of course many small entities within the Norwegian electricity 
sector. In 1938 the number of distribution companies was 47865. By 1973, it 
had been reduced to 337, of which 100 supplied less than 1000 customers, 
and additionally 157 companies supplying between 1000 and 5000 
customers. Together, these 257 companies (76%) served around 24% of the 
customers. In the other end, the two largest distributors supplied 21%. The 
intermediate 78 companies accounted for the remaining 55%. By 1990, right 
before the implementation of the new market system, the number of 
distribution companies had decreased to 198, and several other mergers like 
in Østfold County and in the Sunnmøre region, were planned and carried out 
in 1991/92. In 17 years the number had decreased by 41%. Many of these 
followed from administrative mergers of municipalities, but through out the 
1980’s the hierarchical restructuring collective managed to mobilize for 
vertical integration within various regions of the country.  
The cooperative system in many ways represented a much larger degree of 
integration than what appeared to follow from the large number of 
companies. Many cooperated on the basis of federative organizational 
principles within larger geographical areas without giving up the formally 
independent status of their own organizations. Midttun, Joa and Garsjø 
(1994) demonstrate how the country had become structured into 16 networks 
of electricity companies integrated in different ways; through political 
ownership systems, long term contracts, cross ownership, a mix of these or 
through complete vertical and horizontal integration. Of total consumption in 
1991, close to 50% of the volume was supplied in completely vertically 
integrated systems. Across these structures there was also larger regional 
cooperative organizations – usually organized to negotiate contracts between 
regions with energy surplus and those with a deficit, and national 
organizations like Samkjøringen and NEVF served as operational and policy 
making hierarchical centers respectively for the entire cooperative system. 
One could say that the sector was actually highly structured and tied together 
                                           
65 Numbers are taken from Hildrum, 199:118 and from Barth Jacobsen, 1998 
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by a multiplicity of relations. And on top of it, there was a strong state-
cooperative regulatory system framed by the concession law system. 
The hierarchical restructuring program was constituted as government policy 
with the presentation of a parliamentary report in 1960 about the 
organization and competence of the NVE66. A special unit within the NVE – 
“The Energy Directorate” – got established to be responsible for planning, 
rationalization and coordination of energy resources. The AP government 
thereby engaged in an ambitious project to restructure the many small 
organizational entities and to create a new unified structure. But, which one? 
Should it be based on the traditional historical cooperative systems and 
Samkjøringen, or should it be more of a state political hierarchy based on 
regional political institutions: the 19 counties and the NVE/Statkraftverkene? 
To do the job in the E-directorate, were appointed Gunnar Vatten who 
became its director in 1962, and Asbjørn Vinjar. The young engineer Erling 
Diesen was also employed and served almost as a personal secretary to 
Vatten. Gunnar Vatten had been educated as an engineer in Copenhagen and 
worked in the NVE until 1956 when he went to work at Westinghouse in the 
US. He also worked at Oklahoma Gas and Electricity Company before he 
was called back to serve in the new directorate because of his knowledge 
about how to operate large utility companies. Asbørn Vinjar had been to EdF 
as a trainee from 1951 and brought with him knowledge about the centrally 
planned and nationally coordinated electricity system in France. To Vinjar, 
the EdF model came to serve as an ideal model for the organization of an 
efficient and professionally governed electricity system (Barth Jacobsen, 
1998:80).  
These two men obviously reflected the two major sources of organizational 
inspiration and professional authority at the time; the American large scale 
utilities and the French EdF. They worked together on the restructuring issue 
until 1978, when Vatten got appointed head of Department in the newly 
established Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, from where he advanced the 
program further. Erling Diesen followed him to the ministry to work with a 
new energy report to parliament, where as Vinjar took over as the director of 
the E-directorate in NVE.  
The model of the future electricity system constructed by Vatten and Vinjar 
in the early 1960’s was based primarily on the EdF organizational model, 
                                           
 66 St.prop. nr. 100, 1959/60: Om Norges Vassdrags- og Elektrisitetsvesens organisasjon og 
kompetanse. 
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and was denoted “Norgesdrift”. The model and the plan to implement it soon 
got strong support from the other NVE-directorate; Statkraftverkene and its 
director Sigurd Aalefjær. The basic idea was to establish one national 
cooperative organization for all public electricity generators and distributors 
to take over from Samkjøringen or as an expansion of it. In the new 
organization, state control and coordination was thought of in similar terms 
as within the EdF system; a centralized hierarchical system based on 
professional technological and economic expertise.  
Regional entities were primarily thought of as based on county borders. To 
Vinjar, this came to mean the counties as institutions in between the state 
and the municipalities. Others, like Hveding - and to some extent also Vatten 
- hold a more pragmatic view which recognized that it would be practically 
impossible to force the inter-municipal cooperatives to transfer their property 
rights to the counties against their own will. However, Vinjar’s county based 
organizational structure model was the one which became presented to 
parliament in 197467. The majority in parliament opposed to the idea and 
rejected it from serious political treatment68. 
There seems to have been only a reluctant support also from the government 
for the very ambitious hierarchical program in the 1970’s – which might 
partially reflect the much weaker political basis for the various minority AP 
governments in between 1971 and 1981. The project was obviously pushed 
from within the E-directorate and from Statkraftverkene. Two elements 
contributed substantially to their hierarchical restructuring project. One was 
the way Nordic electricity trade got organized, and the other was the 
ambitious program for atomic energy which was pushed from collectives 
associated with the Auratom project and the Norwegian research institution 
affiliated with it: The Institute for Atomic Energy (IFA) (Andersen, 1987).  
Nordic electricity trade had been a subject for some controversy. Electricity 
trade with Sweden and, from 1976, also with Denmark, became organized 
mainly in accordance with the hierarchical program. It provided an important 
arena for state coordination and a market monopoly for Statkraftverkene 
towards other Norwegian generators. In the 1950s, a regional power 
company – “Sør-Trøndelag Kraftlag” had established an export contract to 
sell electricity to Stockholm. This led to an intervention by NVE director 
general Fredrik Vogt which in practical terms turned foreign electricity trade 
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into a state monopoly in order to maintain national control with electricity 
export. A system of state monopoly trade accordingly was established in 
which the foreign market became a system for short term power exchange 
rather than long term contracting – based on a principle of national supply 
responsibility. With the cables to Denmark, the Danish (and the Swedish) 
thermal power plants in the Norwegian perspective became the “swing 
producers” needed to manage the large stochastic influences within the 
Norwegian hydro-power system.  
Because transmission capacities were constrained, the international market 
did not clear supply and demand at Norwegian occasional power market 
price. To solve this problem, prices where set at the middle point in between 
the Norwegian occasional power market price and the calculated marginal 
cost of the marginally producing plants in Sweden and Denmark. This 
provided opportunities for the state monopoly to gain an additional profit, 
and Statkraftverkene argued that this profit should be kept by the state 
company as a compensation for its investments into transmission capacity to 
foreign markets. The parliament however, supported the other generators, 
and forced NVE/Statkraftverkene to distribute profits from foreign trade 
among all the generators. The controversies and strategic behaviors which 
followed, later became an important point of critique from Einar Hope.  
The atomic energy project contained more arguments to support the 
hierarchical program. The project was an important point in the 1970 energy 
report from the coalition government, and had been forcefully pushed by an 
entrepreneurial collective associated with the IFA since the mid-1950s. 
Among them were leading personalities among the AP post-war 
industrialists; Jens Chr. Hauge, Finn Lied and professor in physics Gunnar 
Randers. Hveding and the NVE were not particularly interested in the 
controversial technology, but were more or less forced into it from two 
different directions. One was from the breakthrough of the atomic power 
project in the government’s energy report and the other was from the new 
emphasis on area planning which had recently been introduced to counties 
and municipalities. The NVE accordingly engaged in investigating possible 
locations in case parliament should decide to establish a large scale atomic 
power plant. However, these investigations and its report opened the stage 
for protests from environmentalists and communities who angrily attacked 
the NVE and refused to have an atomic power plant in their neighborhood. 
The NVE area planning project thereby opened up for a rapid political 
breakdown for the atomic power program. The discovery of large oil and gas 
resources in the North Sea which provided less controversial alternatives, 
added to the reluctant reception of the atomic power program in parliament. 
Despite the efforts of technological experts to convince the public about its 
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tight safety standards, the atomic power program in Norway dropped dead 
and finally got abandoned also by the AP at the end of the 1970s.  
The 1970 energy report had suggested that decisions on the construction of 
an atomic power station could be taken by parliament as early as in 1973. 
The majority in parliament however, pointed at the need to establish an 
adequate legislation to regulate such a new technology before further 
decisions could be made69. This initiated work on a new energy legislation 
which was first to culminate with the new market oriented energy law in 
1990. By 1974, it had become clear that the parliament would not support 
the atomic energy project, and the plans were pushed aside. From now on, 
thermal power ambitions came to be concentrated on establishing links to 
foreign thermal power generators and on exploring the natural gas 
alternative.  
 
7.3.2 The OED and the 1980 energy report 
In 1978 the AP government established the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy (OED) by separating the Ministry of Industry into two parts. The 
main argument had been the increased administrative pressures from the 
rapidly growing new oil- and gas sector. Bjartmar Gjerde was appointed the 
first minister of the new ministry. Within the energy department, Gunnar 
Vatten established a new and “flexible” organization to cope with both oil-, 
gas- and electricity market issues, where as the waterfall department became 
headed by the jurist Hans-Ludvig Dehli concerned with new power plant 
constructions and the judiciary. Erling Diesen was invited by Vatten to do 
the job on working out a new energy report to parliament which became an 
ambitious and programmatic product from the new ministry regarding the 
electricity sector.  
At this point of time, the state organization of the oil sector emerged as a 
model for the electricity sector – cornered on a strong role for a semi-
autonomous state owned joint stock company model: that of Statoil. The 
1980 energy report from Diesen turned out to represent a renewed ambitious 
hierarchical program which pointed out the need to rationalize the many 
small entities by restructuring the sector into one large state company; 
Statkraftverkene, and around 20 vertically integrated regional power 
companies – preferably organized by the counties70.  
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A new political-administrative organization of the counties in 197671 with 
their state delegated new roles and strong support from the AP, provided for 
a renewed effort to transform the traditional local cooperatives within the 
electricity sector into a hierarchical state-county-municipality structure in 
line with the vision advocated by Vinjar. But as it turned out, an essential 
problem to the approach was that the new county organizations neither hold 
property rights within nor had any expertise on the electricity sector. Early 
attempts at giving the counties a direct role in the sector by allocating state 
property rights to counties, had been strongly opposed to by the established 
inter-municipal federative organizations. The conflicts between the 
established cooperative systems and the counties were intense at the time 
and led to different outcomes for the county initiatives. Some places – like in 
the AP stronghold Hedmark, they managed to establish a large rival to the 
established cooperatives, where as for instance in Rogaland and Hordaland, 
county property rights became forced into the established cooperative 
systems Lyse Kraft and BKK.  
Given these circumstances, the continuous advocacy for a strong role for the 
counties by leading NVE and OED officials, appears to have rested largely 
on strong ideological beliefs rather than political strategy, which sealed off 
opportunities for modifications to stabilized locked-in powers within the 
sector. It appears that a strategy for restructuring based on the existing large 
regional cooperative companies, probably would have been more successful 
in creating a political breakthrough for organizational integration. 
The new energy report received a very mixed response in parliament. In 
particular the formulations regarding centralization and the role of the 
counties were opposed to by the opposition – pushed by local and 
cooperative political influences. Høyre, who had earlier been a supporter of 
hierarchical restructuring, now argued that the proposal would undermine 
the position of local power companies and pointed at the need for local 
adjustments, initiative and flexibility within the industry and the need to 
maintain a number of entities within the sector so that one through 
comparative analysis of costs associated with different ways of doing things, 
could find the more rational methods. The party argued that inter-municipal 
companies of a sufficient size were sustainable economic, technical and 
managerial units and provided for political governance opportunities at local 
levels72. Also the SP, the KrF and the FrP representatives in the industry and 
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energy committee argued against centralization and the proposed role of the 
counties. Given these positions, there was no majority for the governments 
propositions and no obvious platform for political consensus-making.  
What added momentum to the political opposition, was the protests from the 
local cooperatives. Their representative industrial organization NEVF 
worked out their own report, which argued that a realistic ambition would be 
to reduce the number of electricity companies to around 150-160 by the year 
2000. Also the influential board of the NVE argued against the ambitious 
plan to create 20 vertically integrated regional companies (Barth Jacobsen, 
1998:90). The argument was that there was no political support within the 
sector, and in particular that county participation had not been received with 
enthusiasm. Those involved with the local electricity companies were not 
fond of the idea that their sense of local control with investments, 
employment, returns to other non-electricity sector activities and electricity 
prices should get out of their hands and be transferred to a county 
organization – presumably in part directed by a state who struggled for 
centralization of governance and control within the entire electricity sector. 
No doubt, the idea about a strong role for the counties directly confronted 
the established power system within the general supply system in control of 
property rights, financial resources and technical expertise as well as sector 
organizations to lobby for their interests. The NVE appeared to be divided, 
and the hearing process demonstrated a fairly massive response against the 
20 vertically integrated company plan. 
 
7.3.3 The Energy Law Commission and its consensus on 
         “voluntary hierarchical reform” 
Following the response from parliament to its energy report, the AP-
government established a broad representative commission with a mandate 
to propose suggestions for a new legislation; the Energy Law Commission. It 
was constituted in January 1981 under the new AP-minister in the OED; 
Arvid Johanson, who served only a short period until the Høyre-government 
took over in the autumn and appointed Vidkunn Hveding to the position, 
who however had to use most of his time in pressing issues within the 
petroleum sector at the time. 
The Commission was headed by Fylkesmann Arne Haukvik, and contained 
representatives from various ministries, the NVE, the municipalities (KS), 
the electricity industry (NEVF) and the electricity intensive industry (LEEI). 
There was also two appointed experts, the lawyer Eilert Stang Lund and the 
economist, Assistant Professor Vidar Christiansen. Per Håkon Høisveen in 
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the OED served as the secretary for the commission, and from 1982 he was 
joined by his colleague Jon D. Engebretsen73.  
The difficult part of the issues addressed by the commission, was the idea 
about a national cooperative/state governed system for the entire electricity 
system called “Norgesdrift”. The discussion aimed at finding operational 
solutions to create an integrated hierarchical governance system for the 
entire electricity system and to define the future institutional-organizational 
structures of the sector. This part of the work was headed by Erling Diesen. 
By pulling together the various stakeholders in the electricity system in 
specially established sub-groups, the commission served as a forum for 
negotiations between the various actor-networks; the local cooperative, the 
energy intensive industry and the state hierarchical restructuring - a process 
which moderated the attempts at giving the state very substantial legislative 
powers to restructure the sector into a EdF type of hierarchy with a 
professionally guided order. In the end, the commission, in order to achieve 
consensus, had to accept that structural reforms basically should have a 
voluntary character (Thue, 1996:93) – an outcome similar in principal to the 
outcome of the 1922 national plan initiative. In practical terms however, the 
state in the 1980’s had achieved a substantially more powerful ability to 
direct and control local electricity companies through a variety of 
governance institutional and financial instruments created since the 1920s.  
Despite the compromise, the majority in the commission included a variety 
of suggestions for legislative changes which formally would provide the 
state with improved powers to force through a hierarchical reform. This dual 
outcome clearly illustrated the continuous rivalry and controversy between 
the local cooperative and the state hierarchical actor-networks within the 
sector and pointed at still substantial uncertainty about the ability of the local 
cooperatives to either block or substantially modify the implementation of a 
possible hierarchical reform through the legislative process.    
The Commission delivered its main report; “Energilovgivningen” in March 
1985, which also contained proposals for a new legislation. The report 
argued for structural reforms through horizontal and in particular vertical 
integration between electricity generators and distributors into larger 
regional entities which over time preferably should develop into a national 
system with one national and approximately 20 regional vertically integrated 
electricity companies. As operational tools to force such a development, the 
commission suggested a mix of new licenses (concessions) and state 
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expropriations, economic incentives and a variety of administrative 
procedures which to a larger degree would favor vertically integrated 
companies.  
The economists within the commission, represented by Kjell Mathisen (FD) 
and Vidar Christiansen, did not oppose to this hierarchical reform approach. 
Their main contribution was the insistence on marginal cost principles for 
pricing and investments. In the report, it is hard to find any influences at all 
from the wave of market reorientation at the time.  
The continued controversies with the politically influential local 
cooperatives – and to a growing extent with the emerging wave of market 
oriented actors - led to a halt in the hierarchical reform process. Under the H-
SP-KrF government (1983-86), Gunnar Vatten an his colleagues within the 
OED saw no reason to push further and put the report aside. The hierarchical 
reform initiative had apparently reached a dead end at the political level – 
where as it maintained the upper hand within the sector and continued to 
push for regional integration across the country. 
 
7.4 In search for efficiency: Defeats, deadlocks and dead 
ends 
All of these programs and their associated collectives of actors were 
dedicated towards improving the economic efficiency of the electricity 
system. Their framing and core concepts however, were very different, and 
their associated world models had different implications for established 
collectives within the sector. What can be said in general is that none of 
them really had succeeded in mobilizing sufficient arguments and support to 
overturn objections from their opponents and to generate a convincing 
political and institutional breakthrough which would have permitted them to 
substantially reshape the industry. 
The system design and EdF economic program represented by the Hveding 
collective, managed to establish important elements of their program within 
the sector, such as the occasional power market, the EFI simulation model 
and the Nordic power exchange system, but was unable to establish its 
pricing and investment principles in any conclusive manner. This was at 
least in part due to lack of support from the economic profession, which 
undermined Hveding’s LRMC pricing argument. 
The UiO economists on their side, did not develop any operational 
alternative to support their in principle arguments and remained within a 
highly abstract level of argument which aimed at constraining hydropower 
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investments at the time and to level out prices between different categories 
of consumers. These efforts succeeded to a fairly limited extent. 
The ambitious atomic power program on its side, had to face a devastating 
defeat. The only remaining alternative for a substantial reform which could 
improve the economic rationality and overall efficiency of the electricity 
system, was the hierarchical restructuring program represented first and 
foremost by Vinjar, Vatten, Diesen, the E-directorate and Statkraftverkene. 
This program managed to create both significant representations of its 
program and to initiate and structure political processes so as to mobilize for 
its becoming reality. However, both conceptual weaknesses represented by 
the strong role given to the counties and external events outside any control 
of the hierarchical restructuring collective, forced the program to a 
slowdown and eventually to silence. These external events were primarily 
associated with the market economic re-orientation – which had dramatically 
shifted the political outlook for state-hierarchical reform projects. 
Taken together, this left the sector in rivalry between a number of relatively 
weakly represented alternative programs for the reshaping of the industry. 
The sector apparently found itself into a dead end in terms of moving the 
industry forward towards the final goal of optimal technical and economic 
efficiency – or even a decent level by comparison to other countries at the 
time. The row of apparent failures to create a substantial political 
breakthrough for any of the programs which engaged to improve the 
efficiency of the electricity sector in the 1970s and early 1980s, left the stage 
open to a different approach – if it were able to come up with a powerful re-
framing of the sector, if it were able to mobilize sufficient arguments and 
professional and political support, and if it could avoid provoking strong 
counter attacks from well established historical collectives like the local 
cooperatives and the large scale power intensive industries. But where could 
such a different framing come from – and from where could it gain the 
necessary strengths? 
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8 Return to markets: Re-orienting economics and 
       reshaping economies 
 
We shall now leave the Norwegian electricity sector for a while in order to 
obtain a description of the situation from a different perspective. We shall 
trace - in a fairly brief sense – the radical shift in economic orientation from 
the state-hierarchical approach associated for instance with Oskar Lange, 
Ragnar Frisch, Jan Tinbergen and their students, to the market approach 
associated with its advocates such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman and 
George Stigler - and with “Thatcherism” and “Reaganism”. From there we 
shall follow the neo-liberal market program back to Norway. The ambition is 
to investigate major pathways of networking activities and early economic 
reforms in order to figure out how these events related to the electricity 
market collective. 
The initial shift in Norwegian economic policy orientation largely took place 
in between 1977 and 1984 in the area of macro economic governance and 
credit market policy where Friedman’s monetaristic approach challenged the 
“real economics” governance systems which had been established from the 
ideas of Frisch and Lange. Soon, however, the neo-liberal market program 
confronted the established order within multiple areas of economic 
policymaking.  
The breakthrough for the market program within the area of credit policy 
came to represent a gradual transformation of the Norwegian economics 
profession and a relative shift in influence between economic research 
institutions. It was followed by a fairly radical shift in political and 
economic attitudes within the population in general, articulated by rapidly 
growing right wing political parties. This broad shift towards a market re-
orientation also induced a rapid expansion in the education of economists – 
in particular at the public and private business schools. These became the 
new generation of human representations of the expanding program, with a 
capacity to link its theories to real life practices in business as well as within 
the public sector. Some of them quickly came to power in large industrial 
and financial companies in the 1980s – and others entered the rapidly 
growing industry of economic advisers; those John Meyer denoted “The 
Institutional Others” (Meyer, 1996) who engaged in translating the new 
frameworks and theoretical concepts and in re-configuring organizations and 
shaping new economic practices.  
I will argue that the massive change process resulted from a combination of 
the expansion of the neo-liberal market program within economics which 
promised to provide more appropriate governance models as well as to open 
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up for a more dynamic, competitive and efficient economy, with the failure 
of the stabilized post-war collectives to maintain its stability and legitimacy 
through the real-life test of a severe international economic recession. In 
Norway the result was an economic governance crisis around 1977-80, 
which undermined the legitimacy and the authority of the established post-
war governance models, their theoretical core, their governance technologies 
and their research institutions, organizations, professionals and politicians. 
This opened up the field to available alternatives which could present 
sufficient authority behind themselves.  
In 1981, a “Høyre” government came to power and initiated a program for 
“new public management” within the public sector. Both the credit market 
reform and the new public management initiatives are found to be important 
preconditions for the later electricity market reform. To tie these events 
down to the electricity sector case, I will discuss in brief the new public 
management inspired restructuring of the NVE in 1985-86, which separated 
Statkraftverkene from the NVE and turned it into a profit oriented semi-
autonomous state enterprise.  
 
 
8.1 The return to markets in economic theorizing 
In the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, what was to become known as neo-
liberalism within economics emerged within the community of economists - 
in particular in the US. It was followed by a gradual political breakthrough 
in the US in between 1974 and 1980, and by a later but more rapid, radical 
and politically dominated breakthrough in the UK in 1979, which had been 
into severe economic problems during the 1970s. These developments 
spread rapidly but not as radically across Western Europe around 1978-81 
(except France). It represented a radical return to the competitive market 
approach as represented by Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich von Hayek, Milton 
Friedman and others who had been pushed aside by Ragnar Frisch, Jan 
Tinbergen, Oskar Lange and those others who represented the hierarchical 
economic program since the 1930s and  -40's.  
In the broad economic picture at the time, the Soviet Union no longer 
appeared to be in a state of dynamic economic growth. It was rather in a state 
of industrial, economic and political stagnation with continuous problems 
delivering the promised consumer goods to its population. In Western 
Europe state owned industries experienced severe problems everywhere. 
Trade unions went on strike to protest against public sector cut backs. Public 
budgets had expanded rapidly and caused substantial tax increases which 
triggered new types of popular protests, and the international economy 
struggled with growing inflation and staggering markets. The powers of the 
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established hierarchical program virtually “collapsed” as both governance 
and efficiency problems became evident – and in particular as its innovative 
capacity came under questioning by a rising number of new advocates for 
the competitive market alternative. The stability and growth problems in the 
economy had obviously not been completely resolved through the 
combination of state hierarchical industrial initiatives and Keynesian 
economics - after all.  
In the US, the University of Chicago where Milton Friedman was a 
professor, came to represent perhaps the most important “commanding 
height” for the new market oriented approach under  the new slogan: “more 
markets – less state”. During the Ford and Carter administrations, there had 
been a gradual roll back of state regulations and market interventions based 
on a well articulated critique by another Chicago economists, George Stigler, 
in his theory of regulatory capture and costs of government control. State 
regulations was said to make economic activities too rigid, too cumbersome, 
too slow. Lack of efficient competition also was said to make it impossible 
to keep down inflation. State regulations were furthermore claimed to be 
inefficient as a strategy to support consumers, because firms through better 
knowledge about their own activities than the regulators, always would be 
able to circumvent regulations or turn regulations in their own favor. 
Critique towards the “American regulated capitalism” also emerged from 
other institutions such as the generally regarded politically moderate 
Brookings Institution and the emerging right wing and highly ideological 
Public Choice economists.  
 
8.1.1 Early market reforms in the US 
A political process towards a neo-liberal breakthrough can be said to have 
gained power in 1974 when senator Edward Kennedy as the chairman of a 
government committee on administrative practice and procedure, brought in 
Stephen Breyer, a Harvard Law School professor, to work on regulatory 
reforms. Together they initiated investigations into airline regulations and a 
number of other industries which became objects for deregulation in the 
years to come – starting with the airlines in 1978. The airline industry reform 
came to represent a powerful representation of the neo-liberal program by 
demonstrating how an entire industry could be successfully re-framed and 
re-configured on the basis of market economic theory. 
A very influential event which stimulated these early reforms was the 
publication of Alfred Kahn’s book “The Economics of Regulation” in 1970, 
which presented the essential economic critique of traditional American 
economic regulation; that it prevented prices from doing its job in the 
markets, and thereby had devastating consequences for economic efficiency. 
The objective of regulation, according to Kahn, should be to ensure that 
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prices were set according to marginal cost principles. Equipped with these 
ideas, he also came to play an important role as the director of regulatory 
reforms in various industries. His first job was to govern a reform of the 
price system in the New York State electricity system, which introduced the 
EdF marginal cost theory to actual pricing practices in the US. This was 
however an “imitated market” approach, not a “real market” system. Later, 
he headed the implementation of the “real market” airline deregulation 
process as chairman of the government’s Civil Aeronautics Board (Yergin 
and Stanislaw, 1998:341-346).   
 
8.1.2 The British crisis and neo-liberal revolution 
A radical, ideological and political breakthrough in Europe occurred in the 
UK. In 1976, the country and its Labor Party government had partly been set 
under administration by the IMF, when the government had to borrow large 
sums to support the state budget and the pound. During the 1970’s, it 
gradually became clear to observers that Britain industrially and 
economically had lagged substantially behind continental Europe and 
appeared to be incapable of modernizing its industries in order to make them 
internationally competitive. One after one large companies became 
dependent on state subsidies and eventually had to close down. Very few 
new industries emerged successfully. The government could no longer 
afford to carry out a Keynesian counter-cyclical policy, inflation rose to 20% 
and unions were on strike in various sectors. The radical breakthrough for 
the neo-liberal program accordingly came in a country where the 
hierarchical program met the more severe crisis, its perhaps most dramatic 
breakdown before the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989.  
Around 1974, when Friedrich Hayek received the Nobel prize together with 
Gunnar Myrdal74, a radical right wing political opposition within the Tory 
party affiliated with Keith Joseph, Margaret Thatcher and a research 
institution named Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), started educating 
themselves in the theories of von Mises, Hayek and Friedman, and to 
advocate their ideas all across the country as the radical solution to Britain’s 
economic problems (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998:92-108). A rapid reform 
process was implemented when Margaret Thatcher became prime minister 
for a new conservative government in 1979.  
The “bible” of the new regime was Hayek’s book from 1944: “The Road to 
Serfdom” which presented the essence of the liberal market critique of the 
role of the state in the economy, the hierarchical “imitated market” approach 
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of Oskar Lange, the mixed economy and collectivism in general, and which 
argued for the self-sustaining order and innovative capacity of a competitive 
market with profit oriented actors. Privatization, construction of new market 
institutions and tax cuts dominated the agenda and also came to include a 
radical electricity market reform in 1989, which at the time came to add 
further momentum to the Norwegian reform. 
  
8.1.3 Market re-orientation in Europe – and the new public 
          management program 
In 1979, the CDU/CSU with Helmuth Kohl as Bundes-chancellor, took over 
from the social democrats also in Germany. In the following elections during 
1980-81, right wing governments came to power in the US with Ronald 
Reagan, in all the Nordic countries and all across western Europe apart from 
France, where Mitterand won the 1981 president election and pushed 
through a Keynesian and welfare state oriented economic program which 
was given up first by 1985. Many of the European social democratic 
governments had been forced into budget cutbacks and industrial 
restructuring through the 1970’s. The changes however, never became as 
radical as in England.   
As noted in chapter 3, the situation in Norway in several ways was different 
from other West-European countries. The UiO had since the 1930s been one 
of the international academic strongholds for the state-hierarchical program 
and had been an important policy producing institution. The country voted 
against membership in the European Community. Large oil reserves had 
been discovered in the North Sea which increased the credit rating and the 
debt capacity of the state, and the AP government became dependent on a 
strong left-wing opposition in parliament for its political support. The 
answer to economic recession and increased governance problems in this 
situation, was to apply more of the same; more of the traditional governance 
technology developed by the Oslo School economists and more 
expansionary budgets in line with traditional Keynesianism. When the crisis 
became apparent in 1977, the shift became relatively dramatic. 
The breakthrough for neo-liberalism in economics fuelled a related program 
for public sector modernization; the so called new public management 
program, which took as its starting point that business companies due to their 
profit incentives where much more innovative and efficient than government 
bureaucracies, and that organizational forms developed by business firms 
could and should be applied to all kinds of public sector activities for the 
purpose of improving their efficiency. The program developed from 
economics into organizational theory and drew substantially upon the 
emerging area of business strategy theory which came out of leading 
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business schools. These ideas got adopted by international institutions like 
the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF, which pushed for public sector 
reforms across the world.  
 
8.1.4 A few notes on important developments in economic 
         theorizing  
In the US, the continuous economic problems during the 1970’s with 
staggering growth rates, inflation and high unemployment rates were met 
with a reorientation back to “the efficient order of the competitive market”. 
In this respect, it was quite the opposite of the initial Norwegian response, 
which was to increase state hierarchical ambitions, interventions and controls 
within the corporate governance model.  
The shift from the state regulatory to the competitive market program, fueled 
a broad range of economic research. New theoretical developments followed 
from a variety of theoretical approaches. A market selection theory presented 
by the Chicago economists in the 1950s became the explanatory foundation 
for a rapidly emerging area denoted Neo-Institutional Economics, which 
expanded the market theory to theories of the firm; Property Rights Theory, 
Agency Theory and Transaction Cost Theory - associated with scholars like 
H. Demsetz, E. Fama, M. C. Jensen, W. Meckling and O. E. Williamson in 
the 1960s and 1970s. In particular Williamson’s Transaction Cost Theory 
came to influence economic thought and to provide a new focus on the 
structuring and functioning of firms in markets, the role of contracting, the 
possibilities for “outsourcing”, restructuring etc. These ideas were rapidly 
picked up by the new area of business strategy theory and spread from there 
into business where it radically influenced business practices, organizational 
systems and industrial restructuring in the 1980s. 
Another construct which became important was the Theory of Contestable 
Markets (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982) which was based on the idea the 
even though markets or resources might be monopolized, the market itself 
could be seen as an object for competition or it could be subjected to 
“potential competition” through the lowering of barriers to entry for 
competing firms. This became the basic model for a state and public sector 
policy to organize auctions in which private companies competed for 
procurement monopolies and rights to explore national resources and 
policies where the state actively supported entrance for rivals in concentrated 
markets. The approach rapidly expanded to all kinds of public services 
where new market institutions (auctions) became organized to let private 
companies compete for the right to deliver specified public services. 
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Economics also expanded rapidly into political theorizing – not at least 
through the neo-utilitarian “Public Choice” program affiliated with J. M. 
Buchanan, R. D. Tollison and G. Tullock (1980), as well as into other social 
sciences. Without any intent to review these large areas of theorizing, I think 
it is fair to say that the 1970’s and -80’s represented a vigorous growth in 
economic theorizing and an expansion of economics into an even more 
influential position among the social sciences, which reflected highly 
optimistic views on what could be achieved to society from its contributions. 
The very optimistic thoughts on behalf of the ability of the market approach 
to solve even the most troublesome cases, provided the emerging market 
program with a tremendous capacity to associate with policymakers across 
the world and to transform societies and economic sectors through 
regulatory reforms, constructions of market institutions and advancements of  
theoretical concepts and models.  
The strong support for deregulation, more markets and less state, should not 
be seen as a general support for less economic governance on behalf of 
society. On the contrary, the substantial developments within economic 
theorizing and the huge arsenal of new governance tools developed, make it 
highly implausible that less governance was the goal. Rather, the market 
reorientation reflected the acknowledgement of the limitations to economic 
governance efficiency from traditional hierarchical, regulatory and 
cooperative approaches, and aimed at developing much more efficient 
economic governance systems based on a radical “externalization” of non-
efficiency objectives from the context of economic activities. Whatever 
choices which followed from not-for-profit objectives, became defined as 
“economically irrational”, and were handed over to the list of externalities to 
be dealt with outside markets – like environmental problems, distribution of 
wealth problems, migration problems etc. Through state taxes and subsidies 
however, these problems could be “re-internalized” in a second turn – 
without altering the narrowly defined rationality of economic actors needed 
to form atomized calculating economic actors engaged in economic 
interactions and activities.  
The role of economists became to construct new market systems, guide the 
“externalization” and “re-internalization” processes and design the 
institutional and regulatory systems which would force economic actors to 
behave in ways compatible with the roles and the rationality assumptions 
prescribed by economic theory. To support this market constructing 
approach, to advice the new “fiercely competing firms” on how to succeed in 
the new markets and to advice politicians on which market model to go for 
and how to regulate atomized profit oriented actors, additional economic 
concepts and theories developed at a high speed.  
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Some of the most important theoretical advancements were achieved within 
micro-economics – in particular through the application of mathematical 
game theory to economic modeling. For decades, economists had been 
criticized by institutionalists and organizational theorists for their lack of 
institutional and behavioral realism and thereby lack of proper insights into 
the micro order of real world economic activities. This was in essence a 
critique of the radical externalization of institutions done by economists in 
order to establish conditions for calculating the optimal choices of economic 
actors in mathematical terms. With the new modeling concepts presented by 
von Neumann and Morgenstern in their book: “Theory of Games” (1944), 
and the flow of mathematical modeling which followed in the 1950s and -
60s, modeling assumptions could be claimed to be more realistic, despite a 
continued radical externalization of non-efficiency or not-for-profit 
objectives. More complicated micro-economic decision situations could be 
addressed by mathematical models, which included specific industrial 
structures and which addressed more specific areas of economic decision 
making. These contributions radically improved both the credibility of and 
the operational applicability of the economic theory to economic regulators. 
Today, the micro-economic game-theoretical research program is still rather 
progressive - moving for instance into the area of Simon’s “bounded 
rationality” concept in order to “close the gap” to empirically founded 
insights into human decision-making.  
Another area within economics – one with a less formal, but more empirical 
orientation - had been engaged with micro-economic industrial and 
institutional studies for quite some time. This was the Industrial 
Organization tradition – or the “Structure, Conduct, Performance” tradition 
as it was also labeled. This research program combined the standard 
competitive market theory with empirical studies of the micro-structures, 
incentive systems and efficiency outcomes found in different industries. 
With the inclusion of non-cooperative game theoretical modeling based on 
the “Nash equilibrium” concept in the early 1950’s, and the theory of second 
best solutions from theory of taxation in the late 1960’s, the IO-theory area 
developed into a mainstream field of economic research also for 
mathematically oriented economists. Similarly, in the area of procurement 
and regulation theory, game theory applied to principal agent theory and the 
concept of asymmetric information developed within insurance theory, 
revolutionized micro-economic theorizing. 
Equipped with this new generation of modeling tools and a radically 
increased capability to model detailed and complicated relationships between 
strategic situations, and cost-, incentives- and information structures, the 
micro-economic research program expanded rapidly throughout the 
international economic research community. From its initial American 
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dominance, French economists like Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole, 
came to influence the area through their “elegant” mathematical 
contributions. The radically increased capability to model micro-economic 
incentives and strategic economic problems by the use of game-theory, had 
vast implications for the persuasiveness of the economic program we 
associate with neo-liberalism, and thereby its ability to produce policy 
recommendations and to initiate and direct institutional reforms through out 
the world.  
As a consequence of these developments, numerous economic sectors of the 
American economy and gradually also many in a number of other countries 
(like Great Britain), became objects for deregulation initiatives, like for 
instance the road transportation industry, the railway-, the harbor, the oil- 
and gas-, the airline-, the telecommunication- and the agriculture industries, 
and the public utilities like water- and energy distribution. Within the neo-
liberal framework, the various new theories were specifically applied to the 
institutional-organizational-technological characteristics of each particular 
sector. New markets were constructed, new roles and rules of the game were 
defined, new governance systems were established and new industrial 
structures prescribed.  
 
8.1.5 The electricity sector deregulation program in the US 
The electricity sector was one of the latest to be addressed by the wave of 
deregulatory reforms in the US. What happened in the 1970’s, was primarily 
an introduction of the French marginal cost theory to pricing practices as for 
instance done by Alfred Kahn in New York State, and a development of 
regional power pools in which generators could trade electricity on a 
bilateral basis. The period until 1977 also represented a rapid expansion of 
atomic power plants. A new legislation under the Carter administration in 
1978 focussed on energy saving in the wake of the crisis for the atomic 
power industry, but also opened up for the so called independent power 
producers (IPPs) to supply electricity into electricity networks owned and 
operated by traditional regional monopolies a “contestable markets” strategy. 
This third party access reform, provided for a very moderate competition in 
electricity generation. Despite the fact that much of the frustrations and 
critique of the established regulatory system related to the electricity system, 
the sector became one of the latest to be turned into a competitive market 
system. As a matter of fact, the implementation of electricity sector 
deregulation first started in 1997. 
The  reason for this relative delay seems to have been the frightening 
institutional and technical complexity of a physical network based sector 
with more than 3000 companies. These were ranging from the very large to 
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the very small, with a mix of private, public and cooperative ownership75 
with complex contractual and ownership interrelations and with massive and 
highly specialized government regulations at all levels ranging from the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to the various state 
regulatory bodies, the power districts and the municipalities. Also because 
the optimal price theory which had been developed by EdF, had only 
recently been introduced to the American electricity system, both regulators 
and most of the electricity economic profession through out the 1970’s 
engaged in work which were rather based on the EdF theoretical 
contributions than the competitive market approach. In this respect, 
American developments in the 1970’s had much in common with the 
program presented by Hveding and the coalition government in Norway in 
1969/70. 
When the debate over deregulation of the electricity utility sector broke 
through in 1981-82, it  reflected in particular the problems which increased 
inflation during the late 1970’s incurred on the industry when the political 
regulatory system constrained price increases to cover increased generating 
and distributing costs. The industry reacted by cutting new investments and 
thereby caused a reduction in technical efficiency, and by complaining over 
and attacking the regulatory system. (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1985:11-23). 
But, probably even more important was the successful deregulation of other 
sectors which added momentum to political and scientific initiatives for 
electricity sector reforms along similar lines. 
Specific theorizing on the prospects for deregulation of the electricity sector 
emerged from around 197576. From 1981 on, a broad range of papers 
appeared which discussed the possibilities for deregulation within the sector. 
A variety of ideas on how it might be organized and detailed discussions of a 
variety of problems and constraints were presented at conferences, in 
journals and books. Until this point, deregulation and new approaches to 
natural monopoly regulations had been treated at a fairly abstract theoretical 
level of analysis in relation to the electric utility sector, without serious 
attempts at really digging into the technological and institutional specifics of 
the sector. From 1980-81, we can say that a scientific research program 
                                           
.75 By 1980, 78% of generating capacity was private, 2,5% was cooperative, 9,6 was federal, 
5,6% was municipal and 4,5 was owned by power districts and states (Joskow and 
Schmalensee, 1985:12) 
76 For instance Walter J. Primeaux Jr.: “A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structure 
for Electric Utilities.” In Phillips, Almarin, ed.: “Promoting Competition in Regulated 
Markets”, Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1975 
 171 
directed towards deregulation of the electricity sector became established in 
the US, which aimed at radical regulatory reforms.  
The electricity deregulation program in the US has accordingly existed for 
nearly 20 years, and first by the late 1990’s eventually seems to have made a 
breakthrough into a real world remaking of the sector. Compared to this long 
lasting process, its numerous theoretical contributions, complex political 
processes and multi-faceted discussions with participation by numerous 
scientific, political and sector actors, the Norwegian reform process appears 
to have been highly simplistic and streamlined with almost no scientific, 
political or sector controversies.  
The Norwegian electricity sector deregulation appears not to have been 
directly related to the breakthrough of the American debate in 1981-82 and 
the scientific contributions it produced – even though the two programs 
became conceptualized at the same time. The specific influences from the 
American electricity market reform debate and theorizing seem to have 
entered the Norwegian reform program through research projects at the SAF 
in Bergen first by 1985/86. Rather the Norwegian electricity market reform 
emerged from a traditional Industrial Organization research program which 
focussed on empirical research on efficiency problems within industries, and 
from the political program for new public management pushed by the 1981 
Høyre government. In the broader sense however, the Norwegian electricity 
market reform was of course influenced by the neo-liberal program and its 
early regulatory reforms in other sectors. The link primarily came to be 
represented by the group of economists at the NHH, which came to represent 
the new main stream of economics in Norway. 
 
 
8.2 The breakthrough for neo-liberalism in Norway 
         through credit market reform 
The breakthrough for the neo-liberal program into Norway represented a 
fairly radical shift in scientific and political orientation. Friedman and the 
Chicago school had argued strongly for their monetaristic general 
equilibrium model and had also been permitted to experiment large scale and 
to develop new economic governance institutions for instance in Chile after 
the coup in 1973. The model got adopted both by the US and the German 
central banks already by the mid 1970s. The combination of high 
unemployment rates, huge government debts and inflation forced 
governments in the US, the UK, Germany and elsewhere in western Europe 
to abandon traditional Keynesian economic policies and go looking for 
alternatives in the wake of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods exchange 
rate regime in 1972 and the 1973 oil-crisis.  
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Due to the initial low state debts and the increased debt capacity of the new 
oil-state, Norway had the economic freedom to go on a usual - until 1978 - 
an option which turned out to be very costly. At that time, the dike collapsed 
and revealed a severe economic crisis. In the political process to come, the 
credit market reform came to represent the overturning of the Oslo School 
and its post-war governance system, with radical implications for state 
economic governance practices. 
 
8.2.1 The credit market reform 
Both historians, economists and politicians77 have engaged in analyzing and 
explaining the Norwegian credit market reform and the later financial crisis 
of the banking sector in between 1989 and 1992, which ended with a state 
rescue operation and take over of the three largest commercial banks. One 
very interesting analysis of these events is the one by Bent Sofus Tranøy in 
his study: “From “Oslo-school”-ambitions to neo-liberal visions”, (1994)78. 
Tranøy traces the breakthrough of the credit policy reorientation back to the 
economic governance crisis in 1977-78, which in part resulted from an 
ambitious counter-cyclical economic policy by the AP-government from 
1975 to 1978. A political turnaround by the AP government in 1978 is 
excellently demonstrated by Tranøy to represent a major turning point of the 
economic, scientific and political orientation in Norway from a domination 
of the Oslo School towards a new domination of the competitive market 
school. The initial shift was largely associated with economists in Norges 
Bank (NB). Tranøy’s historical analysis follows the rivalry between the two 
schools of thought through the reform process. He outlines in substantial 
detail the complex interacting transformation process by focusing on the 
scientific, the political, the institutional, the organizational and the 
governance technological developments, and by taking the descriptions of 
these further into explanations within the frameworks of a political 
science/philosophy of science (Popperian and Kuhnian) theoretical approach 
which focuses on the paradigmatic change character of the process.  
The mediators of the transformation process is taken by Tranøy primarily to 
be economists in the central bank “Norges Bank (NB)” followed by some of 
their colleagues in the Ministry of Finance (FD). These are seen as 
representing a continuous line of historical professional opposition, which  
                                           
77 Axel Damman 1991, Harald Espeli 1992, Trond Reinertsen 1992, Torger Reve 1990, Emil 
Steffensen og Erling Steigum 1990, Kåre Willoch 1990, Tore Jørgen Hanisch 1996 
78 My translation 
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had been pushed back by the Oslo-school to a marginal and weakly 
articulated position most prominently represented by economists at NHH.  
From the early formulations of a new interest rate policy in 1974 within NB, 
via frustrating attempts to expand and modify the traditional governance 
technologies of the Oslo-school in the “Krøsus” econometric simulation 
model, and through the hiring of young economists like Jarle Bergo and 
Einar Forsberg, early neo-liberal initiatives grew into a more founded 
critique of the traditional theoretical framework and its governance 
technology. By 1978, a new credit policy program outlined in principal by 
the NB economists during the autumn 1977, was taken up by the AP-
government which for some time had experienced the rise of the severe 
governance crisis and the frustrating differences between the calculated 
forecasts of economic policies produced by the complex econometric 
models, and real world outcomes. At the same time, the government pushed 
through an immediate “wage- and price stop” legislation which lasted until 
1980, intended to cool down inflation and stop the accelerating government 
budget- and national balance of trade deficits, an act which clearly illustrated 
the pressures from the experienced loss of economic control by the 
government. Several state owned industries experienced continued financial 
distress, repeated rescue operations and eventual bankruptcies, privatization 
or other sorts of radical restructuring.  
The NB economists now got the opportunity, the political support and 
the resources to present their monetaristic alternative, by mobilizing 
insights provided by international economic research programs. 
Supported by the Minister of Finance, the social democratic 
economist Per Kleppe and his staff – among them his “vise-
minister”79 the economist Tormod Hermansen - adequate government 
committees were established which aimed at producing professional 
and political support for a new market oriented credit policy. 
  
8.2.1.1 Re-framing the money and credit policy 
The focus of the new approach centered on the role of the interest rate in the 
economic governance policy. The Oslo-school had been advocating the 
superior role of “real economic values” in opposition to “speculative 
financial”, and an active role of state governance in the economy. The Oslo 
school had represented strong beliefs in substantial freedoms to control the 
essential input variables through state institutional-organizational systems 
                                           
79 Statssekretær 
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which permitted for a strong capability for state control and governance with 
each economic sector of society. Within this framework, money was not 
primarily seen as a standard market commodity, but rather as an input factor 
to sector policies and to re-distributive welfare policy. The government was 
seen to have substantial degrees of freedom to manipulate interest rates and 
credit distributions by the use of the institutional-organizational systems 
which had been continuously expanding its technological governance 
instruments during 30 years.  
In opposition to this approach, the NB economists argued in line with 
Friedman’s monetaristic theory, that money should be seen as a standard 
homogeneous commodity where prices primarily and most efficiently are set 
in markets. Based on both ideological influences, experiences from the much 
larger and more complex American economy, the failing socialist economies 
with very visible black economies and the highly complex and politically 
unmanageable international financial markets which increased rapidly during 
the 1970’s, the new line of theorizing emphasized the limited ability of 
governments to prevent “spillovers” and black markets from undermining 
attempts at government manipulations of the financial markets. Furthermore, 
such manipulations would decrease social welfare as it would allocate 
resources to potentially less profitable investments or to consumption where 
it would be less wanted. Government controls were accordingly not only 
impossible, but also harmful. The neo-liberals argued that the general 
equilibrium model was the adequate modeling approach rather than the 
complex econometric models based on partial sector analysis. They also 
argued that government interventions should be restricted to supply side 
economics and interventions by the central banks primarily aimed at the 
control of inflation. Apart from this, the market would see to it that resources 
were allocated efficiently between sectors, projects and consumption. The 
new approach accordingly started out as a radical re-framing of the money 
and credit policy area based on a different basic model. 
8.2.1.2 Creating a representation of the future end, and strategic 
                  transformation of relevant actor networks  
The “Interest Rate Committee” established in 1978, represented a strategic 
attempt at producing a breakthrough and a new consensus for a monetaristic 
policy. As the chairman of the committee was appointed Petter Jacob Bjerve, 
the director of SSB. He had been an assistant and student of Ragnar Frisch at 
UiO, had served as a Minister of Finance and was a member of the 
government’s “Money and Finance Advisory Committee” at the time. He, in 
his own person, politically as well as professionally represented the 
influences of the Oslo-school in the social democratic governance system. If 
he could be convinced about the new approach, it would provide a strong 
professional signal and legitimacy to both the social democratic and the 
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scientific economic communities. With him in the committee were appointed 
several of those who had been working on the new approach, among them 
Jarle Bergo who became its secretary and core specialist. Other economists 
represented the bank association, NB, FD, the trade unions, the Price 
Directorate and NHH. For the first time since the war, economists at the 
University of Oslo were not represented in an important government 
committee on the money and credit policy, which in it self clearly indicates 
the significance of this turning point. Also the political representatives were 
selected so as to tactically design a process where the new professional 
arguments could be able to counter and to overthrow the expected strong 
opposition and powers of the traditional “low interest rate” policy, in 
particular within SP, parts of AP and the trade unions (Tranøy, 1994:116-
123). 
With the availability of data which demonstrated that those with the higher 
incomes received more benefits from the low interest rate policy than those 
with the lower incomes, through their higher net borrowings, and by 
pointing to the “unforeseen” outcome of government rationing that bank 
managers were implicitly given powers to allocate subsidized loans to 
“friends and associates”, the re-distribution argument of the established 
interest rate policy was effectively undermined. The general market 
equilibrium model and arguments were powerful arguments both in terms of 
their normative powers and in terms of the authority of the international 
scientific community which signed up behind them. The arguments 
substantially discredited the Oslo-school in addition to the severe 
governance crisis and the Labor government’s support to the new approach.  
The Interest Rate Committee arrived at a new consensus and presented what 
should be regarded as a new program for the future credit policy (Tranøy, 
1994:123). At the same time, core representatives of politically and 
scientifically important institutions had been affiliated with the new program 
through the educational program prepared within the committee, and became 
its representatives in the political transformation process.  
To the Oslo-school economists, the shift represented both a fundamental 
defeat and a “back to basic” return to core concepts of their theory which 
during the many successful years since the war had been “blackboxed” away 
from dispute; among them the micro-economic market theory and the 
incentive problems of economic actors. The transformation of the Oslo-
school could be done on the basis of principles to be found in the common 
roots of the neo-classical economic program, and as such they were not 
completely thrown into the dark, but was able to close the gap to main 
stream international economics which had turned massively towards the neo-
liberal program. Somewhat similar to the moderate market oriented 
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opposition represented by the NHH economists in the 1960’s and -70’s, the 
UiO economists came to represent a moderate hierarchical governance 
oriented opposition to the neo-liberal program during the 1980’s – and as we 
shall see, also in the electricity market reform case. 
  
8.2.2 From market re-orientation to economic recession and a 
new  
         AP regime  
Tranøy describes how the credit market reform emerged stepwise from the 
initiatives taken late in 1977 by the AP government, through a re-
configuration of the money and credit market governance system, its 
legislation, technologies, division of roles and practices, via the credit 
market deregulation reform implemented from January 1984, to the near 
complete political given up to control interest rates during the two severe 
international exchange rate crisis in 1986 which occurred in combination 
with a sharp drop in oil-prices. These developments occurred not without 
substantial attempts at rescuing the traditional Oslo-school positions and not 
without political compromises which undermined the ability of the new 
regime to control the policy implementations of its own program. 
A convincing victory in the 1981 parliamentary election for Høyre, led to a 
conservative minority government headed by Kåre Willock. The Willoch-
government was extended in 1983 by the two parties KrF and SP in order to 
strengthen the parliamentary basis of the government. Both of these were 
still substantially influenced by the traditional political “low interest rate” 
approach and were reluctant to leave interest rates to be decided by the 
market. During the years 1984 to 1986, the contradiction between a 
politically enforced low-interest rate policy, which was supported also by the 
AP in political opposition, and the monetary approach which had opened the 
national credit market to the international market, forced the NB to supply 
the banking sector with a massive increase in liquidity to keep interest rates 
down. This caused a radically expanded credit to the market which “heated 
up” the economy and created a “financial bubble” which ended in a new 
economic governance crisis when oil prices suddenly declined dramatically 
in the spring of 1986. In the autumn 1986, the three-party Willoch-
government withdrew and a new Gro Harlem Brundtland AP government 
took over in November.  
The new AP government immediately imposed a 12% devaluation of the 
currency and a new wage-legislation in cooperation with LO, which forced 
wage-increases down. It thereby demonstrated a more traditional Keynesian 
role of the state in the economy. The forceful new counter-cyclical policy 
however, in combination with an international economic recession, turned 
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the “overheated” economy into a fairly deep recession with increased 
unemployment rates and contraction of real estate markets. This undermined 
the stability of the banking system which had expanded its credits 
aggressively in the deregulated credit market under the expansionary credit 
policy. Headed by the new chairman of the State Bank Security Fund: 
Tormod Hermansen,  the state forced a takeover of the three largest 
commercial banks in Norway in 1992.  
The bank crisis in the early 1990s in my view came to represent a substantial 
reduction of the powers of the neo-liberal program in Norway. It had been 
demonstrated that the competitive market approach contained dangers to 
economic stability. The days of innocence and naive beliefs in the “magic” 
of the market had ended. Ten years of scientific and political initiatives for 
neo-liberal reforms largely came to and end. From now on further reforms – 
like in the telecom and the airline industries – largely followed from 
international pressures or, like in the postal sector, from rapid market 
developments and technological innovations which gradually pulled the 
carpet under the established system.  
 
8.2.3 An actor-network theoretical re-interpretation of the credit 
         market reform 
The credit policy reform  presented by Tranøy, is described and explained in 
a way rather similar to what would have followed from an Actor Network 
theoretical approach. The two rival networks of actors; the established Oslo 
School and the emerging Monetaristic Chicago School, are each hold 
together by their common visions and programs. They include networks of 
institutions, organizations, theories, governance technologies, humans, 
parties, etc. that are mobilized to support the expansion of the program and 
to produce “anti-acts” to undermine the simplifications (blackboxes) and the 
powers of the rival. The shift followed from the failure of the established 
collective to pass a real-life market test, which provided a “window of 
opportunity” to the rival collective which mobilized its international 
“actants” to re-frame the policy area and to convince the core executive 
“commanding height”: the Minister of Finance and the government. Tranøy 
also demonstrate how the expanding collective strategically associated with 
non-members and transformed them into its own collective in order to create 
a political breakthrough for the new program in parliament and within the 
established corporate governance system. This was done by construction 
additional arguments and by adding proofs in the form of statistical 
evidences which undermined the established system and supported the new. 
After the breakthrough, the collective engaged in re-configuring the 
governance system, its legislation, governance technologies etc. Finally, 
Tranøy describes a rivalry situation with many similarities to the rivalry 
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between Edison and Morgan presented by McGuire, Granovetter and 
Schwartz, in which the traditional state-hierarchical “low interest rate” 
collective mobilized and regained commanding heights in 1986, 
implemented a “reactionary” economic policy, but quickly had to give in 
because of the powers of the established new professional dominance, the 
new open market structures and institutional arrangements which permitted 
international market forces to overturn political initiatives to control interest 
rates and exchange rates. The sequences of change had become an irrefutable 
durable system. 
The unresolved confrontation between the two programs however, created 
another economic crisis in the banking sector, which in a second turn 
undermined the legitimacy and the powers of the expanding neo-liberal 
program.  
 
 
8.3 The New Public Management program and the 
         restructuring of the NVE 
Through the credit market reform process and the rapid decline in political 
legitimacy for the hierarchical program in broad, the neo-liberal program 
came to influence economic policy-making during the 1980s. Initiatives and 
influences from economic research institutions shifted from the UiO/SSB to 
the NHH/NB, and the FD gradually and partly shifted its associations and 
orientation accordingly. With the political takeover by the Willoch 
government in 1981, what was to become known as The New Public 
Management Program experienced a rapid breakthrough. The Høyre 
government - and from 1983 the H-KrF-SP government - induced a wave of 
new public management initiatives under the broad labels “a more open 
society”, “a more efficient and service oriented public sector” and 
“deregulation”. Many of these aimed at deconstructing corporate governance 
systems by separating political responsibilities more clearly from 
operational, by pulling political powers into the ministries and by turning the 
ministries into political workshops for the government – in cooperation with 
external research institutions. Operational entities on the other hand, should 
preferably be organized according to modern business principles.  
A multiplicity of actor-networks were affiliated with and contributed to the 
expansion of this program at the time. Private business activities increased 
their political legitimacy and expanded both economically and normatively, 
state owned industries were privatized and a variety of sectors became 
objects for deregulation initiatives. Business schools increased their numbers 
of graduates radically. Business advisors and organizational change 
advocates expanded rapidly on wave after wave of new organizational and 
 179 
strategic “fads” etc. etc. In particular business schools like BI, NHH and the 
regional collages80 were important to the education of a large number of 
human representations of the neo-liberal program. Without this massive 
influx of educated business economists both to private and public sector 
organizations, the neo-liberal program would probably have been far less 
powerful and without capacity to transform activities at local levels.  
Important international enunciators of new public management reforms 
during the 1980s and 1990s were also organizations such as OECD, IMF, 
World Bank, GATT and the EU Commission. Through these organizations a 
multiplicity of specific reform programs were pushed on to their member-
states.   
The neo-liberal “more markets – less state” program appears in part to have 
entered the electricity sector from the ambition of the conservative 
government to improve state administrative efficiency through structural 
reforms in the state administration and in other state economic activities. The 
target for such a reform in relation to the electricity sector was the NVE. The 
administrative system of the NVE had maintained its integrated structure 
through various waves of reforms in ministry-directorate relationships since 
the conflicts over the organization of NSB and NVE in the early 1920’s. 
Finally, the integrated structure was to be deconstructed. The ambition of the 
government was on the one hand, to separate the business-like activities 
which was organized in the internal NVE department “Statkraftsverkene”, 
by turning it into a state owned business oriented company - preferably 
organized as a joint stock company. On the other hand, the policy role of the 
board of NVE, should be lifted into the OED, which was to hold the role as 
the political “workshop” for the government at a larger distance from sector 
interests - in concordance with George Stigler’s regulatory capture 
argument. First, however, I will step back a little, to present some of the 
important changes in the state administration of the electricity sector which 
had already been conducted under the AP-government. 
 
8.3.1 Re-organizing the state electricity sector administration 
In 1978, under the pressures of the economic governance crisis and the 
rapidly expanding petroleum activities in the North Sea, the AP-government 
decided to establish a new Ministry of Oil and Energy (OED) in order to 
increase its administrative and governance capacity. By this event, the 
electricity sector was moved from the Ministry of Industry to the new OED. 
The electricity sector thereby became administratively separated from the 
                                           
80 distriktshøyskolene 
 180 
area of industrial politics under which it had largely served as an input 
sector, and became a more autonomous policy area  associated with energy 
politics. This restructuring also pulled the sector closer to the newly 
established and international market oriented oil- and gas industry - closer to 
a state sector administration more dominated by economists.  
The OED received particular attention from the Ministry of Finance due to 
the importance of the large state revenues from the oil-and gas sector. In this 
way, the electricity sector came to be more closely compared to the highly 
lucrative petroleum sector - a comparison which made revenues from the 
electricity sector appear rather microscopic. In particular, it appeared that the 
electricity sector was incapable of extracting any substantial resource rents 
to state budgets. The administrative change did however not have any 
immediate dramatic effects on the traditional orientation of the electricity 
sector administration, as the staff largely came from the ID and the NVE.  
But, the change obviously made the sector more accessible to the later 
reformers, easier to associate with, to capture and to transform, and it turned 
a state financial perspective on the sector more into focus rather than the 
industrial perspective which had dominated since 1946. 
In a state financial perspective there is – in general - not only the question of 
how economic principles about efficient pricing and investments should be 
implemented and managed. An important issue is also how returns from 
investments can be increased and in particular, how this return can be 
allocated to state budgets rather than to the electricity sector companies, the 
energy intensive industry, the consumers or the municipalities. Within the 
perspective of the social democratic “renewal” program after 1986, which 
aimed at increasing the economic solidity of the welfare state, the state 
financial perspective on the electricity sector became important. For obvious 
reasons it remained rather redundant in relation to the market reform process, 
and first came into focus during the electricity sector tax reform in 1995/96.  
The state financial perspective however also pointed at the need to redefine 
the sector from a non-commercial to a commercial sector in order to create a 
basis of legitimacy for increased state taxation of the sector – in addition to 
increased capital returns from direct state investments. The political role of 
and status of the electricity companies as not-for-profit political-
administrative institutions severely constrained the legitimacy of the state to 
collect taxes from the sector. A reform which altered this role and status of 
local political institutions in the direction of a commercial business-like 
interpretation, would accordingly be welcomed by the FD and the AP 
government. Hence, both the neo-liberal program and the state economic 
perspective contribute to explaining why the AP government, FD and its top 
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civil servant from 1986 on, Tormod Hermansen, became important 
advocates for the electricity market reform81. 
 
8.3.1.1 Restructuring the NVE - and its accounting system    
Following criticism from the political opposition in parliament, from within 
the electricity sector itself and from the environmentalists towards the 
mixing of state regulatory and state market operational responsibilities, the 
AP government in 1980 established a committee headed by Lars Leiro to 
have a closer look at the organization of the NVE. The report, NOU 
1982:19, was presented in June 1982. The majority in the committee argued 
that the NVE should remain an integrated administrative unit, but that the 
department Statkraftverkene should be organized more independently with 
its own administrative functions. The minority argued instead that 
Statkraftverkene should be separated and organized as a state owned joint 
stock company. The challenge for the new Høyre-government accordingly, 
became to produce sufficient arguments for the more radical approach. 
To the new government, the restructuring of the NVE became part of a larger 
plan to restructure the four large state sector companies NSB, Postverket, 
Televerket and NVE/Statkraftverkene, to end the implicit state subsidies, to 
expose them to market pressures and to increase capital returns. The credit 
market reform had led to increased interest rates – also to the state. While the 
state companies in 1980 paid 7,4% interest to the state, the cost of state 
borrowing had increased to 13%. NVE was by far the largest borrower of the 
four companies, and interest rate subsidies to the NVE alone could be 
calculated to around 3 billion NOK a year. Additionally, the state companies 
were granted free loans the first 1,5 year after the investment had been 
completed (Barth Jacobsen, 1998:147). 
Apart from adjusting internal interest rates to market rates, the government 
introduced new accounting principles, which turned out to add important 
“loads” to the efforts to undermine the credibility and trust in state 
governance of production companies. Traditionally, hydro-power 
investments had been written down over 40 years according to a linear 
principle. From January 1st 1982, a new “saldo-system” was introduced 
according to which most of the investment was written down in 10 years. 
Consequences to accounting results were dramatic with the completing of a 
number of large state hydro-power constructions by the mid-1980s. The 
                                           
81 The electricity market reform was followed by a tax reform within the electricity sector 
implemented from January 1st 1997. 
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numbers went into red and thereby demonstrated the inefficiency of the 
established system. 
The coalition government supported the minority view of the Leiro-
committee in its proposition to parliament. The conflict in parliament 
emerged primarily on the issue of organizational form. With a joint stock 
company, the ability of the parliament to interfere politically into the sector 
would be radically reduced, as substantial operational governance rights 
would then be handed over to company management. A joint stock company 
form would also open up the agenda for a possible future privatization of the 
state company. This consequences, in addition to the trade unions’ lobbying 
for a continued strong political responsibility which provided for their ability 
to surpass both management and government through direct political 
channels to the parliament, eventually led to a defeat for the government on 
the joint stock company issue. Statkraftverkene became organized in an 
intermediate organizational form - into what was denoted a “semi 
autonomous state company” directly under the OED. The parliament 
approved the proposition to reorganize NVE in 1985, and Statkraftverkene 
became separated from the NVE from January 1st 1986. 
Through this restructuring, the large state power company Statkraftverkene, 
which controlled approximately 30% of national electricity production, 40% 
of generating capacity and 50% of hydro-reservoir capacities and around 
85% of the national grid system82, had become a semi-separated 
organizational entity instructed to follow commercial objectives alone. 
Commercial and regulatory roles had been separated at the state 
administrative level. This was an important initial step towards a neo-liberal 
governance model for the entire electricity system – but by far a conclusive 
one. 
Within the NVE, the separation had been support by Statkraftsverkene itself 
and its director Sigurd Aalefjær, who since long had been arguing for a more 
independent responsibility directly under the ministry rather than having the 
board of NVE in between (Thue, 1996). The traditionally strong governance 
board of NVE with a core role in the corporate governance system, now 
became reduced to an advisory board with no substantial political powers.  
The rest of NVE was maintained as a directorate outside the ministry with 
operational responsibilities for the various regulatory and planning functions 
related to the waterways and the electricity sector. During the restructuring 
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process, the NVE lost many of its competent employees to Statkraftverkene, 
and the Ministry of Finance engaged actively to obtain further reductions in 
the staff. NVE director general Sigmund Larsen retired from his position in 
1986. The NVE was left with substantially reduced powers, capacity and 
status as well as with continuous pressures to defend its remaining resources 
in a situation where – as we shall see - the hierarchical and the market 
reform alternatives confronted each other within the state administrative and 
political arenas.  
In 1987, Erling Diesen, who had been employed by NVE from 1961 to 1978, 
was offered the possition as the new NVE director general after Sigmund 
Larsen. Diesen had served as the full-time chairman of the Energy Law 
Committee for two years and came from the position as the general manager 
of the regional power company Buskerud Energiverk. Being a core 
representative of the hierarchical restructuring reform collective, Diesen 
engaged actively in the organizational restructuring program, for instance 
through the so called “20-men’s club” which contained the general managers 
from the largest power companies. Within this forum, the hierarchical 
restructuring actor-networks mobilized efforts to maintain momentum 
behind the hierarchical reform initiative, to push for regional restructuring 
and to garde institutional order in the electricity sector which had 
increasingly came under pressure from the effects of overcapacity in 
generating capacity. Until 1991/92, the club served as an important forum 
for sector coordination and hierarchical restructuring initiatives in the sector, 
where after it was dissolved as the new market regime destroyed its 
legitimacy. 
 
 
8.4 From credit market and new public management 
        reforms to electricity market reform? 
From its international roots in economic theorizing, I have now followed the 
neo-liberal market program from some of its early breakthroughs 
internationally, back into Norway, through its initial overturning of the 
established post-war state-hierarchical collective during the credit market 
reform process and through the wave of new public management reforms in 
the early 1980s. This expansion of the new economic approach certainly 
represented an important precondition for the later electricity market reform 
– through the very broad re-orientation it produced. But there were also 
some very specific sequences of developments and relationships between 
events, actors and programs which provided more direct links to the later 
electricity market reform program, namely the credit market reform, the new 
public management reform of the state directorate NVE and the relative shift 
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in state partnership with the economics profession from the UiO to the NHH 
economists. 
Another route of development started from the establishing of the new 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in 1978, which associated the electricity 
sector closer with the petroleum sector and which turned a “state financial 
return on energy resources” perspective more into focus also in the case of 
electricity. With the ambitions of the 1986 AP government to renew and 
strengthen the basis of the welfare state, pointed directly to a neo-liberal 
market reform program in combination with an electricity sector tax reform. 
In the broad perspective of the neo-liberal market program, the credit market 
reform can be seen as representing the first out of three major market reform 
projects, focussing on the three most significant economic resource variables 
in the Norwegian economy; capital, labor and electricity (energy). By 1984-
86, the capital market reform had been completed. After some scattered and 
not very successful efforts by the conservative and the coalition governments 
to embark on labor market reforms, electricity became the obvious candidate 
for a further major expansion of the neo-liberal program83. This became even 
the more obvious as the political difficulties involved in challenging the 
trade unions with radical labor market reforms under the new AP 
government in 1986, became quite evident. One could accordingly argue that 
the tremendous relative importance of the electricity sector in Norway 
provided for an important link or association between the credit market 
reform and the later electricity market reform, which concentrated and 
mobilized scientific and political-administrative actors and resources behind 
the latter reform initiative. This link may have been particularly evident to 
the NHH economists, who had taken the professional initiative and who 
mobilized research and policy advice activities to expand the market 
program further.  
There were also important conceptual and theoretical similarities between 
the capital- and the electricity policy systems. Under the state-hierarchical 
regime represented by the “Oslo school of economics”, the credit policy and 
the electricity policy were both primarily seen as input factors to industrial 
growth and economic redistribution policies, which could and should be 
manipulated by the government in order to allocate resources in accordance 
with political preferences for industrial growth and economic justice. Interest 
                                           
83 There were several initiatives to establish a more competitive market based wage-formation 
at the time – in particular for managers within the state sector. With the 1986 AP government, 
these initiatives were stopped. 
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rates and electricity prices were in this sense conceptually identical. The 
reshaping of one of them became an argument for the reshaping of the other.  
The new public management initiatives and in particular the restructuring of 
the NVE also became important to the later reform process through their 
demonstration of changes in the perceived rules and roles of the game 
between economic organizations and state policy-makers and regulators, and 
through their adding to the destabilization of the established post-war state 
hierarchical program. They broke apart the traditional corporate governance 
model with its multiple political objectives and “negotiated economy” 
practices. The entire new public management program represented a 
program for the externalization of not-for profit objectives from public 
sector economic enterprises, and a concentration of responsibility for these 
externalities in the ministries and in directorates which became re-configured 
in accordance with the role the state regulator in economic theory. The 
1985/86 reform of the NVE represented an early re-structuring of the state-
administrative system in accordance with the neo-liberal program; 
Statkraftverkene became fundamentally but not completely disentangled 
from non-economic objectives and the rest-NVE became a candidate for 
further re-configuration and re-formatting into a proper state economic 
regulator.  
With the NVE reform, the hierarchical restructuring collective – the major 
rival to an electricity market reform alternative - had become partly invaded. 
Its integrated stronghold NVE-Statkraftsverkene, became separated, its 
influential board of the NVE was stripped for political institutional powers 
and transferred to the ministry, substantial pressures were maintained to 
reduce NVE staffs and budgets, and the managerial legitimacy of 
Statkraftverkene had become severely shaken by the combination of credit 
market deregulation and an accounting reform. On the other hand, the 
transformation was obviously not complete and contained important 
compromises – in particular on the issue of organizational form, which 
reflected a rather broad political reluctance towards what might lead to a 
future privatization the electricity sector.  
One could possibly also argue that the state-administrative reform of the 
NVE - in a second turn - influenced thinking – or supported a re-thinking - 
within local and regional power companies and added momentum to 
ongoing business oriented transformations. This occurred in particular within 
a number of electricity companies in the south-eastern part of the country. 
Some of these – like Oslo Lysverker, Bærum Energiverk, Lier Energiverk 
and Vest-Agder Energiverk engaged in business oriented organizational 
reforms in the second half of the 1980s, and thereby adopted role 
interpretations fairly similar to the roles they were later given by the 
 186 
electricity market reform program; that of the profit seeking competitive firm 
disentangled from not-for-profit objectives.  
The presentation has also introduced and followed some of the key actors 
which gradually mobilized behind the electricity market reform initiatives. 
In particular, we have noted a man called Tormod Hermansen, who appeared 
to “pop up” in core positions along the sequence of events that I have 
discussed – both in the credit market reform and in the new public 
management reforms. But also the right wing political parties, actors within 
the state administration, the “modernists” within the AP and the NHH 
economists were among those who mobilized for further neo-liberal reforms. 
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9 Einar Hope and the entrepreneurial electricity 
market reform collective 
Having described and discussed the electricity market reform approach from 
the point of view of developments within economics and from early market 
oriented reshaping of the economy projects, we shall now shift attention to 
obtain a third description. This time I will focus directly on the electricity 
market reform collective as it gradually emerged at the Center for Applied 
Research (SAF) in affiliation with the Norwegian School of Business 
Administration (NHH) in Bergen, on its enunciator Einar Hope, the research 
program he formulated and the networks he mobilized and coordinated to 
advance it. 
From the presentation in chapter 7, we already know that Hope and his 
colleagues at NHH had been introduced to the early electricity economic 
program represented by Vidkunn Hveding around 1965-67, and that Hope 
from the point of view of an industrial organization perspective became 
interested in doing empirical research on the new occasional power market 
established in 1971. From these early events and initiatives, what was to 
become an operational alternative with substantial professional authority 
behind itself grew into filling the open space left by other reform initiatives 
within the sector, and to link to those forces and early economic reform 
projects which emerged from the market re-orientation within economics at 
large.  
I will follow this construction work through some of its major projects in 
order to answer questions such as: How did such an alternative actually 
emerge? What were its relations to the electricity sector? When was it 
actually established as a market reform program? What were the core 
elements in the program and in the actor-networks associated with it? Did it 
relate specifically to other electricity market reform programs like the 
American that I have presented in brief, or the British? Or did it emerge 
more or less as a separate approach? How was this entrepreneurial collective 
expanded from an interest in doing empirical research to a market reform 
collective with substantial capacities to reshape a large sector of the 
economy? 
I will essentially argue that Hope’s program provided an answer to 
Hveding’s argument that there was no operational market at large on which a 
system based on the SRMC pricing principle could be implemented. Rather 
than from abstract discussions however, the operational alternative emerged 
out of direct interactions by economists into efforts to solve certain acute 
economic problems at the operational level within the electricity sector. It 
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emerged from a mix of empirical research and real life problem solving in 
which economic theory provided broad, in principle guidelines and concepts 
which could be applied in an incremental, innovative and entrepreneurial 
style which involved a variety of network constructing activities. Among 
these, constructions of scientific organization and scientific authority were 
particularly important. 
 
 
9.1 The Industrial Organization program at the SAF/NHH 
It was at the NHH/SAF in Bergen that ideas about a full scale market based 
electricity system was first formulated, and it was this research institution 
which came to play the professional scientific role in the reform process. Of 
particular interest here is the role of Einar Hope both as an important 
enunciator of the market reform and as a core networker in between an 
industrial organization research tradition, the economists at NHH, state 
administrators and the electricity sector.  
His role in what was to became the market reform process can be said to 
have started from a large research program within the scientific area of 
Industrial Organization at NHH in the 1970’s, and from the establishing and 
expansion of the SAF, where he served as its director. Through the 1980’s 
the SAF grew into a position as perhaps the most influential economic 
research center in Norway at the time, with a strong academic profile and 
tight relationships to the state central administration. In relation to various 
industries, the SAF took on the role as a scientific advisor to state 
directorates and ministries. In this respect, it might be seen as somewhat in a 
similar position as the economic department at the UiO and the SSB in 
between 1945 and 1978. 
 
9.1.1 The “structure-conduct-performance” approach to 
          electricity sector studies 
Einar Hope was educated as an economist at NHH. During the late 1960’s 
and early 1970’s he specialized in what at the time was a rather marginal 
area of economic theorizing in Norway as well as internationally; the 
Industrial Organization Theory (IO) largely affiliated with the American 
“structure-conduct-performance” tradition. Hope became familiar with these 
ideas during his stay at the University of Minnesota (1967) and at the 
University of Cambridge (1971-72). Supported by professor Gerhard Stolz at 
NHH, Hope during the 1970’s headed a large empirically and educationally 
oriented research program at NHH aimed at investigating a variety of 
economic sectors in Norway. Through this work, both Hope and his 
colleagues developed a broad basis of empirical knowledge about a variety 
of Norwegian economic sectors structured by the IO-theory which 
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concentrated on structural and micro-economic problems. The early tradition 
focused particularly on the dynamic character of the market mechanism and 
on the relationship between market structure, actor behaviors (incentives) 
and economic efficiency outcomes. As such, the tradition differed radically 
from the econometric tradition at UiO. The micro-economic theoretical 
approach and the search for structural changes which might contribute to 
efficiency improvements rather than state directed macro-economic 
reallocations, turned the electricity general supply system and the internal 
occasional market for power into focus as a particularly interesting area for 
empirical investigations. 
Internationally the IO research program achieved increased scientific and 
political interest in response to the economic governance problems 
acknowledged in the early 1970’s, and as a consequence of the introduction 
of mathematical game theory to analysis of industrial organization problems. 
The demand for research and policy advises led to initiatives to organize 
research activities both by the state and by the academic community in 
Bergen in which the IO research area came to play a major role.  
 
9.1.2 The significance of scientific organization and scientific 
          authority 
In the early 1970’s the research program headed by Einar Hope became 
organized as an internal research center - SAF - at the Institute for 
Economics at NHH. In 1976 however, the Ministry of Industry established 
Institute for Industrial Economics (IØI) as an independent state research 
institute located close to NHH, and Einar Hope was appointed its managing 
director with the ambition to initiate sector oriented economic research 
programs which could serve as knowledge basis for government policies. 
Two years later, in 1978, Hope left the IØI after internal disputes with the 
board over the academic profile of the research activities, where Hope 
strongly had argued that research practices should be closely tied to the high 
standards of academic research, where as the board had argued for a more 
pragmatic policy-advisory profile. As a consequence, the research 
community at NHH decided to push the SAF as an alternative and appointed 
Hope as its research manager (Mathiesen and Sandmo, 1997:189-192).  
In 1984, the SAF was formalized as a separated research foundation outside 
the NHH. This choice largely followed from the need to circumvent the tight 
administrative and economic constraints which followed from the state 
ownership to NHH. From this “outside” position, professionals from within 
the NHH could be engaged in externally financed research projects and 
receive payments outside tight state wage-regulations.  
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The academic actor-network affiliated with the IO scientific program, 
accordingly managed to establish an institutional-organizational structure 
headed by one of its core academic professionals, where high academic 
standards could be controlled and where a broad range of researchers from 
the state owned business school could be recruited on a project basis. At the 
same time, it remained in close affiliation with state institutions which 
increasingly demanded knowledge, political advice (or scientific 
legitimacy?) to its economic policies. SAF and Einar Hope in this way 
became the core actors in a rapidly expanding Norwegian IO research 
program with a substantial capacity to mobilize academic resources within 
NHH and direct these to a variety of economic sector studies.  
Through the new research institution, the research community at NHH were 
able to mobilize economic resources to increase both their research staffs 
and their empirical and theoretical research activities, and state governance 
institutions as well as various other economic sector oriented organizations 
got access to a well organized academic research institution structured and 
coordinated by Einar Hope. In this sense, it served as a useful institution in 
both scientific and political entrepreneurial collectives – both as an actor and 
as an organization acted upon. 
Apart from governing the SAF, Einar Hope also conduced several research 
projects himself, in particular in relation to the electricity sector and in the 
area of regulation of competitive markets, where he later became a dominant 
scientific contributor to the new competition law which was implemented in 
1993 (Mathiesen and Sandmo, 1997). Because of his particular interest in the 
electricity sector, he established relations to economists with specialized 
interests in electricity economics, and through applied research projects, he 
managed to mobilize a variety of disciplines into electricity sector research 
activities - including a group of young industrial organization specialists on 
“market imperfections” and “regulation and control” theory. 
In 1991, the Ministry of Industries84 and the SAF jointly established the 
Center for Industrial Economic Research (SNF) by merging SAF, IØI and a 
Center for International Business (CIB) at NHH. Einar Hope was appointed 
managing director of the new large research institution, a position he hold 
until 1995 when he took over as the director of the state competition 
authority. By 1991 the SAF had grown into a dominant applied economic 
research institution in Norway with substantial academic authority and 
credibility. It represented a core institutional structure in a scientific network 
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which affiliated a broad range of economic researchers both at NHH as well 
as at the UiO (SAF-Oslo) and to a growing extent also at the District 
Colleges (DH).  
A variety of aspects contributed to the emergence of a powerful role for the 
SAF at the time – in addition to strategies and actions carried out by its 
constructors. First and foremost, there was the increased demand for sector 
analysis and policy advises which followed from the breakthrough of the 
market reorientation both within political and industrial communities, and 
the new public management initiatives pushed by the governments of the 
early 1980s. This permitted for a rapid growth in empirical and analytic 
research projects financed by the Norwegian Research Council, industries 
and government institutions. Second, there was the rapid expansion of the 
industrial organization theory internationally which attracted young 
Norwegian researchers to specialize within the program. Many of these were 
financed by and trained in the SAF research activities. Third, there was the 
role of state ownership to NHH which on the one hand “forced” the external 
research organization of SAF and - at least partly because of that - an 
organization with a capacity to integrate research activities across scientific 
disciplines, and on the other hand, provided the SAF research institution 
with a role as a close research counterpart to the state at a ministerial level of 
governance rather than at a directorate-sector level.  
SAF gradually became a joint academic-state project despite the 
controversies over the IØI research policy in 1978, a controversy which 
ended with the success of the SAF and finally with the joining of SAF and 
IØI in 1991. No doubt, Hope’s insistence on a demanding scientific profile 
and perhaps also his own personal style, had given SAF a strong reputation 
for correctness, reliability and scientific professionalism which turned it into 
a highly powerful “policy advice” unit which reinforced its attractiveness to 
the actor-networks it hold on to and by which it was being supported. 
 
  
9.2 Re-framing the electricity system: The market reform 
program 
In April 1982, Einar Hope at a seminar in the state research council NTNF 
presented a research program directed towards analyzing micro-economic 
structures and behaviors in the electricity market, which pointed at a more 
general market oriented reform program. The ideas were later presented in 
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an article in “Statsøkonomisk Tidsskrift” 1983 called “Markets for power 
exchange in Norway: An in principal discussion”85 .  
In the article Hope pointed at the need to study how market actors reacted to 
changes in administratively set prices, how market equilibrium was actually 
achieved under such conditions and what happened when markets did not 
clear. He also addressed the issue how incentives could be created to induce 
actors to behave rationally in the short as well as in the long run so that one 
through micro-decisions could achieve the wanted results of the energy 
economic policy. Hope furthermore presented what appears to have been his 
main critique of the established institutional system; the limited flexibility in 
pricing that resulted from the segregation between the “firm power market” 
and the “occasional power market” and the lack of appropriate markets and 
instruments for risk management to be used by individual power companies 
and consumers. These viewpoints grew directly out of his research on the 
functioning of the occasional power market in the late 1970s. While pointing 
at the observed differences between the established institutional-regulatory 
system and the standard micro-economic ideal model, he also argued that 
changes might not need to be dramatic and could be achieved through 
various institutional adjustments (Hope, 1983:43-62).    
The immediate background was his observations from the electricity market, 
that substantial new capacity and large unpredictable variations in supply 
and demand conditions caused high risk exposures and large financial losses 
to actors. Already in 1978/79, he had suggested to introduce a futures market 
which would make it possible to reallocate risks more efficiently across 
actors86. With the emerging over-capacity, focus turned to the more general 
market balance problem, the continuous large price differences between the 
firm power market and the occasional power market and the related conflict 
between sellers and buyers over the authority of the fixed price contract 
regime which constrained the ability to increase purchasing through the low 
price occasional power market. 
Hope’s arguments were closely in line with traditional positions among the 
economists in their pointing at the important relationship between the 
occasional power market and the firm power market as a market equilibrium 
relation. What was new, was his pointing at the need to study how economic 
actors actually behave at the micro level of analysis when prices in the two 
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markets do not converge over time due to political-administrative 
interventions into prices, and his pointing at new operational market systems 
to deal with at least some of the problems observed. His basic point of 
reference was the competitive market model in economic theory which 
defined the optimal resource allocation under specific assumptions. We also 
note that Hope’s ambition was not only to establish new competitive market 
systems to manage specific problems, it was also to “improve the rationality 
of economic actors”, which could be done by designing market systems and 
organizational forms (with specific incentives) which induced them to take 
what he saw as “rational economic choices”. In this sense, the program he 
suggested was both about the construction of and expansion of markets and 
about the re-framing and re-shaping of economic actors in accordance with 
the rationality standards of economics.  
The ideas outlined in 1982 /83 sketched some of the main elements in the 
later electricity market reform program, but it did not present any outline of 
an alternative system. Neither did it directly confront the approach 
represented by Hveding through for instance an explicit critique of the long 
term marginal cost pricing principle, nor address the efforts to achieve a 
hierarchical organizational reform. At the time, it was essentially a scientific 
research program, possibly with certain practical, incremental implications 
for electricity trade practices. 
Hope did also not include any references to international discussions on the 
subject of electricity market reform or other deregulation projects in his 
article. He was the single author, and the only colleague who was referred to 
as a provider of comments, was his colleague, professor in economics Agnar 
Sandmo87 at NHH. The word deregulation was not even mentioned, and 
there are no obvious signs that Hope had a general and large scale market 
reform in mind rather than a search for better knowledge and possibly a 
gradual introduction of new market elements.  
Hopes’ article clearly confirms the impression that his research program 
mainly grew out of his empirical research and the theoretical perspective he 
had developed during the -70’s based on the early structure-conduct-
performance tradition, rather than from for instance the American debate on 
electricity market deregulation that I have presented briefly in chapter 5. It is 
also apparent that his micro-economic approach emerged fairly 
independently from the traditional area of electricity economics. On the 
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other hand, it had much in common with the general approach of the EdF 
researchers in the 1940s and -50s in their close interaction with the real 
world electricity system and their combination of economic theorizing with 
pragmatic search for operational improvements to system design and 
economic governance systems.  
 
9.2.1 Investigating established systems and behaviors: The  
         Statkraft project 
Neither the FD nor the OED paid any particular attention to Hope’s ideas 
before 198688, but SAF received financial support for research projects from 
the Norwegian Research Council (NTNF) to carry out the research program. 
The first research project was named “Markets for power exchange in 
Norway”89 and was financed by NTNF and NVE-Statkraftsverkene jointly. 
As a part of this project, SAF became engaged by Statkraftverkene (which at 
the time still was a department within the NVE) in a special project aimed at 
analyzing possible market strategies for the state institution in the 
“occasional power” market.  
The research project became structured into various sub-studies which 
presented different reports. These ranged over providing an overview of the 
existing trading system90, a description of established pricing practices91, a 
survey-analysis of decision behaviors in the occasional power market92, a 
theoretical analysis of the operational decision problem of a single power 
company93 and a discussion and critique of the established governance 
system for national optimization of electricity generation94. These reports 
were followed by a discussion of the established electricity trading system, 
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of the constraints on the occasional power market in its present form and a 
critique of the lack of overall price-flexibility in the electricity market.95.  
In their main report, Einar Hope and Sigurd Tufte96 presented a fairly 
detailed analysis of the electricity markets and a critique of the current 
institutional trading system – including the role of Statkraftverkene in the 
market. They pointed in particular at the complexity which resulted from 
conflicting political objectives – in particular the tradeoffs involved in the 
role of Statkraftverkene in industrial and re-distributive economic politics as 
opposed to its role as a state commercial enterprise aimed at maximizing 
economic returns. This mix of political objectives was at stake with the 
rationality concept in economic theory, and was thereby seen by the authors 
as “irrational”. This essential critique pointed at externalization of non-
efficiency objectives from the area of decision-making by the market actors 
as the fundamental route to rationality as well as efficiency improvements. 
Much concern was also given to the way foreign trade with electricity was 
organized. The authors criticized the “inappropriate” economic incentives 
related to the institutional arrangements between Statkraftverkene and other 
members of Samkjøringen in relation to the foreign markets, where 
Statkraftverkene had a trade monopoly, but where gains from this trade were 
to be distributed to all the members of Samkjøringen. They demonstrated 
how this arrangement caused complicated and apparently “irrational” 
strategic games between the generators and Statkraftverkene with in-optimal 
outcomes in terms of resource allocation. They also pointed at how these 
complexities made it difficult to define a “rational” market strategy for 
Statkraftsverkene - both for system development and for operational trade 
purposes.  
The report supplied Sigurd Aalefjær and his top managers in 
Statkraftverkene with scientific economic arguments for a more independent 
and economically “purified” organization of the state enterprise. Despite a 
few angry opponents to Hope’s arguments, the report appeared to be well 
received by the leadership of the state directorate97, which by 1984/85 had 
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really started feeling the pressures from the new public management 
initiative of the government to reorganize the NVE and business-organize 
Statkraftverkene. I think it is fair to say that Einar Hope/SAF in this way 
played a role also in the 1985/86 NVE reform, by providing scientific 
arguments to the political-administrative decision process within the 
directorate.  
On the other hand, the report was very critical to various roles of 
Statkraftverkene in the electricity system. During the electricity market 
reform process to come, much of the tension occurred between Hope and his 
associates who argued to abolish the various “unique” roles of the state 
company in different parts of the electricity system, and representatives of 
Statkraftverkene who struggled to maintain a dominant role for the company 
in the future electricity system. When Gunnar Vatten moved from the OED 
and took over as the CEO of Statkraftverkene in 1986, Statkraft became 
perhaps the most important commanding height for Vatten, Vinjar and 
Diesen’s hierarchical restructuring collective which became the major rival 
to Hope’s market reform alternative. 
 
9.2.2 Electricity economic research projects at SAF 
In 1985, Hope and Morten Berg - a NHH economist who was employed as a 
researcher at the SAF - applied and got financial support for another research 
project. It was named “Prices and costs in power distribution”98 and 
represented a deliberate effort by the SAF to further increase its competence 
in electricity economics and to establish a solid micro-economic theoretical 
foundation for its research into a more market oriented electricity system. 
The project was headed by Morten Berg, started out in January 1986 and 
presented several reports in the winter/spring of 1988. Within this project, 
economists from both NHH and UiB were engaged in discussions and 
writings on a variety of theoretical contributions related to the various parts 
of the hydro-power based system - and to taxation and resource rent issues. 
Through this project, SAF economists, and in particular Morten Berg, got 
the opportunity to dig further into the modern international scientific field of 
electricity economics as it developed during the 1980’s. The contributions 
pulled upon, ranged over the early French and American traditions to recent 
developments within economics such as theories of market imperfections, 
second best solutions and developments within economic modeling like 
                                           
98 My translation 
 197 
optimal control theory99, which permitted for a more sophisticated modeling 
of uncertainty over time than what had been developed by Pierre Massé in 
the 1940’s. Through this project, the Norwegian market reform program 
became more closely affiliated with the international - in particular the 
American - scientific work on deregulation of electricity systems and 
economic system design100, not by engaging in the discussion of 
deregulation in the broader sense, but rather through the more technical, 
mathematical contributions to this debate - contributions which were 
important to the analytical sharpness, to the scientific status and authority of 
the market approach among economists – not at least in relation to the group 
of electricity economists at UiO - and to the ability to produce specific in 
principle guidelines upon which an operational reform of a highly technical 
and complex industry could be designed.  
Another important report within this project, was the one by Eirik Schrøder 
Amundsen on “Resource rent and economic adjustments in the electricity 
sector”101, which outlined principles which had been theoretically discussed 
and applied to the Norwegian oil and gas sector and which later came to be 
core elements in an electricity sector tax reform which followed the market 
reform and which represented a major interest to the FD-administration.  
Through these reports many of the theoretical contributions to the market 
reform program had been collected, described and linked together. The 
program was hardly at all made up of unique new concepts. It was a rather a 
unique linking of different contributions from various areas of economic 
research.  
 
 
Figure 9.1. The construction of a specific electricity market reform program 
            at SAF 
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9.2.3 Framing a market based system and attacking established 
         practices  
The first policy oriented project directly ordered from the state 
administration came from the OED in early 1986. In this project SAF was 
asked to provide a scientific judgment of the formulations given in chapter 6 
in the government’s parliamentary report no. 71 (1984-85): “Norway’s 
future use of energy and energy production”. The chapter was called “Price 
policy and energy economizing”102. The report from SAF103 was written by 
professor in economics Kåre Petter Hagen and by Morten Berg and Einar 
Hope, outlined their critique of established principles and practices within 
the electricity sector and presented the market based approach to electricity 
pricing and investments, tariff principles and electricity trade in general 
theoretical terms.  
In the report, Kåre Petter Hagen outlined the critique of the long term 
marginal cost principle in relation to electricity pricing which had already 
been noted by the economists in the early 1970s. He argued by the use of 
standard economic theory, that the alternative cost principle should be 
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applied in general, which meant that short term marginal costs and consumer 
willingness to pay should be the only relevant factors to pricing, where as 
the long term marginal cost principle was only relevant to investment 
decisions. Both investment costs and calculated rate of return, which had 
been at the core of the disputes over state electricity pricing, should 
accordingly be seen as irrelevant to pricing. This far, he provided nothing 
more than traditional arguments from the economists. He continued 
however, by focussing on the problem of risk management to individual 
actors within the system and argued that the established divided system with 
a market for firm power with administrated prices and another market for 
occasional power with flexible prices which absorbed the entire market 
uncertainty, need not be the most adequate way to solve the uncertainty 
problem.  
“The problem seems rather analogous to what we have in the 
currency market with fluctuating exchange rates. Here, actors can 
hedge against fluctuations in future exchange rates by transactions in 
termin markets, and it is natural to raise the issue whether something 
similar possibly could be organized in the electric power market”  
and a little further down the page:  
“An alternative way to organize the electric power market could be to 
base all trade on market equilibrium prices and then establish 
possibilities for hedging for those interested in eliminating the risk 
from fluctuating prices. A closer analysis of this would expand beyond 
the framework of this paper” (Berg, Hagen Hope, 1986:22)104.  
The quotes both demonstrate the new re-framing of the electricity sector now 
advocated by the NHH economists and the association between the credit 
market and their re-framing of the electricity market. Rather than 
hierarchical control with prices, the entire system should be reshaped into a 
single market system where risks could be managed by standard financial 
instruments. 
The contribution by Morten Berg was largely to outline the principles of 
marginal cost pricing applied to electricity supplied through a network 
system; the optimal tariff theory. He thereby presented another traditional 
but still fundamental critique, namely towards the use of average cost as a 
basis for tariffs (and investments), a principle which was referred to in the 
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government report and which reflected the traditionally used practice within 
the general supply sector. Rather than average cost, he argued that the 
alternative cost principle should be applied as the pricing principle. In case 
such prices did not cover total costs, fixed prices for being connected to the 
system should rather be adjusted so that distortions of marginal cost 
elements could be avoided. This critique did not refer to the hierarchical 
program, but rather to the traditional cooperative program and practices. It 
provided strong arguments for micro-economic professionalism in pricing 
practices as well as in regulatory directives.  
Implicitly, it also suggested a strong hierarchical “imitated market” program 
with a more substantial capability to direct local practices. This related 
basically to the electricity transmission and distribution networks, but also 
more generally towards all types of economic practices within the sector. In 
this sense, the market reform program which emerged, reserved a substantial 
role to economic professionals in designing tariff- and regulatory systems 
which would be necessary to secure the implementation of “proper” 
economic principles in sector practices.  
Finally, Einar Hope focused on the market institutional systems and 
presented and extended the arguments that he had developed in the report to 
Statkraftverkene into a discussion of the need to establish new systems for 
trade with both electric power and risk, of the need to provide direct access 
by consumers to the market and the need for increased flexibility in pricing 
and contracting. He also repeated his critique outlined in the Statkraft-report, 
of the inappropriate incentives which followed from institutional 
arrangements within the sector. In addition to more flexible electricity 
markets, he argued for the establishing of markets for commodity futures for 
electricity trade where risks could be reallocated between actors seeking to 
hedge their risk exposures in the market. To this financial contract market 
also non-electricity companies could be invited. Hope also went on to argue 
that there was a substantial need to increase the economic competence of 
actors in the electricity market to make them more able to develop consistent 
economic strategies.  
In his arguments, Hope now had become more explicit in his discussion of 
what could be achieved within the framework of the established system and 
which institutional changes would represent a more radical market reform. In 
his final comment he noted that:  
“It should [..] be clear that there are constraints on what can be 
achieved through better market adjustments and distribution of risks 
in the occasional power market seen in isolation, without seeing it in 
conjunction with the remaining part of the electric power trade 
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system. Given that firm power represents 90% of the total power trade 
and given that there are numerous problems related to market 
adjustments within the firm power part of the system, the largest 
efficiency gains will all together be found within this part. The 
challenge lays in other words in finding measures and systems which 
can create improved efficiency, flexibility and better utilization of 
resources within the electric power trade system as a whole.”105 
(Berg, Hagen and Hope, 1986:63). 
With these concluding remarks Hope and the NHH economists had 
presented a programmatic paper to the state central administration which 
demonstrated that they were prepared to work out the principles of a general 
market reform of the electricity system. Taken together, the report presented 
the basic theoretical perspectives and principles behind a market based 
system based on standard micro economics, contributions from electricity 
economics and Hope’s structure-conduct-performance approach. The report 
also presented the most important arguments from the economists against the 
practices of the established hierarchical and cooperative systems within the 
sector. It explicitly pointed at the need for a general reform and at some 
possible institutional ingredients in such a reform.  
The presentation was done in a fairly popular scientific form, with no 
international references neither to the academic debate on electricity sector 
deregulation nor to other deregulatory processes. As such, the report 
presented arguments in the form of pure theoretical statements and pragmatic 
arguments without further attempts at adding power behind them in order to 
push for their realization in a political-administrative context.  
At this point of time, the market alternative had been created as a scientific 
construct which was being pulled into the internal debate in the government 
and within the FD/OED.  
 
 
9.3 The gradual stabilization of an electricity market 
         reform program 
With these contributions, a market based system had been created as a 
laboratory construct with contributions from different disciplines at the 
SAF/NHH and with substantial professional authority mobilized behind it. 
The market reform program presented by Hagen, Berg and Hope in October 
1986 can be seen as the termination of the first major part of the market 
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reform process; the first major milestone in its stabilization process - to use 
Latour’s concept – as an outcome of a number of other initiatives and 
projects.  
 
Figure 9.2.  Stages towards a possible stabilization of an electricity market 
                   reform 
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By these successive and interrelated events, the market reform program 
became established as a circulating actor-network construct representing a 
semi-ontological market reform system. It had been developed from 
economic theory with a special emphasis on the structure-conduct-
performance approach, from substantial empirical research and from early 
attempts at more limited and incremental improvements primarily within the 
occasional power market system. The theoretical framing pointed at both the 
establishing of a unified market system, at a re-configuration of the industry, 
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at a significant role for professional hierarchy and at the ambition to “re-
shape” actors to behave according to the rationality assumptions of 
economic theory. This demanded that non-economic objectives be excluded 
from the framework of the actors’ decision making in order for them to 
calculate their “optimal economic choices”.  
The emergence of the Norwegian electricity market reform program appears 
to have developed largely along a pathway separated from other electricity 
market reform approaches internationally, but well on the inside of the more 
general shift from state-hierarchical systems to markets in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.  
The presentation also points at the important role of the SAF research 
institution in the market reform collective – as the academic laboratory for 
market oriented research, education and scientific networking and as a 
network system which linked a variety of competencies together with state 
policy advice interests and necessary financial research funding.  
The market reform program provided a conclusive answer to the early 
critique from the Hveding collective that there was no solid ground on which 
the SRMC argument could be applied. The presentation also demonstrates 
that to develop such an answer needed substantial empirical research, 
practical problem solving as well as entrepreneurship in combination with a 
more micro-oriented and multi-disciplinary approach capable of addressing 
the many different parts of the electricity system. As we shall see, there was 
numerous other aspects of the electricity system which had to be 
systematically addressed by the economists in order to produce an 
operational reform alternative with the necessary credibility to force a 
political breakthrough within the sector as well as within the political and 
state administrative system. Without the research program created by Einar 
Hope and without his ability to expand it into an in theory alternative 
through lots of networking and research, Norway would obviously not have 
embarked on a market reform – at least not at an early stage. 
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10 Tormod Hermansen, the social democratic 
modernization program and the links to the 
      electricity market reform collective at SAF 
 
Finally, the fourth leg of the animal shall be presented. Now, the attention 
will be directed towards the state, towards the rivalry between the market 
oriented political parties and a social democratic party struggling to regain 
the initiative during the late 1980s, and towards the network of actors and 
commanding heights which came to play major roles in the further market 
reform process.  
In these processes, Tormod Hermansen appears to have played a role in them 
all – usually in a key networking position. He accordingly provides a 
promising point of entrance for investigations into how the social democratic 
party’s strive for modernization came to shape important conditions for the 
electricity sector reform approach, as well as into how the scientific program 
at the SAF became transformed into a radical, operational political reform 
project through various networking activities.  
What were the major differences between the neo-liberal program which 
emerged from economics and became supported by the right wing political 
parties, and the social democratic modernization program? What 
implications did the new program have for the structuring of the market 
reform? What was the role of Tormod Hermansen in the shaping of it, and 
which scientific schools of thought came to influence the new approach? 
From this focus on the shaping of the political regime which hold power 
during the period in which the electricity market reform process became 
pushed – between 1986 and 1989, I shall narrow down on the relationship 
between the Ministry of Finance where Hermansen in 1986 had become the 
head of administration, and the economists at NHH. The purpose is both to 
outline some of the networks within the state administration which 
mobilized for the market reform alternative, and their relations to NHH 
economists and the electricity market reform project. What was the role of 
the electricity market reform research program at SAF in this broader state-
science network? 
My core argument is that the electricity market reform became mobilized as 
the major representation of an ambitious economic reform program outlined 
jointly by NHH economists and the Ministry of Finance through 1986-87. 
The report from Berg, Hagen and Hope in 1986 served a particularly 
important role in this program, which represented a major breakthrough for 
the NHH economists into the FD administration at the expense to the 
traditional FD-UiO relationship – invited and mediated by Hermansen. It 
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was this joint FD-NHH network of actors with their state institutional 
powers and scientific capabilities and authority which mobilized the 
electricity market alternative to fill the open space within the electricity 
sector; a fairly wide spread acknowledgment of the need for some kind of 
reform to improve economic efficiency and organizational rationality. 
 
 
10.1 Tormod Hermansen and the social democratic 
         modernization program 
Tormod Hermansen in 1986 became appointed head of administration106 in 
the FD after Eivind Erichsen’s retirement. Hermansen was a member of AP, 
but was appointed by the coalition government and its conservative Minster 
of Finance, Arne Skauge. The background for this event was apparently that 
Hermansen since 1981, during a period where the conservative and the 
coalition governments pushed for new public management reforms, had 
shown himself as an effective leader of public sector reform processes within 
the Ministry of Labor and Municipal Affairs, where he also served as head 
of administration107.  
From his new position in the FD, he in August 1987 initiated a further shift 
in economic orientation facilitated through a restructuring process within the 
FD. In his view, and despite the credit market reform, the FD was still 
dominated by a macro-stabilization oriented Keynesian tradition which 
prevented initiatives for micro-economic transformation of economic sectors 
and thereby an efficient market economy, growth and international 
competitiveness. During the initial process within FD, he suggested to 
reduce the number of departments from 11 to 4. Seven heads of department 
were accordingly forced to find other positions outside the ministry (Barth 
Jacobsen, 1998: 122). Through negotiations, the final number was set to 8, 
but through the very restructuring process, Hermansen had been able to put 
together a new team which radically reduced the remaining influences of the 
traditional Oslo School of Economics within the FD, and which shifted 
associations closer to the NHH economists in Bergen (Barth Jacobsen, 
1998:157). 
Tormod Hermansen had been educated as an economist at the UiO under 
“the regime” of Trygve Haavelmo and Leif Johansen. In the late 1960s, he 
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worked at the EFTA secretariat in Geneva, where the Norwegian delegation 
was headed by Per Kleppe. One source which is said to have influenced 
Hermansen during this period, was Ota Sik, the minister for planning in 
Alexander Dubcek’s pre-1968 government. Sik was an important ideologist 
behind the reform initiative in Tchekoslovakia, who argued for a market 
based system within the frameworks of a socialist state. A condition for such 
a system to produce an efficient economy, was to eradicate negative aspects 
of and features of management through dedicated interventions108. These 
ideas represented a new concept; the transformation of Oskar Lange’s central 
planning system into Hayek and von Mises market theories and philosophy, 
with a close attention to the role of leadership in a system with public 
property rights and thereby constraints on assumed individual economic 
incentives.  
From 1969, Tormod Hermansen worked at the district collage in 
Kristiansand as a teacher in micro-economics. In 1972 he came to the 
University of Bergen (UiB) as a lecturer, where he also came to work with 
Einar Hope at NHH/SAF on Hope’s large empirical industrial organization 
research project. He wrote a few chapters in research publications edited by 
Hope which was primarily intended to be educational literature for students. 
No doubt, Hope’s empirical orientation, industrial organization theoretical 
approach and search for practical improvements in sector economies fitted 
rather well to the ideas represented by Ota Sik and to Hermansen’s own 
interest in competitive markets – as seen from a state governance 
perspective. 
In 1977 he was appointed head of one of the departments in the Ministry for 
social affairs109, but was soon brought to the FD as a “vise-minister”110 for 
Minster of Finance Per Kleppe in the AP government. As I have already 
noted, he there came in a key “junior” position during the credit market 
reform and its dramatic shift from the Oslo School of Economics to the 
monetaristic Chicago School approach of the NB economists. With his 
background relationship both to Per Kleppe and the NHH economists, it 
appears that Hermansen became a fairly influential spokesman for the new 
approach of the NB economists, and that he learned an early lesson on how a 
radical market reform could be created from economic research and turned 
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into a large scale remaking of society process through a lot of dedicated 
networking as described in chapter 7. He also experienced the build up of the 
new oil sector, the establishing of Statoil as a main political instrument for 
state oil- and gas policy and the build up of the state governance and income 
systems in the new oil- and gas sector, which came to represent in important 
comparative standard for financial contributions from the electricity sector to 
state budgets. 
In the following, I will follow Tormod Hermansen through some of the 
projects he became involved with which came to both represent important 
shifts in Norwegian economic policy and important commanding heights for 
the electricity market reform. The two most influential projects in our 
perspective, were probably the Hermansen Committee and the Steigum 
Committee. Together, these committees presented the foundation for what 
was to became an early Norwegian parallel to Anthony Gidden’s and Tony 
Blairs new social democratic “Third Way” policy in England in the late 
1990’s, which could perhaps be subscribed under the label: “More markets – 
more governance” – to take over from the neo-liberal: “More markets – less 
state”. 
 
10.1.1 “More markets – more governance” 
The shift in government in May 1986 brought the AP back to power with a 
new Gro Harlem Brundtland government, and with it, an ambition to 
modernize a traditional social democratic policy which had been pushed 
back by the neo-liberal and new public management programs in the wake of 
the economic crisis in the late 1970s. The government initiated efforts at 
constructing a “renewal” program for the party which aimed at reinforcing 
the welfare state concept based on a reinterpretation of the role of both state 
and markets in the economy. The approach was to include a modified but 
professionally viable economic neo-liberal program and thereby  to tune 
down the traditional hierarchical ideology, and partly to include and modify 
the new public management program into a new organizational policy for the 
state and the public sector at large.  
On the other hand, it also included a close income-political cooperation with 
the trade unions which forced a partial breakdown for new public 
management aspirations to privatize public services and labor market 
deregulation initiatives like increasing wages to public sector top 
management. A new “solidarity alternative” concept demanded that those 
with the lower incomes should rather receive the wage increases. The labor 
market and the trade unions accordingly came to represent an important 
defense-line for traditional social democratic policies which maintained an 
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internal balance within the party between the traditionalists and the new 
generation of “modernizers”.  
Public sector reforms were seen by the government as obviously needed in 
order to produce a stronger defense for collective political organization 
against privatization and in order to regain the political initiative by the AP. 
This view represented a radical rejection of the neo-liberal view of the state 
associated with the Reagan- and Thatcher administrations in the US and the 
UK as well as an obvious fundamental approval of the neo-liberal view of 
the efficiency of markets. In order to be defended, the welfare state had to be 
modernized through market oriented reforms (exclusive the labor market). 
The renewal program can be seen as an effort to integrate the traditional 
social democratic ideology and its labor union power basis with the neo-
liberal and new public management programs. This resulted in a more 
complex governance program with a specifically social democratic “more 
governance” oriented role of the state and a flexible, multi-optional approach 
to public sector organization and state regulation and control systems. One 
could also say that rather than the traditional and ideologically infused 
quantitative distinction between states and markets represented by the neo-
liberal program and the traditional socialists, the ambition became one of 
focusing on the qualitative dimensions of the state-market relationship and 
on the variety of governance tools and organizational forms available for the 
improvement of micro-, meso- and macro economic order and efficiency 
within the frameworks of a social democratic welfare state concept. This was 
the large scale political-economic program in which Tormod Hermansen 
came to play an important role. 
The ambition of the government to get Norway into the European Union and 
to prepare the Norwegian economy for the competitive European market, 
was of course an important point of reference for this new policy – an 
argument which was used to persuade traditionalists and trade unions about 
the necessity of economic and organizational reforms.  
Where as the AP party organization had dominated the party’s policy 
formulations during the 1970’s and during the opposition period from 1981 
to 1986, the ambition to incorporate modern economic, political and 
organizational theory pointed at a reform strategy dominated by social 
scientists directly organized by the party leadership/government. Through its 
networking with various scientific professionals, often structured into 
various government policy committees, the new program became shaped in 
between 1986 and 1988/89. Young economists like Ted Hanisch, Eldrid 
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Nordbø111, Torstein Moland and Bjørn Skogstad Aamo had entered the 
prime minister’s office and the FD and thereby “sealed off” influences from 
the post-war traditionalist generation (Barth Jacobsen, 1998:154). In the FD, 
Tormod Hermansen in coordination with Minister of Finance and AP vice-
leader Gunnar Berge played important roles in the construction of a new 
economic program. The government also invited another area of social 
science; which we might denote “the neo-institutional political and 
organizational theory research program” to participate in the policy-making 
process. 
The association between the neo-institutional political and organizational 
theorists and the program for renewal of the AP program, was based on their 
understanding of the role of the state in the economy and the role and 
character of politics and public sector administration as a highly complex 
phenomenon, in contrast to the simplistic market versus state dichotomy of 
the economists. In its search for ways to redefine the role of the state and to 
modify and “social democratize” the market-liberal and the new public 
management programs, the political and organizational scientists offered a 
large bulk of relevant empirical research and theoretical concepts as well as 
substantial national and international scientific authority. Professor Johan P. 
Olsen in particular, came to represent this area of science and became an 
important participant in formulating the integrative new program. He was 
involved with the LOS Research Center which was a center for social 
scientists at University in Bergen (UiB), NHH and UiO who had public 
sector organization and governance as its primary domain. It had gained 
attention and momentum through out the 1980’s, largely in opposition to the 
simplistic beliefs in the “magic” of the market represented by the 
expansionary economists. It was also part of a strong Scandinavian scientific 
research program with strong links to the US – in particular to Harvard 
University and to Stanford University, where James G. March had been a 
substantial contributor to the program, not at least through his close 
cooperation with Johan P. Olsen. 
 
10.1.2 The rivalry between the market-liberal and the 
            modernized social democratic programs 
The concepts of the social democratic “more markets – more governance” 
renewal program can be traced in other policy oriented reports presented by 
the AP-government as contrasted with the “more markets – less state” 
                                           
 111 Eldrid Nordbø from 1981 to 1986 served as head of department in the Ministry for labour 
and municipal affairs when T. Hermansen served as its head of administration (Norges 
Statskalender). 
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orientation of the “think thank committees” of the coalition governments. In 
between 1986 and 1991, four different government reports reflected this 
“ideological” battle between the by now “classical” neo-liberal and the 
transformed social democratic renewal programs. Of these, the first and the 
last report were initiated by two different coalition governments and the two 
intermediates by the Brundtland AP-government.  
The first report was presented by the coalition government in April 1986 and 
was called ”Program for modernization of the state administration”. It 
represented an extension of the 1981-83 conservative government’s ambition 
to “simplify” public administration, to push for market- and service-oriented 
new public management initiatives and deregulation, and also reflected the 
government’s long term financial program for 1986-89112. The program 
reflected a continuous strong commitment to create a more efficient public 
sector – primarily through increased exposures to market competition in 
markets for public services as well as in the labor market. To a larger extent 
public sector entities should have to compete directly with privately 
organized alternatives in order to demonstrate their economic efficiency, and 
public sector managers should have to compete for their jobs in similar ways 
as private sector leaders. A moderate operational program for privatization 
of public services and efforts to reduce the rigidities of public sector wage 
setting were accordingly included in order to get this competition off the 
ground. 
Privatization of public services and a shift away from detailed regulations to 
a more clear cut separation into autonomous operational business oriented 
entities on the one hand, and a politically oriented central 
administration/economic regulator on the other, represented the main 
direction. Specialized modernizing programs for the ministries were also 
announced in order to strengthen their flexibility and usability as political 
instruments and workshops to the government. A major argument here was 
to secure a sufficiently large distance and independence between the state 
political institutions and organized economic interests (Helgesen, 1991). 
That is, a deconstruction of the post-war corporate governance structures 
which linked sector cooperative systems closely to the state administration 
and which had actually delegated traditional state authorities to sector 
cooperative organizations in many sectors of the economy.  
In May 1987, one year after it gained power, the Brundtland government 
presented its “Renewal Program: The New State”, which was partly an 
                                           
112 St. meld. nr. 83, 1984/85 
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extension of the modernization of the state administration program presented 
by the coalition government. The new program however, deviated in 
important respects and in particular on the role of privatization and the role 
of state control in the economy. In short; it rejected the neo-liberal role of the 
state. It reflected the ambition to modernize, protect and further develop the 
welfare state within the frameworks of public property rights control. 
Privatization was rejected as a wanted approach but, the report stressed the 
necessity to improve the provision of public services if unwanted 
privatizations were to be avoided. The government accordingly supported a 
much more flexible organization of public administration and public 
production activities with more freedom and more economic responsibility 
to operational entities – with more business-like organizational forms.  
The further development of these ideas can be traced in the third government 
report presented by the Hermansen-committee in March 1989; the NOU 
1989:5: “A better organized state”, which focussed on public sector 
organizational issues. The committee had been established in January 1987 
and was headed by Tormod Hermansen. Its core professional member was 
Professor Johan P. Olsen. Contrary to the focus on market reorientation 
represented by the two previous programs, the new report focused on the 
complexity involved in the roles of the modern state and on the multi-
functional character of public sector administration. It thereby attacked the 
simplified core of the new public management program; the assumption that 
business organizational models were fundamentally relevant to all kinds of 
public sector organizational purposes.  
The committee analyzed around 300 different public sector organizations in 
their search for useful models and concepts in relations to various 
organizational fields and purposes. Different forms of organizational and 
structural arrangements were presented and discussed and largely found to 
be appropriate in different situations. Rather than arguing for a few 
particular institutional-organizational structures and forms, the report 
outlined a broad set of alternatives and pointed at mediating forms and 
flexible approaches which could make it possible to increase efficiency and 
maintain or increase political, economic and administrative governance and 
control simultaneously. The choice of organizational form should 
accordingly depend on the specific purpose and character of the tasks of 
each particular entity, and could take different forms, for instance in between 
the traditionally organized public bureau for civil service administration 
tasks to business organized publicly owned joint stock companies for goods- 
or service-producing entities - or outright privatization.    
The report presented important guidelines for the social democratic 
modernization approach and for the intermediate organizational forms like 
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“state company” or “municipal company” forms which were designed as 
judicial forms in between the traditional public bureau and the commercial 
joint stock company. It also came to outline the major direction of as well as 
the essential constraints on the electricity market reform: State control and 
public property rights within the electricity sector should be closely guarded.  
Already in 1985, we have seen that the “state company” judicial form had 
emerged as a compromise form in between the coalition government and the 
AP/trade union traditionalists during the organizational reform of 
NVE/Statskraftverkene. The electricity market reform - from the perspective 
of the “better organized state” – could be seen as a selected, specific and 
particularly suitable approach to a production oriented sector reform – in 
order to demonstrate the new social democratic renewal model. As we will 
see however, the electricity sector reform process emerged politically before 
a new social democratic consensus had been achieved. In the meantime the 
traditional public sector hierarchical program within the party mobilized for 
the hierarchical restructuring program associated with the Vinjar-Vatten-
Diesen collective and with AP government policies back to 1960 – to 
challenge the market oriented “modernizers” within the party.  
The fourth and final report presented on the topic of public sector reforms, 
was worked out by the “Normann-committee” which had a strong 
representation of NHH economists. It had been appointed by the Ministry of 
Work and Administration under the new Syse-coalition government in 
August 1990, but presented its report first by April 1991 after a another 
Brundtland government had once again taken over. The committee, headed 
by Professor in Economics at NHH, Victor Normann, represented a 
deliberate effort to regain the initiative for a more classical economic market 
liberal and new public management program by stressing the economic 
efficiency arguments of the general market equilibrium theory, and by 
following a strategy of calculating the potential welfare gains from a number 
of radical deregulation and privatization projects through out the economy. 
The work of the committee in this sense reflected the entire economic 
research program through out the 1980s at the NHH - including the 
electricity market program. 
The report however, met opposition from public sector interests and trade 
unions, and from the neo-institutional political and organizational theorists, 
who presented a flow of arguments against the “one-sided” economic 
approach. The impression of overwhelming potentially radical changes in a 
multiplicity of economic sectors appeared to have met the same destiny as 
the first national plan for the electricity sector: It was too ambitious, 
provoked to much resistance and thereby undermined its initial fairly strong 
political support. It was too much at a time. The report in the end received no 
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support from the Brundtland AP-government, and was not used as a back-
ground report for further political initiatives (Helgesen, 1991). Rather, it 
came to represent a relative breakdown of the ambitious market liberal 
program within the central state administration – and a return to a policy of 
consolidation.  
The combination of the on-going financial crisis in the deregulated 
commercial banking sector, the political and scientific reactions to the 
Normann-committee and the return to another social democratic government 
in 1990 which in parliament was dependent on the agrarian Senterpartiet 
under its new leader Anne Enger Lahnstein, can largely be seen as ending 
the period of  expanding economic neo-liberal and new public management 
programs initiated at the state-administrative level in Norway. In 1991, 
Tormod Hermansen also left his “commanding height” in the FD and moved 
to the state telecom company Telenor, where he embarked on a  
modernization of the state company and the telecom sector – as part of 
Norwegian preparations for the international deregulation of the telecom 
sector from January 1st 1998. The state administration thereby also seems to 
have lost one of its important driving forces for further economic 
deregulation.  
As a confirmation of this impression, the AP-government in its 
parliamentary report, St. meld. nr. 35, 1991/1992, stated its fundamental 
support for the established institutional-organizational systems in the state 
administration and rejected the need for further radical restructuring 
processes, neither in terms of organizational sizes, redistribution of roles nor 
introduction of new governance tools (p. 5). In close accordance with the 
attitude of the institutionalists, the government underlined its understanding 
of public administration as one of complexity and multiplicity of roles aimed 
at the maintenance of multiple values, goals and aspects (p. 32). This 
apparently forced back the market liberal program; more markets - less state, 
and undermined its capacity to remake society through further large scale 
breakthroughs into new sectors of the economy. And, it turned the emphasis 
towards more technical reforms at more detailed levels of sector economic 
regulations – within the frameworks of the new regimes which had been 
created through the 1980s. “More markets – less state” had become “more 
markets – more governance”. 
  
10.1.3 The Steigum committee and the new economic program 
The more specific concern with a possible electricity market reform emerged 
in relation to another important committee which had a more economically 
defined focus. In October 1986, the AP government established a committee 
within the FD under the leadership of Gunnar Berge and Tormod 
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Hermansen. It became headed by NHH professor in economics Erling 
Steigum jr., and received the mandate to prepare for the government’s long 
term economic program. In other words: the government’s economic “think 
thank”. Another of its members was the FD economist Sigurd Tveitereid, 
who had taken over responsibility for energy affairs within the FD. The 
committee worked out numerous ideas on a new economic policy which 
aimed at transforming the social democratic policy into a policy which 
reflected the new developments in international scientific and political 
economics. In Hermansen’s words:  
“In many ways I think that what I did was to catch an international 
efficiency-trend – another approach to state activities with different 
governance philosophies – among others what Thatcher did in 
England. These were new approaches. We were curious and 
concerned with avoiding that Norway in any way lagged behind”113.  
The report from the Steigum-committee became presented in 1988 and was 
called ”Norwegian economy in transformation” (NOU 1988:21)114. It 
outlined the political aspirations and perspectives of the now much more 
micro-economic and demand side management oriented Ministry of Finance 
in alliance with NHH economists. Through out 1986 and 1987 the 
committee served as a creative “think tank” within the FD into which the 
1986 report from Kåre P. Hagen, Morten Berg and Einar Hope to OED was 
included. Both the role of Steigum as a representative of the NHH 
economists and Hermansen’s personal knowledge of and respect for Einar 
Hope, ensured that the Hagen-Berg-Hope report was turned into focus as the 
most ambitious reform proposal presented by the committee.   
Not only the credit market, but the entire economic policy had now shifted 
from the traditional Oslo School of Economics to the general equilibrium 
approach. The Steigum report argued strongly to break off from a policy 
which focused on the allocation of resources to and within specific sectors 
and for turning to a policy which stimulated demand side interests in the 
governance system in general. It argued for general market oriented changes 
in order to improve resource allocation efficiency in broad terms. Hence, 
emphasis should be given to strengthen competition and flexible pricing in 
general. In particular the markets for capital, labor and energy had to be 
                                           
113 Bjørn Barth Jacobsen interview with Tormod Hermansen. My translation  (Barth 
Jacobsen, 1998:158) 
114 Norsk økonomi i forandring (my translation) 
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developed, where as specific policies to support local employment and 
district communities should be abandoned.  
Given the obvious political constraints on any labor market reforms under a 
social democratic government, energy turned to the focus. A national market 
for electricity was taken up specifically, and the report argued that a unified 
national market for electricity with similar prices for all buyers should be 
established. The established divided power market was said to lead to great 
variations in pricing, implicit subsidies and other delivery conditions which 
implied inefficient resource allocations (NOU, 1988:21:18).  
The advocacy for a general electricity market reform in the report shows that 
the electricity market reform had reached a consensus within the FD through 
the “educational” activity of the Steigum Committee, and was advocated 
actively during 1988 as a reform in line with the deregulation of the capital 
market. It also indicates that the reform initiative by 1988 was supported by 
the AP government – as part of its new long term economic program.  
Below, in figure 10.1., I have outlined the networking activities which came 
to shape the state engagement in the electricity market reform. It came to 
materialize something pretty close to the early ideas of Ota Sik; a flexible 
market oriented system within a strong state governance control and public 
property rights regime: “More markets – more governance”. 
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Figure 10.1. The shaping of the “more markets – more governance” 
   electricity market reform program 
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With the presentation of the Steigum report, attention moved towards 
practical electricity market reform initiatives. This was a job to be governed 
and coordinated by Hermansen and Tveitereid115.  
 
 
10.2  The “Hermansen electricity market reform collective”  
From the point of view of the FD, an electricity market reform would have to 
rest on scientific contributions from Hagen, Berg and Hope/SAF. But it also 
had to be administratively anchored within the OED. The latter point was of 
course a challenge which had to be carefully solved. The solution found was 
to separate the department within the OED which was responsible for the 
electricity market - the market department - into one petroleum market 
department and one energy department. Next, Arne Øien asked Tveitereid to 
take the idle job as head of the new energy department116. However, this 
arrangement did take some time and Tveitereid could not take over the new 
job before December 1988. In the meantime, Hermansen moved on to 
initiate a specific market reform research project with Einar Hope at SAF, 
which was formally established in August 1988. To participate in the 
coordination of the project between the SAF and the FD, the young FD 
economist Eivind Tandberg was sent to work with Hope on the project117. In 
the FD, deputy director Arild Sundberg became responsible for the project. 
Together with Tveitereid, one representative from OED and one from NVE, 
Sundberg also became a member of the governance committee for the 
research project. 
Through the work of the Steigum-committee and through these networking 
activities, what we may call the Hermansen electricity reform actor-network 
became established. It was both an interpersonal network, a network between 
organizational entities and an institutional network of legislative, rule based 
and contract based relations. We may also see it as part of a political-
administrative network with relations to political parties and scientific 
communities more broadly, but here, I will concentrate on the more narrow 
core. 
                                           
115 The new competition law can probably also be seen as initiated through the work of the 
Steigum committee. 
116 Bjørn Barth Jacobsen, 1998: 157, interview with Arne Øien. 
117 Tandberg was permitted to do his “social service” instead of military service as a research 
assistant at SAF. 
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Below, I have illustrated the inter-personal and the institutional networks of 
the Hermansen market reform actor-network. It is important to note that each 
node in the network represents an actor as well as a network where each hold 
a capacity to change the relationship and thereby transform the network.  
 
Figure 10.2. The Hermansen interpersonal electricity market reform 
                     network 
 
          NHH 
         SAF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 OED        FD 
 
Bold arrows indicate the core relationships within the network.  
Per Håkon Høisveen was a deputy director within the OED, who had been 
working with Erling Diesen within the Energy Law Commission on the 
hierarchical restructuring approach. He was asked to participate in the 
governance committee for the SAF project as a representative from OED and 
as a linkage to the ongoing legislative reform process. 
In figure 10.3, I have indicated the institutional relationships associated with 
the interpersonal Hermansen state-administrative actor-network.  
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Figure 10.3. The Hermansen “institutional” electricity market reform 
      network 
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The shaded boxes represent the core institutional elements in the operational 
reform project. 
The core of the network contained the Ministry of Finance, the Energy 
department within the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, the Steigum 
Committee and the NHH-SAF. The NVE was largely outside the network at 
the early stage, but was invited to participate in the governance committee of 
the SAF research project. Department director Svein Storstein Pedersen 
came to represent the NVE in the project.  
The reorganizing within the OED which placed Sigurd Tveitereid in the 
position as head of department for the energy department, adds to the 
impression that the government was supportive to the idea to push for Einar 
Hope’s market reform alternative. We also note that the hydropower 
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network. The department was headed by cand. juris. Hans-Ludvig Dehlin, 
who followed the sector from the Ministry for Industry to the new OED in 
1978.  
 
 
10.3 The roles of the state and of entrepreneurial 
collectives within the state administration in the 
creation of new market systems  
The role of the state in some industrial economic system is a crucial one. It 
may take a variety of forms, each providing different sets of roles and rules 
of the game and distributions of powers and economic gains between state 
institutions and their civil society counterparts in anyone particular sector of 
society. The state is accordingly an object for intense rivalries between 
different collectives of actors which can be characterized by their different 
purposes and programs – be they represented by political parties or other 
kinds of collective systems and interests. The case presented demonstrates 
this interplay between civil society entrepreneurial collectives and actor-
networks within the state political-administrative system. It shows that the 
ability to mobilize the adequate networks of actors behind a radical large 
scale economic reform initiative is crucially dependent on the congruency 
between the civil society entrepreneurial collective and some powerful state 
counterparts. It has also pointed at the significance of the capturing of the 
relevant commanding heights - or even the creation of new ones -  if an 
entrepreneurial collective of the type we discuss here shall succeed in 
expanding and stabilizing its program in society. By moving its delegates 
into important institutional positions, these institutions become enrolled into 
the entrepreneurial collective and thereby become capable of taking on 
responsibilities on behalf of it. Without such counterparts – such a thing as 
an academic research program is unlikely to be turned into a stabilized real 
life economic system. 
To create this congruency in part depends upon various networking activities 
which obviously involves the government and its relevant ministers, and 
which has to do with the “capturing and reshaping” of the relevant 
commanding heights within the administration. In part it also has to do with 
timing and concordance between the civil society entrepreneurial collective 
and major formative movements at an international level – which provide 
necessary legitimacy and political support for the local change program. 
The expansion of the market reform collective into the state administration 
and thereby its transformation from a research program into a political-
administrative program, occurred in part as a consequence of the appointing 
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of Tormod Hermansen to a leading administrative position within the FD in 
1986. As such, we may infer that the linking had some elements of pure 
chance. But from that event, the linking of NHH with the FD was part of a 
deliberate program to reshape the Norwegian economy as well as public 
sector administration, and the availability of a highly developed research 
program which concerned a radical market reform of one of the most 
significant sectors of the economy, offered a perfect opportunity to advance 
the broader change program. The electricity market reform program 
accordingly expanded on the basis of mutual initiatives from both 
economists and entrepreneurial collectives within the state. It is hard to find 
any evidence that actors and economic interests from within the electricity 
sector itself intervened or played any significant role in the process at this 
early stage. 
The report from the Steigum committee as well as the establishing of an 
operative electricity market reform collective within the state administration 
and the initiation of another research project at the SAF, represent additional 
steps towards the stabilization of a real world electricity market system – 
however still at a substantial distance from the final goal. 
 
Figure 10.4.  Political-administrative elements in the stabilization of an 
   electricity market reform program 
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We have also seen that the specific form of the electricity market reform, as 
an economic deregulation without privatization, was deeply rooted in the 
social democratic rejection of the neo-liberal role of the state – in its defense 
for a view on the role of the state which had deep roots in Norway back to 
the early days of Gunnar Knudsen, to the concession law system for national 
resource control and the post war social democratic welfare state. It also 
became linked up with a scientific program which hold a detailed and 
complex understanding of the role of the state in modern societies. The 
joining of the neo-liberal with this more complex view of the state, came to 
represent an early breakthrough in Norway for something which was to 
become known as a social democratic “third way” program most 
prominently advocated and spelled out by Anthony Giddens and Tony Blair 
in England later in the 1990s. 
 
 
10.4 Triangulating the sources of the electricity market  
         reform collective 
I have now outlined a picture of the roots of and the various pathways of 
developments which came to shape the establishing of an early 
entrepreneurial electricity market reform collective in between the SAF and 
the FD/OED. There may have been other pathways with significant 
influences that I have not presented – that I might not even be aware of. To 
explore these might be a challenge to historians. My primary concern here 
however, has been to investigate these matters from the theoretical 
proposition that economics as a scientific discipline plays a significant role 
in processes of re-framing, re-configuring and re-formatting of economies. 
At this point of the analysis, I think we may conclude that at least in this 
case, economics as theory and as a scientific community played an essential 
role in the shaping of what was to become a large scale reform process. It 
also played an essential role in the shaping of a political-administrative 
program which provided access to positions from where the new electricity 
market program could be pushed towards a re-configuration of the industry.  
The presentation has indicated that alternative change programs lost much of 
their powers or where unable to mobilize sufficient powers to create 
convincing political breakthroughs in the 1970s and early 1980s. This 
followed at least in part because of their lack of support from any substantial 
professional economic community. The various “unsuccessful” programs – 
which all aimed at improving economic efficiency and rationality within the 
sector in some way or another – left a space open for other alternatives in 
terms of relatively limited legitimacy and authority behind the existing 
system. Strong historical lock-ins represented by two different rival 
concepts; the local-cooperative and the state-hierarchical, made this a highly 
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challenging task to any type of approach. It remains to be seen how the 
market reform collective were able to cope with these challenges in order to 
create sufficient support to create a significant political breakthrough in 
parliament as well as within the electricity sector. 
The program which gradually became constructed at the SAF, emerged from 
a specific interest in the functioning of the occasional power market, and 
from efforts at expanding its ability to cope with specific economic problems 
within the sector – such as the substantial variation in precipitation from year 
to year and the lack of appropriate systems for individual electricity 
companies to cope with financial risks. By giving the occasional power 
market a very different role than what it had been given by Vidkunn 
Hveding, Hope around 1982 re-framed the system in such a way as to 
provide a possible operational alternative consistent with the early insistence 
by economists on a SRMC based pricing system within the entire electricity 
system. Piece by piece essential elements of such a system became collected 
and aligned through various research projects and scientific networking 
activities.  
We may also note that the most important roles in Hope’s program in part 
were given to economic experts as the designers of appropriate price systems 
and economic governance and control systems (through the role of “the state 
regulator”), and in part to electricity company owners and managers as local 
decision-makers. There was no substantial concern with technological 
system design – as whatever investment problem had become transformed to 
a pricing and financial return problem – market based or imposed by experts 
representing the state regulator. Technological choices had become 
disentangled and externalized from the economic governance system.  
These developments occurred as the credit market reform and a broad 
political, ideological and educational movement had transformed the 
environment of these events. When Tormod Hermansen took over his new 
job in the Ministry of Finance, the credit market reform as well as a number 
of new public management reforms in which he had been involved in many, 
had been completed, and substantial experience and learning had been 
gained which now could be collected behind another large scale economic 
reform. These early events and broad social changes where in essence what 
provided the electricity market approach with a substantial capacity to 
“capture and reshape” important commanding heights – in addition to a 
powerful advocacy from the entire NHH economics community.  
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Transforming the electricity industry 
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Introduction 
In this final part of the analysis the aim is to explain the radical 
transformation of the electricity sector and the apparently successful 
stabilization of a competitive market system through the 1990s. What I will 
do, is to follow this process of transformation from the research project at 
SAF initiated by Hermansen and Tveitereid through the political-
administrative networking and rivalry with an alternative reform proposal, to 
the legislative breakthrough for the market reform in parliament. From this 
decisive event I will investigate in short a variety of change projects initiated 
by the market reform collective which aimed at a broad and rapid re-
configuration of the industry.  
The ambition is first and foremost to explain why the reform became so 
effective in its reshaping of an industry characterized by powerful historical 
lock-ins. From the theory of entrepreneurial collectives outlined, there are 
two major analytical contributions to such an analysis. One is the dynamic 
concept of power which suggests that some entrepreneurial collective has 
been able to aggregate sufficient powers to force major actors (actor-
networks/actants) on the “outside” of the collective to get on the “inside”. 
The other is the concept of simplification of one actor-network by another, 
which demands a relative congruency between the roles given to specific 
actors and their own understanding about their roles within their own rules 
and roles of the game models. Without such a congruency, enrolled members 
are unlikely to behave in predictable ways – as seen from the acting 
entrepreneurial collective’s point of view.  
On the one hand, this turns the focus of attention towards the collected and 
constructed elements which made up the aggregated chain of durable powers 
associated with the market reform program. What were the main ingredients 
in this power system? On the other hand, it draws the attention towards the 
relationship between the specifics of the program – the actual juxtaposition 
of its core simplified elements and its surrounding rules and roles of the 
game model – and the programs of important rival networks of actors within 
or related to the electricity sector – like Hveding’s system design program, 
the hierarchical restructuring program, the local cooperatives and the large 
scale power intensive industry program. How did these relate to the new 
market approach? Where they opponents or were the roles given to them 
acceptable as seen from their own perspectives?  
A third focus of attention will be on the actual process of change from the 
perspective of the strategy of the market reform. Can it be said to have been 
a rationalistically planned and implemented economic reform, or was it 
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rather an incremental process characterized by sequential planning, partial 
implementation and successive problem solving, strategic rivalry, chance 
events, political networking and stepwise transformation of the industrial 
environment by the expanding entrepreneurial collective?  
Finally, the ambition is to demonstrate the crucial and very powerful roles of 
economics in reshaping of industry processes. The core argument is that 
contributions from within economics provided the market reform collective 
with both a powerful support and a very rich source of conceptually 
consistent solutions – or models – which could be applied to the many 
different operational problems which had to be sorted out along the way. 
Through the linking of Einar Hope’s empirical research with a network of 
economists at SAF/NHH with access to a broad set of highly specialized 
scientific literature, the capacity for problem solving and system innovation 
became quite impressive. Furthermore, through the implementation of new 
systems which where derived from economic theory, cognitive-, 
organizational- and behavioral structures through out the sector gradually 
became transformed so as to become consistent with fundamental theoretical 
assumptions and propositions within economics. 
Part IV contains the following three chapters: 
Chapter 11: 
Constructing a market; its scientific representation and its relations to 
established collectives 
 
Chapter 12:  
Hierarchical restructuring or market reform? The decisive breakthrough 
 
Chapter 13:  
Shaping and stabilizing a market system and its economic agencies 
This rounds up the analysis before the summary and final conclusions which 
will be presented in chapter 14.     
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11 Constructing a market; its scientific 
representation and its relations to established 
collectives 
 
We shall now turn to the actual construction of a market reform alternative at 
the SAF which later became handed over to the political-administrative 
decision process. The focus of attention is the SAF report “Market based 
power exchange in Norway” which outlined a market based system as an 
operational alternative. To get a picture of its core elements, I will provide 
an overview of the content of the main report as well as a brief overview of 
the many sub-reports which discussed a variety of issues in substantial more 
detail. I will then present a couple of issues which became sources of dispute 
within the economics community – notably between the economists at 
NHH/SAF and some of their colleagues at UiO. Finally, I will speculate a 
little over the relationship between the program outlined and those of its 
major historical rivals. This will in turn serve as a point of reference for the 
next two chapters.  
 
 
11.1 Producing a representation of a market based system: 
the electricity market report 
The first major step by Hermansen and Tveitereid was to initiate an outline 
of an operational reform alternative with sufficient scientific authority 
behind it to be able to mobilize for a political-legislative breakthrough. One 
had to create a convincing representation of the system by which to 
demonstrate both efficiency advantages and practical and organizational 
solutions. Due to the close interaction between the FD and the NHH 
economists - actually working on a joint project - much of the work could be 
delegated from FD/OED on a basis of trust. The simple thing to be done was 
to ask Einar Hope at the SAF and his colleagues to work out the theoretical 
principles and arguments and to come up with a practical reform proposal - 
on the single condition that property rights should not be touched. The task – 
from the point of view of the SAF - was accordingly fairly open, but 
nevertheless contained quite a few implicit demands. First, the SAF needed 
to come up with a convincing representation of the market system both in 
theoretical and in practical terms. Second, scientific authority and legitimacy 
needed to be mobilized behind it, which implied that support also from the 
economists at the UiO was an important issue. Third, one had to outline the 
major elements in an operational strategy for the implementation of the 
reform.  
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The project started in August 1988. From the beginning it appeared to be just 
another theoretical research project118. It was explicitly said to be directed 
towards a further development of the theoretical principles of a market based 
system, and should be conducted without much attention to the existing 
institutional, organizational, judicial and political characteristics of the 
sector. Initially, it appeared no to be clear - at least not to Hope - that this 
work should serve directly as the basis for a new and rapidly implemented 
legislation (Thue, 1996:100).  
Hope saw his role as a scientist in a classical, positivist sense. One should 
not intervene directly into politics, but distinguish clearly between the 
scientific provision of alternatives and arguments in accordance with high 
scientific standards and the political responsibility for taking the political 
choices119. The turning of the project into an operational reform initiative 
became explicit later in the winter 1989 – apparently as a consequence of a 
decision to speed up the process. As we shall see later, the immediate 
background for this move was the surprising re-emergence of the 
hierarchical restructuring program at the time – forcefully supported by its 
traditional supporters within the AP in parliament. At this later stage, Hope 
was asked to present more practical and operational proposals for the actual 
implementation of his market system in order to advance the market reform 
alternative in accordance with a very tight time schedule - forced by the rival 
collective of actors.  
The implementation oriented part of the project to this point had been largely 
carried out by FD delegate Eivind Tandberg, who served as the operational 
project coordinator at SAF and as the inter-mediator between the Hermansen 
actor-network in the state administration and the Hope actor-network at the 
SAF. Through the role of Tandberg, the more operational and political 
preparations by the FD/OED could be carried out as a project within the 
project at the SAF. Tandberg was responsible for the chapter “Scenarios for 
market based power trade in Norway”120 at the end of the final project report 
(chapter 6), which outlined in brief the main steps in an eventual 
implementation process. In cooperation with Berit Tennbakk, he was also 
                                           
118 The governance committee appointed by FD and OED was: Deputy director Per Haakon 
Høisveen, OED, department director Svein Storstein Pedersen, NVE,  deputy director Arild 
Sundberg, FD and head of department (from December 1988)  Sigurd Tveitereid  OED. 
119 Confirmed in interview with Einar Hope, 20.11.98 
120 My translation 
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responsible for the comparative study of foreign electricity systems and 
electricity market reforms. Hope and his staff of researchers also spent a few 
days on the implementation issues – while preparing the final report.  
The report “Market based power exchange in Norway”121 was published in 
March 1989 - only 8 months after the project had been started up. Apart 
from a group of 12 researchers and research assistants directly engaged in 
the project group, a number of other researchers at NHH had been involved 
in the 10 sub-reports which contained both specialized theoretical analysis, 
empirically oriented studies of the Norwegian electricity sector and 
comparative studies of international electricity market reforms (Bjørndalen 
et al: 1989:forword). As such, the project reveals a quite impressive 
capability to mobilize and coordinate scientific resources within a short 
period of time, which covered a fairly broad range of scientific fields. No 
doubt this contribution could not have been done without the SAF research 
organization, the scientific networks it had already established and the range 
of electricity sector studies conducted through out the 1980s in interaction 
with both sector practitioners, state administrators in the 
NVE/Statkraftverkene and international research programs. As such, the 
work was essentially a structuring and a pulling together of contributions 
which were ready at hand. 
The report came to represent a very important element in the further process 
by providing a representation of the market reform alternative in the form of 
a written document. Its role became to mobilize support through 
visualization, explanations, scientific arguments and authority. It provided 
guidelines for the work on the new legislation as well as for the re-
configuration of sector institutions, organizations and trading systems. The 
scientific research project thereby had become a project for its actual 
becoming reality through political-administrative processes, for its own 
breakthrough, rapid expansion and possibly for its stabilization as a real life 
system within the electricity sector. 
 
11.1.1 The content of the market reform report 
The research project was organized so as to address a variety of issues which 
on the one hand were important ingredients in the reform, and on the other 
hand drew substantially on earlier research. It was essentially a structuring of 
the different elements involved and a production of fairly popular 
presentations. According to Einar Hope:  
                                           
121 Bjørndalen, Jørgen, Einar Hope, Eivind Tandberg and Berit Tennbakk, 1989: 
“Markedsbasert kraftomsetning i Norge”, SAF rapport nr. 7. 
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“We did not develop any new theory or apply very advanced theories. 
What we did, was to apply fairly simple theoretical contributions in a 
practical manner”.122  
One of the sub-reports was provided by Morten Berg on the subject “Priority 
of delivery”123. Another was by Eirik Schrøder Amundsen and concerned 
“Resource rent, efficiency and income distribution”124. Other contributions 
concerned the need for an accounting reform (finance and accounting 
theory), a study of horizontal and vertical integration in the electricity sector 
(industrial organization theory), an elaboration on the principles for the 
organization of electricity network system (natural monopoly theory), a 
discussion of state regulations of natural monopolies (game theoretical 
regulation and control theory), demand side issues (micro-economic price 
theory), the organization of markets for risk (finance) and a specific study on 
the application of a futures market approach in the hydro-power system 
(finance, oil and gas sector concepts). Among these studies, the work 
regarding organization and regulation of the “natural monopolies in 
electricity transmission and distribution” represented new contributions to 
the bulk of theorizing which already had been worked out. The work on an 
accounting reform was also “new” in this particular sense. The following 
provides a visual overview of the research projects involved. 
                                           
122 Interview with Einar Hope, 20.11.98 
123 Berg, Morten, 1989: “Prioriterte leveranser”, SAF-arbeidsnotat nr. 9. My translation. 
124 Amundsen, Erik Schrøder, 1989: “Grunnrente, effektivitet og inntektsfordeling”, SAF-
arbeidsnotat nr. 12. My translation. 
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Figure 11.1.  Overview of the market reform representation in terms of it 
   sub-reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on a joint market economic re-framing of the sector, the various sub-
projects contributed with a great number of elements and ideas on how the 
electricity sector could be re-shaped, how specific economic measurement 
and control systems, trade systems etc. could be introduced to increase 
economic efficiency or solve specified regulation and control problems. 
Several of these sub-reports came to represent the starting point for later sub-
system reforms during the 1990’s which gradually and piece by piece 
transformed different features of the electricity sector.  
 
11.1.2 The main report and its arguments 
The main report (Bjørndalen et al, 1989) presented and discussed the core 
concepts of the market reform. Here, Hope for the first time – within half a 
page - explicitly refers to the international debate on market reforms in 
electricity sectors in other countries and thereby to some extent relates his 
reform program to international developments. Three different reasons for 
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emphasis on the efficient operation of the established system. Second, there 
is a pointing to the international movement towards deregulation of public 
sector industrial sectors like telecommunication and transport, and finally, 
Hope pointed at the growing concern about possible inefficiencies in the use 
of resources within the electricity system. Of these three arguments, the last 
rationale obviously represented the historical and scientific mission of 
Hope’s project, which dominates the argumentation through out the report - 
with a focus on efficiency improvements rather than deregulation. 
 
11.1.2.1 Demonstrating empirical knowledge 
The main report contains four major parts. The first is an introductory part 
(chapter 3) which presents a brief overview of the electricity sector and 
points out some of the technological, institutional, organizational and 
economic specifics of it. It also presents several charts over regional 
organizational systems within the sector which serve to demonstrate the 
awareness of the authors about the great institutional complexity of the 
sector and thereby defend the report from possible objections to the market 
reform program for not being based on sufficient insights into real world 
system. The short-hand textual references to various governance system 
elements, political governance through public property rights, the various 
license systems, the state power contracts, the public sector accounting 
system and the special tax system within the sector, also serve to 
demonstrate substantial empirical knowledge. 
  
11.1.2.2 Providing the basic arguments for the market solution 
In the second part (chapter 4) the report presents fundamental concepts 
within economic theory in a standard textbook version. That is, the pareto-
efficiency solution of the welfare theorem and a brief discussion of standard 
textbook deviations like imperfect competition, collective goods, external 
effects, incomplete information and transaction costs. Then, the basic 
critique of pricing and investment principles and practices within the sector 
is presented along the lines described by Hagen, Berg and Hope in their 
1986-report. The presentation is obviously not directed towards economic 
scientists, but rather towards a broad audience where the purpose primarily 
is to present the basic arguments of economic theory on which the electricity 
market reform rested and the core scientific arguments against current 
practices within the sector 
 
11.1.2.3 Presenting and discussing the applicability of the  new market 
          system 
The third part (chapter 5), which is the main chapter of the report, presents 
the new electricity market system. The analytical framework applied is the 
“structure-conduct-performance (SCP)”  concept which was at the core of 
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Einar Hopes early research program. To the basic and in principle 
deterministic causal model, two additional variables were added; uncertainty 
and public regulation. Where as uncertainty mainly contributed by 
modifying the otherwise deterministic causal relationship between structure 
and conduct and between conduct and performance, public regulation 
represented the independent variable to be manipulated in order to change 
the system – both directly through exogenous interaction and indirectly 
through causal effects which derived from the changes in industrial 
structures from these exogenous interactions.   
After discussing the complex measurement and realisticness problems 
involved in the analysis, Hope goes on to present the market model, to 
discuss its application to the electricity sector and to compare it with the 
hierarchical restructuring approach.  
Hope finds that the Norwegian electricity sector appeared to be less 
decentralized than what would have been expected to be found in a market 
based system. Despite the many cooperative and hierarchical systems and 
structures within the sector, he does not see it as a very tightly coordinated 
or centralized system, and argues that the institutional preconditions are 
largely suitable for a market based system - with a fairly large number of 
relatively autonomous economic entities. The content of this judgement 
seems to be that the system had sufficient organizational entities for a 
competitive market to be credible, but that the entities were not sufficiently 
autonomous from larger cooperative or state hierarchical governance 
systems, which accordingly should be deconstructed through the 
implementation process.  
He goes on to point at the dominance of production interests within the 
system and argues that the demand side was too weakly represented, which 
led to a limited concern with consumer needs and consumer adjustments to 
market supply conditions. The current system was seen as “technologically 
and administratively” defined rather than defined according to economic 
criteria.  
The publicly owned companies are seen by Hope as non-rational economic 
actors. They were following objectives which deviated in important ways 
from what would have been expected from “economically rational” market 
actors. However, given the explicit constraint not to touch public property 
rights, he notes that behaviors are assumed to be changeable through 
adequate reforms within the sector - without changing property rights. That 
is, structural changes cause changes in conduct and performance. But, he 
also notes some skepticism about the realism in this presupposition. 
Disregarding these problems, he argues that the sector should be organized 
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so as to maximize welfare efficiency and warns that following other possible 
conflicting targets would reduce the ability to achieve wanted economic 
results. 
Following these basic arguments for the market reform - he presented the 
market based system and discussed its different functions such as 
production, transmission, distribution and consumption, the related types of 
actors and the application of the general price- and investment theory to a 
decentralized decision system in the competitive part of the system. He also 
noted various regulatory approaches to a centralized governance system in 
the natural monopoly part of the system. Then, each of the functions are 
discussed in some detail before, finally, there is a critical discussion of the 
hierarchical program for horizontal and vertical integration. Where as the 
report admitted that there might be efficiency gains from horizontal 
integration between small distribution companies, integration between 
generators and vertical integration between activities which can be 
characterized by completely different cost functions, were seen as usually 
inappropriate for the efficient functioning of a market based system. (p 123). 
Compared to Hveding’s system design approach, the economic framing did 
not focus on the contribution of different technologies to over all system 
efficiency, but on differences in the cost structure of various types of 
activities and on the efficiency of each individual activity. 
The presentation is non-academic in the sense that references to international 
academic debate is absent. What is being referred to is the various sub-
studies of the research project in which different academic contributions had 
associated the authority of their research areas behind the reform initiative. 
This approach both served to maintain a fairly popularized style as well as to 
provide Hope with a broad set of theoretically advanced applications to 
specific elements of his model, and thereby a persuasive capability to fight 
off objections also at the micro level of economic and organizational 
analysis.  
 
11.1.2.4 The main elements of a re-configuration of the industry 
The final part of the report, chapter 6, presents the more operational 
“scenarios” for the implementation of a market based system. What is 
denoted “scenarios” are actually short hand presentations of the main 
elements in an integrated regulatory reform; the main elements of a re-
configured electricity industry. These elements were:  
1) the establishing of a market institution,  
2) the establishing of a national transmission company,  
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3) the re-organization of the distribution companies,  
4) the re-shaping of the role of Statkraft in the power market and  
5) the regulation and political governance principles and approaches. 
The first element contained the free access principle and the establishing of a 
jointly organized spot and futures market organized by a joint stock 
company denoted “Kraftsentralen AS”. This company was thought of as 
resulting from a reorganization of Samkjøringen into a more “modern” 
business-like organization, however  still owned and controlled by the 
generators. The company should both function as a clearing house and as the 
operator of the electric pool system in coordination with a national 
transmission company. SAF accordingly suggested a continuous 
“cooperative” control of the market institution rather than state ownership, 
similar to the new English power pool institution which became established 
in 1989.  
The second element, a transmission company “Transkraft AS”, was 
suggested separated out of Statkraft. The company should only be 
responsible for electricity transmission within the national grid, should not 
be allowed to trade with electric power and should have a general contract 
with Kraftsentralen AS about conditions for high voltage transmission based 
on the free access principle. Ownership was to be clarified later, but it could 
either be a state owned or jointly owned by the  power companies (like in 
England). 
The third “scenario” presented a program for reorganization of distribution 
companies. They should be organized as joint stock companies and managed 
according to business economic principles and business accounting systems. 
Here, it was also added that property rights should be clarified further – 
another hint from the economists at the distrust in a continued public 
ownership system. Distribution should be separated from transmission and 
should be managed and regulated according to a cost minimization principle. 
It should be operationally separated from electricity trade and 
organizationally separated from electricity production. The traditional area 
concession and obligation to supply system should be abolished, and 
distribution should be subjected to state organized monopoly regulations.   
The fourth element regarded the organization of what remained of Statkraft 
after separation of transmission activities. The report here argued that 
established electricity contracts should be changed at their expiration 
according to standard market conditions, which would imply that future 
contractual terms should be decided in the market rather than in the 
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parliament. The company should operate just like any other actor in the 
market – as a profit oriented enterprise. In order to prevent the company 
from exploiting a dominant market position, the report suggested to 
restructure the company – for instance through an internal separation into 
regional generating divisions. Also the organization of electricity trade with 
foreign markets was suggested reorganized from the Statkraft monopoly 
system to a competitive market system with direct participation by foreign 
actors in the Norwegian market. 
 
11.1.2.5 Arguing with the hierarchical restructuring approach 
In the fifth and final point, the report suggested to establish the welfare 
economic objective as the only relevant criteria for state economic 
regulatory systems, aimed at securing efficient competition in the power 
market and efficient monopoly control in the “natural monopoly” system. 
Regulations and political interventions which were not based on such 
economic principles, should be excluded. 
Finally, the report summarized some of the critique of the hierarchical 
restructuring reform program and pointed out that a market reform could not 
be established on the basis of a reform based on that  approach. The 
arguments here were the more pragmatic and structural ones, where as the 
main theoretical arguments against a hierarchical system in general – such as 
the basic critique of the LRMC pricing principle - were left out. Because this 
final discussion has a conclusive character, this fairly “pragmatic” summary 
of the critique of the hierarchical alternative might have weakened the 
persuasiveness of the report towards the hierarchical restructuring reform 
alternative. Also the summary in chapter two, lacks references to the basic 
theoretical critique which for instance had been presented by Hagen and 
Berg, which were referred to in the middle of chapter 4. In this respect, I 
think it is fair to say that despite the substantial mobilization of scientific 
resources, the report did not pull some of the most essential contributions 
together into a final, concentrated and persuasive row of rhetorical 
arguments with a capacity to really “shake” the hierarchical program. To 
find these arguments, one had to search through the entire report of 135 
pages. As the concluding arguments appear form a quick look, they seem to 
present an alternative to the hierarchical program with differences which 
mainly have a pragmatic, operational and “system of thought” character. 
Given the political efforts to mobilize the hierarchical reform alternative in 
early 1989, this conclusion is a bit puzzling. What can explain that even 
though potentially more “damaging” scientific arguments were available, 
these were not pushed up-front by a project which was to be used directly to 
overthrow its hierarchical reform rival through scientific arguments? Perhaps 
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it can be found in Hopes “non-confronting” personal style and reluctance to 
engage directly in the political game? Perhaps in the practicalities which 
resulted from tight time constraints? Or from the analytical framework, 
which used the structure-conduct-performance scheme as the basic 
conceptual framework. This directed arguments in the direction of 
“structural” and “relative improvement” arguments rather than those derived 
from the core of micro-economics.  
With the market reform report from SAF, the scientific research program had 
been turned into a political program for the actual remaking of the sector, but 
it was by far a complete operational reform alternative. In particular, it 
lacked the judicial part, which had to be worked out by the OED. 
 
 
11.2 Disputes and alignments with UiO economists 
In the previous chapter I have indicated that with the restructuring of the FD 
in 1986 and the Steigum committee, the scientific-political hegemony within 
the economics community moved further from the UiO/SSB to 
NHH/SAF/NB – and from the Oslo School to the Chicago School of 
Economics. In this situation also the electricity market reform became an 
object for some controversy between economists at the two academic 
institutions, which in part reflected the strong hierarchical/econometric/ 
formal modeling tradition in Oslo and the more empirical and industrial 
organization oriented tradition at NHH. When being presented the reform 
proposals, UiO economists like Steinar Strøm and Finn Førsund were not 
fully prepared to accept the market project, and argued that the electricity 
sector governance system should at least in part be based on professional, 
centralized control with investments, prizing and operational coordination 
within what was essentially one technically integrated system.  
The confrontation also reflected the strong beliefs in the need for advanced 
mathematical calculus at the UiO as opposed the more pragmatic and micro-
structural reform approach represented by Hope - broadly supported by the 
NHH economists125. With the mathematically oriented research projects 
carried out by Morten Berg and others, however, the NHH economists also 
had some calculus to present to back their arguments – in particular in 
relation to the natural monopoly part of their re-framed electricity system.  
The dispute also came to include the local subsidiary of the SAF at the 
University of Oslo – the SAF-Oslo, where scientists working with SAF 
                                           
125 Interview with Einar Hope, 20.11.98 
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research projects were members. When Finn Førsund became a scientific 
advisor for Statkraft during its struggle to maintain a dominant role in the 
network balancing system as well as its efforts to prevent the company from 
being separated into smaller units in line with Hope’s reform program, this 
created substantial tensions within the SAF. 
The NHH economists had both taken over as the major counterpart to the FD 
and had produced an operational alternative to Hveding’s system design 
approach, based on the basic argument of the economists in the 1970s. There 
was accordingly no serious doubts about who had the more powerful 
arguments and the operational alternative, and in the end, there was no 
serious opposition from the UiO economists in general to the new market 
approach. Einar Hope could calmly note that there should be room for 
different points of view also within the SAF. While sinking a bit of their 
professional pride, most UiO economists gave their support to the market 
approach and thereby secured a broad professional support from the 
economics community to the reform process. 
Nevertheless, Hope and his colleagues had to use some time finding the 
proper arguments against Førsund’s insistence on the need for substantial 
hierarchical coordination and control, and to develop additional concepts to 
provide alternative operational solutions. To Hope, a crucial point in the 
reform approach was to reduce the dominant role of Statkraft in the network 
balancing and in the foreign electricity trade systems. One of the major 
controversies in the previous system pointed at by Hope in his 1983 Statkraft 
report, occurred because Statkraft in reality was responsible for short term 
physical balancing of the system, which together with its monopoly on 
foreign trade provided the company with opportunities for strategic price 
manipulations. Another crucial issue to Hope was to prevent the new 
“Transkraft AS” network company from becoming engaged in power trade 
and thereby confuse its intended new role as a neutral provider of 
transmission services to all market participants. Both these objectives were 
threatened by the efforts of Statkraft to defend its unity as well as its 
traditional unique positions in the electricity sector - with the apparent 
support of Førsund.  
The controversy however, stimulated the development of the idea about a 
separated market for short term regulatory power; the regulatory market, as a 
market based system to take over the short term network balancing 
responsibility from Statkraft. The new concept permitted all generators to 
provide such services on equal conditions in a centrally organized, separated 
auction system.  
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11.3 Relations between the new market reform program 
and its major historical rivals 
The electricity market reform as it became shaped in between the electricity 
market approach at the SAF and the modernization of the social democratic 
party, can be seen as a juxtaposition of several basic programs characterized 
by different simplified cores. The character of the Norwegian reform 
accordingly followed from the specifics of this particular mix, obtained 
through its creation process. In figure 11.2. below, I have outlined the 
program as a juxtaposition of four different core elements. 
 
Figure 11.2. Core concepts within the market reform program 
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“The competitive market” represented the new market approach within 
economics associated with Friedman, Hayek, Stigler etc. It was clearly the 
main interest and target of the SAF researchers and essentially grew out of 
their efforts to expand the occasional power market administered by 
Samkjøringen and later on to create an extended economic system based on 
standard market economic concepts. The competitive market element 
received strong support both from the right wing political opposition and 
from those engaged in modernizing the social democratic party. 
“The state-hierarchy - imitated market” was the actual approach to the 
second half of the electricity system; the transmission and distribution part of 
it. The concept rested on an economic rationalization provided by the 
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concept of a “natural monopoly” - which derives from a specific cost 
structure of production. From this concept, the SAF economists in essence 
argued that the transmission and distribution network system should be 
organized in accordance with a hierarchical principle, governed by the 
optimal tariff theory and submitted to monopoly control by the state 
regulator. This was clearly an “imitated market” approach basically similar 
to that of Oskar Lange and EdF. The optimal tariff theory presented by 
Morten Berg represented a SRMC pricing approach to such a hierarchical 
system in which unit prices were set according to the SRMC principle where 
as cost recovery could be obtained through adjustments in fixed annual fees 
paid simply for being connected to the electrical grid. 
The third simplified element, “the new public management” concept, 
represented a radical separation of economic actors from economic 
regulators and the idea that public sector economic actors should organize 
themselves in accordance with “business principles” – associated with 
capital ownership and profit maximization. Apart from the insistence on a 
general accounting reform and an unbundling of competitive activities from 
“natural monopoly” activities by separated accounts, the program did 
however not contain any suggestions regarding compulsory changes in 
electricity company organizations. The principle of pragmatic organizational 
flexibility advocated by the Hermansen committee and Johan P. Olsen, left it 
to each company to choose appropriate organizational forms. With regard to 
the state electricity administration, the basic concepts had already been 
established through the separation of Statkraftverkene from NVE in 1985/86. 
The program outlined a further radical re-structuring of Statkraftverkene – 
both in terms of separating different types of activities and in terms of 
abolishing its “unique” roles in the electricity system. 
Finally, “the national resource control” element tied the market reform into 
the fundamental constraints of principles inherited from Gunnar Knudsen 
and the early concession law process. National (and political) control with 
the large hydro-power resources represents a basic and nearly unchallenged 
principle for the political regulation and structuring of the electricity industry 
in Norway – organized through a complex system of legislation. Given the 
relative weakness of Norwegian private interests, a continued national 
resource control was obviously linked to a continued strong institutional 
lock-in of public property rights. 
 
 
11.3.1 Conflicts and links with historical programs 
In the following I will “speculate” in short over possible relationships 
between the market reform collective and its various historical rivals within 
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the sector in order to trace major frontlines of rivalry as well as foundations 
for possible links between them – for a capacity to “hook up” with each 
other.  
It was first around 1985-86 that the reform program became explicitly 
formulated within main-stream economics as a general market equilibrium 
concept similar to the credit market reform. Even after this, and perhaps in 
particular due to the specific scientific orientation of Einar Hope, the 
program maintained a strong empirical orientation which tended to separate 
it from close affiliation with deregulation processes in other countries. This – 
I think -  strengthened the ability to construct a realistic reform program 
within the Norwegian context as well as to associate with and to gain support 
from historical collectives with substantial locked-in power positions. The 
single most important contribution to this mediation of the program 
however, appears to have been the constraint not to touch property rights 
imposed by the AP government – without which opposition against the 
market approach from both the local cooperatives and the state-hierarchical 
actor networks would probably have been devastating. 
   
11.3.1.1 The market reform program versus Hveding’s system design 
   program 
To the Hveding system design collective, the program presented by the SAF 
represented an answer to its claim towards the economists in the 1970s that 
there was no operational alternative by which their SRMC pricing principle 
could be applied and aligned with the LRMC investment principle. By 
providing a possible solution, the LRMC pricing principle represented by 
Hveding was forced into a retreat. What obviously remained however, was a 
serious concern with the ability of a market based system to deliver 
investments on time – due to the long planning and investment periods 
involved and the large stochastic variation in precipitation which would 
cause market prices to vary substantially from year to year. There was also a 
concern with the ability of the market to deliver the appropriate investments 
from the point of view of the different contributions of individual 
investments to the overall efficiency of the system. Thus, without having 
institutional positions within the state administration nor in principle 
economic arguments to oppose the market alternative, Hveding and his 
associates probably remained essentially skeptical and likely to support 
elements within the system which maintained a capacity for integrated and 
planned system design and which might restrict the role for the competitive 
market in providing new generating capacity.  
The natural monopoly part of the market program however, corresponded 
more closely to Hveding’s system design approach. Also the business 
orientation provided a possible link between the two programs. 
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11.3.1.2 The market reform program versus the hierarchical 
  restructuring program 
These two alternatives emerged as the two major rivals during the political-
administrative decision process to come. In conceptual terms the competitive 
market and the organizational integration approaches represented opposite 
principles along the classical market versus hierarchy dichotomy, associated 
with the traditional right-left ideological delineation. Beyond the ideologies 
however, there were also possible links. In particular the natural monopoly 
concept, the strong emphasize on the role of a professional, centralized state 
regulator and the (reluctant) admittance on behalf of the market program that 
efficiency gains may follow from horizontal integration between relatively 
small electricity companies, provided a role for and a “world model” with 
roles and distribution of governance and control rights with striking 
similarities to that of the organizational restructuring program. In fact, the 
additional legitimacy from additional economic arguments could be seen to 
have strengthened the authority of a centralized governor/regulator, and new 
concepts presented by the market program provided challenging new 
opportunities for a state regulator to influence the future shaping of the 
sector.   
The role of Statkraft however, represented the obvious target of controversy 
between the two programs. In the state-hierarchical restructuring program, 
the company represented the national level of planning and coordination in 
the “Norgesdrift” system as well as the link to foreign electricity markets. In 
the market program, the national company had became separated along 
functional lines and its roles in national as well as international electricity 
markets had become reduced to those of other electricity companies. One 
might say that the organization of Statkraft was one of the prime targets of 
the market reform program, where as the NVE received the legitimacy of the 
“ideal representation of collective social interests” associated with the state 
regulator in economic theory . In this respect, one should expect a different 
attitude towards the market program from NVE officials than from Statkraft 
representatives.  
 
11.3.1.3 The market reform program and the local cooperatives 
The local cooperatives were basically opposed to the state-hierarchical 
program – in particular the state-county model represented by Vinjar, but 
appears to have been completely unable to mobilize any substantial support 
for an alternative based on sound (scientific) cooperative economic 
principles. Hence, the powers of the cooperative program resulted basically 
from locked-in institutional and organizational structures and from a strong 
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political and managerial desire to maintain autonomy from state or county 
directives and interventions.  
The cooperatively organized electricity companies and their municipal 
principals to a large extent rejected the profit oriented firm as represented by 
the market reform program, and maintained that their electricity companies 
in essence were similar to requisite societies in that their purpose was to 
maximize utility to their consumers through low prices rather than to gain 
profits to the owners. This cooperative position had however come under 
pressure from the market re-orientation during the 1980s and obviously 
suffered from inadequate theoretical defense. A new generation of managers 
were already engaged in “modernizing” their cooperative electricity 
companies, primarily by applying concepts developed within business 
economics. 
Local cooperatives accordingly should be expected to represent a mixed 
response. Basically they would reject the concept of business orientation as 
well as market competition within their supply areas, but would be likely to 
support the market program rather than the state-hierarchical in order to 
defend local autonomy. The promise not to touch property rights and 
organizational forms was probably a necessary concession for the market 
reform collective to establish links to any substantial share of the local 
cooperatives. On the other hand could some of the “modernized” electricity 
companies and the new generation of managers be expected to support the 
market program more actively as their “world models” in essence were quite 
congruent with the market program. 
The cooperative organization Samkjøringen, could be expected to support 
the market reform due to the substantially increased role for the various 
markets organized and operated by the organization. Samkjøringen had been 
working with Einar Hope for a number of years and the organization was 
clearly though of as the market institution also in the future system. 
 
11.3.1.4 The market reform program and the large scale power  
  intensive industry collective 
The large scale power intensive industry program had come under severe 
attack in the 1970s. Through the 1980s, representatives of the industry to an 
increasing extent argued for an increased role of the market within the 
electricity industry in response to the political difficulties in parliament. By 
taking the step into saying that the industry preferred to negotiate contracts 
in the market rather than with the politicians, many also recognized that the 
industry with its competence and resources would have a number of 
advantages within an open competitive system. In particular Norsk Hydro – 
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the second largest power generator - appears to have seen these opportunities 
rather early (Reiten, 1988).  
Of particular interest to these companies – in case of a market contracting 
system – was to deconstruct the Statkraft monopoly on foreign electricity 
trade. During the 1980s, the industry had expanded internationally by 
purchasing factories for semi-finished and consumer products in various 
countries, and now they saw opportunities for trading electricity across 
national borders to supply these subsidiaries. From being closely associated 
with the state-hierarchical program, it appears that the industry to a large 
extent was prepared to support the new market program. 
  
 
11.4 Powers, congruencies and strategic positions in 
         market-making projects 
Through a large number of research projects and mediations, the market 
reform program had been turned into an entrepreneurial collective with 
substantial authority which both derived from positions within the state 
political-administrative system and from economics as a scientific discipline. 
With the 1989 report from the SAF and the alignment of the Norwegian 
economics community behind the reform program, further important steps 
towards a decisive breakthrough had been achieved. 
The program had also been specifically shaped so as to become acceptable to 
dominant actor networks within the sector as well as within the political 
community. Despite obvious frontlines of conflict there was a number of 
possible links between the new market program and its most important rivals 
within or associated with the sector. In figure 11.3, I have illustrated the 
main frontlines of rivalry as will as indicated possible links between the 
major programs involved. 
 
Figure 11.3. Major frontlines and possible links between the rival programs  
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Bold lines and bold arrows indicate frontlines of rivalry. Other arrows 
indicate important links between different programs.  
The figure illustrates what we may call the different strategic position of the 
two major rival programs; the market reform and the hierarchical 
restructuring reform. Where as the hierarchical restructuring program faced 
two different frontlines; one towards the cooperative program and one 
towards the market reform program, by tuning down the issue of property 
rights and organizational form, the market reform program faced only one 
major rival; the hierarchical restructuring.  
In the next chapter, I will investigate into the rivalry between these two 
entrepreneurial collectives during the political-administrative process 
towards a decisive breakthrough. 
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12 Hierarchical restructuring or market reform? 
The decisive breakthrough  
 
On April 28th 1989, four weeks after Hope had completed his report, the 
Brundtland government presented its proposition for a new energy law126. It 
did not contain any market reform, but a hierarchical restructuring reform 
relatively consistent with the report from the Energy Law Commission in 
1985 and with what had been presented to parliament by the coalition 
government in the 1984/85 energy report127. What had happened? Had the 
market reform collective failed? Was it too late?  
Supporters of the hierarchical restructuring reform within the AP had 
apparently managed to fight off their market oriented rivals and to force 
through a decision within the government to go for the hierarchical reform. 
They were also in a hurry to get the law approved by parliament before the 
1989 parliamentary election in September. On the other hand, the new bill 
was presented four years after the commission had finished its report and 
three years after the Brundtland government had regained government 
control. To the hierarchical restructuring collective, this was quite a period 
of time to wait for further progress.  
The Minister of Petroleum and Energy, Arne Øien, on behalf of the 
government, had actually been quite supportive to the market reform 
alternative, where as in particular AP representatives in parliament were 
against the idea and remained loyal to the hierarchical program which had 
been initiated by another AP government in 1960. This program had since 
then been the major contribution from the party to efforts to increase 
economic efficiency within the electricity sector. (Thue, 1996:91).  
At the time, the AP leadership and the government were deeply engaged in 
preparations for a Norwegian membership in the EU, where the EU 
Commission as part of its efforts to establish the internal market in 1991 also 
mobilized to break into the highly protected energy sector in order to include 
it into the new open market system. Even though this may have provided 
additional arguments for those in favor of the electricity market alternative in 
Norway, the government’s presentation of the hierarchical restructuring 
alternative in a situation where a market based alternative was indeed 
                                           
126 Odelstingsproposisjon 73 (1988-89) 
127 The report did not receive much criticism in parliament at the time. Innst. Stortinget, 218 
(1985-86) 
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available, illustrates - I think - that the EU issue did not substantially 
influence the Norwegian electricity legislative reform process at the time.   
 
 
12.1 Mobilizing the hierarchical reform alternative 
The AP leadership had shown no particular interest in pushing the 
hierarchical restructuring reform right in the middle of its strive to hammer 
out its “renewal of the state” program – and its modernization of the party. 
Facing this re-oriented party leadership in government position and being 
gradually aware of the emerging challenge from the new market reform 
initiative, the hierarchical restructuring collective had to turn to the doors 
which were open to it to mobilize for a rapid political breakthrough. The 
approach became to pull the case out of the ministry and over to the 
parliament. The initiative thereby shifted to the AP representatives in the 
Energy- and industry committee, where Kjell Opseth played a leading role in 
addition to Anne-Lise Gjørv and Arve Berg. The AP-members in the group – 
jointly with the SV representative – supported the hierarchical restructuring 
reform initiative strongly and asked Arne Øien to present the bill for 
parliamentary treatment128.  The political initiative forced the two 
alternatives into a situation of intense rivalry along different frontlines 
within the political, the state administrative and the electricity sector arena. 
 
12.1.1 The hierarchical restructuring collective 
Which were the strongholds of the hierarchical restructuring collective at 
this point in time? Apart from NVE and the Waterway and energy supply 
department within OED, Statkraftverkene mobilized on the hierarchical side, 
and with it, its trade unions which had close relationships to AP 
traditionalists within the Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) – and to the 
traditional post war power base within AP associated with the state - large 
scale industry program.  
When Gunnar Vatten took over as the managing director of Statkraftverkene 
in 1986, the company came to play a leading role within the collective. 
Within the modified EdF-like organizational model, Statkraftverkene was in 
the key position as the national vertically integrated company on top of the 
20 regional ones from where planning, investments and electricity trade 
could be orchestrated and enforced. As such, it represented the very “heart 
and brain” of the Vinjar/Vatten model. Also the trade unions within 
                                           
128 Interview with Arne Øien by Bath Jacobsen, 1998:167 
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Statkraftverkene had been mobilized in opposition to the attempt by the 
coalition government at turning it into a joint stock company at a distance 
from political interventions from parliament - and from lobbyists. Now, they 
pushed further to strengthen the role of the state company in the future 
electricity supply system within the frameworks of a public sector 
governance system.  
The support for the vertical integration approach had apparently also been 
further strengthened within Statkraftverkene after an initiative from the 
Høyre parliament group in a letter to OED on May 9th 1988129, where the 
party asked to receive an orientation about possible consequences from a 
further market oriented restructuring of the state power company, included a 
transformation to a joint stock company, a partial privatization and a 
regional separation of the company. This was the threat to the ambitious 
semi-autonomous state electricity company. A committee pointed out by 
OED (Erling Diesen) and Statkraftverkene (Gunnar Vatten) was established 
on September 30th 1988 to work out an answer under the leadership of 
former AP Minister of industry; Finn Lied. Also Vidkunn Hveding, who as 
we know was a member of Høyre, was included in order both to increase the 
political legitimacy of the committee and to mobilize Hveding’s authority on 
electricity economics and electricity system design to work out an offensive 
strategy to meet this challenge.   
The arguments presented by the committee leaned closely on to the ongoing 
work within the Hermansen committee, and suggested a model for 
Statkraftverkene similar to that of Statoil; a 100% state owned joint stock 
company in combination with a paragraph which secured political control in 
cases found to be sufficiently significant for political and social interests130. 
The committee also suggested to reorganize the company into a corporate 
structure where different types of activities could be separated into 
subsidiaries. The answer presented by OED was accordingly, on the one 
hand to “modernize” the formal ownership structure into a “business 
oriented joint stock company model” and thereby also increase its 
commercial autonomy, and on the other hand to reject any split-up of the 
company or any other initiatives which would reduce the governance control 
of its top management and the key roles of the company in the future 
electricity sector system. A market oriented “corporate hierarchy” became 
                                           
129 Barth Jacobsen ref: OED files: Doc. no. 9854P/003.1., 1998:163 
130 Barth Jacobsen, 1998:164 
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the defense model against the neo-liberal push for privatization and down-
building of market power.  
The hierarchical restructuring collective behind Kjell Opseth and the other 
AP representatives’ initiative in parliament, could be outlined as follows: 
 
Figure 12.1  The entrepreneurial hierarchical restructuring reform 
   collective  
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OED-minister Arne Øien was the one to receive the pressures mobilized. As 
an effect of the political and institutional powers mobilized in parliament 
which provided a majority support in the AP parliament group to support a 
new legislation based on the report from the Energy Law Commission, he 
and the government were forced to represent the hierarchical program, to 
work out an appropriate legislation and to present it to the parliament.  
The report from the Energy Law Commission in 1985 had been handed over 
to the OED where Per Haakon Høisveen131 who had worked with Diesen in 
the commission, in late 1988 presented a proposal based on the report from 
the commission. But Øien – being influenced by the Hermansen network - 
rejected it132. The case was then transferred to Tveitereid in his new Energy 
department, and Tveitereid and Høisveen were asked to work out another 
proposal together. The Hermansen-network had thereby managed to take at 
least partial control within the administration. This is about the time when 
Einar Hope in Bergen was asked to come up with practical solutions to 
implement his market reform alternative. If the hierarchical program went to 
parliament, the market alternative obviously ought to be available for the 
political debate.  
But Opseth and the AP-group in parliament rejected the market oriented 
suggestions worked out by Tveitereid and Høisveen and pushed Øien hard to 
come back with the hierarchical alternative in time to treat the bill in the 
spring-session. In that case, the proposition needed to be finished before 
Easter. Time was short and the process became speeded up. The political 
game had became twisted around the issue of timing. 
Politically, AP and SV were in minority, but the government had a basic 
agreement in parliament also with SP, which secured a necessary majority if 
and when needed. But in this case, SP and its member in the energy and 
industry committee Ole Gabriel Ueland, was highly ambiguous to the 
centralization approach. Support from KrF was also quite uncertain. Høyre 
and FrP had clearly turned against the hierarchical reform and argued for 
market oriented approaches. Also within the AP, there was an obvious split 
between the “modernists” and the “traditionalists”, but the latter had 
apparently been able to settle the issue internally. The solution open to Arne 
Øien, was to ask Tveitereid and Høisveen to come up with a compromise – a 
                                           
131 Høisveen was also a member of the governance committee for the market reform project at 
SAF 
132 Barth Jacobsen, 1998:167. Interview with Arne Øien 
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proposal which included elements from both alternatives, but which 
fundamentally met the demands from Opseth and the AP-group in 
parliament.133 
The new bill134 was presented on April 28th – one month in delay. One can 
only speculate whether the delay was just accidental. Tveitereid rejects that 
the ministry caused the delay, but admits that they had long and difficult 
discussion – with Vinjar, Diesen and Storstein Pedersen in NVE and with the 
FD – on how to proceed.135 Whatever the reason, the effect was that the 
report from SAF had been presented to the FD/OED before the proposition 
from the government was presented to parliament. There was accordingly a 
basis on which the opposition could ask the government to present 
alternative solutions. The choice open to the market reform collective was 
obviously one between trying to strike a real compromise within the 
hierarchical restructuring collective, or to maintain the proposition mainly in 
line with the hierarchical alternative in order for the opposition in parliament 
to oppose to it and to ask for alternative solutions and thereby turn the 
conflict over to the parliament. Despite Øien’s demand for a compromise 
solution, it seems to me that what happened was in accordance to the second 
alternative; to present something rather closely in line with the hierarchical 
approach at a point in time where it was neither too late to become 
obstructive nor too soon for the market reform alternative to be available as 
an operational alternative. A reason for this might have been that the 
hierarchical restructuring program had already been substantially modified 
by the cooperative collective during the negotiations within the Energy Law 
Commission and that a compromise with yet another program would have 
reduced the hierarchical restructuring approach to nearly nothing. 
Whatever strategies involved, this was obviously a critical point in the 
rivalry between the two programs, where the outcome still appeared to be 
completely open. If anything, the hierarchical collective held the upper hand 
at this point of time. The AP and the LO had reached agreement internally to 
go for the hierarchical reform. The AP modernists appeared to have no 
chance to change the power relations in the short run and the government 
appeared to be fairly powerless - unable to direct the party organization at 
this point. 
                                           
133 Barth Jacobsen, 1998:167. Interview with Arne Øien 
134 Odelstingsproposisjon nr. 73 (1988-89) 
135 Barth Jacobsen, 1998:170 
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However, in parliament, the Høyre representatives argued strongly against a 
political treatment of the proposition in the spring-session, and received 
support from a majority represented by all parties except AP and SV. Time 
was said to be too short to treat the complicated issues involved136. 
Formulations presented about vertical integration based on counties and the 
suggested paragraphs which would provide new state powers to force local 
companies to merge, were obviously highly controversial – not at least to SP 
representatives who were closely involved with the cooperative program. 
Given the delay, it became politically impossible to force a treatment of the 
new law before the summer. The government had to withdraw it and to 
return it to parliament in the beginning of the autumn-session in October – 
right after the election.  
The market oriented part of the political opposition was obviously well 
informed about the market reform alternative. It was freely available in the 
form of Hope’s report, which outlined an alternative system and presented 
the arguments from the economists for a market system as well as their 
arguments against the vertical integration alternative from the point of view 
of a market system. The game thereby became dependent on the parliament 
election.  
 
 
12.2 Mobilizing the market reform alternative within the 
electricity sector 
The hierarchical proposition from the OED fuelled opposition from the local 
cooperative collectives across the country directed against the proposed new 
powers of the state to directly interfere into local affairs. Just like in the case 
of the first national plan presented in 1922, local interests defended their 
institutional positions furiously. 
The mobilization by the local cooperatives turned the market reform 
alternative into focus within the sector. A substantial demand for information 
about the market alternative rose. In particular the large “Energy summit” in 
Trondhjem in September – a traditional yearly meeting where the “entire 
sector” participate, turned out to demonstrate a substantial support for the 
market reform alternative.  
“There was a substantial interest in my arguments and positive 
response from many of the speakers at the meeting. The atmosphere 
was absolutely positive. This was because my arguments could be 
                                           
136 Innst. O.nr.93 (1988-89):1 
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used against integration. Vinjar spoke after me and started by saying 
that now he ought to have had a bullet-proof shield in front of 
him.”137  
In particular the younger generation expressed their support138 – many of 
them representing distribution companies who wanted to avoid being locked-
in by a single regional electricity generator in order to purchase at the lowest 
possible price. The younger generation was also substantially influenced by 
the radical market reorientation during the 1980s and some had already been 
engaged in “modernizing” their electricity companies by applying concepts 
adopted from business organization and strategy literature and from business 
advisory consultants. 
Among the senior supporters was the leader of the NEVF139 and chairman of 
Oslo Lysverker, Arne Finstad, who had initiated a business oriented 
reorganization process within his own company from 1987. Also Jon Tveit 
from Bærum Energiverk was an early spokesman. The wave of new public 
management had truly reached some of the public electricity companies. 
These quickly adopted the ideas presented by Hope and became market 
reform “allies” within the sector.  
Through out the autumn, Hope and his colleagues traveled across the 
country and presented the market reform alternative to numerous electricity 
companies and their political board members. Even though the ideas 
presented where new, the new system was to a large extent based on the 
existing power exchange market. There was also not much which appeared 
to really challenge the established power relations within the sector. Property 
rights should not be touched upon and nothing indicated that Samkjøringen 
should not continue to operate the power pool system. The extension of the 
common carrier principle from the high voltage national grid system to all 
the regional electricity networks appeared also not to be a major problem. 
The principle was well known, and the sector was rather proud of its 
historically unique internal market system. One could also argue that the 
usual stochastic variation in precipitation within the hydro-power system 
played their own important role, as both 1988 and 1989 were wet and mild 
years with substantial net export at low prices to Denmark and Sweden. 
                                           
137 Interview with Einar Hope, 20.11.98. 
138 Interview with Einar Hope, 20.11.98. 
139 Norske elektrisitetsverkers forening 
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Table 12.1. Production surpluses in GWh, 1985 – 1990. 
 Expected 
operational 
production 
capacity 
pr. 01.01 
 
 
Production 
 
 
Gross 
consumption 
 
 
Net export 
1985     99 696   103 292   102 748        544 
1986   101 894     97 284     99 316   - 2 032 
1987   102 716   104 283   103 946        337 
1988   105 108   110 019   104 391     5 628 
1989   105 578   119 197   104 345   14 852 
1990   107 816   121 848   105 941   15 907 
Source: Central Statistical Bureau (SSB), Historical Statistics, 1992 
 
The immediate outlook for economic gains to distributors and consumers 
from a market deregulation would certainly have been different in 1986 than 
in 1989. From the point of view of generators in net surplus capacity 
situations, the outlook was of course the opposite. As a result, the profit 
argument suggested support from those in net purchasing position to the 
market alternative. 
 Through the information and enrollment activity, much of the cooperative 
sector came to be associated with the market reform – in agreement or for 
tactical reasons – during the autumn of 1989, and started sending “signals” 
through their political networks. And “competition” and “natural monopoly” 
gradually came to dominate the vocabulary through out sector discussions. 
The presentation of a market alternative led to internal work within NEVF to 
work out their position on the subject, which resulted in a report which 
supported a market based system in a more moderate form. The market 
should not be open to small and medium sized consumers. In effect, they 
argued for an extension of the established internal market system for 
generators to include distributors and large consumers. The report also 
argued for a period of transition before competition was to become 
efficient140. These activities indicate that support for the market reform was 
not unconditional, but that major sector-managerial interests saw it as a 
powerful contribution to the undermining of the hierarchical restructuring 
                                           
140  Thue, 1996:105 
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reform in parliament, and expected that the market reform could be modified 
and adjusted through the political process.  
The confrontation within the sector between the two alternatives, the 
guarantee not to touch local property rights by the market reform alternative, 
the presence of a growing number of market- and new public management 
oriented managers within the sector and the substantial work carried out to 
present the market reform alternative and to enroll and mobilize support for 
it, shifted the situation towards the market reform side. At this point of time, 
the situation appeared still to be open. Unexpected events, new initiatives or 
new arguments could have turned the situation either way. In Hope’s words:  
“It was a fragile process which could have gone wrong for a number 
of reasons.”  (Hope, 20.11.98) 
Another organization which played an important role as a supporter of a 
market based system, was Energidata in Trondhjem and its two managers 
Oddbjørn Fredriksen and Bjørnar Otterstad. These had long experience with 
the electricity sector as providers of statistical analysis and independent 
judgements to the OED and to Samkjøringen. In September 1988, they 
presented a report to the OED which argued that there would be a substantial 
over-capacity within the electricity system well into the 1990s and argued 
that the separation between the occasional and the firm power markets 
should be dissolved. There should be a market also for firm power.141 These 
arguments undermined the credibility of the forecasts presented by NVE and 
Statkraft which argued for the construction of new large gas-turbines in 
order to meet immediate market demands, and thereby also further 
undermined beliefs within the OED in the ability of the central planners to 
govern and control investments. Energidata also presented their ideas around 
the sector. 
 
12.3 The legislative breakthrough for the market reform 
The 1989 parliamentary election led to a shift in government to another 
Conservative/Christian Democratic/Center (H-KrF-SP) coalition with Jan P. 
Syse (H) as the prime minister. The new government took over on October 
16th 1989 and remained in power only until November 4th 1990. Already on 
October 20th the new government withdrew the AP Energy Law Proposition. 
The new Minister of Petroleum and Energy, the economist Eivind Reiten, 
                                           
141 Interview with O. Fredriksen by Barth Jacobsen, 1998:163 
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came to play an important role in the further political process. He 
represented SP – the political bridgehead of the cooperative program with 
strong links to a number of local cooperative actor-networks.  
Eivind Reiten also enters our story from a couple of other positions. From 
being the chairman of the SP youth party organization in the late 1970s and 
the secretary for the SP group in parliament from 1981 to 1983, he entered 
the FD as a vise-minister from 1983 to 1985 during the credit market reform 
period. Then, he became appointed Minister of Fisheries, a position he held 
until AP took over in 1986. He then went to Norsk Hydro, where he in 1988 
became director for the hydro-power division of the county’s second largest 
electricity generator, as well as perhaps the most competent opponent to 
Statkraftverkene within Samkjøringen. Being an educated economist as well 
as a participant in several public debates over the electricity and the power 
intensive industries, he was also closely associated with the economics 
community. Below, I have outlined some of the major actor-networks 
associated with Eivind Reiten. 
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Figure 12.2.  Major relations in “the Eivind Reiten actor-network” 
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Through the role of Eivind Reiten – in person – major elements in the 
cooperative program and in the large scale power intensive industry came to 
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of view of the market reform collective, to secure the alliance with the power 
intensive industry on the one hand and to consolidate a political alliance with 
the cooperative collective on the other. 
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position. We have already seen that Eivind Reiten in 1987-88 argued that the 
energy intensive industry in the future would rather prefer to negotiate 
electricity prices in the market than in the parliament. Norsk Hydro 
obviously supported the market alternative, and Reiten from his experiences 
from FD and the government in the first half of the 1980s, had been an 
important contributor to this strategic shift. It seems to me that there must 
have been a clear consensus at least among the most dominant members of 
the government, that the government would support nothing but the market 
alternative, and that Reiten knew very well what he had to do. 
Reiten’s association with Norsk Hydro pointed at a couple of other positions. 
If prices were to be set in the market as a consequence of the inability to 
secure low prices politically in the future, the industry also wanted direct 
access to the international electricity market. This position clearly turned 
industry interests against the monopoly of Statkraftverkene in foreign 
electricity trade. The other link from Norsk Hydro was the one to 
Samkjøringen. The 51% state owned industrial company had since the late 
1920’s, when the initial Samkjøringen organization became established, 
represented a major opponent towards NVE and a dominant direct role of the 
state directorate in the electricity sector. The company was probably the 
most influential actor within Samkjøringen, with substantial international 
business experience, a market oriented management and business 
organization and a highly qualified staff of economists and engineers.  
Also through his SP-network, Reiten had strong links to Samkjøringen 
which represented the core institution in a national cooperative governance 
system within the sector based on federative “bottom-up” principles, and to 
the local cooperative networks into which the party was closely affiliated 
through their municipal strongholds.  
What can be derived from his network position is firstly, that Reiten as a 
representative of Norsk Hydro strongly supported the market alternative and 
the abolishment of the foreign trade monopoly. Secondly, that he supported 
the idea that Samkjøringen rather than some state institution should operate 
the national grid system and the power pool, and thirdly, that by appointing 
him as the minister of petroleum and energy, one obvious purpose must have 
been to secure the link between the ambiguous SP and the market reform 
alternative in order to ensure a majority vote for the reform in parliament. 
Just 5 months after it gained power - on March 30th 1990, the coalition 
government approved and presented a new legislative proposition to 
parliament based on the market reform alternative. The parliamentary 
election and the shift of government had turned the situation upside down. 
Now, the hierarchical restructuring alternative appeared to be the lost case. 
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12.3.1 The administrative process 
When Eivind Reiten arrived in the OED, much of the job had already been 
done.  
“Quite a lot was done by Tveitereid when I came to OED in 1989 – 
and we withdraw Øien’s proposition. There had been a nice 
cooperation between FD with Hermansen and Sundberg. The 
administration was closely coordinated in both ministries. That Øien 
as a minister of energy had got Tveitereid over to OED, was a very 
decisive move.”142   
This remark from Reiten clearly confirms the importance of the Hermansen 
market reform network as well as the strategic importance of the moving of 
Tveitereid to OED for the ability to switch to the market reform program. 
What happened next, was that Reiten decided to close down the Waterfall- 
and energy-supply department in the OED, which he saw as a bottleneck in 
the process143. With this move, all offices which related directly to the 
electricity sector became organized under Tveitereid’s energy department, 
which moved rapidly to organize and coordinate groups of experts from 
within the ministry, SAF and NVE, to work out practical and legislative 
solutions for the new market governance system. New ideas such as the area 
concession system for transmission and distribution activities and the point 
tariff system suggested by a couple of Statkraft economists, were included.  
There was opposition from the hierarchical actor-network of course, for 
instance represented by Vinjar144, who opposed strongly to the new market 
system and in particular to the idea that Samkjøringen should be responsible 
for the operation of the national grid system. Also Statkraftverkene opposed 
strongly – in particular to the need for a separation of the company and to 
the suggestion to end the state monopoly foreign trade regime. These points 
of view however, appear to have had no significant impact on the outcome, 
                                           
142 Interview with Eivind Reiten by Barth Jacobsen, Barth Jacobsen, 1998:188. My 
translation. 
143 Thue, 1996:107 
144 Barth Jacobsen: 1998:188 (NVE notat 28.02.90 by Vinjar) 
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and the new legislation was entirely consistent with the ideas presented in 
the 1989 SAF report.  
The law presented the basic principals for the new market system. The actual 
restructuring of the state institutions involved in the electricity system, was 
to be treated later. As we have seen, a separate process directly related to a 
possible restructuring of Statkraftverkene had been initiated by Høyre in 
1988. The administrative process which aimed at providing an answer to the 
parliament on this issue, had been in control of Gunnar Vatten and the 
hierarchical restructuring collective – supported by Hveding. Given these 
circumstances, little more than the basic principles were laid down in the 
law. A separate proposition was to be presented later about the re-
organization of Statkraftverkene. With Reiten, Tveitereid and Hermansen in 
administrative control however, the SAF economists gained the initiative in 
a very intense struggle yet to come over the future of the state company. 
 
12.3.2 The political decision process 
The next challenge was to get the reform through parliament. This involved 
negotiations with the coalition parties in parliament as well as with FrP on 
which the minority government was dependent for support. Gunnar Berge 
had taken over as the leader of the AP parliament group and Kjell Opseth 
had been moved from the energy and industry committee.  
With the party leadership back in parliament, its ability to direct party 
representatives obviously improved. With Gro Harlem Brundtland and 
Gunnar Berge in parliament, AP would probably not have obstructed the 
new energy law. As it turned out, it was not necessary to demonstrate this 
shift, as Reiten and the government managed to convince the somewhat 
reluctant SP representatives in parliament to support the market reform. 
Even though opposition to the competitive market ideology was fairly strong 
within the SP on behalf of the cooperative program, and despite the fact that 
Reiten had to push the “not to touch property rights guarantee” argument to 
truly convince his party colleagues, it appears to have been no real doubts 
regarding where the party had to go. A turning of the SP against its own 
dedicated minister on this issue, would have been quite a surprise. When 
forced to choose between the market which would maintain local autonomy 
and a state oriented hierarchical restructuring alternative, the party had to go 
for the market. But there for sure had to be some play for the gallery.  
Interesting to note here, is that  the alliance between the cooperative SP and 
the market oriented right wing parties on the market reform, was not an 
unsacred tactical alliance, but also followed from the interests of Norsk 
Hydro and Samkjøringen mediated through Eivind Reiten in person – largely 
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in opposition to a trading system dominated by Statkraft. This was an 
important underlying conflict which in part mobilized the SP to engage in 
securing the market reform – in addition to it strive to maintain local 
autonomy and federative organizational structures within the industry.  
It is also quite interesting to note the very striking difference between the 
reform approach of the 1922 national plan and the 1989 market reform. 
Contrary to in 1922, the process – for various largely pragmatic or accidental 
reasons – had been separated into different sub-processes. In this way, 
several controversial points were postponed - like for instance the conflict 
between Statkraft and Samkjøringen over who was to have the future 
responsibility for the power pool system and the physical balancing of the 
electricity network, as well as the traditional controversy over the electricity 
contracts to energy intensive industries. Nor were tax issues addressed. In 
this respect, the political process was completely opposite to the 1922 
hierarchical reform process which collapsed because it pushed a very broad 
specter of changes through its complete, simultaneous reform approach. The 
radical market reform got implemented through a sequential process which 
permitted for broad alliances over time, where the different elements of the 
reform program could be mobilized to create allies needed to win the various 
“local battles”. No doubt, also the complex integration of different rival 
programs into the market reform program, provided a useful basis for the 
transformation of quite different opponents.  
The energy and industry committee in parliament was still divided on several 
issues. There was a majority of 8 which contained the government parties 
SP, KrF and Høyre and the right wing FrP, and a minority of 7 from AP(6) 
and SV(1). But also the minority supported much of the suggested reforms. 
The divide was primarily over the export regime, where the majority 
suggested that the Statkraft monopoly should be replaced by a “Committee 
for power negotiations” in line with a similar committee within the gas 
export regime, where as the minority supported a continued Statkraft 
monopoly. As a second best option, they could accept a compromise 
suggested by KrF where Statkraft as the operational entity coordinated 
export negotiations on behalf of other generators within the frameworks of a 
joint export committee. 
The support for vertical integration by the minority had been reduced to little 
more than oral statements and play for the gallery. The hierarchical program 
had lost the battle over the new energy legislation. What remained was 
simple formalities.  
In November 1990, just before the final voting over the new energy law, the 
government coalition broke down and a new Brundtland government 
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returned to power based on political support in parliament from SP and SV. 
The new government neither would nor could stop the process and the law 
obtained a conclusive majority support. Through the short inter-mediation 
with the coalition government, the AP leadership had probably got the 
reform which it had wanted but not been able to convince its own party 
about, as well as a large scale radical reform by which to demonstrate the 
policy of the modern social democratic party; “more markets – more 
governance”.145 
 
 
12.4 How can the breakthrough for the radical reform 
program be explained? 
With the new energy law implemented from January 1st 1991, the market 
reform reached a decisive breakthrough into its becoming a stabilized real 
world phenomenon – nearly nine years after Einar Hope presented his 
electricity market research program in 1982. Norway had thereby established 
a market oriented legislation for its electricity sector which was to become 
an international forerunner along with the British reform, the only area of 
market deregulation in which Norway played a significant innovative role by 
any international comparison.  
Strikingly similar to the Morgan versus Edison case, the process appeared to 
have been relatively open between two major alternatives. In the end, what 
decided upon the breakthrough was an external event; the 1989 
parliamentary election which brought a coalition government to power. In 
this perspective, elements of chance – or at least influences from events over 
which the rival collectives had no overview and control – were certainly 
important. On the other hand, the outcome was obviously a result of the 
strategic networking activities of the market reform collective, the 
aggregation of scientific and state administrative powers gathered behind it, 
the strategic modifications of the program so as to become adjusted to the 
strong national resource control program historically locked into the sector 
as well as to the institutionally powerful local cooperatives. In the end this 
provided for the crucial alliance between the market reform collective and 
the cooperative collective against the hierarchical restructuring collective in 
the legislative process. Less decisive perhaps, the large scale industry 
dominated by Norsk Hydro supported the market alternative, where as the 
system design oriented engineers who favored a solution which left a 
                                           
145 For a more extended presentation and discussion of the arguments in parliament, see Thue, 
1996 and Barth Jacobsen, 1998. 
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significant role to hierarchical planning and control – in essence a strong role 
for NVE and Statkraft and a more restricted role for the market, faced a 
relative defeat. 
The outcome can also be seen as resulting from strategic actions taken at the 
frontline of rivalry between the two major actors, which focussed on gaining 
support from within the sector as well as from political actors capable of 
pushing the case. Control with the timing of the process turned out to be a 
significant variable which first forced the market collective to radically 
speed up the construction of a convincing representation of their alternative 
system, and then forced the hierarchical restructuring collective into a defeat 
through the postponing of the legislative process from the spring to the 
autumn by the opposition majority in parliament. But also the “sales work” 
done by Hope and his colleagues through out the sector was probably 
important in gaining sufficient momentum behind the political rejection of 
the hierarchical restructuring reform initiative.  
In the wider context of the broad market reorientation in the 1980s, the 
breakthrough linked on-going change processes within the sector to a 
conceptually consistent system for the entire industry in which the framing 
of these on-going projects fitted in. Also the over-capacity problems in the 
1980s which caused continuous large price differences between firm power 
contracts and prices in the occasional power market, prepared the ground for 
an increased role of the market, by demonstrating possible economic gains to 
distribution companies and consumers from an expanded role of the market.  
In the broad picture, the breakthrough became possible because of the 
unresolved rivalry between an institutionally locked-in cooperative program 
and a state oriented entrepreneurial hierarchical restructuring program, and 
because Hveding and his system design collective based on the electricity 
economics developed at EdF, failed to make a convincing breakthrough in 
the 1970s which would have permitted this collective to re-shape the 
industry in more significant ways. In part this failure had to do with its lack 
of unconditional support from the Norwegian economics community. 
However, both the introduction of electricity economics, the occasional 
power market and the cable to Denmark, all introduced by the Hveding 
collective, became crucial preconditions for the emergence of the market 
reform alternative in Norway. Without these structural circumstances, it is 
hard to see how a market system could have been advanced and put to 
practice.  
This situation with rival as well as unsuccessful attempts at reforms which 
all had the objective of improving economic efficiency and organizational 
rationality within the electricity sector in some way or another, left the field 
 266 
open to some other alternative with a more substantial scientific authority 
behind it and with a capacity to established alliances with powerful locked-in 
collectives.  
It became a reality because Einar Hope and his colleagues at NHH/SAF were 
able to fill this open field, by pushing the early research activities on the 
occasional power market further into a viable system alternative based on 
fundamental concepts within economics, and because Tormod Hermansen - 
in part by chance – was appointed to a state-administrative position from 
where he was able to push this alternative into an operational reform 
program which represented a political alternative, and to orchestrate the 
many networking activities involved. The market reform in this sense, 
became a legislative reality due to lots of work within different related actor-
networks which produced the many elements needed and linked them 
together in accordance with a simplified, powerful re-framing of the entire 
electricity sector. 
On this background, one may also conclude that it became possible to 
radically change an industry characterized by strong lock-ins in part because 
the authority of its historical collectives had been weakened by political 
changes and economic problems in the 1970s. In part it became possible 
because the “radical” market reform had been adjusted to important locked 
in structures so as not to appear that challenging or radical. In part it became 
possible due to the sequential character of the process in which a number of 
controversial issues were not addressed during the legislative process, but 
rather after the market reform collective had gained additional institutional 
powers. I also think that it became possible due to the relatively “irrational” 
character of the decision process in which there was no room for detailed 
evaluations of possible consequences for different types of actors, or for 
other aspects of the system, which might have stimulated substantial counter 
forces (anti-acts). One may even conclude that it became possible due to a 
strategic and rapid “coup” by well organized actors with substantial 
scientific and political authority which left opponents without a well 
organized defense.  
Finally we may also note the specific role of economic efficiency in this 
process. Economic efficiency played a major role in all the different 
entrepreneurial collectives which set out to reshape the electricity industry 
since 1960 – except the environmental. But it played two very distinct roles. 
One is associated with the purpose of the future and the other has to do with 
the real life testing of collectives/systems which have managed to become 
stabilized. In the rivalry situation over alternative reform programs, 
efficiency as a purpose of the future apparently plays a very crucial role, 
where as the demonstration of immediate economic success is largely 
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irrelevant. The ability to mobilize persuasive arguments and authority behind 
some specific approach to efficiency improvements, becomes the completely 
crucial issue, as both the capturing of commanding heights and political 
decision processes depends on the relative persuasiveness of different 
alternatives. This is in essence why economics as a scientific discipline plays 
such a tremendously powerful role in reshaping of industry processes. And 
that is why the absence of unconditional support from the relevant 
economics community may be so devastating to reform initiatives of this 
kind, where as other areas of science that are not in particular concerned 
with economic efficiency, are found to be more or less irrelevant to the 
game. The success of the market reform in creating such a breakthrough, and 
the striking effectiveness of its reshaping of the sector afterwards despite 
major up-front compromises, can accordingly be traced back to its roots in 
economics and the economics community itself. 
However, with the approval of the new energy law in parliament, there was 
still no real life competitive market with the industrial and organizational 
structures, characteristics and systems prescribed in the 1989 SAF report. 
The law was only another step forward to a stabilized marked system. In the 
next chapter, I will follow some of those projects and processes initiated by 
the market reform collective in the wake of the new legislation, which aimed 
at both a re-configuration of the industry and a re-formatting of its economic 
agencies – as suggested by Einar Hope. 
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13 Shaping and stabilizing a market system and its 
economic agencies 
 
With the new legislation, the market reform program had become 
institutionalized as the policy of the state and thereby obtained support by 
the institutional powers, the authority and the resources of the state 
apparatus. But there was still no real competitive market with “rationally 
calculating profit-maximizing actors” to be observed. To actually transform 
the sector, its economic agencies and its agents was the challenging task 
which confronted those who were involved in the reform project after the 
energy law had received a majority support in parliament. Just like the 
legislative process, I find that this transformation process in many ways was 
still uncertain and open, and that it crucially depended upon the collective of 
actors, institutions, organizations and trusted delegates which mobilized for 
the making of a market system through a large number of operational reform 
projects. It could have met severe political setbacks, obstructions or efforts 
to undermine its authority from rival programs. It could also have met 
ignorance, institutional constraints, economic crisis or even technical 
problems which would have prevented the market program from reaching a 
stabilized position. It was indeed still a large scale experiment governed by 
economic theory, economists and state administrators. But it also became 
supported and advanced by various other types of actors who entered the 
sector - as business consultants, investors, traders, brokers, educational 
institutions etc. 
Two severe instances of economic turmoil nearly caused political 
interventions to constrain the new market system by changing the legislation, 
by altering conditions in electricity contracts administratively, or even to 
abolish the market system altogether. Basically, these resulted from shifting 
weather conditions, and as such represented a “testing” of the capability of 
the new system to “manage” the large stochastic variation in production 
capacity in the hydro-power system. The situation year by year from 1990 
through 1996 is shown in table 13.1. below. 
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Table 13.1. Variation in production, consumption and net-export in GWh, 
1990-1996 
 
 
 
  Expected 
  operational 
  production 
  capacity, 
  pr. 01.01 
 
 
  Production 
 
 
    Gross  
  consumption 
 
 
  Net. export 
1990     107 816     121 848     105 941       15 907 
1991     108 083     111 009     108 236         2 775 
1992     108 083     117 503     108 777         8 729 
1993     109 457     120 096     112 196         7 899 
1994     109 635     113 213     113 082            132 
1995     111 850     123 017     116 349         6 662 
1996     112 348     104 712     113 688      - 8 976 
Source, Central Statistical Bureau (SSB), Electricity Statistics, 1996 
The first instance occurred in the autumn 1992 after a period of very low 
spot-market prices due to the established over-capacity combined with a wet 
and mild winter (which on the other hand was not as extreme as in 1990). 
The emerging competition when distributors and consumers could choose to 
buy spot rather than fixed contracts however, pushed contract prices as well 
as contract periods substantially down and forced or induced generators to 
re-negotiate existing long term contracts with distributors and large 
consumers. This triggered political initiatives from generators who nearly 
succeeded in gaining sufficient political support in parliament for a 
legislative intervention. In October 1992 the AP government suggested to 
constrain access to the market for small and medium sized consumers (less 
than 2MW capacity or 5 GWh yearly consumption) by forcing these to take 
contracts with at least 5 years duration146. This would have introduced a 
fairly long transition period like the one established in the UK. Even though 
there was in fact a majority in parliament for some level of intervention, 
none of the suggested proposals obtained a majority vote.  
Already in April 1992 the government had suggested to change the export 
regime due to expected over-capacity. The industry obtained a license to 
export 4 TWh on fixed contracts for 5 years, which was later increased to 5 
                                           
146 Ot.prop. 11, 1992-93 
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TWh for 6 years (1993-1998)147. This, of course, had a similar but less 
discriminate effect on prices.  
The second incident occurred in the both very dry and cold autumn and 
winter of 1996/97 when production shortage resulted in substantial import at 
high prices. As a result, consumer prices increased radically to meet the 
resulting energy capacity shortage and thereby provoked political initiatives 
on the consumer side to abolish the new market system. The incident led 
NVE to work out alternative administrative systems to increase security of 
supply and ration consumption, which however were not implemented.  
In both cases, the new market system survived and thereby further stabilized 
its position as a robust, flexible and manageable system also under relatively 
extreme opposite weather conditions.  
Also the rivalry with the hierarchical program continued – in particular in 
relation to the restructuring of Statkraft issue, where Hope had suggested to 
split the company both between generating and transmission activities and 
internally between different generating divisions. These ideas met strong 
opposition from the state company and its director Gunnar Vatten. Later on, 
traditional regional hierarchical interests also regained momentum and 
mobilized to integrate counties and larger regions through cooperative 
arrangements and through mergers and acquisitions, and thereby reduced the 
number of independent suppliers in the market. From the traditional 
cooperative electricity companies, the market reformers met less ambitious, 
but more defensive and protective attitudes associated with opposition 
against capital ownership and profit-maximizing as the major objective for 
the electricity company rather than for instance minimization of consumer 
prices.  
On the other hand, the now radically increased powers and credibility of the 
market reform program, obviously had the effect that actors on the outside of 
the market reform collective to a much larger degree wanted to get on the 
inside. This was in particular true for electricity company managers. Many 
started or intensified education of staff members in economic theory, 
finance, business organization and marketing. They recruited business 
educated and experienced employees and initiated organizational changes to 
adopt to the demands of the new competitive situation. Courses and seminars 
prospered. There was in many respects an open, interested, expectant and 
loyal - even eager - attitude among sector practitioners towards the new 
                                           
147 St.prop. 81, 1991-92 
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regime which meant that the sector transformation process also came to be 
driven from a variety of local initiatives hardly overlooked by anyone. 
Adding to this, a number of new, market oriented actors like trader- and 
broker-companies were invited into and entered the sector. Many of those 
were created by experienced employees within the electricity sector who left 
their jobs to explore new business opportunities. These came to serve as 
important representatives of the market reform program who triggered local 
breakthroughs for competitive behaviors, expanded trade in the organized 
exchange market and developed organizational models for efficient trade 
management which became adopted by many of the publicly owned 
companies after a while148. Other important roles were played by the 
business consulting industry, which became engaged by public electricity 
companies to give advice on how to organize more business oriented 
companies.  
No doubt however, the commanding height and major force in the continued 
making of the new market system was still represented by the state-
economist alliance, who initiated a number of reforms in order to implement 
and further develop the SAF program. In 1991 Tormod Hermansen left the 
FD to take on a new job as the CEO of the state owned telecom company 
Telenor. Einar Hope also devoted himself mainly to a different task, namely 
the new competition law to which he became a major scientific contributor. 
From 1995, he took over as the director of the Norwegian competition 
authority, from where he came to influence the restructuring of the 
electricity sector from a state administrative position. The responsibility for 
the further work on the electricity market reform had largely been delegated 
to Siggurd Tveitereid and his staff in the OED – and to SAF economists with 
specialized competencies. 
In the 1989 SAF report, the following five elements had been identified as 
essential to the restructuring of the industry in the new market system: 
1) The market institution “Kraftsentralen AS”, which implicitly 
addressed the organization of Samkjøringen. 
2) The national transmission company “Transkraft AS”, which addressed 
the division of Statkraft into two functionally separated companies. 
3) The reorganization of the distribution companies, which addressed the 
separation of electricity supply from network distribution and the 
                                           
 148 In particular companies like Norgeskraft AS, Scankraft AS and Norsk Kraftmeglig AS 
became important formative sources 
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“formatting” of public electricity companies to become “rational 
economic agencies”. 
4) The redefinition of the role of Statkraft in the power market, which 
addressed market power, regulatory services, international trade and 
the “formatting” of Statkraft as a “rational economic agency”. 
5) Regulation and governance, which addressed the need to establish 
appropriate economic regulatory institutions - and thereby the role of 
NVE, and the need for regulation and control systems based on 
economic principles. 
 
These issues represented the point of departure for a flow of reform projects 
which step by step re-structured and re-formatted the electricity sector, its 
organizations and its actors. One reform focused on the reorganization of 
NVE, a second on the reorganization of Statkraft, a third on the organization 
of the power exchange institution (Samkjøringen) and the foreign trade 
system, a fourth on accounting and tariff reforms, a fifth on natural 
monopoly regulations, etc. etc. Below I have listed some of the major 
projects and reform efforts carried out in between 1991 and 1997. 
1) Reorganization of NVE 
2) Division of Statkraft and establishing of a national grid company 
3) Re-structuring and re-formatting the power pool and the electricity 
trade systems 
4) Accounting reform and unbundling of market and monopoly activities 
5) Tariff system reform 
6) Trade concession reform  
7) Monopoly regulation and control system reforms  
8) Reorganizing international electricity trade 
9) Structural reform of electricity network system 
10) Regulating organizational changes in electricity companies 
11) Electricity sector tax reform 
12) Expansion of market to include other countries 
 
In the following I will discuss some of these projects a bit more closely. 
First, we shall have a look at the re-shaping of the core institutions NVE, 
Statkraft and Samkjøringen and at two different system reforms; the 
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accounting reform and the point tariff and third party access reform. Then, I 
will discuss efforts by the market reform collective to shape market 
competition as well as the organizational structures of local and regional 
power companies in accordance with the economic theory of the market 
program. Finally, I will present and discuss various initiatives and 
approaches to shape of the market infrastructure monopoly control system; 
the electricity network “natural monopoly” system. 
 
 
13.1 Re-configuring and re-formatting the basic structure 
of the industry 
On the basis of the re-framing of the industry offered by the 1989 SAF 
report and the new legislation, the market reform collective quickly moved 
to re-configure the industry and to shape the basic infrastructure and the 
measurement, regulation and control systems. The first target was  the state 
regulatory institution – the new role of the NVE. 
13.1.1 The re-structuring and re-formatting of the NVE   
In the wake of the 1986 separation of Statkraftverkene, the NVE had been 
reduced into what was commonly denoted “the rest of NVE”. Both its largest 
activities and much of its most competent staff had been transferred to 
Statkraft, and the politically powerful board of the NVE had been reduced to 
an advisory committee. Furthermore, the FD under the Hermansen 
leadership, repeatedly pushed for further cut backs in staffing and funding 
based on the argument that the period of rapid expansion of production 
capacity had come to an end. The NVE general director from 1987, Erling 
Diesen, during his three first years in office accordingly struggled to hold on 
to resources and competent staff members in a situation with threatening 
dissolution of the powers previously associated with the directorate. 
Based on a report from an inter-ministerial working group in March 1990149, 
the government in May 1990 presented a plan to reorganize NVE into one 
directorate with six different departments, of which the important newcomer 
was the energy saving and market department. It also suggested in line with 
FD arguments, to reduce the remaining staff of 400 to approximately 325 by 
                                           
149 “Norges Vassdrags’ og Energiverk. Framtidige oppgaver, organisasjon og bemanning”, 
OED rapport, 1. mars 1990. 
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the end of the year 1991150. The reorganization was approved by parliament 
in June 1990.   
It was accordingly a severely “squeezed” general director Diesen who by the 
OED became involved with the preparations for a market oriented legislative 
reform and who was suggested to take on an important new role for the NVE 
within the new competitive market system; as the market system regulator 
with substantial responsibilities and powers to direct the further 
transformation of the sector and to regulate the “natural monopoly” 
infrastructure system in particular. To Diesen, who for two decades had 
exposed himself as one of the most prominent supporters of the hierarchical 
program, to take on such a role would apparently imply a fairly radical shift 
to the rival market program. On the other hand, as we have seen, the new 
role of the NVE corresponded in important ways with the hierarchical 
restructuring program; it constituted a center for industrial restructuring, 
formative initiatives and hierarchical regulation and control of sector 
activities. Even though the basic framing was different, the role of the state 
institution was quite similar and its powers to carry it out was apparently 
substantially increased by the adding of the legitimacy and the governance 
instruments provided by economic theory. The switching distance in this 
respect was not that large after all, and the restructuring of the NVE was 
carried out without notable conflict.  
The new energy saving and market department within the NVE was to do 
much of the actual work on the further reform process. As its leader, the 
OED wanted a well experienced economist with a capacity to push forward 
reforms based on economic principles and theory. To the job was selected 
Jan Moen, who became employed as the director of the department in the 
autumn 1990. He came from a position as a manager at Oslo Lysverker 
where he had been engaged for a couple of years as part of the company’s 
ambitious strive to become a more efficient, “modern” and business oriented 
organization (in the previous non-market regime). He was the one to take on 
the core networking role in between the NVE and the SAF/SNF, and the one 
to secure the basis for efficient delegation of responsibilities from the OED 
to NVE; trust based on professional understanding of and personal 
commitment to the market reform program. The actual leadership and 
internal authority in relation to the work on the new electricity market 
system within NVE accordingly came to rest primarily with Moen rather 
than Diesen, who however hold the more visual formal responsibility for the 
broad set of NVE activities and who played an important role in mediating 
                                           
150 Stortingsprop. nr. 95 (1989-90) 
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the market reform towards those who had represented the hierarchical 
restructuring program as well as towards the general public.  
Through this restructuring and reformatting of the NVE, the market reform 
collective established a basis for delegation of much of the further work 
towards local and regional electricity companies. The role of Jan Moen, 
illustrates the important qualitative character of relations which serve as 
basis for delegations. There has to be a convincing set of program-specific 
relationships and coherence between the leadership of the collective and the 
delegate for delegation to be efficient as a basis for expansion of a remaking 
of society program. Such a thing as for instance an institutional relationship 
alone, would clearly not do the thing.  
The state directorate had become re-configured and re-formatted to serve the 
new market system. From now on, one of its primary objectives became to 
influence electricity companies and others within the sector so as to act in 
accordance with market economic principles151. 
 
13.1.2 The restructuring of Statkraft 
The reorganization of Statkraft was presented by the AP government to 
parliament in a separate parliamentary proposition in May 1991 - one year 
after the new energy law had been approved152. As we have seen, the work 
on this particular issue had its roots also in initiatives taken by Høyre in 
parliament, which had induced a report by a committee established by the 
OED in cooperation with Statkraft and its director Gunnar Vatten, which 
suggested a reorganization of the company into a corporate joint stock 
company structure. This might be seen as an extension of the proposal put 
forward by the coalition government in 1985 which had been rejected by the 
parliament majority after strong opposition from the trade unions and the AP 
towards the joint stock company form. However, it also outlined Statkraft’s 
ambition to “modernize” its organizational structures while at the same time 
maintain integrated managerial control over its established multifunctional 
activities, resources and tasks. 
The restructuring of Statkraft issue came to represent a main frontline 
between the state company and the market reform collective. In a letter from 
FD to OED dated Sept. 7th, 1990, the FD even suggested to separate the 
                                           
151 (NVE annual report 1990) 
152 St.prop. 100 (1990-91) 
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generating part of the company into several autonomous generating 
companies and to wind up or sell the construction activities153.  
To Einar Hope, the restructuring of Statkraft issue in several ways 
represented a cornerstone to the framing of and the efficient functioning of 
the future market system154. It was during this conflict that Statkraft engaged 
SAF researcher professor Finn Førsund at UiO who argued for a continued 
important role for an integrated hierarchical governance system – in 
particular in order to maintain short term physical balance in the national 
grid system. This became an important argument for Statkraft to maintain its 
unique roles in the system. In response, Hope and his colleagues developed a 
“regulatory market model” as a market based alternative way of solving the 
problem – an anti-anti act which provided no privileged role for the state 
company at all. Statkraft also mobilized substantial resources behind its 
claim for a continued state control with international electricity trade and 
thereby a continued role for a large integrated state company to carry out this 
task.  
In August 1990, still under the coalition government and OED-minister 
Eivind Reiten, the OED informed Statkraft that the ministry wanted a 
separation of the company into one generating and one transmission 
company as well as a separation of engineering and construction activities 
into subsidiaries. The company had to give in at these points and to start 
preparations for an implementation of the separation of the company from 
January 1st 1992. Also the argument about a continued state monopoly on 
international electricity trade was rejected by the ministry, who had received 
a special report on the issue from a working group with participation from 
both SAF and Statkraft, which concluded that a continued state monopoly 
would not be possible within the future EU regime.  
The state’s positions on separation of Statkraft and foreign trade were 
maintained when Finn Kristensen took over from Eivind Reiten as the OED-
minister in the new AP government. Statkraft became separated and the state 
monopoly abolished – apart from the concession system which provided the 
OED with the authority to approve, reject and regulate long term export 
contracts. Statkraft S.F.155 became the state generating company with a 
                                           
153 OED-arkiv 90/3895-9 
154 Interview with Einar Hope 
155 Established on the basis of the new state firm law in 1991 – a result of the work of the 
Hermansen Committee.  
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continued responsibility for established state contracts to energy intensive 
industries. There was no further division of the company – neither in terms 
of autonomous regional companies nor in terms of internal divisions or 
subsidiaries.  
Statnett S.F. became the national grid company (Transkraft AS) with 
ownership control over 85% of the national grid system and rental 
agreements to control and operate the remaining 15% owned by various 
regional electricity companies and large power intensive industries.  
What remained then, was the issue of who was to own and operate the power 
pool/market institution (Kraftsentralen AS) and to operate the short term 
physical balancing of the system – tasks which were currently under the 
formal responsibility of Samkjøringen. The government proposition offered 
no specific solution to this problem, and suggested to delegate authority to 
the government to settle the issue.  
 
13.1.3 The state takeover of Samkjøringen and the reshaping of 
    the trade system 
Both the SAF and the coalition government supported the idea that the 
market institution should be owned and operated by the market actors rather 
than the state. This could be obtained through a restructuring of 
Samkjøringen into a joint stock company. The new AP government 
however, took Statkraft’s position that operation and balancing of the 
network system should be coordinated closely with the network owner – the 
new Statnett S.F. company. No doubt also, basic ideological positions on the 
role of the state in the economy were important in the controversy.  
AP obtained support from the leftist SV party, but controlled no majority in 
parliament. The party which usually provided the necessary support for the 
government in parliament; SP, in this case clearly supported the 
Samkjøringen alternative. The issue was accordingly open and invited 
substantial lobbying from the parties involved. 
The parliamentary debate and voting on this issue turned out to be the only 
incident of parliamentary drama during the entire market reform process. In 
the end, the market liberal party FrP fell down on the government’s side – 
apparently because its leader Carl I. Hagen had been provoked by the 
intensity of the massive lobbying campaign put forward by Samkjøringen 
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and its members – and chose rather to support a state takeover of the market 
institution from Samkjøringen156.  
The outcome represented the end of the national cooperative organization 
which became dissolved thereafter. A new company named Statnett Marked 
AS was founded as a subsidiary of Statnett S.F., which took over all 
employees from Samkjøringen except its top management. Associated plants 
and installations were already owned by Statnett. “Kraftsentralen AS” had 
thereby also been established as a state owned joint stock company 
responsible for the power pool and the organized electricity market. The 
government finally also supported the SAF idea about “the regulatory 
market for short term balancing of the electricity network and settlement of 
contracts” as an auction based way of organizing these tasks.  
Statkraft lost its foreign trade monopoly, but came to play a dominant role as 
the largest and most experienced partner in nationally coordinated export 
and power exchange initiatives in the years to come. It had to accept the 
basic separation of the company in accordance with the re-framing of the 
sector put forward by the SAF, but managed to reject further disintegration 
and finally – after more than 60 years of subordination - managed to 
overturn Samkjøringen. The outcome of the reform process in this respect 
came to represent a compromise - an image of the social democratic renewal 
program with its combination of market orientation and state governance 
ambitions: “More markets – more state governance”. 
The essential change in the trade system from the previous regime to the new 
market system, was the opening of the internal occasional power market. 
Anyone who paid the entrance fee of NOK 50.000 a year could now buy and 
sell electricity and financial contracts at Statnett Marked. There was no 
attempt at forcing all electricity trade over the organized exchange market – 
like in the British power pool system157. The electricity exchange market 
accordingly contained a spot market which historically had represented less 
than 10% of the total volume, and the new regulatory market for short term 
dispatch and settling of contracts for all types of physical contracts158.  
                                           
156 For a more extended presentation of the parliamentary debate, see Barth Jacobsen, 1998, 
214 - 220 
157 The British power pool system was in essence an extension of their previous hierarchical 
national merit order system. 
 158 Contracts are set ex ante delivery, where as actual supplies of electricity can only be 
calculated ex post. 
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From there, Statnett Marked employees in cooperation with economists at 
the SNF embarked on developing a futures market with standardized 
financial contracts in accordance with what had been advocated by Einar 
Hope. The new futures market became established as a market to market 
system in which the exchange market institution (Statnett Marked AS) 
engaged in financial contracts with sellers on the one hand, and buyers on 
the other. This permitted actors to trade electricity in the form of pure 
financial contracts with each other on a non-relational basis. Nobody knows 
who they are actually trading with. What is left to consider for each 
decision-maker is the quality of the contract in terms of its supply profile, 
the price and his expectations about future prices and risks. Contracts are 
settled every day, losses charged and gains distributed.  
To operate this specific task, Statnett Marked engaged Norwegian Option 
Central (NOS), which has a similar responsibility at the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. The new electricity market thereby became institutionally linked 
with other organized markets – and thereby to leading expertise on 
operational exchange market trade systems.  
To manage their trading operations, traders and brokers obtained standard 
financial market computer software based on standard principles and 
equations in financial theory. Some also initiated innovative projects to 
model specific risk problems in the hydropower system (for instance Norsk 
Hydro) and to design types of contracts to deal with these particular 
problems – like financial “weather contracts” to hedge risks related to 
unpredictable changes in precipitation to the hydropower system.  
Over time, these contractual systems and computer based calculating 
systems constituted a common technology which made it possible for trained 
employees to hold track of their complex contract portfolios, to adjust them, 
to simplify and “standardize” decision-making procedures and to make 
decisions at a rapid speed. The EFI simulation model came to serve as a 
technology for price estimates and the NVE - and later on the Competition 
Authority - forced generators to release hydrological data and data about 
storage levels to the market on regular intervals. 
The futures-contract system got organized in a rolling two year schedule 
structured into weeks, blocks and seasons which were all priced and traded 
at the exchange. Week contracts for the near future (8-11 weeks), then 
blocks and then seasons for the second year. The basic contract is a financial 
week contract with a flat (base load) delivery profile. One block contains 
four weeks and one season contains three blocks. As times move on, new 
seasons are added, seasons are dissolved into blocks and blocks into weeks. 
A contract can be bought and sold an unlimited number of times before 
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maturity, which permit actors to design their risk exposures flexibly and 
continuously.  
During 1992 and early 1993, prices in the larger bilateral contract market 
converged towards the by then lower prices at the organized exchange 
market. This added substantial tensions among electricity distributors who 
were locked into high priced long term contractual relationships with  
regional generators to which the distributor was historically related also 
through ownership or political relations. By 1994 however, prices increased 
rapidly due to changed weather conditions, and distributors had to cover 
their fixed supply obligations with expensive spot market contracts. As a 
consequence of this turmoil and the economic losses which followed, a 
market for professional market advice emerged from where broker 
companies established a basis for a rapidly expanding broker and business 
advice industry which organized bilateral trade as semi-structured non-
relational exchange markets. Gradually, many of the smaller companies out-
sourced trading to these companies or created joint trading companies. The 
“learning curve” across the sector was certainly rather steep during the first 
3-4 years of the new market system.  
The broker companies were now able to construct new types of contracts – 
usually with different types of delivery profiles and real options for the 
buyer in terms of when to execute a given contract. The larger companies – 
like Statkraft S.F., Oslo Energi AS and BKK BA organized their own trade 
departments which did similar things. In this way, a competitive market for 
organized electricity exchanges emerged which forced transaction costs 
down and spurred organized non-relational trade through different trading 
systems. This had the effect that even though a substantial share of the 
electricity market was still based on bilateral contracts, most of these were 
actually traded between buyers and sellers in a non-social relational way in 
which only contractual conditions and price mattered. Social, political and 
organizational relations had indeed become externalized from trade practices 
at a dramatic scale.  
Through the very powerful new role of the organized electricity market and 
the common technology, organizational forms, theoretical concepts and 
educational programs embarked on, a fascinating “re-formatting” of 
electricity companies and their economic actors rapidly spread across the 
sector. Traditional bilateral trade practices based on various non-economic 
structures and relationships were broken apart. Electricity companies 
restructured their trading activities, established departments or subsidiaries 
or out-sourced their electricity trade to expert companies. Even internal 
supply from generating departments to market departments within vertically 
integrated supply companies were broken apart – each department buying 
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and selling through the market. Gradually, economic organizations and 
economic actors became structured and formatted in accordance with basic 
concepts in economics. They became “economically more rational and 
capable of designing rational economic strategies”, to rephrase Einar Hope’s 
early critique of the sector.   
  
13.1.4 The expansion of the Norwegian electricity market to 
Finland and Sweden 
From January 1st 1996, Sweden and Finland also deregulated their electricity 
markets and joined the organized Norwegian electricity market (Finland 
through Sweden). Svenska Kraftnät bought 50% of the shares in Statnett 
Marked AS and the company shifted its name to Nord Pool ASA. As its new 
director was appointed Per Hjort, who came to play an important role in the 
integrative process with Sweden. He also enforced a further development of 
the organized trade system – for instance by introducing continuous time 
computer based trade at the Nord Pool exchange. He also engaged as an 
advisor to other countries who wanted to establish similar electricity trade 
institutions. Nord Pool ASA has apparently - by the late 1990s - become 
perhaps the most important delegate of the market reform collective, 
engaged in expanding the Nordic market system to the European continent.  
With the inclusion of the Swedish market, the number of actors trading in 
the Nord Pool markets increased substantially, and with the renewed 
tendencies towards deregulation in Europe, there has been an influx of 
trading companies from other countries as well who have engaged 
themselves primarily for learning purposes. Some of the larger European 
electricity companies have also acquired established broker companies in the 
Nordic market for similar reasons. 
 
13.1.5 The accounting reform and the role of capital accounting 
in the formatting of economic agencies  
Among the first tasks to be carried out by the OED/NVE during 1991 and 
1992, was the accounting reform, which was an integrated part of the market 
reform proposal presented by the SAF. Accounting in public sector 
electricity companies at the time followed traditional public sector principles 
which showed no capital value balance sheet – only costs, revenues, debts 
and funds. That is, investments in real assets were set at zero value, which of 
course made it impossible to calculate real economic returns to these 
investments. Electricity company boards typically aimed at striking some 
balance between the ambition to reduce consumer prices and the desire to 
accumulate internal investment and security funds, which essentially 
corresponds to a standard economic model within cooperative theory which 
says that the principals of requisite societies optimize consumer surplus plus 
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company profit in such as way that consumer surplus at the margin is equal 
to marginal company profit. Which implies that consumer surplus and 
company profit is equally important (Enke, 1945, Helmerger and Hoos, 
1962)  
With the accounting reform, everybody had to convert to joint stock 
company standards, which meant that balance sheets which showed real 
asset values had to be calculated according to principles and guidelines 
presented by the NVE. As a basic rule, the historical cost principle should be 
applied with linear depreciation at various lengths for different types of 
investments. By January 1st 1993, all electricity companies had established 
joint stock company accounting systems – disregarding their actual judicial 
form or their established economic objectives as represented for instance by 
their board members. 
The new energy law did not require companies with both competitive market 
and monopoly activities to separate into different judicial entities, but it 
demanded that accounts be separated between activities which belonged to 
the competitive part of the system; that is electricity generation, trade and 
supply, and activities defined as the “natural monopoly”; the transmission 
and distribution part. Each company accordingly had to produce one annual 
report for each part in which common assets and resources were distributed 
in accordance with NVE principles and instructions. Furthermore, costs 
related to different voltage levels in the network system had to be reported 
separately. The purpose of all this was to establish an economic report 
system which on the one hand turned capital and capital returns into the 
focus of the electricity company economic governance system, and on the 
other hand provided a basis of economic data structured so as to serve as a 
foundation for state regulation and control systems derived from economic 
theory. It should in particular provide relevant and reliable data on which the 
NVE monopoly control of tariffs and network company profits could be 
established and executed.   
As I have noted in my historical presentation of the industry, a large number 
of electricity companies basically saw themselves as either cooperatives in 
which governance rights were derived from the consumers, or as public 
service enterprises in which governance rights derived from the diverse 
interests of political electors. Even though board members often represented 
different views, these companies had usually no intention to transfer 
themselves into enterprises in which capital ownership provided the 
dominant source of legitimate governance rights and economic beneficiaries. 
Neither did the market reformers in the state administration embark on any 
explicit attempt at changing ownership relations or judicial ownership forms 
– apart from a very general request for “more business oriented 
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organizations”. Since 1991 however, we have witnessed a remarkable 
transformation of ownership interpretations and ownership practices, in 
which it seems to me that the accounting reform played a very fundamental 
role as a “Trojan horse” which gradually reshaped collective cognitive 
patterns within the companies as well as among board members and 
politicians. From the perspective of Hope’s expressed distrust in the 
potential for “rational economic behavior” within a publicly owned system, 
this qualitative transformation process appears to have been a bit of a 
surprise. 
With the accounting reform, each and every company was forced to adjust 
their economic measurement systems so as to focus on their accumulated 
capital values and capital returns. Through this exercise, political board 
members gradually both came to realize that their companies actually 
represented substantial economic values – even as measured by historical 
cost. They also learned that rates of capital return to their electricity 
companies were fairly low – even as compared to their own individual bank 
saving rates. Gradually and not without resistance from cooperative 
strongholds, economic efficiency became de-coupled from electricity price 
benchmarking with neighbor electricity companies and switched to a 
comparison of capital returns.  
Rather than allocating economic surpluses between consumers and internal 
funds, capital owners gradually became the more legitimate beneficiaries. 
The Municipal Law also became adjusted so as to permit municipalities and 
counties to receive dividends from their companies – disregarding their 
formal judicial organizational forms, and more and more municipalities and 
counties started demanding dividends from their electricity companies and to 
increase their claims from year to year.  
Political board members no longer primarily represented consumers or 
electors. They first and foremost represented their public institution in terms 
of capital ownership to the firm. The next step would be to restructure the 
company so as to obtain better control with capital returns from its different 
types of activities. Finally, the reshaped owners would engage in calculating 
how rates of return could be improved and how the accumulated capital 
invested in electricity alternatively could be invested in other types of 
activities. A stunning transformation of ownership  – without any 
privatization or other shifts in property rights – forced in part through a 
“technical accounting reform”. 
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13.1.6 Shaping the market infrastructure system; point tariffs 
and third party access in national, regional and local 
electricity networks 
Einar Hope and his SAF colleagues had devoted relatively little attention to 
the transmission and distribution part of the system. Their main concern had 
been with the electricity market, and the entire idea about applying the 
natural monopoly theory to the network infrastructure system came up rather 
late in the process, and came to be focussed primarily from the perspective 
of economic regulation and control. Other important innovative concepts 
however, came from others who engaged in finding appropriate ways of 
reorganizing the network system on the basis of Hope’s re-framing of the 
entire electricity system. The two perhaps most important contributions were 
the point-tariff and the trade concession systems.  
The idea about a point-tariff system rather than the traditional distance-tariff 
system, originated by two economists in Statkraft – Braaten, who was the 
chairman of the “Transmission Council”159 in Samkjøringen,  which was 
responsible for the high voltage national grid system, and Lauen, economy 
director in Statkraft. By the summer 1990, a working group organized by the 
council and headed by Braaten, presented a report which suggested changes 
in the tariff-system in the national grid system160 based on an input/output 
principle. There was one price for feeding electricity into the grid, and 
another for taking electricity from it. Subsequently, physical distance 
between buyers and sellers did not matter as long as both parties had direct 
access to the high voltage grid system. The idea met opposition from power 
intensive industries who had benefited from their close location to large 
power stations in the previous regime, but it received support from the 
market reform collective as well as through out the general supply sector.  
A point tariff system eventually got established not only in the high voltage 
national grid system, but also in regional and local electricity networks. 
Electricity could then be traded at a single price in the entire national 
electricity system (if no capacity constraints) where as one had to pay a price 
for transmission and distribution which depended on the physical point of 
access in either the national grid, a regional network or some local network. 
Separation of national, regional and local networks followed a pragmatic 
mix of mainly voltage and ownership criteria.  
                                           
159 Overføringsrådet 
160 Sentralnettet 
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The establishing of the new tariff system became an important task for the 
NVE during 1991 and 1992. I have listed the following NVE reports from 
1992, which contained general instructions to network owners and which 
provide an overall impression of the content of this work.  
January 3rd, 1992:   Designing transmission tariffs161 
January 14th, 1992: Annual reports and transmission tariffs162 
February 2nd, 1992: Transmission tariffs. The point tariff system163 
May 6th, 1992:  Norms regarding canceling of contracts164  
May 27th, 1992:  Transmission tariffs statistics. Submitting tariffs to 
NVE165 
July 19th, 1992:  Point tariffs in regional electricity companies166 
September 10th, 1992: Amplifications167 
October 15th, 1992: Installation/shifting of measuring equipment 
(recommended solution)168 
November 11th, 1992: Tariffs and economic reports 
An important aspect of the work of NVE at this point, was to prevent 
companies from establishing “too profitable” tariffs. With the re-framing of 
the electricity sector by economic theory, electricity companies which had 
been perceived of as governed either by consumer interests or broad social 
interests, were now - in general - conceived of as profit maximizers which 
could be expected to behave completely opportunistically. A general trust in 
the appropriateness of the tariffs could no longer be based on the political 
legitimacy of local government ownership - even though the individuals at 
the boards were the same. Trust now had to rest upon detailed instructions 
and direct control from the (only) organization which in accordance with the 
                                           
161 Utarbeidelse av overføringstariffer, NVE rapport 
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166 Regionale verks punkttariffer, NVE rapport 
167 Presisteringer, NVE rapport 
168 Installasjon/utskifting av måleutstyr (anbefalt løsning), NVE rapport 
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new economic conceptual framework hold social responsibility; the state 
regulator.  
Due to both the increase in control ambitions and the imposed downsizing of 
NVE staffing, the control issue tended to create substantial administrative 
overload. Much of the regulatory interventions in the end followed as the 
NVE came to serve as an appeal court for conflicts between network owners 
and network users over tariffs. In many of these conflicts, which appeared in 
newspapers and journals at the time, network owners were accused of 
“blowing up” the value of their network in their newly established balance 
sheets in order to calculate higher tariffs. In a few cases such allegations 
were justified by the NVE and tariffs reduced. 
The other invention originated within the OED in 1989/90. It contained the 
idea about a new concession (license) system called “trade concession”. The 
new concession permitted the state regulator to specify conditions 
specifically to different types of activities and to the different categories of 
organizational structures represented within the sector. The system covered 
both judicial entities owning electricity networks and companies buying and 
selling electricity in the market (physical trade). Concession was not needed 
to buy or sell financial electricity contracts. The very flexible concession 
system permitted the NVE to develop contractual conditions over time so as 
to force specific types of actors to adopt to additional requirements.   
A major concern in the new system was to safeguard the operational 
separation of monopoly activities from competitive activities and thereby 
non-discriminate third party access also to regional and local networks. The 
network company license holder was obliged to transfer electricity to all 
consumers within his area – disregarding who were their electricity 
suppliers. He was also obliged to hold track of the various suppliers in his 
network and to calculate and administrate payments between different 
suppliers. Such a “measurement, calculation and payment“ system 
represented a necessary economic infrastructure system for the market to 
function, because ex ante contracted volumes always deviate from real 
consumption, which can only be measured ex post. To hold track of these 
differences with a large number of suppliers and mainly manual reading of 
each consumer’s consumption, clearly represented substantial transaction 
costs which derived from the market system, but which were allocated to the 
natural monopoly system. Network owners accordingly introduced 
substantial transaction fees on the shifting of supplier in order to recover the 
costs involved (and possibly, to reduce the number of shifts). This made 
such shifting practically prohibitive for small consumers. 
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The trade concession system became an important and very powerful 
governance tool in the further development of a ”natural monopoly” 
regulation and control system. License periods were set on a yearly basis to 
start with, in order for the regulator to upgrade license-conditions quickly if 
needed, and network owners could potentially be “punished” through 
redistribution of licenses or upgrading of license-conditions if they did not 
“behave”. The NVE under Jan Moen’s surveillance initiated new research 
projects where economists – in particular from SNF - worked on finding 
improvements to the regulatory system by applying models and methods 
offered by economic regulation and control theory. 
With the accounting reform, the point tariff system and the trade concession 
system, the natural monopoly concept became stabilized as a generally 
accepted reality through out the sector as well as within its affiliated research 
institutions. Despite the fact that these changes represented a fairly radical 
redistribution of governance rights between the state regulator and the local 
political network owners, few protested at this point. The market reform 
collective had expanded to hold a very powerful capacity to transform 
elements of its environment. 
Through these reforms, Norway by 1993 had established the perhaps most 
open third party access competitive market system in any electricity system 
world wide. 
 
13.2 Regulating market behaviors and organizational 
        changes  
Economic regulation of profit seeking agents had moved to the focus as an 
exclusive task for the state in the new market system. Local governments 
had in effect been excluded - with a reference to economic theory. Through 
delegation from the SAF/OED market reform collective, the NVE market 
department came to represent the state regulator. Another state regulatory 
institution which entered the stage, was the State Competition Authority 
(KT169) – in particular after the new competition law had been approved in 
1993 and Einar Hope took over as its managing director in 1995.  
The economic re-framing of the sector had created two distinct regulatory 
roles; the market regulator and the “natural monopoly” regulator. Hope 
argued that regulatory responsibilities between these two parts should be 
separated in a distinct way so that KT hold responsibility for market 
regulations and NVE for the natural monopoly regulations. This turned out 
                                           
169 Konkurransetilsynet 
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not to be that easy – in particular because the comprehensive concession law 
system which related to a multiplicity of issues within the electricity sector, 
belonged to the jurisdiction of the NVE. The concession laws are based on 
the principle that nothing is legal unless it is specifically permitted by 
someone uniquely defined. For instance, companies were required to submit 
an application for renewal of their concessions in case of any formal changes 
in property rights or organizational form. In case of, say, an acquisition of 
one company by another, this permitted the NVE to set up additional 
requirements as conditions for granting a renewal of concessions involved. 
Hence, the concession law system in general provided the regulator with 
much stronger governance instruments than did the competition law, which 
is fundamentally based on the opposite principle: Everything is permitted 
which is not explicitly forbidden. The consequence was that the two 
institutions to a large extent had to cooperate on regulatory interventions in 
the market. 
 
13.2.1 Regulating the market, enforcing competition and shaping  
    company forms 
State regulations in the Norwegian electricity market have been guided 
rather closely by economic theory and the principles and ideas laid down by 
Einar Hope and his SAF colleagues in the 1989 market reform report. The 
ambition has been to see to it that competition was enforced through 
initiatives to stimulate competition - like reducing barriers to entry into 
electricity trade and reducing transaction costs for consumers shifting 
between suppliers. It has also been to prevent cooperation among generators 
and vertical integration between competitive and monopoly activities. 
Through the state regulatory institutions, the market reform collective were 
at least in part able to direct and control the further restructuring of the 
industry at regional and local levels. 
One of the first issues which emerged, concerned whether or not the 
regulator (NVE) should accept an acquisition of a vertically integrated 
company by another vertically integrated company. The case was the 
regional company Akershus Energiverk which wanted to purchase the local 
supply and distribution company Oppegård Energiverk. Akershus thereby 
had to apply to the NVE to take over the area concession hold by the 
distribution company. In the end, NVE ruled that in order to prevent further 
vertical integration, the company could not be sold unless its competitive 
and monopoly divisions were sold separately to different judicial entities. In 
order for Akershus to purchase the entire company, it had to reorganize its 
own network division into a separated judicial entity – for instance as a 
subsidiary. This regulatory intervention turned out to have significant 
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effects, as companies with ambitions to merge with or acquire other 
companies started restructuring themselves into new corporate forms.  
Another issue appearing at the regulator’s desk, related to the establishing of 
three large regional cooperative arrangements in 1993 – in the wake of the 
generator campaign to increase spot market prices and mobilize for a 
political intervention to constrain the new market. The three largest cities 
Oslo, Bergen and Trondhjem formed a cooperative called OBT Kraft, four 
county/regional electricity companies along the south coast from Telemark 
to Rogaland formed the cooperative entity Sørkraft, and ten different 
electricity companies in the middle and northern part of the country formed 
Nordenfjeldske Energi. A fourth cooperative – Fylkeskraft Østlandet – had 
already been established in 1987 to coordinate negotiations with electricity 
sellers at the west coast before the market reform. Together with Statkraft, 
these organizations by 1992 accounted for 73% of total electricity 
production.170 This time no concessions were involved as the new 
organizations remained cooperative arrangements where each participating 
company maintained its autonomous status. But the new competition law 
ruled against market cooperation which had a potential to influence market 
prices. After obtaining a report from Lars Sørgaard at NHH/SNF which 
discussed the problem from the perspective of economic cartel theory (game 
theoretical industrial organization theory), the KT in December 1994 ruled 
that the two cooperative organizations Sørkraft and OBT-kraft were illegal 
market arrangements and had to be dissolved171. The KT argued that on the 
one hand, they had the potential to influence prices, and on the other, their 
lack of ownership integration made them unlikely to exploit any substantial 
efficiency gains from their cooperation. The decision also provided 
guidelines for the two other organizations. Where as OBT-Kraft decided to 
reduce its activities to a joint office for commercial contracting, Sørkraft 
appealed the KT decision. In the wake of the Swedish deregulation and the 
merging of the two national markets in 1996, Sørkraft was granted 
permission to continue based on the argument that the cooperative 
represented no substantial market share in the enlarged market.  
Also this case set important benchmarks for the future restructuring of the 
sector. Integration through traditional cooperative arrangements had proven 
difficult as it directly confronted a fundamental anti-cooperative concept in 
                                           
170 Lars Sørgaard, Report to the competition authority, 1993 
171 Sørkraft appealed the decision and received permission after Sweden had joined the 
market in 1996 
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the economic theory of the new market system. This turned the attention of 
companies towards formal capital based integration like mergers and 
acquisitions rather than the federative arrangements traditionally used by 
cooperatives. 
A third type of regulatory intervention related to regional electricity 
generators which executed the powers of established contractual agreements 
and exploited the fact that the many small consumers were still locked into 
their local distribution companies due to prohibitive switching costs. The 
strategic ambition was to lock local distribution companies into long term 
electricity contracts at prices above competitive market prices, and to 
discriminate consumer prices so as to maintain large consumers at the cost of 
the many small locked in ones. To break off these interlocking directorates 
inherited from the previous regime, became an important element in the 
efforts of KT and NVE to break apart traditional systems of inter-
organizational domination and thereby increase competition and shape 
autonomous market actors  - as prescribed by theory. One of the most 
important cases in this respect, was the NVE ruling on the area concession to 
Sunnhordland Kraftlag (SKL), which is a regional electricity company in 
northern Rogaland and southern Hordaland counties. SKL is owned by local 
distribution companies, which again are owned by the municipalities within 
the region – a typical historical cooperative structure. In this case, the NVE 
refused to provide the SKL with an area license until it changed its 
arrangements with its local distribution companies, who at the time in late 
1993, still received all their electricity from SKL. Another interesting 
outcome of this case, was that the local distribution company Kvinnherrad 
Energi, decided to sell its share in SKL at a market price and transfer the 
capital acquired to a municipal fund for entirely different purposes. Such an 
act would have been unthinkable before 1991, and was gradually followed 
by a few other municipalities172. 
During the period with high market prices in 1996/97, many cooperative 
electricity companies decided to keep prices to consumers within their 
traditional supply areas below market prices, where as consumers from other 
areas had to buy at the higher price. Also these cases ended at the regulator’s 
desk, and the new competition-director Einar Hope argued that this practice 
undermined the principle of a single market price and should be abandoned. 
This time however, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs intervened and 
claimed that the constitutional autonomy of the municipalities prohibited the 
                                           
172 In Sweden, this had been common practice for many years. 
 291 
state from intervening directly into their pricing policy. Einar Hope and the 
KT had to back down. 
To further increase competitive pressures, the NVE collected and published 
information on contract prices. This work was later taken over by the KT. 
The state also decided to regulate the price consumers had to pay when 
shifting from one electricity supplier to another. Step by step the transaction 
fee was reduced from approximately NOK 5000,- to NOK 200,- before it 
was abolished all together. Small consumers can now shift between suppliers 
at short notice without cost. Network companies were permitted to recover 
the actual transaction costs in their network tariffs, so that the costs were 
allocated to all the consumers.  
Finally, the NVE introduced a system in which small consumers could trade 
on standardized consumption profiles over the year. This eliminated the need 
for continuous measurement of individual consumption, as yearly 
consumption became distributed over the year in accordance with a simple 
average model estimated for the entire population of small consumers. By 
1996, accordingly, even the smallest consumers could easily shop electricity 
from whatever electricity supplier they wanted, and new broker companies 
entered the stage who specialized in mediating the cheapest available 
electricity in the market to households and other small consumers.  
By these regulatory interventions, the probably most competitive electricity 
market world wide emerged also for small consumers, and the organizational 
restructuring process within the sector was forced into specific forms which 
also in essence derived from economics. 
 
13.2.2  Regulating organizational changes over time 
Several of the regulatory initiatives and interventions into the new electricity 
marked contained ambitions to influence the re-structuring of regional and 
local electricity companies. The preferred organizational structure was the 
one which had been forced through for the state company; a complete 
judicial separation of market activities from transmission and distribution 
monopoly activities. But, such a separation was in general opposed to by 
company managers, who wanted to maintain managerial controls with both 
types of activities rather than handing this “top level of coordination” over to 
the owners (the politicians). The conflict was accordingly quite similar to the 
one between the market reform collective and Statkraft during 1990-1991. 
A variety of different initiatives taken by electricity companies to restructure 
their organizations had implications for area concessions and accordingly 
showed up as applications for various concessions. This induced the 
OED/NVE to develop a more systematic policy which could provide general 
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guidelines when conditions for new licenses/concessions were granted. 
Because of the limited legitimacy of the state to interfere into municipal 
property rights, the new policy came to represent both a compromise and an 
outline of a long term strategy to “upgrade” organizational structures over 
time so as to approach the preferred model. To create additional 
transformative capability, a range of new demands were included into new 
trade licenses in which special conditions regarding the organization of the 
license-holder were included. The explicitly stated purpose was to prevent 
further vertical integration and to secure that network activities were 
managed “completely independently from other activities”173.  
To guide licensing conditions, a hierarchical system of organizational 
models was developed in which individual companies were permitted to 
escalate but not to descend. The system was the following: 
Figure 13.1. The hierarchy of organizational models 
Level 1: Preferred models: 
 
             Model I      Model II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 2: Intermediate model: 
        Model III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level 3: Least acceptable models: 
       Model IV      Model V 
 
                                           
173 Standard formulation in new area concessions provided by NVE from 1997. 
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Level 4:  Not accepted model: 
 Model 0 (traditional vertically integrated organization) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Enclosure to area concession license, NVE, 1997 
In case of mergers and acquisitions, the new license-conditions ensured that 
the new company at least became organized such as the most “advanced” of 
those companies being merged. The hierarchy of models directed the 
preferred route of further developments. The system implicitly also allocated 
different degrees of economic legitimacy to the different models. By 1996, 
only one public electricity company was organized in accordance with level 
1 models; the one in the city of Drammen (model II).  
The “up-grading of organizational structure” regulatory system is an 
interesting example of how new systems of power are created to direct 
specific types of local behaviors. It starts with a simple statement derived 
from economic theory, which is largely ignored or rejected by local actors. 
Then, the state-economist collective starts experimenting with different 
“loads of legislative authority” in single cases, before a more complete 
system of institutional loads to support the initial simple normative statement 
is established. In the end, there is a durable system of power which either 
induces local actors to change their organizations to obtain the more 
legitimate form, or forces them step by step to escalate up the ladder of 
ranked forms.  
The case also illustrates how governance is expanded through the market 
reform, through regulatory innovations which dig into the autonomy of civil 
society economic agencies in a multiplicity of ways in order to force a 
specific reshaping and re-formatting of their structures and their economic 
actors.  
 Network company 
 Gen./supply subsid. 
 Gen./supply company 
 Network subsid. 
  Management 
 Network 
 department 
  Generating 
  department 
Supply 
department 
 294 
 
 
13.3 Regulating the natural monopoly; shaping the 
        monopoly regulation and control system 
A natural monopoly is defined in economic theory as a situation in which the 
cost function of a production is such that the average unit cost decreases with 
increased output within the entire relevant demand interval for the good 
produced. The downward sloping average cost curve has the consequence 
that competition between producers will not provide the optimal social 
output. Rather production should be managed by only one producer174. The 
concept of a natural monopoly is a very simple and powerful one, and it 
certainly caught on quickly within the electricity sector as the new 
framework for understanding what the electricity network “really was”. It 
provided for a clear cut concept of separation between the two parts of the 
electricity system and a simplistic conceptual identity to the part of the 
electricity network system which by far represented the most employees.   
The argument that the electricity network constituted a natural monopoly 
was not primarily based on the view that each part of the system had a 
downward sloping average cost curve more than many productions typically 
found in market organized systems. Rather, it was the entire national 
network which was taken to represent the monopoly in the sense that it 
would not pay to construct a parallel system disconnected from the other. It 
was accordingly primarily the connectedness of the technological system 
which turned it into a natural monopoly. But, then one could of course ask if 
this is not also the case for generating plants and consumption units. It would 
obviously not pay to disconnect these from the integrated system either. It 
seems to me that one could argue that the entire technically integrated 
Edison central station system is what constitutes a “natural monopoly 
system” in this sense - with all its different parts and functions.  
It appears to me that the actual concept of separation is rather a functional 
than an economic one. Some important functions within the integrated 
central station system such as generating and trading were re-framed as 
competitive activities suitable for market organization. This separation at the 
same time re-constituted the remaining part of the electricity system as a 
necessary market infrastructure system with a great number of functions and 
types of activities. One important consequence of this re-framing was that 
                                           
174 There are other insights from the natural monopoly model as well, such as the problem of 
cost recovery at the social optimal level of output. 
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the new market actors became economically dependent on an infrastructure 
system which they no longer controlled. This is – I think – basically what 
established the need for state monopoly control from the point of view of 
economic theory. One has to prevent those in control of the market 
infrastructure monopoly to exploit those dependent on it; like generators, 
traders and consumers. The cost structure of the market infrastructure 
appears to be essentially irrelevant to the need for monopoly control in the 
case of a physically integrated system. 
Re-framing the non-market part of the system in this way, permits us both to 
see the apparent problem the natural monopoly concept run into, and to 
reveal an interesting process of gradual re-framing of the “natural 
monopoly” in which more functions were found to be suitable for 
competition in markets or quasi-markets. As a consequence, the natural 
monopoly understood as an integrated hierarchy step by step “shrinked”, and 
the number of functionally defined competitive systems increased. 
 
13.3.1 The initial monopoly control system 
Through out 1991 and 1992, the NVE also engaged in creating an initial 
economic monopoly regulation and control system; a so-called “rate of 
return” regulation as suggested by the SAF. The system was restricted to a 
regulation of capital returns from each network company fixed at a 
maximum rate set at 1% above the risk free market interest rate as measured 
by long term Norwegian state bonds. In order to calculate rates of return to 
network investments, the system was fundamentally dependent on the 
accounting reform. The NVE also initiated an additional fairly 
comprehensive information gathering system where network owners had to 
report in detail about their electricity networks as well as their about 
organizations. 
With the completing of the accounting reform by December 31st 1992 and 
with the new tariff system in place, the new regulatory system became 
operational from 1993. In 1994, the NVE started controlling and calculating 
economic rates of return to each network owner as calculated on the basis of 
the historical cost principle. Those with larger returns than permitted were 
forced to repay consumers through lower tariffs the following year. With this 
system, the NVE and the SAF on the basis of economic theory, had 
constructed an integrated economic governance system in which economic 
results in network companies were just as much outcomes of these 
constructions as outcomes of the economic activities themselves. Their 
calculated capital values were administratively set by the NVE – not by 
market valuations. Depreciation rates were set by the NVE. Accounting rules 
were set by the NVE. Maximum rates of capital return were set by the NVE. 
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Deviations were corrected and surpluses reallocated by the NVE. Economic 
autonomy of local network owners had thereby been substantially reduced 
by an entirely new durable system of domination created by the market 
reform collective.  
The problem with the rate of return regulatory system from the point of view 
of economic theory, was that the regulatory system provided network owners 
with no incentives to reduce costs. All costs were deducted before the rate of 
capital return was calculated. There was also some room to maneuver within 
the accounting system which permitted network owners to adjust their 
numbers so as to avoid breaking the rate of return limit.  
Even though tariffs in between 1993 and 1996 declined on average, this 
could be explained with the general reduction in market interest rates. The 
system was clearly unsatisfactory from the point of view of the market 
reform collective, and new initiatives were taken in 1995 to improve the 
regulatory system. Equipped with large quantities of data about each 
network company, NVE director Jan Moen headed a project group together 
with SNF researchers to create a much more powerful system to be 
introduced from January 1st 1998. 
 
13.3.2 An attempt at structural reform of the network system 
In 1993, there was jet another electricity network reform initiative which 
originated in the natural monopoly theory; a restructuring of ownership to 
electricity networks. The idea had strong links back to the hierarchical 
program, but the basis for the new initiative appears to have been the new 
natural monopoly concept. A traditional formulation says that “there should 
only be one producer”. In the standard interpretation, this would mean that 
there should only be one company with one set of share owners to organize 
the entire production. But, this is to say more than what is provided by the 
cost structure argument as such. What seems to follow from the argument, is 
that production should be efficiently coordinated. How to achieve efficient 
coordination in some real world case, appears to be an all together different 
issue.  
Many of those elements which had to be coordinated were already 
coordinated in a tight state governance system under the concession law 
system, the new energy law and a system of agreements between network 
owners. Both a “line-concession” system for high voltage power-lines and 
the area concession system provided the NVE with substantial abilities to 
coordinate and direct the different network owners and their many activities. 
In addition, the state hold direct ownership to Statnett S.F. The economic 
regulation and control system added another important governance system to 
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the overall hierarchical state governance system towards the electricity 
network system. 
Never-the-less, a project which aimed at restructuring property rights within 
the electricity network system was initiated by the NVE in 1993. 
Responsibility for the project became delegated to Statnett S.F. under the 
leadership of former NVE employee and member of the governance 
committee of the 1989 SAF market reform project; Svein Storstein Pedersen. 
Statnett engaged Einar Hope and the SNF to work out a report on the 
theoretical basis for such a restructuring of the network system, and to come 
up with alternative solutions. (Formally, the NVE served as the principal 
towards SNF).  
The report “The extension of the national grid. An in principal analysis”175 
was presented in August 1994 and argued that in principle the entire 
electricity network should be owned and operated by only one company. For 
pragmatic reasons however, the report concluded that only the medium 
voltage (132 and 66 kV) networks should be merged with the national high 
voltage system, where as the 22 kV local networks should remain with their 
existing local distribution companies. 
The report received substantial opposition from regional electricity 
companies and their organization EnFO. To directly confront regional and 
local property rights turned out still to be an impossible task. The report was 
in effect rejected as a basis for network reform, and Storstein Pedersen and 
Statnett were forced into complex negotiations with regional electricity 
companies over different organizational models which included both 
ownership and technical and market related organizational principles. As the 
systems varied substantially from region to region, it turned out to be 
impossible to find a basis for agreement on any substantial restructuring of 
ownership. In the end, only minor changes were made – mostly in order to 
“balance” access to the national grid system between regions. In most cases, 
this had the effect of transferring power-lines owned by Statnett S.F. to 
regional companies and not the other way. 
With this defeat, the idea about an integration of the network system through 
a unified national ownership had reached a dead end. The electricity network 
system remained an “irrational organizational system”. The market reform 
collective had to accept that one had to live with a large number of regional 
                                           
175 Bjørndal, Mette, Einar Hope and Hans Olav Husum: “Sentralnettets utstrekning. En 
prinisppiell analyse”. SNF-rapport 62/94. My translation 
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network companies, and that the “natural monopoly” had to be coordinated 
through regulations rather than through integrated ownership. The case also 
demonstrates how a project may break down when its opponents are capable 
of rejecting core simplified elements and force these into unmanageable 
complexity. The powers of its powerful initiators literally disappears. 
 
13.3.3 Yardstick competition and DEA analysis as a basis for  
    economic regulation 
The new concept of monopoly regulation developed in between 1995 and 
1997, took the fragmented ownership structure as its starting point. Its 
master concept was “yardstick competition”, taken from game theoretic 
economic regulation and control theory. Through administrative 
comparisons between relatively similar network companies or between 
companies and a representative model, information about the relative 
efficiency of companies could be obtained by the NVE. An incentive scheme 
could then be constructed in order to induce network owners to increase their 
efforts to become more efficient.. This is the simple principle. A practical 
real world system which does not produce severe counter-effects was a much 
more cumbersome challenge. 
The first problem was to define in practical terms what was to be measured. 
Major issues here, are to isolate historical effects from current administrative 
effects and demographic and topographical effects from organizational 
effects. One had to sort all the network companies into relatively 
homogenous groups in order to compare them. This is not easy, as 
typographical, meteorological, demographic and organizational structures 
vary tremendously from region to region. In order to sort out these 
difficulties, the NVE once again engaged professional expertise from the 
SNF. The economist Sverre Kittelsen became the core professional 
participant in the establishing of a comparative system based on the highly 
technical DEA analysis. Now, the comprehensive amount of data collected 
from each network company could be fed into a computer program which 
calculated the relative efficiency of all the network entities and sorted them 
into three groups with different efficiency levels. 
The next problem to be solved was the lack of appropriate economic 
incentives in the rate of return regulatory system. The alternative economic 
model – practiced for instance in the British network system – was a price 
cap system. Here, the regulator fixed the maximum price to be charged by 
taking the initial price and adjust it for inflation and then specify efficiency 
improvement requirements in order to arrive at a new regulated price. This 
will ensure both efficiency incentives and a division of the gains achieved 
between the firm and the consumers. The problem is that owners thereby 
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have an incentive to reduce investments, maintenance and service in order to 
increase profits.  
The solution to this problem was to establish a much more comprehensive 
regulatory system based on a principle of income regulation. In effect, the 
new system regulated both rates of return, prices, investments, quality and 
efficiency improvements in a much more detailed and complete way. For 
each and every year, the regulator decides a maximum income for each 
company based on presented budgets, expected inflation rates, delivery 
volumes, sport market prices, efficiency improvement requirements etc. for 
the year to come. Based on actually accounted results, investments, inflation 
rates, delivery volumes, sport market prices, energy losses, interest rates and 
so forth, the regulator adjusts the maximum income permitted for each 
company. Too high incomes will then be adjusted for in the next year along 
with too low incomes. A whole range of elements relevant to the company’s 
operations could then be included into a single formula to be used in the 5 
year period between 1997 and 2001176. 
In reality, this very tight economic governance system turned the entire 
electricity network system into something very close to an integrated 
hierarchy. Each company could be forced to take on efficiency 
improvements over time without having any routes to escape if it was to 
maintain a necessary economic return over time. Each network company had 
lost a substantial share of autonomous governance rights which usually 
derive from property rights. Property rights and economic governance and 
control had become nearly completely separated, and economic governance 
rights in large had become redistributed to the NVE. All of this resulted from 
a process of innovation framed by the natural monopoly concept in which 
ever more sophisticated elements extracted from economic theory were 
added to a growing system of domination and control. The case is a 
wonderful illustration of the role of economics in industrial transformation 
processes and the role and character of power as an aggregated durable 
system of loads which are constructed and collected by some entrepreneurial 
collective in order to direct behaviors in accordance with the program of the 
collective itself. 
At the same time, one can also conclude that owners as well as managers had 
received a system of governance with substantial powers to rationalize their 
network companies. Many of those found the new system very useful in this 
                                           
176 For a detailed presentation of the system, see “Retningslinjer for inntektsrammen for 
overføringstariffer, NVE Oktober 1997. 
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respect, and engaged with substantial enthusiasm to fulfill the intention of 
the new regulatory system – and some even beyond that. 
  
 
13.4 The role of economics in shaping market- and state 
governance systems 
Through the survival of two instances of severe economic problems and 
through a large number of interrelated change projects, we witness the 
process which eventually stabilized the new electricity market system as a 
durable, robust, locked-in economic system. From the representation 
presented by the SAF in 1989 which provided a new framing of the 
electricity system, and from the legislative breakthrough in 1990, a market 
system with specific industrial structures, trade systems, infrastructure 
regulations, electricity companies and economic actors emerged, largely due 
to the tremendous amount of work carried out by state regulators and 
professional economists to create these outcomes. Through the process, 
essential industrial and organizational structures were re-configured, major 
power structures shifted and essential collective cognitive patterns re-
formatted. To our model of the ontological stabilization process, we may 
now add a substantial number of additional elements: 
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Figure 13.2   Stabilizing the electricity market system by adding elements 
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All of these elements had been specifically shaped by economic theory. Non 
of them were for instance structured according to electrical engineering 
theory; the system design scientific tradition represented by Vidkunn 
Hveding and his colleagues at Norway’s Technical and Natural Science 
University (NTNU). The entire system had become reshaped on the basis of 
core concepts from within economics.  
Not all the projects were successes from the point of view of the market 
reform collective. One was an apparent failure, where as others involved 
compromises with other collectives of actors. But, over all, the outcome was 
a system with both structures and behaviors that were shaped by and thereby 
became embedded in economics as a modern scientific discipline, which 
were added to the aggregated historical power systems within or related to 
the sector.  
The process of transformation contained partly parallel, partly sequential 
projects. Some projects depended on the previous fulfillment of several other 
projects. For instance, the one of creating an effective economic regulation 
and control system for the natural monopoly system, depended specifically 
upon the successful implementation of the accounting reform, the tariff 
reform, the information gathering project and the area concession reform. 
The process accordingly needed substantial strategic coordination and 
distinct project managerial capabilities in addition to the institutional powers 
offered by state legislative and governance authority. 
The power of modern economics to break into and transform economic 
sectors categorized by strong lock-ins, seems to result from the aggregated 
capabilities of its comprehensive pool of simplified theoretical principles, 
models and concepts which address a very broad set of problems within 
economic systems. Through the translation and  mediation of these by 
trained economists, they become specifically adjusted to real life systems, 
improved upon and forced through by a combination of scientific legitimacy 
and arguments and state institutional powers. Adding to this, a large number 
of educated economists bring these theories, models and concepts to a large 
number of local activities where they – supported by the centralized reform – 
engage in re-shaping local activities in similar ways. Together, they 
constitute the aggregated powers necessary to break into, overturn and 
reshape structures which have already been shaped by other powerful 
historical collectives. 
Despite the major breakthrough for the electricity market reform collective 
with the new energy law in 1990, the outcome of individual re-shaping 
projects seem never to be guaranteed, being still dependent on actions taken 
at the frontline between the expanding economics collective and  collectives 
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that are historically locked into the industry by their own durable systems of 
power. The limited restructuring of Statkraft and the state take-over of 
Samkjøringen represent at least partial failures of the market reform 
collective to establish its preferred solutions. However, as the structural 
reform of the electricity network case demonstrates, the failure of one project 
may be countered by another project derived from an alternative approach to 
solve the same problem. The lack of integrated ownership in the “natural 
monopoly system” due to institutional lock-ins, was “solved” by separating 
property rights from de facto economic governance rights and by turning 
governance rights over to the state regulator. Detailed and sophisticated 
governance systems were then applied to the state regulator which provided 
at least as tight economic controls with local companies as what we find 
within many corporate economic systems. The game seems to be one of 
finding a passage point into the overturning of the rival collective which is 
not defended by strong institutional lock-ins.  
The exclusive role of the state regulator in economic theory, provided the 
market reform collective with a particularly useful point of entrance from 
where powerful governance systems could be constructed and applied in 
such a way as to make local economic behaviors highly predictable and 
governable. It may even be illuminating for the sake of understanding, to 
exchange the notion “state” with the notion “core of economics collective” 
in the role as the actual market system regulator; the actor responsible for 
overall social efficiency.  
 
13.4.1 The shaping of “rational economic agencies” and of  
   “economic man” 
Through the market reform process, we also witness the shaping of “rational 
economic agencies” and of real life economic man who behaves in ways 
very similar to the concept of economic agents in economics. In economic 
theory the concepts are not taken to be descriptions of real economic actors. 
On the contrary, they are thought of as extreme simplifications applied as 
assumptions in order to formalize economic problems in mathematical 
models. The striking observation, is not that these concepts of economic man 
are unrealistic, but rather that they tend to become reality through lots of 
work by economists to advance these concepts for the sake of improving 
economic efficiency in society. 
A particularly interesting case is the shaping of the power pool/market 
institution and the gradual transformation of related bilateral trade to 
organized non-relational trade. Economic theory here serves in the role as a 
“relation-destructing device” in between economic agencies by shaping 
institutions, contract systems, technologies, measurement systems, role 
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distributions etc. etc. in which actors can and are invited to calculate the 
“pure” economic value of commodities, financial contracts, risk exposures, 
etc. and trade these without reference to any other objective than to 
maximize their economic utility from the transaction.  
This way of doing trade is not a “simple and natural” way of basic human 
interaction. It is a highly specialized activity which cannot take place in any 
large scale without the constructive formative role of economics and 
economic technology systems. At this point, my observations clearly 
confirms the argument of Michel Callon that economics plays a dominant 
role in the creation of human calculative capabilities and of real life 
economic man. Through the re-shaping process, we witness the creation of 
economic man as a deliberate outcome of the efforts of the market reform 
collective to transform “irrational” economic organizations and actors. By 
accepting, understanding and “doing” the role they are given in the new 
system, irrational actors become rational. 
The role of accounting systems – or measurement systems in broader terms – 
in formatting agents is interesting in this respect. It seems to me that the 
accounting reform played a very fundamental role in the reform process by 
defining property rights in terms of capital ownership rather than community 
membership, in a highly operational way. In effect, this operational/technical 
change contained an essential change in the content of and the implicit 
distribution of property rights. It kind of “dissolved” a public cooperative 
sector and turned it into an “as-if-private” economic sector where actors 
were asked to and expected to behave as private capital owners despite the 
fact that they were still representatives of their community electors.  
Furthermore, the new accounting system provided a very powerful state 
governance tool as well as the foundation for a number of additional 
centralized regulation and control systems which aimed at governing and 
controlling some specific aspect of sector activities – like the 1996 electricity 
sector tax reform which turned public sector electricity companies into 
ordinary commercial tax objects, and the 1998 monopoly regulation and 
control regime.  
Interesting to note also, is that notions such as “liberalism” and “economic 
freedom” is not what really comes to ones mind when observing the 
transformation process. On the contrary, the new system was shaped by the 
adding of a lot more state governance systems with a capacity to govern and 
control organizations and behaviors through out the electricity sector which 
goes well beyond the capacity of the previous system. This is not only true 
for the natural monopoly part of the system, but also the competitive. At the 
same time, most of the existing state governance system was kept – notably 
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the comprehensive and powerful concession law system which became 
adjusted as well as empowered through the process. 
The natural monopoly system however, in particular illustrates the new 
capacity of modern economics to generate economic governance and control 
system which may provide a state regulator with a hierarchical governance 
capacity far more impressive than probably even thought of by Oskar Lange 
or the EdF engineers. This results from the economic legitimacy provided by 
the natural monopoly argument of course, but more so by the application of 
optimal control theory which is an “imitated market” price-theory based on 
the SRMC principle, by the application of regulation and control theory 
based on game theory with asymmetric information, by the application of 
specifically designed accounting systems and principles and economic report 
systems based on these, by the application of DEA analysis, etc. etc. 
Through these many governance concepts and instruments the electricity 
company and its actors in effect gets wrapped in from “all” directions and 
can do little but to comply.  
Through the successful fulfillment of these many projects, the new market 
system gradually moved towards a stable ontology locked into the electricity 
sector by the many new systems of power generated through the process. 
When most of the identified problems had become resolved and 
implemented as operational elements of the industrial system, we may talk of 
a mature, stable and well-functioning market system where actors behave 
mainly in accordance with the roles they have been given – as simplified 
elements of the market reform collective. The more substantial the powers 
produced and the more complete the transformation, the more predictable, 
manageable and “rational” will be their behaviors from the point of view of 
the market reformers.  
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14  Summary and conclusions  
 
A summary of my analysis exposes the many different perspectives and 
levels of investigation in a project which has aimed at both exploring theory 
and methodological concepts and approaches, and at explaining about a large 
scale economic reform. On the one hand side, there has been an exploration 
into economic and social theories, methodologies and analytical constructs 
which has aimed at finding adequate routes and tools to address the research 
questions and challenges raised. On the other side, there has been an 
empirical investigation which covers a sequence of historical events which 
ranges from very extended to rather narrow perspectives and which yields 
both some explanatory results and possibly a few normative implications. An 
adequate summary accordingly necessitates both a separate outline and a 
synthesis of these diverse contributions. 
The combination of a search for an adequate theoretical framing, for useful 
analytical concepts and for empirical knowledge, is a result of the perceived 
interdependency between theory, methodology and empirical evidence. The 
result is a mosaic of concrete evidence mingled with perspectives, concepts 
and arguments that are abstract and general. If this mix is convincing, it is 
probably not because each element of evidence or each line of argument is 
not refutable, but because the combination makes sense and provides a 
contribution to our understanding of the market-making phenomenon 
discussed. I do of course hope that my arguments seem reasonable, but I 
would be even more thrilled if I have managed to provoke further 
explorations into the phenomenon discussed by those who find the approach 
and the contributions still unsatisfactory. Then, the efforts have been worth 
the price. 
The analysis leans itself on the overall framing of a theory and methodology 
about entrepreneurial collectives presented in part 1, mostly drawing on 
contributions from sociology of science and technology and from economic 
sociology, but also with reference to other areas of scientific thought. 
Together, the theoretical apparatus collected outlines elements of a general 
methodology of change-making in society which starts out without a 
comprehensive theory of society itself, of the economy, of particular 
industries, about stable characteristics of human actors, of institutions or of 
the relative rationality of different economic systems. These types of 
phenomena are rather generated along the way through historical processes - 
in rivalry with alternative categories of actors, institutions, economic 
systems etc. Instead, one starts out with the emergence of interpretative 
categories, particular purposes of the future and cognitive frames which 
comes to define entrepreneurial collectives as “circulating entities” stabilized 
by their own holding togetherness. These entities expand by enrolling 
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elements of their environment into their own networks through processes in 
which the collective aims at stabilizing itself, its program and its collective 
things in society. They expand through processes which have been addressed 
by notions such as re-framing, re-configuration, re-shaping, re-formatting, 
molding of content and construction and collection of durable systems of 
power. The act of expansion is accordingly seen as a simultaneous 
qualitative and quantitative transformation in which a non-member human or 
non-human is enrolled and becomes a member (or a collective thing) of the 
collective. 
Because the actor-network methodology offers a different framing and a 
different set of basic categories for the type of story one can tell, it also 
invites a rethinking of some of the fundamentals in economic theories that 
are concerned with explaining economic and industrial change; theories 
which typically starts out with either stable categories of actors - like in new 
institutional economics - or with stable categories of collective institutions - 
like in economic sociology and traditional institutional economics. It is 
thereby able to bypass the apparently never ending controversy between 
these two alternatives. It also offers a particularly strong argument against 
structural and functional types of explanations like for instance mechanical 
cause arguments or Darwinian “natural selection” types of causal 
explanations about why certain economic systems and organizational forms 
exist or emerge. Rather, the approach regards them as essentially floating 
phenomena, prevailing as long as their blackboxes (simplifications) remain 
closed and as long as they are being held on to by those networks which 
somehow provided for their stabilization in society.  
In between an outline of empirical findings and normative implications on 
the one hand, and a rethinking of some of the basics in theories about 
economic change on the other, the ambition has been to address some 
theoretical problems at a more intermediate or middle-range level of 
analysis. A major focus of attention has been to investigate into the specific 
role(s) of economics in the making of the economy. This suggests a theory 
about economic efficiency which corresponds to an explanatory emphasis on 
final cause explanations; on economic efficiency as a purpose of the future. 
Such a theory should be able to outline the mechanism of change in question 
and to explain why and how scientific economics plays such a powerful role.  
Another focus has derived from the need to solve the apparent contradiction 
between the path dependency theory embraced by institutional economists 
and the radical de-locking observed. A general solution has been outlined in 
part 1 based on a critique of the limited explanatory contribution represented 
by the economic increasing returns argument in relation to “lock-in-making” 
and “de-locking”. Rather, I have suggested a path dependency theory which 
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carries more on a dynamic concept of power which makes it possible to 
explain with more substance both how lock-ins are created and how they 
may be de-locked.  
Finally, I have focussed on analytical concepts which might be useful to 
address different types of activities and events on the trajectory towards 
stabilization of an economic entrepreneurial collective, its program and its 
collective things within some sector of the economy. The summary will both 
provide a short-hand review of these elements in the context of the 
Norwegian electricity market reform, and discuss the character of the 
economic change process in terms of concepts such as purpose, trust, choice, 
chance and necessity.  
The summary is divided into three different parts. The first provides a 
summary of the major empirical findings which contribute to explaining why 
and how Norway became a hotbed for market reform of the technically 
integrated and institutionally complex and locked-in electricity system. 
Then, the stability of and some possible future challenges for the market 
reform will be discussed along with a few normative implications for other 
electricity market reforms as well as large scale economic reforms in more 
general terms. 
The second part discusses various medium range theoretical findings, theory 
constructions and suggestions which derive from the molding of the overall 
theoretical perspective and analytical concepts presented in the theoretical 
and methodological introductory with the empirical evidence presented 
through parts II - IV. 
Finally, the third section pulls back to a reflexive perspective, to the 
problems of some of the basics in theories about economic change, and to 
some of the possible problems and shortcomings of the presented theoretical 
and methodological approach at the present stage. 
 
 
14.1 The Norwegian electricity market reform process. 
What can we learn from it? 
First, we may conclude that the Norwegian electricity market reform in 
several respects is a special if not unique case. It emerged and became in part 
structured on the basis of specific natural, political and historical conditions. 
For instance, Norway is a nation with large resources of energy of different 
kinds, with absolutely no serious concern with its own future energy supply 
situation – a situation which probably provided a basic security of supply 
which provided a “relaxation” needed for voluntary and radical large scale 
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economic experiments. In this respect, the case of Norway is perhaps 
somewhat unique.  
The large hydropower resources had turned the national control issue into 
focus at an early stage. Already in the early years of the century, efforts to 
obtain such control provided the country with a highly specialized 
concession law system which secured political control at both municipal and 
state levels of administration. This system has later been subject to broad and 
fairly stable political consensus. For instance after the discovery of large oil- 
and gas resources in the North Sea, the hydro-power concession system 
became copied in order to provide a similarly strong national resource 
control and state governance system towards the “new” energy resources. 
This broad political consensus on the national resource control issue, gave 
the market reform approach a distinctive Norwegian stamp. 
Also the features of the nearly 100% hydro-power based system separates 
the Norwegian case from those of most others countries. In particular the 
early establishing of an internal, market based electricity trade system for 
generators which became established to solve a specific coordination and 
efficiency problem within the decentralized hydro-power system, provided a 
unique point of departure for an entrepreneurial market reform collective. 
The existence of a “quasi market system” during the 20 years before the 
1990 market reform, also provided an institutional, collective cognitive and 
pragmatic basis from where to expand competitive market concepts. In this 
perspective, Norway offered a case with a relatively “short distance” from a 
pre-market to a competitive market system. 
Second, we may conclude that the Norwegian case may offer a typical case 
in terms of the making of a new market system. The Norwegian market 
reform can primarily be seen as a re-framing and restructuring of the 
integrated “Edison central station system” so that some of its functions 
became framed as “system-internal” markets. The reform was not about 
ownership or resource control, but about governance system, about prices, 
trade systems, investments and economic efficiency in a national resource 
allocative perspective. Quite on the contrary, the prevention of unwanted 
“spillovers” from the new competitive market system to the national 
resource control issue was a vital political concern – and it still is. The 
problem is that the competitive market model is theoretically and 
ideologically connected to private property rights for reasons spelled out for 
instance by Ludvig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek; mainly “the economic 
incentive of private capital owners” type of argument. The establishing of a 
competitive market brings along with it scientific and ideological arguments 
for privatization – which in a world with free equity markets might rapidly 
undermine traditional national property control rights over the hydro-power 
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resources. The Norwegian electricity market reform is accordingly in a 
crucial sense a hybrid similar to the ideas of Ota Sik; a competitive market 
shaped by economic theory within a hierarchically and politically controlled 
system. In the longer term however, the stability of this hybrid will be put to 
severe economic and political testing. Already, we see clear tendencies 
towards a larger role for the equity capital market in the system. 
On the other hand, efforts to establish a market in a situation where neither 
the categories of actors nor institutions seem to fit, has provided us with an 
outstanding opportunity to test the hypothesis that the functioning of markets 
does not result from pre-given, stable features of economic actors or from 
pregiven social institutions, but from a process in which actors and 
institutions are being acted upon; re-framed, disentangled, educated, re-
structured, configured and re-formatted by dedicated market making 
entrepreneurial collectives. Because of the apparent institutional and agency 
“contradictions” which results from the molding of inconsistent cognitive 
models, we have also been able to investigate into some of the many 
problems and mutual transformations involved in processes of creating and 
expanding a new market system, on which basis we may try to generalize a 
few insights. 
  
14.1.1 Why and how Norway became a hotbed for electricity 
    market reforms 
The overall explanation of why and how Norway became one of the first to 
carry out a radical market reform in this area, is derived from a triangulation 
of four different perspectives.  
- One focussed on a variety of entrepreneurial collectives with different 
reform programs, who aimed at improving the economic efficiency 
and rationality of the sector in between 1960 and approximately 1985.  
- The second focussed on developments within economic thought and 
within economic policy-making internationally since the late 1960s, 
and followed these influences to Norway, through the credit market 
reform and the new public management program enforced by the 
conservative and the coalition governments in between 1980 and 
1986.  
- The third turned the attention towards the electricity sector research 
activities headed by Einar Hope at NHH in Bergen, and the emergence 
of the SAF research institution.  
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- Finally, a fourth perspective was obtained from a focus on the roles of 
Tormod Hermansen, the 1986 Labor government’s modernization 
program, the Ministry of Finance and the role of the Steigum 
Committee in initiating the electricity market reform.  
Together these perspectives provide the main empirical elements to my 
explanation about the breakthrough for the electricity market reform. 
My first argument is that the market reform alternative became possible 
because of the failure of existing alternative reform programs to create 
sufficiently decisive breakthroughs for their alternative programs. What I 
have called “The Hveding system design collective” made important 
contributions to the electricity system by introducing scientific electricity 
economics in the tradition of EdF, by enforcing the establishing of the 
“occasional power market” for electricity generators, by constructing an 
integrated simulation model for the entire electricity system as a new system 
design governance instrument177, and by pushing for an integration of the 
Norwegian hydropower system with neighboring thermal power production 
systems. But, it did not manage to create a decisive breakthrough for a 
scientifically guided pricing and investment practice based on the LRMC 
principle advocated – not a least because of the critique from the economics 
profession at this point. The economists on their side, fell short of 
developing an operational alternative which would have made it possible to 
apply their preferred SRMC pricing principle instead. 
Another powerful entrepreneurial collective was dedicated towards the 
introduction of atomic power. A breakthrough for this program would have 
shaped energy legislation, industrial structures and the political agenda in a 
very different direction. As it turned out, the collective broke down for a 
multiplicity of reasons - one of which was the strength of local resistance 
towards locating atomic power plants in their neighborhood, which resulted 
in part from NVE’s efforts to fulfill the requirements of the new area 
planning legislation. Its most significant contribution to our story in the end, 
appears to have been the initiative by parliament to work out a new energy 
legislation. This put a legislative reform on the track already in the early 
1970s. 
The third reform program at the time was the hierarchical restructuring 
approach which aimed at reshaping the electricity sector into a hierarchical 
order partly influenced by the French EdF, partly by large American utilities. 
                                           
177 Known as the EFI-model. 
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The program was institutionalized by the Labor government in 1960 and was 
driven primarily from the NVE’s E-directorate, associated with Gunnar 
Vatten, Asbjørn Vinjar and Erling Diesen. The program met stubborn 
opposition from local cooperative interests, and in particular the state-county 
model advocated by Vinjar became a target for attacks from the established 
cooperative and federative public sector organizational systems through out 
the sector. These had managed to reinforce their positions after the 
breakdown of an ambitious hierarchical program in 1922 as well as during 
WWII, when the cooperative system became a national defense line in the 
face of loss of control with state institutions. The result was a slow process 
of restructuring of the sector by any relevant international comparison, 
largely advancing through general restructuring of municipalities into larger 
entities. A radical hierarchical reform was rejected by parliament in 1980 
and turned over to the Energy Law Commission, which came up with a 
moderated compromise in 1985 – at a point of time when state-hierarchical 
models had been substantially politically discredited in general. 
To sum up this argument, I would say that the openness to a market oriented 
alternative within the electricity sector did not follow from any severe crisis 
or failures within the established system to adjust in reasonable ways to 
immediate perceived problems - like for instance the excess generating 
capacity problem in the early 1980s and the associated price differences 
between occasional and firm power in the early 1980s. It rather followed 
from the failure to generate powerful improvements in the perceived 
economic rationality of the sector as compared to the electricity systems in 
other European countries. The lack of any decisive breakthroughs for any of 
the entrepreneurial programs in the 1970s and -80s left frustrations in 
different camps – which opened up for some alternative route178. The 
mechanism of change was not primarily one of real life economic testing, 
but one of efforts to solve specific problems from the perspective of 
economic theory, to outline different solutions and to overturn the 
established order by means of a specific program for the shaping of the 
future system.  
My second argument is that the market reform alternative came to represent 
the operational alternative to the theoretical arguments put forward by the 
economists already in the 1970s. The shaping of the program in part resulted 
                                           
178 It is also interesting to note that all the different alternative programs at the time - except 
the environmental - had economic efficiency as a major purpose, however shaped by different 
interpretative categories, models, technologies and logic. They were all economic in this 
basic interpretation. 
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from the international reorientation towards deregulation and markets, and in 
part from Einar Hope’s empirical research on the functioning of the 
occasional power marked - including efforts to solve immediate problems to 
actors operating in this market179. From there, it expanded through a number 
of economic research projects at the SAF which both addressed a broad 
range of empirical questions and efforts to acquire and work out relevant 
theoretical knowledge. The specific organization of the SAF research 
institution as a collective institution for NHH researchers, was an important 
element in the networking system in which the market reform collective 
emerged. It was the aggregation of this work and these organizational 
structures which generated a scientific and later on, a pragmatic, operational 
reform alternative. 
Finally, there is a line of argument from the international reorientation of 
economics and economic policy-making to early initiatives for a credit 
market reform in Norway in 1977/78, through the new public management 
program which among other things resulted in the restructuring of NVE in 
1985/86 in which Statkraftverkene became separated as a semi-autonomous, 
somewhat more business oriented state company, to the efforts to modernize 
the labor party and to the tight cooperation between the Ministry of Finance 
and economists at NHH represented by the Steigum Committee. This line of 
argument at the same time follows Tormod Hermansen from his early 
cooperation with Einar Hope at the SAF in the early 1970s, through his 
position as an assistant minister to Per Kleppe in the Ministry of Finance 
during the early part of the credit market reform, through his important role 
in carrying out various new public management programs in the early 1980s 
to his new position as the administrative leader of the Ministry of Finance 
from 1986 to 1991. Hermansen in several ways played core networking roles 
in several market oriented reforms within the frameworks of the public 
sector through the period – including the efforts at modernizing the Labor 
Party in between 1986 and 1989. Under his leadership and the initiatives of 
the Steigum Committee, the electricity market reform became mobilized as a 
political-administrative reform in a cooperation between the Ministry of 
Finance, the NHH economists and the Einar Hope electricity market reform 
collective at the SAF. As such, the reform became a major representation of 
a broader program for economic reform represented by the NHH economists 
and the Ministry of Finance under the Hermansen leadership – backed by the 
AP leadership/government, but without broad support from within the party. 
                                           
179 In itself, this activity can be seen as one of the many local projects hooked on to the 
international “circulating reference” associated with market reorientation at the time. 
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Another important feature of the reform, was the absence of close links to 
deregulation processes in other countries. These of course caused inspiration 
in broad as well as scientific and political “backing”, but the actual 
development of the reform program was primarily based on Einar Hope’s 
empirically oriented IO-SCP tradition. This, I believe, substantially 
strengthened the ability of the program to tailor-make a new system based on 
pragmatic applications of economic theory to the complexities of the 
historically established Norwegian system.  
I have also argued that the new governance system was largely added to 
existing governance systems and provided substantial roles not only for 
competitive actors, but also for hierarchical governance and control in line 
with the Oskar Lange/EdF tradition. This was in particular true in relation to 
the electricity network system where most of the employees within the sector 
are engaged. This provided for an ability to transform also the NVE based 
part of the hierarchical restructuring collective, who came to play an 
important new role as the state regulator in the shaping of the new market 
system. 
These diverse events explain why the electricity market reform program 
managed to emerge as a viable scientific-political-administrative reform 
alternative. From there, I have argued that the breakthrough for the market 
reform followed partly from the unique powers of economics to shape 
conceptions of what is economically rational and efficient, from the 
construction of a visual representation of the market system in the form of a 
comprehensive research report, from the molding of the program to fit with 
the national resource control consensus and the locked-in powers of the local 
cooperatives, from the complex networking activities carried out by the 
Hermansen market reform collective within the state administration, from 
strategic maneuvers in parliament and from the substantial information 
activity carried out by Hope and his colleagues through out the electricity 
sector during 1989.  
However, other representatives of the Labor Party managed to force the 
government to go for the hierarchical restructuring reform represented by the 
1985 Energy Law Commission, and a decisive breakthrough for the market 
reform alternative only became possible because the outcome of the 
parliamentary election forced the Labor Party to withdraw. In the new 
coalition government, Minster of Petroleum and Energy, Eivind Reiten, 
ensured the necessary political alliances with both the power intensive 
industry and the local cooperative systems represented by his own party 
“Senterpartiet”, behind the marked reform alternative. 
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Many features of the new system were however still open to controversy, 
and the actual shaping and stabilization of the market system resulted from a 
stepwise resolving of and carrying out of a multiplicity of change projects 
during which the market reform collective managed to maintain fairly tight 
controls with the process, and to shape the various parts of the system in line 
with its theoretical principles and its initial operational reform models. The 
most important exceptions from this picture, was the state takeover of the 
power pool from the collective of generators represented by Samkjøringen 
and the “failure” to restructure ownership within the electricity network 
system in accordance with the natural monopoly theory. It was only after the 
settlement of and the carrying out of these many change projects, that the 
new market system became stabilized and irrefutable to those who opposed 
to the whole idea or to some specific features of the new system. Through 
these many projects, the new market system became locked into the sector 
by an aggregated, durable system of domination of power which partly 
forced, partly induced actors on the outside of the entrepreneurial collective 
to get on the inside and thereby expanded the reform program through out 
the sector. The process of stabilization accordingly had elements of both 
purpose, of choice, of chance and of a successive strategic shaping of 
necessary pre-conditions for further expansion and stabilization process.  
 
14.1.2 The stability of the electricity market reform, and some of 
             its future challenges 
At the end of the 1990s, the Norwegian electricity market system appears to 
be a highly robust economic system, still in transformation towards more 
competitive and more “economically” governed structures and behaviors. 
Piece by piece the traditional public sector cooperative and federative system 
is being replaced by organizational models taken from equity owned firms 
and their related research traditions. Ownership- and managerial controls are 
increasingly being separated. Municipalities behave more and more like 
equity owners who extract dividends from their firms, adjusts capital 
structures to tax rules, sell out their electricity companies in order to transfer 
capital to other purposes, or buy other companies in order to gain more 
advantageous commercial positions. Disentangled electricity network 
companies integrate regionally through mergers and acquisitions. Electricity 
trade is increasingly dominated by professional traders operating on a non-
relational basis in sophisticated electricity trade systems, and consumers to 
an increasing extend shop electricity across suppliers in fairly simplistic 
ways. Competition seemingly works and the hydropower resource base is 
still under tight national control through continuous public ownership and 
state legislation. Not many really doubts whether the market system fits or 
not. It certainly does – as many of its different elements have been 
rearranged so as to become fit. 
 319 
In the meantime, the EU Commission has strengthened its efforts to 
deregulate the European electricity industry by pushing an ambitious 
program for competition and by stepwise adding new regulatory instruments 
and capabilities. Denmark and the Netherlands are about to embark on 
general market reforms and electricity exchanges are being introduced also 
within regional power systems in Germany. Spain introduced a new market 
oriented legislation in 1997. Even the French EdF seems to be backing off as 
a result of recent moves by the Commission. The market system is obviously 
in a state of European expansion.  
Yet, there are of course real life tests of the Norwegian market system that 
have not yet come to the surface. One of those is “the capacity expansion 
test”. Due to the inherited over-capacity established in the early 1980s and 
the access to foreign thermal power systems with excess capacity, 
investments in new power generating capacity in Norway have steadily 
declined from a capacity of 9,5 TWh licensed and under construction in 
1980, to 5,2 TWh in 1985, to 3,5 in 1990 and only 1,7 TWh in 1997180. The 
country is currently a net electricity importer as the expected average 
production capacity is 113 TWh where as gross consumption is around 118 
TWh. The still large volatility in prices from year to year, appears to have 
caused substantial uncertainty and sort of a “go-stop-go-stop” impression of 
investment projects. Also the very political character of investment decisions 
and the conflicts with the environmentalists over large gas turbine projects 
and the carbondioxide emission regime, complicate the relationship between 
market signals and actual investments. 
However, given the expansion of an open international market for electricity, 
investments that are not forced by environmental regulations like close-
downs of nuclear power plants, are likely to be small in generation and 
somewhat larger in transmission capacity in order to expand trade 
opportunities to exploit available capacities and benefits from the integration 
of different technologies and regions. In this situation, investments in the 
Norwegian system is likely first and foremost to reflect the new role of the 
Scandinavian hydropower system as a peak load provider to the larger 
North-European thermal power system. Because these investments primarily 
will take place in the market infrastructure natural monopoly system, 
electricity engineering (system design engineering) is still in operational 
command to direct a large share of actual investments towards those 
alternatives which add the more efficiency to the overall system rather than 
to alternatives which provide the more profits to individual project owners. 
                                           
180 Central Statistical Bureau (SSB), Electricity statistics, 1996 
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Whether the generating capacity expansion test will also be successfully 
passed, accordingly remains to be seen. 
There are certainly also important tensions within the new system which 
relates to some of the core blackboxes of the market system – like the 
interpretation of and the shaping of the point tariff system, the extension of 
the national grid infrastructure system and the political versus commercial 
role of municipalities. Any forced opening of the simplifications which 
serves as major building blocks in the market system, potentially threatens to 
undermine the stability – or the lock-in - of the system. Or it will induce 
major changes directed by new blackboxed concepts. An important direction 
of development in the latter case – appears to be a gradual reframing of the 
interpretation of the natural monopoly concept in combination with a 
continued creation of competitive systems related to the many functions of 
the electricity network system. 
 
14.1.3 Some implications for other market reform projects 
In the European perspective, the Norwegian electricity market reform 
represents an important point of departure for a process which is expanding 
from the north towards central Europe. As noted in the introductory, the 
“Nordic model” has become quite influential as an approach to market 
reforms in several other countries, based on its “deregulation without 
privatization” approach. I find that there are a few insights from my study 
which might have some value to those engaged in such reform initiatives. 
First, it should be noted that a market institution established from basic 
concepts within economic theory was introduced in the Norwegian 
electricity system already in 1971. Even though it was a closed market for 
generators, it permitted practitioners through out the industry to gain 
substantial experience and familiarity with a competitive market trade 
system before the radical expansion of the market nearly 20 years later. It 
also established basic concepts such as “third party access” and “short run 
marginal cost pricing” as stabilized principles within the national trade 
system. Through the efforts of Hveding and his system design collective to 
link thermal power plants to the Norwegian hydropower system, Sweden and 
Denmark also became associated with the internal power market – even 
though with Statkraft as an intermediate. To establish an operational internal 
power exchange system or to get access to such a system may be a useful, 
pragmatic way of getting the process started – rather than to embark directly 
on the political process needed to force changes through legislation. 
Second, it can be noted that the reform emerged out of a large empirical 
research program in which economists  
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1) gained substantial in detail knowledge about the electricity system and 
its practices,  
2) engaged in practical trouble shooting and innovative activities to 
improve the efficiency of specific elements of the system,  
3) established additional research projects in which broader theoretical 
problems became addressed and linked to the empirical problems studied 
and  
4) mobilized a network of colleagues capable of translating, mediating and 
applying basic economic concepts as well as a wide range of new 
contributions from within economics.  
Together, this permitted for the ability to work out an alternative system on 
the basis of relatively moderate institutional changes in the existing system. 
This suggests that it might not be a good idea to copy somebody else’s 
system. Rather one should find operational solutions through iteration 
between empirical studies and theory – and then apply elements developed 
elsewhere where it might fit into an operational re-framing. 
As a third point it should be noted that the reform process was intimately 
tied into powerful locked-in features of the Norwegian system. These had 
become established through the maintenance and reinforcement of durable 
systems of power established by historical entrepreneurial collectives within 
the sector as well as within the political community. The reform became 
possible because the scientific economic reform program through political 
mediation became framed in such a way as to respect the most basic political 
stronghold; national resource control. It furthermore became possible 
because the program provided sufficient links to powerful hierarchical 
networks within the sector and thereby avoided multiple frontlines. 
Also the rapid, incremental and in part “irrational” political decision process 
was important in the sense that it did not open up the stage to a possible 
mobilization of powerful opposition and multiple, simultaneous frontlines. 
This permitted the entrepreneurial collective behind the reform program to 
add new elements to their program through the process and thereby increase 
its capacity to overturn resistance from rival collectives. It also served to 
reduce complexity, to concentrate powers in order to force decisive 
breakthroughs and to generate solutions to problems which “popped up” 
along the way through sequential innovative activities. 
Finally, it can be observed that the apparent success of the Norwegian 
market reform in terms of its stability and its reshaping of real world 
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industrial structures, organizations and economic agents, was crucially 
dependent on the success of a large number of specific reform projects in 
which concepts from within economic theory were applied to reframe, re-
configure and re-format all the various parts of the system in accordance 
with the re-framing represented by the overall program. Through these 
innovative projects, new concepts from within economics became applied so 
as to radically increase the capacity for economic regulation and control 
through out the system. The case demonstrates that through collective 
cognitive re-framing and the introduction of new governance technologies 
and concepts, economic behaviors can be fairly radically transformed – 
without any substantial privatization of property rights. This suggests that 
from the point of view of a state which does not hold major property rights 
within its public sector electricity system, there is no particular sense in 
directly confronting property rights holders. Deregulation without 
privatization may be a more powerful and less constrained approach than 
generally believed by economists. 
In the more Norwegian perspective, we should be prepared to recognize that 
the specific system we have established is both tied closely into the 
uniqueness of our history and the uniqueness of our hydro-power electricity 
system. The market reform emerged in an effort to expand and reshape a 
unique internal electricity trade system which had become established to 
solve a very specific problem in a hydropower system within a semi-
structured and fairly decentral governance system.  
Countries with systems based on other technologies and resource bases and 
with different organizational structures inherited from history, are likely to 
be better off with systems that are specifically designed from the uniqueness 
of their own system rather than from copying ours. This does not mean that 
we should not give advice on the basis of our experiences. It rather implies 
that we should have tremendous respect for the differences and the specific 
challenges others will have to cope with – in which elements of our system 
might or might not fit in. 
As a contribution to the understanding of market reform processes in the 
very general perspective also discussed in the introduction of this thesis, 
there are a few additional things to be said. It seems to me that the ability to 
create a successful market reform both depends on the quality, the 
institutional-organizational positions and the extension of the entrepreneurial 
collective in relation to their object of transformation. It seems to be 
important for the initiators of such reforms to be able to associate with a 
competent and well organized community of economists with substantial 
professional authority, with specialized and detailed knowledge about the 
object of reform – including its physics and technologies, and with 
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competence on or access to a wide range of economic theories needed to 
innovate and tailor make appropriate and powerful solutions to many 
different parts of the system.  
It is also important to establish close ties between such an economics 
community and actors in commanding height positions towards the object of 
reform. This might very well be in the state administration, but may also 
origin elsewhere – like in large companies, sector organizations, political 
parties and the like. These may have to adjust the juxtaposition of simplified 
elements in the economic program in such a way as to make it politically 
feasible, to reshape it so as to be able to associate with powerful networks of 
actors needed to carry through the core of the program. Such an adjustment 
might even contain the rejection of concepts within economics – such as the 
role of the state or of private property rights. Such an alignment necessitates 
hands-on, competent strategic and political leadership with access to a 
multiplicity of networks.   
The ability to create a decisive breakthrough for and stabilization of a radical 
economic reform, not only depends on clear cut theoretical framing, 
adjustments to present circumstances, the production of visual 
representations and access to the relevant commanding heights. It is also 
dependent on the education of delegates on which the expansion of the 
program on the outside of the overview and control of the reform 
enunciators can be based. These delegates are needed to bring the program 
into the vast number of local activities, to ensure local support and 
transformation in accordance with the purpose of the reform program. 
Without a large number of delegates distributed through out the system, 
actors are likely to enter and leave the program in for the entrepreneurial 
collective unpredictable ways. They might also reject the roles they are 
given and mobilize substantial efforts to undermine the new program, or 
they might reshape it in order to exploit it for purposes not consistent with 
the program. Over time this is likely to cause a breakdown of the reform 
from lack of transformative capacity, seemingly irrational or uncontrollable 
behaviors and unmanageable complexity.  
Education and distribution of a large number of trusted delegates of this 
type, by necessity takes time. If they are not already there, the chance of a 
radical economic reform to stabilize in the short run is likely to be small. 
This suggests that in the case where a sufficiently extended entrepreneurial 
collective is not available in the short run, an approach where you embark on 
more limited, stepwise reforms in which you both produce visible 
representations and educate delegates are likely to be a more successful 
alternative - both in the short and in the long run. 
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Finally, in this very broad perspective, it might be noted that traditional 
arguments from market  economics and business strategy literature about the 
lack of innovative capacity within the state, may be at least partly rejected. 
When it comes to re-shaping industries and force them and their actors to 
become more efficient, state officials may be just as innovative as private 
businesses. After all, states are agencies for collective national economic 
interests and are sometimes instructed to behave accordingly. They might 
even employ individuals with impressive innovative and networking 
capabilities.  
The idea that states have no significant roles to play in open, international 
competitive markets, is accordingly just as misguided. In particular the 
opportunity for tight alliances between scientific economic communities and 
networks of actors within the state administration, may turn out to be a 
tremendously potent alliance for economic transformation. The economists 
have access to an enormous international production of economic 
governance models and technologies as well as to the education of a large 
number of delegates. State officials provide access to unique state powers. It 
certainly takes lots of international market forces to generate an equivalent 
of transformative powers towards local behaviors. 
  
14.2 Medium range theoretical findings and suggestions 
In broad terms, I find that the actor-network theory provides a both flexible 
and powerful analytical apparatus to analysis of economic change, industrial 
transformations and in particular  the emergence of modern market 
economies. Rather than adding concepts such as of social networks to a 
theory of markets, it holds the capacity to explain the interaction of such 
concepts with the economy as a major characteristic of the shaping of 
economic systems, -organizations, -agents and -practices. That is, it takes as 
its object of study also the interaction of economics in broad with the 
economy. As such, I find that it represents a more appropriate and powerful 
approach than “the social construction of the economy” alternative 
represented by McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz. A particular strength is 
exactly that it does not start out from any stabilized conceptions of either 
individual actors, collective structures or institutions, but rather starts from 
the interaction of purpose formation, language and concept creation and 
human discourse in which new concepts and ideas are being born. Rather 
than providing a privileged explanatory status to either individuals, 
interpersonal relations or institutions, the theory opens up to the study of the 
interaction of actors and networks of different kinds associated with those 
hybrid entities that are engaged in the remaking of society in some way or 
another. 
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I think that my study on several occasions confirm the importance of 
interpersonal networks, but only in as far as they concern the purpose of 
their joint projects. Relationships between theories, between organizations 
and institutions and between positions were also important in a similar 
interpretation.  
Also the often articulated essential role of entrepreneurs is confirmed – both 
as the initiators and inventors of the simplifications and juxtapositions which 
make up their programs, and as the strategic directors and coordinators of 
entrepreneurial collectives in the larger scale. Without a dedicated strategic 
leadership determined to create a breakthrough for its program, the collective 
entities that I have studied would probably not have been able to succeed in 
reaching any stabilized state within the electricity sector. But leadership 
alone is not potent. A potent leadership capable of creating decisive 
breakthroughs, is dependent on its access to and relations to devices, 
concepts, institutions and networks by which to aggregate persuasive 
capabilities – by which to extend their range of operations.  
 
14.2.1 The role of economics in the economy  
Economics and the economics community offers a tremendous amount of 
such concepts, theories, networks and institutions to entrepreneurial leaders 
oriented towards economic and industrial improvements and changes. These 
are generated from the interaction of economists with the economy world 
wide and from the iteration between theory generation and practical problem 
solving at levels ranging from international credit, monetary and equity 
markets through national, sector and organizational trouble shooting to the 
adjustment of operational routines and specific incentive systems at very 
local levels of operation. As such, main stream economics is more about 
performing the economy than about explaining it. A major purpose is to help 
improving economic efficiency in society. It should accordingly be of no 
surprise if powerful entrepreneurial collectives engaged in the reshaping of a 
sector of a nation’s economy, emerged from within the middle of the 
scientific economics profession itself.  
 
14.2.1.1 Economic efficiency as a purpose of the future or as a test 
          mechanism? 
Rather than assuming that a market based system succeeded because it was 
the more efficient in an immediate sense, my analysis demonstrates that the 
immediate success of and the stability of the reform followed from the 
construction of a persuasive alternative derived from economics, from its 
support from scientific and state-administrative networks, and from its 
mediation through political adjustments so as to align it with major locked in 
features of the established system. Success followed from the activity of 
 326 
these networks to transform the many different elements of the electricity 
system in a strategic way through a multiplicity of interrelated reform 
projects. Only when these many projects had produced substantial new 
structural, institutional and cognitive circumstances within the sector, the 
stability of the market reform became irrefutable. Through these many 
projects, what was perceived of by the enunciators as more efficient in 
theory, gradually became transformed into a stabilized real life system where 
its actual efficiency could be tested in the overall market economic and 
political systems. 
Economic efficiency is thereby found to play two distinctly different roles in 
economic transformations. One relates to the real life testing of what has 
become stabilized as either  industrial systems, organizational systems, trade 
systems, behavioral systems etc., commonly referred to as the market 
selection mechanism. Here profitability and prices to consumers play 
essential roles. However, the mechanism is not one of functional selection, 
but one of testing the stability, “the holding together” and the problem 
solving capability of program specific collectives. The other role rather 
relates to economic efficiency as a purpose of the future. What is important 
here, is the ability to turn into reality what starts out as a specific framing or 
program for the advancement of economic efficiency in some sense. Here, 
economics as ideology - in the words of Bromley – becomes important as 
well as its scientific or argumentative persuasiveness. 
This second role was essential also in the Edison versus Morgan case 
discussed by McGuire, Granovetter and Schwartz. It was the success of 
Edison in persuading European investors about the long term economic 
efficiency superiority of his large scale central station approach, and his 
production of networks and delegates to support his program, which in the 
end outperformed Morgan’s approach. We must therefor reject their 
argument that economic efficiency did not decide upon the outcome. But, 
similar to their findings and arguments, the Norwegian electricity market 
reform case demonstrates that the ability of some economic-technological 
efficiency concept to outperform another, depends on its persuasiveness in 
addition to the construction of networks associated with it and its ability to 
link on to networks of actors which may use the program and its actors and 
collective things to advance their own projects. Industrial transformations 
primarily has to do with this second role of economic efficiency; economic 
efficiency as a purpose of the future.  
But, as I have also demonstrated, the breakdown of an established economic 
system through its failure to pass the market test or the success of rival 
collectives in forcing a breakdown of its stability over time, in specific cases 
may serve as necessary preconditions for a radical new approach to be able 
 327 
to create a decisive breakthrough. In the end, it all comes down to the 
relative persuasiveness of the present system as opposed to new alternatives. 
If a new alternative is sufficiently convincing, a radical transformation may 
occur without a previous severe failure or weakening of the established 
system. We may also infer that economic crisis may be an important point of 
departure, but hardly a sufficient condition for successful economic 
transformation. On the contrary, it may reflect a limited capability within 
political, scientific and commercial communities to construct and support 
new entrepreneurial collectives which may also prevent a new approach 
from carrying out the wide range of change projects needed to stabilize a 
new system. 
The “purpose of the future” role of economic efficiency in shaping economic 
systems and economic activity, points at the very powerful role of 
economics in these processes as it constitutes the scientific area which is 
specifically dedicated to this issue. In particular the market reorientation 
which started in the late 1960s and the rapid expansion in economic and 
business management theorizing which followed, appear to have moved the 
economics profession into an even more powerful entrepreneurial position in 
large scale as well as smaller scale economic and industrial transformation 
processes – possibly at the expense of the engineer profession. This appears 
not only to follow from the increased role of market competition in the 
economy which was in essence the outcome of these processes. It also 
follows from the increased capability of economics and the economics 
community to produce economic system alternatives where economic 
efficiency as well as governance controls have in fact been substantially 
improved. The increased powers of economics can accordingly be traced 
back to the rapid growth in the production of economic theory, economic 
governance models at both state and firm levels, economic measurement 
systems etc. 
  
14.2.1.2 Economics as a devise for the destruction of social relations 
            and for the shaping of economic man and economic agencies 
Powers, interests and social networks are changeable phenomena just like 
the economic systems they are thought of as the directors of. In order to 
explain economic change, we have to account for these changing phenomena 
as well. What we find then, is that a new framing within economics 
supported by constructed new concepts and capabilities, provided for new 
links to economic governance actors such as states and firms. These new 
networks of actors, concepts, governance technologies and institutions 
gradually generated breakthroughs for systems which forced social 
structures in trade systems apart and turned them into non-socially related 
trade systems similar to concepts within economic theory. Modern 
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economics may thus serve as a device which dissolves social networks 
traditionally embedded in markets and turns economic actors into “atomic 
entities” calculating their individual utilities, and economic agencies into 
systems where their individual actors are surrounded by a multiplicity of 
governance systems as well as formatted so as to behave more strictly in 
accordance with the economic objectives of their controllers (principals). 
They became “undersocialized” or “oversocialized” to use Granovetter’s 
terms181, through the tremendous formative capacity of economics itself.  
The two different roles of economic efficiency implies that economic actors 
analytically can be separated into two different kinds. One is represented by 
the actor within entrepreneurial collectives who is engaged in reshaping 
economic systems, technologies, economic agencies and economic 
behaviors. The other is represented by the one acted upon, the one to take on 
the form of “a rational economic man” as described by economic theory - as 
a preferred outcome of the transformation process. Economists engaged in 
such reform processes do not themselves necessarily behave in accordance 
with the commonly expressed “economic utility” oriented concept of 
economic man in economic theory182. Rather than being directed by 
individual economic gains, they are primarily engaged in shaping economic 
systems in accordance with their beliefs, their unique knowledge and their 
common theoretical models and methods. They engage on behalf of their 
professional community in entrepreneurial, innovative re-making of industry 
and economy projects. 
This does of course not mean that economists may not serve in the role as 
“rational profit oriented economic man” or that economic practitioners never 
take on the entrepreneurial role. In fact, practitioners often form 
entrepreneurial collectives in which economists engage on the basis of 
individual economic gains, for instance as business consultants.  
 
14.2.2 Path dependency, de-locking and mechanisms of radical 
    industrial and economic change 
The theory of path dependency has been broadly embraced by economists 
within the institutional camp. There are however, different versions of this 
                                           
181 Granovetter, 1985 
182 Any choice or behavior may of course be described as consistent with some specific utility 
preference function of an individual – as the concept is based on an analytical 
(tautological) statement. What is referred to here, is the more “popular” version based on 
monetary gains. 
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theory which more or less explicitly draw on different types of basic 
explanatory arguments, ranging from economic efficiency to power to the 
broad holistic versions. I have argued in the theoretical introductory that the 
economic increasing returns argument may very well be correct, but that its 
explanatory capacity is unsatisfactory small. This problem both relates to the 
actual creation of a lock-in, to the maintenance of it and to the eventual de-
locking in the form of some kind of revolutionary change. The actor-network 
concepts in my view provides a more adequate and comprehensive approach. 
To me, the concept of translation in combination with a concept of power, 
where power is defined as the aggregated chain of elements (loads) in 
durable systems of domination, has been particularly useful in this respect. 
They describe what is involved in the creation of decisive breakthroughs and 
maintenance of  predictable behaviors within industries.  
We may now rewind on a couple of additional insights into the path 
dependency phenomenon. First and foremost, we may conclude that 
entrepreneurial collectives with programs in which economic efficiency or 
profitability plays a major role, provide a direct link between the increasing 
returns argument and the dynamic power argument. This follows when the 
establishing of a lock-in through a decisive breakthrough for such a 
collective, provides the opportunity for rapid and extensive transformations 
of its environment and for stabilization of economic concepts that are 
believed to increase economic efficiency or profitability. Given the 
breakthrough, increasing returns are likely to follow from a rapid expansion 
of these concepts. The power argument and the increasing returns argument 
in this case becomes two sides of the same coin. The mechanism of a lock-in 
creation can be understood from the dynamic power argument as the more 
basic concept, but where economic efficiency or profitability as a purpose of 
the future in the special (economic) case plays a very essential role in the 
creation of, the maintenance of and the breakdown of such powers. 
Second, the different historical entrepreneurial collectives discussed through 
out this thesis, demonstrate that de-locking may occur in different ways – for 
instance depending upon the extent by which established locked-in systems 
have been de-stabilized by real life economic tests, from external chocks like 
wars or severe economic crisis or by efforts from rival entrepreneurial 
collectives to undermine their stability. The capturing of and re-shaping of 
the relevant commanding heights within the state administration was perhaps 
the most typical route to a radical takeover by some new program – like the 
post-war large scale state-industry program, the hierarchical restructuring 
program, the Hveding system design program and the market reform 
program.  
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However, the de-locking usually also had a character of strategic association 
between a well established historical collective and an emerging 
entrepreneurial collective which permitted the new collective to establish 
their concepts, principles, measurement systems, technologies and devices in 
order to address a large number of the locked-in collective things more or 
less from within the sector and at a local scale. Rather than confronting 
locked-in systems jointly and directly, there was a search for a basis for 
association, and for the establishing of passage points for what we may call 
"Trojan horses" – exemplified by the concept of the state-regulator in 
economic theory and the accounting reform. The actual de-locking followed 
from the aggregated effects of the diverse changes induced or forced by 
these Trojan horses in combination with the programmatic statements of the 
new collective and the aggregated system of loads at its disposal. 
We may thus conclude that a powerful strategy for radical large scale 
economic reform – apart from constructing representations and elements of a 
durable system of powers – has to be concerned with purposeful de-locking 
activities, which typically would take the form of a search for possible points 
of entrance through which constructed elements of the program can be 
strategically placed within the existing locked-in system. By relating to these 
“Trojan horses” and by adding loads and additional elements to them, 
sequential reforms and changes becomes possible. This in turn both 
destabilize - or obstruct - the locked-in system and add momentum to the 
change program. It seems to me that the power of the sequential strategic 
approach exactly has to do with this simultaneous de-locking and 
momentum-generating-through-partial-transformation character of radical 
change processes. 
 
14.2.3   The trajectory of a large scale economic reform 
The electricity market reform has been described as a process which passed 
through several stages. However, it does not support the idea that some 
specific sequence of events can explain the outcome of later events in some 
direct mechanical sense. It rather suggests a different version of necessity. 
Specific elements, which can be conceptualized in general terms, serve as 
necessary conditions for certain later events to be able to occur. Both 
purpose, choice, chance events and necessary preconditions seems to be 
important aspects of industrial and economic change (Mandelbaum, 1987). 
First, let us summarize our findings of conceptual elements in the trajectory 
of industrial transformations towards “improvements in the methods of 
doing things”. 
First of all, someone had to shape the program and an initial collective for 
its expansion, to get the idea, to formulate a re-framing as well as a program 
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for the re-shaping of the particular economic activity, and to mobilize and 
organize actors and resources in order to expand the program. I have shown 
that Einar Hope and his colleagues at NHH/SAF played a particularly 
important entrepreneurial role in creating an scientific market reform 
program, in line with basic theoretical arguments which had been 
represented by the economists for some time. This program emerged out of a 
research program oriented towards finding opportunities for structural and 
operational improvements in the electricity economic systems, out of 
empirical research on the functioning of the occasional power market and 
out of iteration with economic theories expanding world wide at the time. 
The structuring and the formatting of the SAF research institution in relation 
to the NHH on the one side and state governance institutions on the other, 
also played an important role in the advancement of the program into an 
extended research network and into becoming a core element in a more 
extended scientific-political network which aimed at furthering the market 
reorientation process in the Norwegian society.  
Second, the reform depended on institutional control over the relevant 
commanding heights – in this case primarily within the FD, the OED and the 
government – and thirdly it depended upon efforts to construct a persuasive 
representation of the reform alternative. The representation can be seen as a 
“semi-ontological thing” representing the final real life system in the form of 
descriptions, scientific arguments, operational solutions and strategies for 
implementation. 
Fourth, one had to mediate the program so as to become politically feasible. 
The constraint not to touch property rights both aligned the economic 
program with the national resource control issue regarding which there was a 
strong historical consensus, and narrowed the gap between the reform 
program and core concepts represented by the established cooperative 
systems within the sector. This provided opportunities for necessary political 
alliances against the major rival; the hierarchical restructuring program.  
Fifth, one had to produce a decisive institutional breakthrough which made 
it possible to mobilize substantial more powers and resources behind the 
reform which partly forced, partly induced sector actors on the outside of the 
market reform collective to get on the inside. In this case, the approval of the 
new market oriented energy law provided such an institutional breakthrough. 
As demonstrated, the breakthrough had both elements of strategy and 
chance. 
Sixth, the reform collective had to re-configure the core elements of the 
industry by re-structuring state governance institutions and the state 
electricity company. It had to re-arrange their objectives and employ trusted 
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delegates in command positions to direct the further transformation process. 
Through this re-configuration, the NVE strengthened its role in the system, 
its governance legitimacy and piece by piece its operational governance 
instruments. Statkraft became separated and stripped for most of its unique 
system roles. Somewhat by political “accident”, the power pool and power 
exchange system became organized as a state subsidiary where as 
Samkjøringen which was intended for these tasks, became dissolved. 
Electricity companies through out the sector were forced to change their 
economic measurement systems and to separate their accounts in accordance 
with the accounting reform and later in accordance with a large number of 
specific regulatory systems based on the new accounting system.  
And seventh, detailed operational governance systems were developed and 
applied which partly forced local actors to behave in specific ways and 
partly added momentum to a broad re-formatting of collective cognitive 
patterns within the industry, which gradually changed interpretations of 
organizational objectives, economic rationality, distribution of roles, 
property rights and appropriate economic interaction with economic 
counterparts and economic regulators. 
Hence, re-framing, program shaping, network building, program 
modification, power struggles, institutional breakthrough, re-configuration, 
delegation, sub system reforms and re-formatting of collective cognitive 
patterns all represent important elements along the pathway of industrial 
transformation studied. Through these many activities by a dedicated 
entrepreneurial collective who took advantage of an historical opportunity in 
the 1980s, an industrial sector of the economy characterized by substantial 
historical lock-ins has been radically re-shaped over a period of less than a 
decade. 
 
14.2.4 Purpose, trust, choice, chance and necessity in industrial 
   change processes 
Why is the role of purpose so important in the process presented? First of all, 
the problem which we encounter is that in order for something to be chosen 
and implemented, it has to be of a sufficient “degree of reality”, and to 
represent a relatively credible and legitimate alternative in terms of future 
outcomes to choice-makers in command positions. Purposeful constructions 
of alternatives is accordingly vital to the capacity for translation 
(enrollment). Einar Hope and his research colleagues, the SAF institution 
and their development of the market reform alternative in theory, formulated 
the purpose and created the option as well as the scientific legitimacy and 
authority to support it. But it also resulted from lots of dedicated work to 
advance an economic program; to improve economic efficiency by radically 
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increasing the role of competitive markets. This was also the core program 
of the Hermansen network within the FD, which provided a basis for a 
highly trustful relation between the NHH/SAF economists and the FD. Trust 
was based on their agreement on the content of the reform program and on 
their interdependent roles within the market reform collective.  
As a consequence, we have to acknowledge that the act of choosing in the 
context we are talking about here, is not a matter of free choice. You are 
both choosing according to the purpose of the program you represent and on 
the basis of the powers it offers to you, and you are being chosen by others 
who strive to fulfill their own purposes, who can associate not only with the 
content of your program, but also with its affiliated powers.  
In the end, it might be said that a major reason for the success of the market 
reform, was its lack of radicalism – its constraint not to touch property 
rights, its limited institutional restructuring approach and its sequentialism. 
All which made associations possible and choice and change manageable to 
the many actors and organizations involved. I have also found that the 
juxtaposition of the core elements of the market reform program permitted 
for associations with different types of actors, as some could mainly choose 
the hierarchical natural monopoly part, some the local governance 
responsibility and control part and still others the continued national 
resource control part. The actual molding of the reform program turned out 
to provide a variety of opportunities for alliances through their choosing of 
particular elements of the program – where as the sequential process reduced 
the number of parallel direct confrontations. 
The presence of chance events also contribute to the rejection of 
determinism in theorizing. The market reform was not the inevitable 
outcome of the circumstances present at the time. On the contrary, the 
market reform process could have broken down for a variety of reasons. Had 
for instance the intersection of separated developments at any point of time 
been different from what they actually were, the outcome might have been 
completely different. One example would be that Hope’s research program 
in fact first took on the actual form of a reform alternative after Tormod 
Hermansen took over as the head of administration in the FD and Erling 
Steigum jr. became engaged to lead the new FD think tank in 1986 for the 
new AP government. Both events had elements of chance. And the project 
nearly ended its entire history in parliament after Kjell Opseth and his 
associates within the AP had managed to push the AP-government to 
represent the hierarchical restructuring alternative. Without the outcome of 
the parliamentary election in 1989, we might have had a very different 
reform, or no reform at all - or one which provided a much more limited 
market development in the years to come. 
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Because changes occur within different institutions at least in part 
independently from each other and often outside the overview and influences 
of one another, timing becomes an important factor to entrepreneurial 
collectives. From the strategic point of view of rival entrepreneurial 
collectives, the ambition becomes to control as many of the variables as 
possible - or as needed - to control the process in order to create a decisive 
breakthrough. But because each actor-network is a historical entity with 
limited overview and powers, outcomes of processes on the outside might at 
any time enter the internal process and alter the situation one way or the 
other. In fact, it did all the time. Consequently, there will be variation 
between the outcomes of two lines of causation if they meet at different 
points of time. In this sense, the role of chance becomes truly crucial.  
Chance obviously also apply to the role of individuals. This is opposed to 
the view that the contributions by individuals are determined by cultural 
characteristics or by the nature of society’s institutions and the roles of and 
positions of specific individuals in such. The choice of an individual in part 
depends on his experiences and his associations with specific actor-networks 
representing certain purposes of the future. In this respect he will differ from 
individuals in other societies and also from within his own. The influence of 
some individual on remaking of society processes, to a substantial degree 
also depends on his status and role in society’s institutions. Even though 
personal capabilities and representation of specific collectives are usually 
important to the issue of who shall occupy a particular position, each case 
will also contain some elements of chance. Both Hope, Hermansen, 
Tveitereid and Reiten were important individuals whose strategic and 
tactical choices turned out to have significant influences on the outcome. But 
the fact that they hold office at the crucial point in time, was not only an 
outcome of purposeful actions or established institutional orders, but also of 
chance events. 
Necessary conditions in a dynamic interpretation implies some concept of 
sequential processes in which necessary conditions for some element to 
increase its stability as a real world phenomenon has to be established before 
such can happen. My presentation presents a great number of such necessary 
conditions, ranging from outcomes of historical processes even far back into 
history like the creation of the concession law system, the breakdown of the 
early hierarchical program in the early 1920’s and the war experiences, to 
specific theoretical developments within economics, contributions from a 
program which introduced electricity economics and electricity system 
design to the sector governance system, large empirical research projects on 
the functioning of the established trade system, political and state 
administrative changes etc. 
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The establishing of the occasional power market in the early 1970’s pushed 
by Hveding, represents the immediate and - I think - also an important point 
of departure for Einar Hope’s reform program; for his theoretical interest in 
the electricity market system and for the structuring of the market reform 
program as an extension of the occasional power market. But, the occasional 
power market cannot be seen as a mechanical cause argument for its own 
expansion into a more complete market. It played in fact two very different 
roles in relation to each of the two major rival programs. To the hierarchical 
restructuring program, it provided the opportunity to isolate stochastic 
influences so that the major part or the system could be controlled as a 
predictable, planned and hierarchically coordinated system, where as it to the 
market reform collective represented an interesting opportunity to 
experiment with more radical market solutions. Hence, the explanatory role 
of the occasional power market cannot be separated from the roles it was 
given by different entrepreneurial collectives. 
To the actual breakthrough process, it is difficult to pin-point exactly what 
constituted necessary conditions for the final outcome to occur. The reason 
is of course that we do not know the outcome in case of any alternative 
events. Whether necessary or not in this particular interpretation, I would say 
that the substantial work carried out to inform and explain the market reform 
to the local cooperatives through out the country during 1989 was probably 
important to the later outcome. This permitted sector interests to state their 
positions on the rivalry between the hierarchical restructuring and the market 
alternatives. I am not quite so convinced that it was vital that Eivind Reiten 
“persuaded” his own party members to go for the reform, as they appear to 
have had no other realistic alternative at the time. Neither do I find any 
evidence that the British reform, initiatives by the EU Commission or the EU 
issue as such, played more than the roles of background curtains from where 
rhetorical arguments could be obtained.  
 
 
14.3 The analytical approach; rethinking some of the 
         basics  
The analysis presented in several respects touches upon the foundations of 
modern social sciences and in particular upon some of the basics of 
economic theories which have as their objective to explain industrial and 
economic change or the existence of particular economic and organizational 
forms. To round up my discussion, it seems appropriate to reflect a little on 
these basics and to outline in theoretical terms the differences between well 
established disciplines and the approach presented in this piece of work. 
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The area of explanatory economic theory can in broad terms be seen as 
separated into two major camps. A classification typically derives from the 
different weights put on the role they attribute to individual rationality in the 
development of collective economic systems, the role of institutional inertia 
(or path dependency), the importance of choice as compared to constraints 
when explaining individual and collective behaviors, and the nature of 
organizations as either formal governance structures or social systems (Dosi, 
1995). 
On the one side we find theories with their point of departure in a specific 
conception of individual agents as carriers of stable preferences and 
capabilities. These typically support their theory by a more or less explicit 
reference to the explanatory capability of functional, market selection 
arguments, like for instance the neo-institutional economics tradition 
associated with transaction cost theory, property rights theory, agency theory 
and the like. The link between the two modes is typically some variant of 
Friedman’s as…if proposition (Vroman, 1995). On the other side, we find 
the more holistic or “social” theories which emphasize collective dynamics 
and social and institutional structure like in economic sociology and 
traditional institutional economics. The most challenging controversies 
between them typically concern the relative interpretative merits of the 
different theories, all acknowledging at least some role both to motivational 
micro foundations and market competition and to collective system effects.  
However, a more ambitious challenge would be to reframe the discussion in 
order to obtain a perspective and a methodology by which we could account 
for the multiplicity of explanatory elements and for the variability in both 
institutional and agency forms as well as the links between them, while 
maintaining accurate analytical concepts. I think this is what the sociology of 
science and technology essentially offers. The trick is to reject both a 
specific theory of economic agents and a specific theory of collective 
systems such as institutions, in order to obtain flexible analytical concepts 
about these phenomena. Next, the trick is to add the role of non-humans to 
the flexible concept of human actors as those elements which expands the 
acting capacity of actors and provide the actor and his behavior with a 
certain shape. The result is an ability to analyze the historical co-evolution of 
both human agents and collective system forms. Neither individuals with 
structured and coherent preferences and adequate cognitive algorithms to 
solve decision-action problems at hand, nor factors of socialization and 
preference formation in the form of some type of institutions, are the 
primitives of the theoretical approach. Non of them exist as a-historical 
phenomena, but are created on the basis of conceptualization, framing and 
configuration – from the shaping of a purpose of the future and the 
attachment of and configuration of human and non-human elements to it.  
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The absence of any stable theory of the actor assumes a radical 
indeterminacy of the actor. The motivations behind his actions, his 
psychological shape, his capacity to act etc. are not predetermined (Callon, 
1998). Without at least a handful of non-human elements, not much can be 
said about him. The traditional and sterile controversy between 
individualism and holism, between intentional actors and social structure 
dissolves with the re-framing into historical and entrepreneurial collectives. 
And, they become linked within entities that are separated on the basis of 
their different conceptions and different appearances over time. 
When explaining such a thing as why some organization exists, economic 
theories may focus on the interests of the agents involved, on the tasks of the 
organization and on the technologies available. It may also look carefully 
into what existed before it came about, into the links between the 
organization and other organizational and institutional entities and try to tell 
an explicitly dynamic story about how it came into being. The radical 
challenge which emerge from both these approaches however, is to 
investigate the nature and process of emergence of particular cognitive 
frames, the emergence of variation in interpretative categories, in patterns of 
behavior, in routines to operate similar functions etc., which underlies the 
shaping of economic systems, organizational forms and economic behaviors, 
of economic interests, of individual and collective objectives, of the 
emergence of particular technologies and so forth. It is to account for the 
coupled dynamics between cognitive, motivational and collective 
dimensions of interest-formation, decision-making and action, possibly 
yielding endogenous preferences and specifically formatted institutions. A 
theory about these phenomena may also account for coexisting contradictory 
models of cognition and action in the heads of individuals, for cognitive 
dissonance and apparently irrational behaviors (Dosi, 1995).  
With theories which start out with stable categories of either actors or 
institutions, it is difficult to handle these challenges. In this respect, 
explanatory economic theory appears to be locked into constraints which 
seems to derive from its foundations. A fruitful resolution may involve an 
introduction of new basic analytical concepts – a construction of new 
concepts of language. Without the introduction of more flexible and more 
general analytical concepts, it is hard to see how a consistent, explicitly 
dynamic account of how organizations, institutions and economic behaviors 
emerge and change over time can be provided.  
The controversy between the functionalist explanation approach underlying 
neo-institutional economics and the intentional constructivist approach has 
as yet not come to any conclusive results. Either one of the two sides seems 
capable of undermining the argument of the other. It seems to me that this 
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apparent dead end also follows from the constraints of the basic analytical 
concepts in both approaches. In opposition to both these views, the theory of 
entrepreneurial collectives – or the actor network theory – provides an 
opportunity to reframe both arguments in such a way as to re-address their 
different roles in dynamic economic processes. My suggestion is that one 
(the constructivist) refers to the purpose of the future of entrepreneurial 
collectives and the other (the market selection) to the real life testing of their 
stability. Without some concept similar to a flexible “actor-network”, the 
linking of these basic ideas within the same sequence of an economic change 
process, seems difficult to achieve. 
The concept of institutional inertia has been related by a variety of authors to 
the concept of path dependency. This has started bringing history into 
economics in very stimulating ways. However, as I have argued in the 
theoretical chapter, there are several issues to be discussed further. One is the 
relative merit of the economic increasing returns argument, where 
institutionally oriented economists appears to be rather hinting at some kind 
of a power argument. This accentuates a question about the stability of 
power taken much for granted in social constructivist approaches, as a major 
theoretical challenge obviously is to identify and conceptualize the 
determinants of de-locking, of major discontinuities or “revolutions” in the 
presence of path dependency or path dependent dynamics. Without a 
dynamic concept of power – or alternatively to those who prefer the 
economic argument; a dynamic concept of economic efficiency gains from 
lock-ins – it is difficult to see how radical de-locking of locked-in 
phenomena can be explained. 
It seems to me that the absence of a theory of the actor in combination with 
the added role of non-humans is a combination which may contribute 
significantly to explaining the existence of and the functioning of modern 
market economies and their economic agents. Any organized market system 
is the result of concept-formation, of separation of categories such as goods, 
sellers, buyers, market place, money, numbers, algorithms, etc. and of the 
distributions of specific concepts of language and technologies. It is a result 
of specific framing, of externalization of non-market categories and re-
internalization of such categories in the form of monetary equivalents. It is 
the outcome of institutional power-constructions, of the creation of 
measurement systems, governance technologies and other loads of 
persuasion which make the behaviors of actors predictable and “rational” 
within the framework which has guided the formative process. Without these 
activities, markets in their modern forms cannot exist. The making of the 
Norwegian electricity market through the work of Einar Hope and his 
colleagues to improve the functioning of and the economic rationality of the 
existing system, provides a number of insight into these diverse activities. 
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The actor-network analytical concepts make it possible to explain the 
operations involved in the historical shaping of the economy as well as the 
emergence of “Homo Economicus”; the rationally calculating and utility 
maximizing human agent which thereby come to exist in real life. He is 
neither an abstract invention nor an abstract vision of a real person, but the 
outcome of a formative process where economic science plays an important 
role. If agents shall be able to behave in preferable ways from the point of 
view of economic efficiency, it demands clear and precise boundaries 
between relations to be taken into account in their calculations, choices and 
actions, and the many relations which will be ignored. Hence, the 
externalization of “non-economic” issues in Hope’s market reform project – 
the cleansing of the “irrational systems and behaviors” of the previous 
system for political, redistributive and other objectives - appears to be a 
crucial activity from the point of view of understanding what is involved in 
“the construction of a modern market system”.  
Rather than intrinsic capabilities within the actors, various material, 
meteorological and procedural systems and devices give the actions of actors 
specific shape. For instance, an accounting system represents a powerful 
system with substantial effects – even on the shaping of objectives and 
preferences of individuals and on the allocation of institutional property and 
control rights. Not to mention the many governance systems and devices 
which can be constructed on the basis of such a thing as an accounting 
system. It takes the mobilization of substantial anti-acts from rival 
collectives to prevent these devices and governance systems from delivering 
substantial translations of actors. 
The theory needed is one about entities which configures ontologies 
including agents. In the early work of Granovetter (1973), there are elements 
of a theory about entrepreneurial collectives; the network where what the 
actors are and do are all dependent on the character of their relations to other 
actors or other networks. They are networks with endogenous objectives, 
preferences and expectations. In his concept, one is also able to shift freely 
between actor and network and to account for variability and change, and to 
escape from the formative powers of the network itself. He does not follow 
these concepts through however, which appears to follow at least in part 
from an over-emphasize on whatever is of social or inter-personal character. 
In this respect, the actor-network analytical concepts expand and enrich 
Granovetter’s early work.  
The theory of entrepreneurial collectives and the actor-network analytical 
concepts oppose the view that markets in their essence are embedded in 
social networks. It is not a question of adding social, interpersonal or 
informal relations to the concepts offered by economists in order to 
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understand the functioning of markets. Rather, an explanation necessitates a 
second order of observation level of analysis in which we take what 
economics does to the economy seriously, in which we focus on the 
functioning of markets as well as on what people do to perform the economy 
and its agents. In this perspective, the relevance of social relations in markets 
in part may be seen as historical “left-overs” from the market reconstruction 
processes guided by economics, or as effects of “spill-overs” which result 
from the impossibility of complete internalization of all relevant aspects of 
economic decision-making in markets – from the fact that economists are 
unlikely to be able to complete their work on separating, externalizing and 
re-internalizing elements which are continuously flowing into their ordered 
economic systems. Even the maintenance of the essential backboxes which 
make up the core of their program – may turn out to be a difficult task in the 
longer run – as the complexities of things may produce capacities to break 
some of those blackboxes apart and to reshape the economy from the basis 
of a configuration of new and different blackboxes. 
Institutional economics here associated with a tradition from Veblen to 
Bromley and Hodgson, is closer to taking the second order of observation 
position vis á vis economics. Bromley also emphasize the purpose of the 
future as the point of departure for a dynamic economic theory about how 
we came from here to there – how the “methods of doing things” have been 
improved (Bromley, 1998). Together with his work on the “ideological” 
character of economics in shaping economic systems and economic 
behaviors (Bromley, 1990), other elements of a theory about entrepreneurial 
collectives are already there – pointing at the same vital role of economics in 
the shaping of the economy. Much interesting work has obviously been 
done.  
What appears to be needed to advance this line of theorizing, is a deep 
concern with the development of analytical concepts by which to operate the 
very challenging questions raised. In this respect, I believe that the actor-
network concepts may serve as a useful contribution and as a point of 
departure which holds the potential for delivering much of the goods 
demanded, and on which basis additional analytical concepts may be 
constructed which are specifically shaped so as to address economic issues. 
One also has to make clear that the actor-network story is not without its 
own primitive categories. These are the circulating phenomena we have 
denoted “collectives”, their human entrepreneurs, the collectives they shape 
and mobilize, the “collective things” which gives them their specific shapes 
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and powers, and the other circulating phenomena which act upon them, 
which enrolls them and modifies them183.  
The theory of entrepreneurial collectives in my view offers concepts needed 
to begin conceptualizing how actors construct their worlds as demanded by 
Fligstein and Mari-Drita, how they organize themselves for their 
provisioning, as visioned by Bromley (and Veblen). It offers the opportunity 
to model how different cultures rival with and interact with each other and 
how political programs, interests and powers interact with economic 
transformation projects, as demanded by Zelizer, Zukin and DiMaggio. 
However, conceptual improvements should be put on the agenda in order to 
fit the network methodology to the specific needs of economic studies. In 
particular, I feel that there is a need for concepts of language which more 
adequately contrast established economic collectives with substantial locked-
in powers within industries and economies with emerging entrepreneurial 
collectives. Those well established are not entrepreneurial in the common 
sense meaning of the term, and should be addressed by some adjective 
emphasizing relative stability and historical origins. Similarly, there is a 
need to better contrast human representatives from non-human 
representatives of a program – and in particular contrast those non-human 
elements which represent “semi-ontological” economic systems from 
elements which hold the more specialized roles within those systems.  
Despite the obvious advantage of a both simple and completely general 
toolbox of analytical concepts, I also feel that we need concepts which 
represent the contrast between a “global” entrepreneurial collective like the 
new market program of the 1980s, the “local” collective associated with 
specific innovations, and the “intermediate” collectives associated with such 
phenomena as industrial transformations, that are both extended and multi-
local. 
It seems to me that the operational solution to these conceptual challenges 
may be to invent dual concepts in which some descriptive adjective is added 
to the actor-network term. Because this term is essentially dual already in 
order to represent both the actor and the network – the active and the passive 
- side of a phenomenon, this leads to triple concepts. Even though this 
                                           
183 An obvious link which I have not explored here, goes to the Schumpeter tradition within 
economic thought, in which the entrepreneur also makes up the basic category.  
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complicates the analytical concepts, there seems to be no other option if one 
is to address these differences with the needed accuracy. 
Even though the actor-network concepts are flexible and may be applied to 
any phenomenon, they cannot be applied to “explain everything” – at least 
not in every relevant way, and do not represent any class of theory “above” 
other theories. Rather, its fruitfulness should be judged from its contributions 
to empirical studies and from the persuasiveness of the type of explanations 
it offers, just like any other social and economic theory. There is nowhere 
else from where we might settle the disputes between rival theories. 
I also recognize that the “following the networks” research strategy which 
follows from the network theory, has its potential weaknesses. In particular it 
invites a tremendous amount of research activity where the researcher all the 
time has to judge the relevance of as well as the strength, the character and 
the role of particular relations – which in the absence of substantial empirical 
knowledge are often difficult to settle.  
In the end, I feel that less time could have been spent on the complexities of 
historical events and the discussion of historical collectives, where as more 
efforts could have been devoted to investigate change processes from points 
of observation around the industry – to obtain specific local perspectives on 
the processes described as well as on their local reform processes. This 
would have provided a perhaps more balanced view on the role of economic 
scientists and state administrators as opposed to electricity company owners, 
managers and employees as well as other change agencies who entered the 
sector and played important roles in the transformation of the industry. This, 
however, will be left for later work – or for others to explore. 
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